THE 

ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
PEOPLES 

THEIR  FUTURE  RELATIONS   AND 
JOINT  INTERNATIONAL  OBLIGATIONS 

GEORGE  LOUIS  BEER 


URRARY 

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THE 

ENGLISH-SPEAKING 

PEOPLES 


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THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

RXW  YORK  •    BOSTON  •    CHICAGO  •   DAIXAS 
ATLANTA  •  SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limitkd 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •   CAIjCUTTA 
UELBOURNB 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltdw 

TORONTO 


THE 

ENGLISH-SPEAKING 

PEOPLES 

Their  Future  Relations  and  Joint 
International  Obligations 


BY 

GEORGE  LOUIS  BEER 

Sometime  Lecturer  in  European  History  at  Columbia 

Unversity;  Author  of  "The  Old  Colonial  System, 

1660-1754,"  "British  Colonial  Policy, 

1754-1765,"  etc. 


■Nrm  fork 
THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1917 

in  tighit  re$«rve3 


COPTBIGHT    1917 

bt  the  macmillan  company 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     PuMished,  June,   1917. 


TO 

E.  C.  B. 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  witii  funding  from 

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PREFACE 

Some  twenty  years  ago,  when  the  question  of  a  formal 
political  connection  between  the  British  Empire  and  the 
United  States  for  the  advancement  of  the  general  inter- 
ests of  the  English-speaking  peoples  was  quite  prema- 
turely raised,  Admiral  Mahan  contributed  to  the  dis- 
cussion a  characteristically  thoughtful  essay,  entitled 
"  Possibilities  of  an  Anglo-American  Reunion."  The 
distinguished  historian  welcomed  the  "  unmistakable 
growth  of  mutual  kindly  feelings  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  "  and  pointed  out  that  "  this  re- 
viving affection  well  might  fix  the  serious  attention  of 
those  who  watch  the  growth  of  world  questions,  recog- 
nizing how  far  imagination  and  sympathy  rule  the 
world."  He  likewise  emphasized  the  common  political 
traditions  and  moral  ideals  of  the  kindred  peoples  and, 
above  all,  "  that  singular  combination  of  two  essential 
but  opposing  factors  —  of  individual  freedom  with  sub- 
jection to  law  —  which  finds  its  most  vigorous  working 
in  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States."  Naturally,  the 
interpreter  of  sea  power  did  not  fail  to  point  out  that, 
of  the  Great  Powers  these  two  alone  were  by  geo- 
graphical position  exempt  from  the  burden  of  large 
armies,  "  while  at  the  same  time  they  must  depend  upon 
the  sea,  in  chief  measure,  for  that  intercourse  with  other 

vii 


viii  PREFACE 

members  of  the  body  upon  which  national  well-being  de- 
pends." 

Though  recognizing  the  great  potency  of  these  con- 
verging forces  and  "  though  desirous  as  any  one  can  be 
to  see  the  fact  accomplished,"  Admiral  Mahan  rejected 
the  project  as  premature,  because  neither  nation,  but 
more  especially  the  American,  had  as  yet  sufficiently 
realized  its  own  interest  in  the  sea  and  the  identity  of 
these  separate  interests.  This  identity,  he  said,  "  cannot 
be  established  firmly  in  men's  minds  antecedent  to  the 
great  teacher.  Experience."  "  The  ground,"  he  con- 
cluded, "  is  not  prepared  yet  in  the  hearts  and  under- 
standings of  Americans,  and  I  doubt  whether  in  those  of 
British  citizens." 

A  great  gulf  separates  19 17  from  1894  when  Admiral 
Mahan  wrote  these  words.  Since  then  all  the  imifying 
forces  have  been  constantly  at  work  and  the  needed 
lessons  of  "  Experience "  have  come  from  an  unwel- 
come war.  Nor  is  the  bitter  process  of  education  yet 
concluded.  The  question  of  the  future  relations  of  the 
English-speaking  peoples  has  in  consequence  assumed  an 
entirely  different  aspect.  What  in  1894  was  unripe  and 
academic,  has  to-day  become  urgent  and  practical.  The 
purpose  of  this  book  is  to  examine  the  question  in  a 
comprehensive  manner,  though  on  a  compact  scale,  tak- 
ing into  account  not  only  the  obligations  and  interests  of 
the  peoples  immediately  concerned,  but  also  the  future 
of  civilization  as  a  whole. 

The  opinions  expressed  therein  have  not  been  impro- 


PREFACE  ix 

vised.  They  are  the  result  of  prolonged  and  intensive 
study  of  the  relations  between  the  two  great  branches 
of  the  English-speaking  people.  Ten  years  ago,  in  an 
account  of  British  colonial  policy  during  the  critical  years 
of  the  old  Empire's  history,  the  writer  said :  "  It  is 
easily  conceivable,  and  not  at  all  improbable,  that  the 
political  evolution  of  the  next  centuries  may  take  such  a 
course  that  the  American  Revolution  will  lose  the  great 
significance  that  is  now  attached  to  it,  and  will  appear 
merely  as  the  temporary  separation  of  two  kindred  peo- 
ples whose  inherent  similarity  was  obscured  by  super- 
ficial differences  resulting  from  dissimilar  economic  and 
social  conditions."  It  is  not  the  object  of  this  book  to 
discuss  the  possibility  of  such  a  political  reunion.  If 
this  outcome  be  in  the  lap  of  the  gods,  it  will  come  in 
the  fulness  of  time,  be  the  date  near  or  far.  Any  prema- 
ture forcing  of  the  pace  would  probably  merely  retard 
such  an  eventual  consummation,  which  in  itself  should 
be  welcomed  by  all  who  realize  that  the  effective  exten- 
sion of  law  and  justice  can  be  accomplished  only  by  the 
voluntary  integration  of  progressively  larger  political 
entities.  Hide-bound  as  we  are  by  the  traditions  of  the 
sovereign  state  demanding  from  its  citizens  supreme  and 
undivided  dedication,  the  world  does  not  yet  realize  the 
possibilities  of  new  forms  of  political  organization  which 
will  permanently  unite  in  a  common  co-operative  pur- 
pose different  nations  and  at  the  same  time  allow  free 
play  to  distinct,  but  not  discordant,  loyalties  of  great 
intensity.     However  this  may  be,  the  object  of  this  book 


X  PREFACE 

is  the  more  immediate  one  of  explaining  the  advisability 
and  necessity  of  a  co-operative  democratic  alliance  of  all 
the  English-speaking  peoples,  from  which  may  possibly 
in  time  be  developed  such  a  new  type  of  permanent  polit- 
ical association. 

The  co-operation  of  these  culturally  kindred  peoples  in 
the  present  war  is  patently  a  step  in  this  general  direc- 
tion and  is  a  happy  augury.  It  calls  to  mind  the  inspired 
lines  from  the  "  Areopagitica,"  that  inalienable  heritage 
of  all  English-speaking  people,  whatever  be  their  phys- 
ical race  or  geographical  origin.  "  Methinks  I  see  in 
my  mind,"  so  Milton  describes  his  purely  English  vision 
which  it  is  hoped  will  be  realized  jointly  by  all  the  associ- 
ated English-speaking  peoples,  "  a  noble  and  puissant  Na- 
tion rousing  herself  like  a  strong  man  after  sleep,  and 
shaking  her  invincible  locks:  Methinks  I  see  her  as  an 
Eagle  muing  her  mighty  youth,  and  kindling  her  un- 
dazl'd  eyes  at  the  full  midday  beam;  purging  and  un- 
sealing her  long  abused  sight  at  the  fountain  it  self  of 
heav'nly  radiance." 

When  so  broad  a  range  of  fact  and  of  theory  is  cov- 
ered in  a  limited  space,  it  is  impossible  even  by  the  free 
use  of  qualifications  to  give  the  intermediate  shades  that 
so  vastly  outnumber  the  blacks  and  whites  of  history. 
Even  with  the  best  of  intentions  a  complex  fact  cannot  be 
summarized  in  a  brief  sentence.  Every  effort  has,  how- 
ever, been  made  to  state  the  facts  accurately  and  to 
weigh  them  impartially.  But  apart  from  its  historical 
,   and  scientific  background,  this  is  essentially  a  livre  de 


PREFACE  xi 

circonstance,  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  public  policy 
and  hence  dealing  largely  with  an  unpredictable  future. 
The  arrangement  of  the  material  and  the  relative  degree 
of  emphasis  upon  the  various  phases  of  the  subject  were 
naturally  conditioned  by  the  fact  that  the  writer  is,  in 
the  main,  addressing  his  fellow  citizens  of  the  United 
States.  It  may  seem  strange  to  append  to  a  volume  of 
this  character  a  series  of  notes.  Their  function  is  in 
part  to  acknowledge  indebtedness  for  fact  or  thought  and, 
in  part  also,  to  substantiate  and  corroborate  the  text. 
Their  chief  purpose,  however,  is  to  furnish  a  running 
bibliography  to  easily  accessible  and  non-technical  liter- 
ature for  such  of  the  readers  whose  interest  may  be 
stimulated  to  inquire  further  into  matters  that  could  be 
discussed  only  summarily  in  the  text  itself.  In  conclu- 
sion, it  should  be  mentioned  that  some  of  the  material 
in  this  book  had  already  appeared  in  The  Political  Quar- 
terly, The  New  Republic,  The  Forum,  The  Annals  of  the 
American  Academy  and  elsewhere. 

George  Louis  Beer. 
New  York, 
June  first,  19 17. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    International  Anarchy 3 

II    Nationalism  and  Sovereignty 31 

III  American  Foreign  Policy  Before  1914    .     .  67 

IV  The  Background  of  the  War 91 

V  America's  Reaction  to  the  War    ....  125 

VI    The  Unity  of  English-Speaking  Peoples    .  169 

VII    Economic  Interdependence 201 

VIII    Community  of  Policy 251 

Notes     .     ...,..,., 275 


I 

INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY 


"  Or,  aujourd'hui 
Nul  ne  peut  plus  vivre  pour  lui 
Seul,  loin  des  autres. 

Tout  ce  qui  est  d'autrui  devient  aussitot  notre; 
Qu'il  s'accomplisse  a  I'autre  bout  de  I'ocean 
Tout  recul,  tout  progres,  ou  minime  ou  geant, 
Importe  a  mon  pays,  a  ma  race,  a  mon  etre; 
L'univers  tournoyant  m'assiege  et  me  penetre, 
Et  mon  coeur  est  coupable  et  fou,  s'il  s'interdit 
D'ecouter  tressailir  et  penser  I'infini." 

—  Emile  Verhaeren,  UAngleterre. 


"Remota  justitia,  quid  regna  nisi  magna  latrocinia?" 
—  St.  Augustine,  De  Civitate  Dei. 


THE 

ENGLISH-SPEAKING 

PEOPLES 

CHAPTER  I 

International  Anarchy 

Introductory  —  Mediaeval  Unity  —  Modern  System  of  Sov- 
ereign States  —  International  Law  —  Its  Nature  and  Sanction 
. —  Its  Limited  Content  —  Its  Ambiguity  —  Treaties  —  Interna- 
tional Commissions  and  Unions  —  Conferences  and  Congresses 
—  Alliances. 

The  present  world-wide  war,  both  in  its  outbreak  and 
in  its  devastating  course,  has  forcibly  driven  into  the 
minds  of  most  thinking  men  the  firm  conviction  that  the 
existing  system  of  international  relations  is  out  of  har- 
mony with  the  fundamental  facts  of  modern  life.  In  all 
quarters  where  the  problems  of  the  present  and  future 
torment  the  soul  and  perplex  the  mind  of  man  there  is 
the  keenest  of  realizations  that  western  civilization  will 
in  the  future  continue  to  be  grievously  imperilled  unless 
some  measures  be  devised  to  limit  at  least,  if  not  entirely 
to  eliminate,  recourse  to  the  ordeal  by  battle  in  the  adjust- 
ment of  interstate  disputes. 

Some  considerable  measure  of  good  will  probably  come 
from  the  holocaust.     Presumably,  the  future  boundaries 

3 


4  THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

of  Europe  will  be  determined  more  in  consonance  with 
the  wishes  of  those  most  directly  interested  than  was  the 
custom  of  a  past  when  strategic  considerations  and 
dynastic  interests  played  an  unfortunately  large  part  in 
the  disposition  of  voiceless  peoples.  Subject  nations, 
exploited  politically  and  economically  by  dominant  races, 
seem  to  be  on  the  verge  of  emancipation  and  are  looking 
forward  to  complete  independence  or  to  the  guaranteed 
assurance  of  full  opportunities  for  self-expression  under 
a  system  of  federal  autonomy.  The  spirit  of  nationality 
is  again  working  with  that  of  democracy.  Russia  has 
already  burst  the  fetters  of  autocracy,  and  the  leaven  of 
liberalism  is  not  only  working  in  a  Prussianized  Germany, 
but  it  is  also  quickening  the  democratic  impulse  in  those 
countries  that  stand  pre-eminently  as  the  champions  of 
freedom. 

Some  of  these  anticipated  benefits,  possibly  the  most 
far-reaching  ones  —  such  as  the  democratization  of  Rus- 
sia, the  unification  of  the  British  Empire,  and  the  final 
healing  of  the  breach  between  the  two  great  branches  of 
the  English-speaking  people  —  if  they  be  realized,  cannot 
be  attributed  to  the  war,  which  will  merely  have  hastened 
the  course  of  already  progressing  movements.  Their 
consummation  was  dependent  upon  different  factors. 
But  other  expected  advantages,  such  as  the  re-unification 
and  re-establishment  of  the  Polish  nation  in  an  autono- 
mous state,  the  dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary  or  its 
reorganization  so  that  the  suppressed  Slav  nationalities 
may  be  freed  from  Magyar  and  Austro-German  oppres- 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  5 

sion,  the  emancipation  of  the  Armenians  from  the  mur- 
derous Turkish  yoke,  could  not  have  been  effected  except 
by  force  of  arms  under  the  existing  international  dispen- 
sation. 

Provided  the  lesson  of  the  present  agony  be  indelibly 
seared  in  the  heart  and  mind  of  future  ages,  the  coming 
generations  will  be  able  to  lead  a  fuller  and  a  freer  life. 
In  a  measure  the  war  has  not  only  purified  the  peoples 
who  have  met  the  onslaught  against  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  western  civilization,^  but  it  may  also  chasten  the 
spirit  of  the  militaristic  aggressor  as  soon  as  defeat  has 
afforded  the  leisure  for  reflection.  There  is  every  pros- 
pect that  the  selfishness,  materialism,  and  class-feelings 
so  prevalent  in  all  present-day  communities  will  be  mark- 
edly lessened  by  the  intimate  association  of  all  ranks  and 
classes  in  unmeasured  sacrifices  for  a  high  purpose  and 
by  the  resulting  orientation  of  the  mind  and  spirit 
towards  quite  other  than  predominantly  self -regarding 
aims. 

The  war  may  prove  to  be  a  turning  point  in  the  world's 
history.  If  it  result  in  the  definitive  vindication  of  the 
democratic  concepts  of  liberty  and  law,  future  generations 
will  probably  somewhat  overlook  the  evil  from  which 
the  good  has  sprung.  But  for  the  portion  of  living  man- 
kind subjected  to  its  destructive  blast,  the  war  is  an 
almost  imqualified  evil  of  most  momentous  dimensions. 
No  matter  what  be  the  exact  military  outcome,  even  if 
right  fully  prevail  against  might,  the  war  cannot  but  cause 
misery  in  almost  equal  measure  to  both  vanquished  and 


6    .       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

victor.  If  it  be  only  by  such  self-immolation  that  western 
civilization  can  be  purged  of  the  evils  of  military  aggres- 
sion then  the  outlook  is  indeed  dark.  Civilization  is 
bankrupt  if  free  peoples  can  preserve  their  liberties  only 
at  such  heavy  cost.  The  supreme  good  that  can  come 
out  of  the  war  is  the  complete  demonstration  of  its  baleful 
nature  and  the  consequent  determination  of  free  peoples 
to  devise  effective  means  of  preventing  in  the  future  a 
recurrence  of  the  evil  even  if  as  a  result  a  measure  of 
their  cherished,  but  somewhat  illusory,  independence  of 
action  should  have  to  be  sacrificed. 

In  the  great  intellectual  travail  engendered  by  this 
well-nigh  universal  abhorrence  of  the  present  dominion 
of  force  throughout  the  world,  there  is  one  point  of 
almost  complete  agreement.  It  is  generally  recognized 
that,  apart  from  the  distinct  condemnation  that  un- 
equivocally attaches  itself  to  those  whose  imperious  will 
to  power  either  thwarted  all  efforts  toward  peaceful  com- 
position or  welcomed  the  arbitrament  of  force,  the  war 
is  a  direct  outcome  of  the  prevailing  international  anarchy 
and  of  the  current  selfish  nationalism  that  is  intimately 
connected  with  this  lack  of  organization.  That  such  a 
calamity  was  at  all  possible  is  due  both  to  an  actual  con- 
dition and  to  a  closely  related  state  of  mind.  All  states 
are  in  varying  degrees  infected  with  the  self -regarding 
nationalism  of  the  day.  No  one  is  quite  free  from  it. 
The  stress  ordinarily  placed  upon  so-called  national  in- 
terests with  its  almost  inevitable  concomitant,  the  tendency 
to  disregard  the  conflicting  rights  of  other  states,  the 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  7 

marked  propensity  to  base  foreign  policy  upon  the  mere 
enforcement  of  national  rights  to  the  neglect  of  their  in- 
separable complementary  obligations,  has  inevitably  en- 
shrouded interstate  intercourse  with  a  murky  atmosphere 
of  fear  and  suspicion.  But  even  if  the  mental  attitude 
were  far  other,  there  is  no  organization  in  which  the  inter- 
national mind  can  express  itself.  The  lack  of  any  inter- 
state political  system,  the  prevailing  international  anarchy, 
leaves  the  world's  peace  at  the  mercy  of  whichsoever  one 
of  the  Great  Powers  is  dissatisfied  with  existing  terri- 
torial arrangements  and  is  willing  and  prepared  to  employ 
force  to  gain  its  ends.  So  long  as  the  community  of 
states  remains  unorganized,  "  the  will  to  war  "  of  one  of 
its  members  will  always  be  able  to  thwart  the  pacific 
purposes  of  the  majority. 

This  international  anarchy  is  the  direct  product  of 
modern  historical  development.  In  mediaeval  thought, 
mankind  was  generally  conceived  as  constituting  one  vast 
community,  a  universal  church-state  with  no  territorial 
limits.^  There  were,  it  is  true,  endless  and  acrimonious 
disputes  as  to  the  respective  positions  of  Church  and 
State  in  this  world-wide  commonwealth,  but  both  Papalist 
and  Imperialist  agreed  in  regarding  mankind  as  con- 
stituting one  society.^  According  to  Dante,  a  pre-emi- 
nent member  of  the  latter  group,  general  peace  was  the 
indispensable  prerequisite  of  man's  perfect  existence  and 
this  condition  was  obtainable  only  by  a  unified  govern- 
mental system.*  This  mediaeval  ideal,  which  was  by  no 
means  ever  realized,  was  generally  discarded  after  the 


8  THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

rise  of  the  national  states  of  Western  Europe  in  the 
fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries.  Despite  superficial 
analogies,  the  gulf  that  separates  the  modern  from  the 
mediaeval  political  system  is  profound.  "  The  change  is 
from  a  world-empire  to  a  territorial  State,  and  from  ec- 
clesiastical to  civil  predominance."  **  The  mediaeval  ideal 
of  an  inclusive  unity  was  replaced  by  the  modern  view  that 
the  political  world  is  composed  of  distinct  communities 
"  entirely  independent,  territorially  omnipotent,  and  to 
some  extent  morally  responsible."  ^ 

The  governments  of  the  national  states  —  England, 
France,  Spain  —  whose  consolidation  marks  the  dawn 
of  the  modern  era  successfully  claimed  for  these  bodies 
politic  absolute  freedom  from  all  external  control. 
Although  basing  their  views  to  a  considerable  extent 
upon  actual  political  facts  and  influenced  largely  by  the 
analogy  of  the  plenitudo  potestatis  that  the  Papacy  had 
taken  over  from  the  Roman  Empire,  a  series  of  remark- 
able thinkers  —  Machiavelli,  Luther,  Bodin,  and  Hobbes 
—  deductively  developed  an  abstract  theory  of  unlimited 
state  sovereignty  both  in  internal  and  in  external  affairs. 
Mankind,  instead  of  being  regarded  as  one  all-embracing 
community,  was  divided  into  distinct  and  separate  politi- 
cal units  connected  by  no  legal  bonds.  Even  the  exist- 
ence of  moral  ties  was  not  infrequently  denied.  Politics, 
if  not  completely  divorced  from  ethics,  led  intermittently 
a  separate  life;  and  raison  d'etat  was  held  to  be  sufficient 
justification  for  heinous  deeds  and  gross  breaches  of 
faith.     This  theory  of  unlimited  state  sovereignty  still 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  9 

largely  holds  sway.  In  the  political  world  of  to-day  the 
concrete  realities  are  the  sovereign  states,  each  one  of 
which  is  conceived  by  its  government  to  be  more  or  less  a 
law  unto  itself. 

With  their  uncritical  worship  of  success,  historians 
have,  as  a  rule,  seen  nothing  but  good  in  the  downfall  of 
medisevalism  and  the  rise  of  the  modern  system  of 
sovereign  states.  Some  ten  years  before  the  present  war 
so  conclusively  opened  the  eyes  of  many  to  the  funda- 
mental defects  of  existing  interstate  relations,  the  pres- 
ent Master  of  Balliol  somewhat  cautiously  questioned 
whether  the  substitution  of  modern  disunion  for  mediae- 
val unity  had  been  all  for  the  best  and  he  denied  the 
necessity  of  assuming  "  that  anarchy  and  disruption  are 
things  good  in  themselves."  "^  But  almost  from  the  very 
outset  it  was  recognized  that  the  Renaissance  theory  of 
state  sovereignty  led  logically  to  the  continuous  warfare 
that  was  then  devastating  Europe  and  that  some  limits 
had  to  be  set  to  the  self-regarding  actions  of  the  sovereign 
state  if  civilization  were  to  perdure.  In  fact,  just  as  the 
mediaeval  ideal  of  unity  was  never  realized  in  practice, 
equally  little  was  its  superseding  ideal  of  a  world  of  self- 
sufficing,  isolated  political  units  in  complete  harmony 
with  actual  facts.  The  great  Dutch  thinker  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  Hugo  Grotius,  perceived  this  clearly  and, 
in  contradistinction  to  Machiavelli  and  his  followers, 
asserted  that  "human  life  is  essentially  a  society,  and 
that  certain  laws,  of  which  fidelity  to  plighted  word  is 
the  most  important,  are  therefore  as  immutable  as  human 


lo         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

nature."  *  With  this  idea  in  view,  he  elaborated  a  system 
of  rights  and  duties  governing  the  relations  of  state  to 
state.  Grotius's  v^^ork  was  essentially  a  protest  against 
the  international  anarchy  of  his  day,  but  his  conclusions 
were  by  no  means  fully  accepted  by  the  statesmen  and 
publicists  of  the  three  following  centuries.  His  asser- 
tion of  the  binding  force  of  natural  law  in  interstate 
relations  ^  has  met  with  scant  acceptance  in  practice.  Yet 
it  was  recognized  that  some  palliatives  had  to  be  adopted 
to  restrict  the  war  of  all  against  all  that  was  rapidly 
ruining  great  sections  of  seventeenth-century  Europe. 
Hence,  largely  upon  the  basis  of  Grotius's  epoch-making 
book,  was  gradually  erected  the  structure  of  modern  in- 
ternational law. 

It  is  idle  in  this  connection  to  enter  upon  the  vexed 
question  whether  international  law  is  really  law  at  all. 
For  obviously,  the  answer  depends  primarily  upon  the 
definition  of  law  that  is  adopted.  International  lawyers, 
partly  as  the  result  of  something  akin  to  the  hero-worship 
that  animates  most  biographers,  naturally  as  a  rule  main- 
tain the  affirmative  of  this  proposition.  Such  also  is  the 
contention  of  so  notable  a  jurist  as  Sir  Frederick  Pol- 
lock. ^°  But  other  equally  eminent  authorities  dissent.  ^^ 
It  is  unquestionably  true  that  international  law  has  in 
great  part  developed  gradually  through  custom,  just  as 
has  the  most  vital  portion  of  municipal  law.  But 
whereas  the  common  law  is  regularly  enforced  by 
courts  with  authority  to  impose  the  judgments,  interna- 
tional law  has  not  passed  beyond  the  customary  stage. 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  il 

There  are  in  existence  no  tribunals  for  its  general  enforce- 
ment and,  no  matter  how  strong  or  weak  be  its  authority, 
its  sanction  is  distinctly  moral  rather  than  legal  in 
nature.  Whether  in  its  essence  it  be  law  or  not,  it  cer- 
tainly differs  radically  from  what  English-speaking  peo- 
ples confined  to  a  tongue  that  does  not  distinguish 
between  jus  and  lex,  Recht  and  Gesetz,  droit  and  loi,  un- 
derstand by  that  term.  An  intrepid  champion  of  the 
claims  of  international  law  to  full  legal  recognition  vir- 
tually concedes  that  there  is  a  vital  distinction  when  he 
says  that  "  as,  however,  there  cannot  be  a  sovereign 
authority  above  the  several  sovereign  states,  the  Law  of 
Nations  is  a  law  between,  not  above  the  several 
states."  ^^  In  actual  practice,  international  law  is  merely 
a  code  of  rules  to  which  the  states  profess  general  adher- 
ence, but  to  which  they  actually  render  only  a  somewhat 
reluctant  and  fitful  obedience.  As  a  profound  student 
aptly  expressed  it : 

"  International  Law  is  like  schoolboy  honour  or  good  form, 
it  does  not  destroy  selfishness  or  quarrelling  or  cheating;  but 
it  proclaims  that  certain  things  are  to  be  avoided  and  others 
are  obligatory,  and  it  unites  even  those  most  sharply  divided 
as  members  in  a  single  society.  It  does  not  solve  the  problem 
of  man  in  society,  but  it  recognizes  it."  ^^ 

When  one  turns  from  the  nature  and  sanction  of  inter- 
national law  to  its  content,  one  cannot  but  be  struck  by 
its  limited  scope.  The  fundamental  function  of  law  is 
to  establish  the  rule  of  reason  and  justice  in  the  relations 
of  man  to  man  and  of  group  to  group.     But  inter- 


12         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

national  law  has  made  scant  progress  toward  such  a  con- 
summation. In  considerable  part,  it  is  merely  a  code 
of  etiquette  prescribing  the  punctilio  of  interstate  inter- 
course in  times  of  peace.  But  in  possibly  even  greater 
measure  it  is  devoted  to  the  formulation  of  the  rules  of 
war.^*  Although  international  lawyers  insist  that  war 
is  no  illegality,  still  there  is  a  distinct  inconsistency 
between  war  and  law  because,  no  matter  whether  the 
decision  reached  by  such  a  contention  of  hostile  forces  be 
just  or  unjust,  the  means  themselves  are  the  negation  of 
reason  and  are  in  no  way  adapted  to  securing  an  equitable 
issue  of  the  dispute.  If  it  be  admitted  that  justice  is 
"  the  eflfort  to  eliminate  from  our  social  conditions  the 
effects  of  the  inequalities  of  Nature  upon  the  happiness 
and  advancement  of  men,"  ^^  then  war  is  its  very  an- 
tithesis, for  its  so-called  "  biologically  just  decisions " 
allow  these  inequalities  full  sway. 

So  restricted  in  its  scope  is  international  law  that  the 
most  vital  questions  do  not  come  within  its  purview. 
The  most  fundamental  issues,  such  as  are  most  likely  to 
lead  to  war,  as  for  instance  the  open  door  in  the  depen- 
dencies of  European  states  and  in  other  backward,  but 
still  independent,  countries,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  far- 
reaching  problems  involved  in  the  attempts  of  Asiatics 
to  settle  within  Caucasian  communities,  are  outside  its 
narrow  range.  It  is  of  the  utmost  significance  that  all 
political  subjects,  whether  of  such  contentious  nature  or 
otherwise,  were  rigorously  excluded  from  the  discussions 
at  the  Hague  Conferences  and  that  the  general  arbitra- 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  13 

tion  treaties  which  have  been  adopted,  as  a  rule,  abso- 
lutely exclude  from  such  adjudication  all  questions  in- 
volving the  vital  interests,  the  independence,  or  the 
honour  of  the  parties  to  them.^® 

Not  alone  is  the  moral  sanction  of  international  law 
only  intermittently  effective  and  not  alone  is  its  scope 
decidedly  inadequate,  but  the  existing  war  has  furnished 
complete  demonstration  that  much  of  its  content  is  am- 
biguous. This  criticism  applies  even  to  that  part  of 
international  law  which  is  embodied  in  general  treaties. 
This  is  entirely  apart  from  the  fact  both  that  the  binding 
force  of  such  treaties  has  not  infrequently  been  chal- 
lenged with  impunity,^'^  and  also  that  the  Hague  Conven- 
tions are  not  binding  on  the  signatories  if  any  one  of  the 
belligerents,  no  matter  how  insignificant,^^  be  not  a  party 
to  them.  In  addition,  these  treaties,  which  constitute 
what  might  be  called  the  statutory  as  opposed  to  the  cus- 
tomary part  of  international  law,  are  not  infrequently 
open  to  contradictory  interpretations.  This  is  in  part 
due  to  the  fact  that  at  times  no  agreement  at  all  could 
have  been  reached  if  the  terms  had  been  absolutely 
explicit  and  the  document  was  signed  only  because  from 
the  very  outset  the  diplomats  were  interpreting  its  mean- 
ing differently.  A  conspicuous  instance  is  the  Treaty  of 
London  of  1867  guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  Luxem- 
burg. When  this  question  came  up  for  European  deci- 
sion, Bismarck  was  insistent  that  the  guarantee  should 
bind  each  one  of  the  signatories  individually,  while  the 
British  statesmen  were  tenaciously  unwilling  to  assume 


14         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

such  unlimited  obligations.  In  this  impasse  the  Russian 
representative  suggested  a  phrase  susceptible  of  different 
interpretations,  "  collective  guarantee,"  ^^  whose  exact 
meaning  has  to  this  day  remained  undetermined.^*^  Simi- 
larly, there  is  some  confusion  as  to  the  treaty  of  1839 
neutralizing  Belgium.  There  are,  of  course,  no  qualifi- 
cations whatsoever  as  to  the  obligations  assumed  by  the 
parties  of  the  treaty  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  that  king- 
dom, but  questions  have  frequently  been  raised  as  to  the 
duties  of  the  signatories  to  proceed  against  those  delin- 
quent in  this  respect.  Gladstone  especially  was  insist- 
ent in  maintaining  that  Great  Britain  had  not  assumed 
an  unlimited  obligation,  one  that  was  irrespective  of  cir- 
cumstances, to  proceed  by  force  of  arms  against  any  and 
all  violations  of  Belgium's  neutrality.^^  Other  British 
statesmen  have  taken  the  same  view.^^ 

Naturally  even  more  indefinite  than  are  these  treaties, 
is  that  portion  of  international  law  based  upon  custom. 
Sharp  differences  of  opinion  that  existed  in  an  academic 
state  before  the  war  have  since  then  become  acute. 
Apart  from  the  German  practice  that  rests  upon  the 
anarchic,  non-moral,  and  purely  self -regarding  precept 
that  neither  the  usages  nor  the  laws  of  war  should  be 
allowed  to  obstruct  military  ends,^^  it  is  in  general  true 
that  when  military  needs  demanded  a  measure,  some  more 
or  less  cogent  argument  or  some  more  or  less  pertinent 
precedent  could  as  a  rule  be  found  to  justify  its  applica- 
tion. Especially  contentious  are  the  questions  arising 
out  of  the  inevitable  conflict  between  the  rights  of  bellig- 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  15 

erents  and  those  of  neutrals.  The  disputes  about  contra- 
band, continuous  voyage,  blockade,  neutral  mails,  all  tes- 
tify to  the  indefiniteness  of  international  usage.  Under 
such  circumstances,  when  the  allegation  of  illegality  can 
be  so  readily  denied,  if  not  completely  refuted,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  states  should  refrain  from  opposing  such 
actions  on  the  part  of  other  states  as  do  not  immediately 
affect  their  own  interests. 

But  only  to  a  minor  extent  is  such  non-action  the 
result  of  the  vagueness  of  interstate  usage.  Under  exist- 
ing conditions,  a  state  does  not  as  a  rule  feel  justified, 
even  if  it  be  so  inclined,  to  raise  its  voice  against  the  most 
heinous  and  palpable  violation  of  international  law  unless 
it  itself  is  wronged.  Much  less  does  it  recognize  an  obli- 
gation to  intervene  by  act.  While  a  crime  within  the 
body  politic  is  deemed  an  injury  to  society  as  well  as  to 
the  individual  adversely  affected,  a  violation  of  inter- 
national law  is  not  considered  an  offence  against  the 
community  of  states.  It  is  plain  that  until  this  condition 
changes,  until  the  community  of  states  has  become  organ- 
ized, the  rule  of  law  as  the  approximate  embodiment  of 
justice  and  reason  cannot  be  said  to  obtain  in  international 
relations.  In  the  present  unorganized  world,  there  pre- 
vails an  anarchy  somewhat  tempered  on  the  one  hand  by 
international  law,  but  even  more  so,  on  the  other,  by 
moral  inhibitions  that  are  recognized  in  varying  degrees 
by  the  different  states.  This  is  the  unavoidable  result  of 
the  modern  system  based  upon  the  absolute  sovereignty 
of  the  independent  state. 


i6         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

While  this  abstract  theory  of  sovereignty  divided  the 
world  in  sharply  segregated  politico-legal  units,  each  one 
of  these  states  was  developing  distinct  interests  outside 
its  territorial  confines  and  the  intercourse  between  their 
respective  citizens  was  becoming  ever  closer  and  more 
vital.  In  response  to  the  need  for  some  regulation  of 
these  important  relations,  there  was  developed  not  only 
the  restricted  and  indefinite  system  of  interstate  usage 
known  as  international  law,  but  there  were  also  con- 
cluded between  the  states  a  lengthy  series  of  special 
treaties  granting  to  their  respective  citizens  civil,  commer- 
cial, and  property  rights  within  each  other's  territorial 
limits.  In  addition  to  such  special  treaties,  others  of 
broader  scope  were  passed  regulating  the  navigation  of 
the  Danube,  the  Congo,  and  the  Suez  Canal,  controlling 
interstate  communications  by  post,  telegraph,  and  other 
means,  giving  international  protection  to  commercial, 
artistic,  and  literary  property.  In  these  instances,  as 
well  as  in  others,  permanent  international  offices  have 
been  established  for  the  administration  of  these  interstate 
interests.  ^^ 

Many  have  hopefully,  and  possibly  too  sanguinely, 
welcomed  these  international  organs,  which  have  in- 
creased rapidly  in  numbers  and  in  effectiveness  since  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  as  the  real  beginnings  of 
international  government.  Be  such  optimism  well  or  ill- 
founded,  it  should  always  be  remembered  that  these  in- 
ternational administrative  bureaus  are  largely  economic 
and  exclusively  non-political  in  nature.     They  have,  how- 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  17 

ever,  not  only  accomplished  an  immensely  important 
work,  but  they  have  also  greatly  decreased  interstate  fric- 
tion by  removing  from  the  diplomatic  field  many  subjects 
that  might  have  given  rise  to  dispute.  While  not  infre- 
quently contentious,  the  questions  handled  in  this  way 
are  such  as  do  not  affect  what  really  are,  or  delusively  are 
held  to  be,  the  vital  interests  of  the  state. 

Such  interests  are  not  handled  by  these  international 
unions  and  commissions,  but  they  are  the  subject  of  direct 
negotiation  between  the  immediately  interested  parties  or 
an  attempt  is  made  to  decide  them  by  general  international 
conferences.  Only  very  rarely  and  then  virtually  solely 
when  the  matter  in  dispute  turns  upon  a  question  of  fact 
or  upon  a  well-defined  legal  principle,  is  there  recourse  to 
arbitration.  If  these  means  fail,  the  settlement  is  left  to 
the  adjudication  of  arms.  In  the  all-pervading  atmos- 
phere of  a  world-wide  war,  it  is  not  generally  realized 
to  what  an  extent  interstate  disputes  have  been  settled  by 
peaceful  means.  Arbitration  has  played  a  significant  part, 
however  minor  a  one  it  be,  in  such  settlements.  The  say- 
ing of  the  Greek  philosopher  that  war  is  the  father  of  all 
things  is  decisively  contradicted  by  the  fact  that  all  Africa 
has  in  the  past  hundred  years  been  divided  up  by  peaceful 
negotiations  between  the  European  Powers.  Other  ter- 
ritorial changes  elsewhere  and  even  in  Europe,  though 
not  on  so  vast  a  scale  as  this  one,  have  likewise  been  peace- 
fully effected.  These  facts  should  give  pause  to  those 
who  oppose  a  supernational  world  organization  merely  on 
the  ground  that  it  would  perpetuate  an  existing  status 


i8         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

that  in  time  would  become  increasingly  out  of  accord  with 
the  changing  conditions  of  the  world.  This  argument 
could  with  equal  validity  be  directed  against  the  state 
itself.  If,  as  a  rule,  the  state's  organization  can  without 
violence  be  readjusted  to  dynamic  conditions,  so  could 
that  of  the  world  state  whose  ultimate  advent  has  been 
the  hope  of  many  a  prescient  philosopher,  poet,  and 
statesman. 

Direct  negotiations  between  the  Great  Powers  have 
disposed  of  many  fundamental  questions  in  all  quarters 
of  the  globe.  It  is  only  necessary  to  mention  the  frontier 
between  the  United  States  and  Canada,  Heligoland,  Per- 
sia, Morocco,  Siam,  and  the  South  Sea  Islands,  But  even 
more  important  is  the  work  that  has  been  performed  by 
international  congresses  and  conferences.  After  the  col- 
lapse of  Napoleon's  attempt  to  establish  a  military  domin- 
ion over  all  Europe,  the  war-weary  Powers  tried  to 
perpetuate  their  alliance  in  order  to  give  permanent 
peace  to  Europe.^^  The  Holy  Alliance,  a  project  of  the 
Tzar  Alexander  to  which  Austria  and  Prussia  gave  their 
adherence,  was  based  upon  lofty  ethical  principles,  but  it 
quickly  proved  impracticable  in  a  world  dominated  by 
ideals  far  different  from  those  of  its  mystic  progenitor. 
But,  at  the  same  time,  another  plan  with  similar  though 
more  limited  objects  in  view  was  developed  by  the  less 
visionary  statesmen  of  Europe.  One  of  the  articles  of 
the  coalition  treaty  of  1814  against  Napoleon  provided 
that  the  four  contracting  Great  Powers  —  Great  Britain, 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  —  should  remain  in  alliance 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  19 

for  twenty  years  in  order  to  maintain  **  the  Balance  of 
Europe,  to  secure  the  repose  and  independence  of  the 
Powers,  and  to  prevent  the  invasions  which  for  so  many 
years  have  devastated  the  world."  As  the  war  was 
waged  against  Napoleon,  not  against  France,  within  a 
few  years  of  his  overthrow,  that  state  was  admitted  to 
this  league  of  the  Great  Powers. 

Despite  what  would  seem  to  have  been  the  best  of  aus- 
pices, this  scheme  soon  broke  down.  It  was  somewhat 
faulty  in  construction,  in  that  it  was  based  upon  the 
hegemony  of  the  Great  Powers  and  disregarded  the 
legitimate  rights  of  minor  states.  They  were  left  voice- 
less. However  important  in  principle  be  this  defect,  in 
practice  it  proved  only  a  very  minor  difficulty  because  no 
effective  opposition  to  the  united  will  of  the  Great  Powers 
was  possible.  The  fundamental  trouble,  however,  was 
that  no  attempt  was  made  to  draw  a  line  of  demarcation 
between  matters  that  were  exclusively  or  pre-eminently 
domestic  in  character  and  such  as  were  of  international 
concern.  Probably  no  such  line  can  ever  be  rigidly 
drawn;  it  must  certainly  shift  with  changing  circum- 
stances. At  all  events,  when  the  various  conferences  of 
the  Great  Powers  met,  they  began  to  interfere  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  other  states.  And,  as  reactionary  influ- 
ences in  Austria  and  Russia  were  constantly  becoming 
more  powerful,  this  interference  was  in  favour  of  the 
established  autocratic  systems  and  hostile  to  the  growing 
movement  for  constitutional  liberty  throughout  Europe. 
In  1822,  the  Great  Alliance  met  at  Verona,  where  the 


20         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

Congress  devoted  its  chief  attention  to  the  revolutionary 
uprising  in  Spain.  France  was  prepared  to  send  an 
army  to  suppress  this  movement,  provided  the  support 
of  the  other  Powers  were  given.  The  Continental  mem- 
bers of  the  Alliance  favoured  the  plan,  but  Great  Britain 
refused  to  assent.  This  refusal,  followed  by  British 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  Spanish-Ameri- 
can colonies  and  by  British  diplomatic  assistance  to  the 
Greek  insurgents,  meant  the  breakdown  of  the  attempt 
by  the  Great  Powers  to  control  the  affairs  of  Europe. 

To  Canning,  the  British  statesman  responsible  for  this 
outcome,  this  was  a  welcome  result,  as  he  would  not  allow 
his  country  to  be  a  party  to  the  suppression  of  Spanish 
liberalism  or  to  the  re-imposition  of  Spanish  rule  in  South 
America.  Under  the  circumstances,  his  well-known 
words :  "  Things  are  getting  back  to  a  wholesome  state 
again.  Every  nation  for  itself  and  God  for  us  all.  .  .  . 
The  time  for  Areopagus  and  the  like  of  that  is  gone  by," 
express  comprehensible,  even  if  short-sighted,  relief. 
While  the  body  was  dead,  the  spirit  remained  and  from 
this  abortive  attempt  at  a  confederation  of  Europe  sur- 
vived the  principle  of  European  co-operation  in  the  settle- 
ment of  many  matters  that  threaten  the  public  peace.  As 
has  truly  been  said,  "  from  the  pacifist's  point  of  view 
the  nineteenth  century  should  be  remembered  as  much  for 
its  Conferences,  its  Congresses,  and  its  Concert  of 
Europe  as  for  the  growth  of  arbitration."  ^^ 

Only  a  few  years  after  Canning's  memorable  words. 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  agreed  in  a  series  of 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  21 

conferences  upon  what  seemed  to  them  to  be  an  equitable 
solution  of  the  difficulties  between  Greek  and  Turk  and 
compelled  both  parties  to  accept  this  settlement.  The 
special  authority  thus  acquired  by  these  three  Powers  to 
regulate  the  affairs  of  Greece  and  her  relations  with 
Turkey  was  exercised  on  a  number  of  subsequent  occa- 
sions, of  which  the  one  not  least  important  has  been 
during  the  present  war.  This  method  of  procedure  was 
later  extended  to  the  affairs  of  the  other  Balkan  states 
and  the  group  of  intervening  powers  was  greatly  ex- 
panded. In  this  manner  grew  up  the  Concert  of  Europe, 
whose  special  function  was  to  prevent  the  Balkan  problem 
from  embroiling  all  Europe  in  war.^"^  This  system  in- 
volved "  a  negation  of  the  right  of  any  one  Power  and 
an  assertion  of  the  right  of  the  Powers  collectively  to 
regulate  the  solution  of  the  Eastern  question."  It  has 
been  applied  to  a  number  of  other  questions  that  trans- 
cended the  interests  of  the  contiguous  states  or  threatened 
the  peace  of  Europe.  By  such  action  of  the  Powers  in 
Congress  assembled  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  effected 
in  1839  and,  a  generation  later,  that  of  Luxemburg. 
Such  joint  deliberation  and  decision  was  applied  as  well 
to  the  Congo  region  in  Central  Africa  and  later,  at  Alge- 
ciras,  to  Morocco.  It  was  the  refusal  of  Austria,  sup- 
ported by  Germany,  to  admit  that  her  dispute  with  Serbia 
was  a  question  of  general  European  interest  that  precipi- 
tated the  present  war.^^ 

Apart  from  what  has  been  accomplished  at  the  Hague 
Conferences,  mainly  in  codifying  the  laws  of  war,  it  is 


22         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

plain  to  every  one  acquainted  with  the  outlines  of  modern 
European  history  that  these  congresses  and  conferences 
have  settled  many  questions  and  have  on  many  occasions 
obviated  war.  Their  acts  have  at  times  been  flagrantly 
violated,  as  by  Austria-Hungary's  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  in  1908.  Similarly,  during  the  disputes 
about  Morocco  from  1906  to  191 1,  but  scant  attention 
was  paid  to  the  Algeciras  Act.^®  Finally,  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  was  marked  by  the  German  invasion  of 
Luxemburg  and  Belgium,  whose  neutralization  formed 
two  of  the  vital  corner-stones  of  the  emerging  European 
polity. 

If  we  look  somewhat  closer  into  this  European  system, 
tlie  causes  of  its  ultimate  failure  will  become  patent.  It 
is  plainly  evident  why  these  conferences  and  congresses 
have  not  solved  the  problem  of  substituting  law  and  jus- 
tice for  force  in  the  settlement  of  interstate  disputes.  In 
the  first  place,  in  the  background  of  all  diplomatic  nego- 
tiations is  the  sword,  be  it  merely  resting  in  the  scabbard, 
half-drawn,  or  brandished  with  a  threatening  gesture. 
In  the  second  place,  as  a  direct  consequence  of  the  theory 
of  sovereignty,  the  states  meet  as  equals  in  these  assem- 
blies, no  matter  how  disparate  be  their  size  and  political 
importance.  Hence,  each  state  has  merely  one  voice 
and  as  it  is  logically  held  that  a  majority  cannot  bind  a 
minority  without  infringing  a  state's  sovereignty,  unan- 
imity is  essential.  Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  in 
such  conferences  as  have  settled  important  political  ques- 
tions, mainly  in  the  Balkans,  the  states  most  directly 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  33 

affected  were  as  a  rule  not  represented.  The  will  of 
Europe,  as  interpreted  by  the  Great  Powers  or  by  only  a 
combination  of  some  of  them,  was  imposed  upon  Greece 
and  Turkey.  In  other  words,  the  Concert  of  Europe  has 
been  effective  only  when  the  questions  at  issue  concerned 
others  far  more  directly  than  themselves.  Under  the 
existing  system,  it  is  scarcely  conceivable  that  such  ques- 
tions as  those  of  Ireland,  the  Philippines,  Schleswig, 
Alsace-Lorraine,  Finland,  Poland,  Bohemia,  or  Croatia 
can  come  before  an  international  congress  unless  war  has 
thrown  them  into  the  crucible.  No  one  of  the  Great 
Powers  will  permit  what  it  deems  is  a  vital  question  to  be 
determined  by  the  vote  of  its  peers. 

Of  such  vital  questions,  that  of  transcendent  impor- 
tance is  the  independence  of  a  state  —  not  only  its  security 
from  forcible  subjection  to  another,  but  also  the  main- 
tenance of  its  influence  and  its  relative  freedom  of  action. 
The  two  score  international  commissions  and  unions  that 
have  been  established  in  the  past  fifty  years  were  not 
designed  to  protect  the  liberties  of  Europe.  Nor  is 
international  law  in  itself  a  more  effective  defender  of 
public  right.  Liberty  and  freedom  have  been  upheld  by 
other  means.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Great  Powers  have 
guaranteed  the  neutrality  of  certain  weak  states,  notably 
Switzerland  and  Belgium ;  and,  until  the  German  invasion 
of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium  in  August  of  1914,  this  had 
been  regarded  as  an  adequate  safeguard.  But  the  main 
rampart  of  European  liberty  has  been  the  doctrine  of  the 
balance  of  power  and  the  alliances  that  have  been  formed 


24         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

to  maintain  it.  Since  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war, 
it  has  become  the  fashion  to  cast  stones  at  this  system. 
But  it  does  not  follow  that,  because  this  system  was 
unable  to  prevent  the  calamity,  it  was  the  cause  thereof. 
A  careful  examination  of  modern  history  would  demon- 
strate that  the  opposite  was  the  case.  Criticism,  however 
valid  for  the  most  part  it  be,  should  not  necessarily  imply 
utter  condemnation.  The  root  of  the  trouble  lies  else- 
where, in  the  prevailing  international  anarchy.  The  fail- 
ure to  create  any  supernational  authority  is  the  funda- 
mental cause  of  the  catastrophe.  The  inevitable  outcome 
of  a  world  divided  into  sovereign  states  is  the  system  of 
the  balance  of  power  with  its  alliances  and  armaments. 
It  was  an  attempt  to  secure  some  measure  of  justice  in 
interstate  relations  by  preventing  the  strong  from  oppress- 
ing the  weak.^'*  It  is  obvious  that,  if  each  state  remains 
isolated,  free  from  protecting  alliances,  each  would  be 
at  the  mercy  of  the  stronger  and  that  ultimately  one  would 
absorb  all  the  rest.  Even  if  the  weaker  states  were  not  ac- 
tually conquered,  their  freedom  of  action  would  be  griev- 
ously impaired.  It  was  this  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
in  mind  when,  on  July  30,  1914,  in  reply  for  Germany's 
bid  for  British  neutrality  during  the  impending  war,  he 
wrote :  "  France,  without  further  territory  in  Europe 
being  taken  from  her,  could  be  so  crushed  as  to  lose  her 
position  as  a  Great  Power,  and  become  subordinate  to 
German  policy."  ^^  Hence,  under  the  modem  state  sys- 
tem, a  Great  Power  cannot  preserve  its  freedom  without 
defensive  armaments  and  alliances.     Without  both  of 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  25 

these,  it  can  have  no  security  or  freedom,  and  the  world 
would  soon  be  dominated  by  whatever  political  aggregate 
cherished  such  ambitions.^  ^  The  determining  factor 
would  be  merely  the  relative  size  of  the  respective  states, 
which  is  largely  a  fortuitous  matter  and  no  indication  of 
the  degree  of  civilization  attained.  No  one  would  con- 
tend that  the  civilization  of  Rome  could  compare  to  that 
of  its  small  victim,  Syracuse.  Nor  would  the  outcome 
give  any  promise  of  the  predominance  of  the  best;  it 
would  only  mean  wide-spread,  if  not  universal,  slavery. 

The  most  vital  and  real  facts  in  interstate  relations  are 
these  alliances.  They  condition  and  limit  the  state's  free- 
dom in  the  most  far-reaching  manner  and,  at  the  same 
time,  they  alone  have  preserved  that  measure  of  freedom 
of  action  that  the  so-called  sovereign  states  do  actually 
enjoy.  They  more  than  anything  else  have  tempered 
international  anarchy  and  made  life  bearable.  This  sys- 
tem of  the  balance  of  power  with  its  alliances  has  by  no 
means  always  or  even  generally  worked  equitably  or  effec- 
tively. It  has  not  always  prevented  war,  though  it  has 
distinctly  lessened  the  rule  of  force.  Its  aim  is  not  the 
negative  one  of  preserving  peace,  but  that  of  protecting 
the  liberty  of  the  various  states  of  Europe.  In  this,  with 
most  noteworthy  exceptions,  it  has  been  successful.  On 
every  occasion  when  Europe  was  threatened  by  the  abso- 
lute domination  of  a  great  military  power,  this  system 
ultimately  safeguarded  freedom. 

Such  was  its  record  against  Philip  II,  Louis  XIV,  and 
Napoleon.     As  Hans  Delbrueck  says,  all  Europe  needed 


26         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

England  in  the  struggle  against  Louis  XIV,  for  without 
England  the  freedom  of  Europe  could  not  be  defended 
against  France.^^  The  same  fundamental  issue  was  at 
stake  a  century  later  in  the  struggle  against  the  military 
despotism  of  Napoleon.^*  The  military  preponderance 
of  Germany  after  the  Franco-Prussian  war  and  the  far- 
reaching  aims  of  the  post-Bismarckian  leaders  have  again 
raised  the  same  fundamental  issue  and  again  the  same 
system  has  spontaneously  arisen  to  cope  with  it.^^  If  it 
be  successful  in  the  end,  as  it  promises  to  be  —  and 
otherwise  the  outlook  would  be  most  dismal  for  the  entire 
world  —  the  co-operative  principle  underlying  this  sys- 
tem of  alliances  will  gain  fresh  vitality.  Although  one 
may  totally  reject  Prince  von  Buelow's  political  creed, 
one  cannot  deny  his  acumen  and  insight  and,  when  he 
says  that  "  it  betokens  an  unscientific  and  unpractical 
mode  of  thought  to  assume  that  after  this  world-war  an 
era  will  dawn,  which  in  its  broad  outlines  as  in  its  details 
is  diametrically  opposed  to  the  past  decades  before  the 
war,"  ^^  he  is  uttering  a  truth  that  cannot  with  impunity 
be  ignored  in  all  the  prevalent  elaboration  of  schemes  for 
international  reconstruction. 

It  has  often  been  asserted,  and  equally  often  denied, 
that  there  is  no  half-way  house  between  a  world  state 
and  the  existing  system  of  sovereign  states.  If  such  a 
structure  ever  be  erected,  it  will  unquestionably  not  be 
proof  against  storm  and  weather.  This  will  prove  true 
whether  it  take  the  form  of  a  reinvigourated  and  recon- 
structed Concert  of  the  Great  Powers,^ ^  or  that  of  a 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  27 

League  of  Nations  to  Enforce  Peace.  Both  have  great 
possibilities;  neither  is  a  permanent  abode,  but  only  a 
temporary  shelter.  And  even  so,  the  Great  Powers  will 
not  avail  themselves  of  such  protection  to  the  exclusion 
of  other  means,  until  the  foundations  have  been  thor- 
oughly tested.  During  this  interval,  the  system  of 
alliances  cannot  be  abandoned  by  a  world  that  tenaciously 
clings  to  the  theory  of  the  sovereign  state.  This  will 
probably  become  even  more  apparent  if  the  bases  of 
modern  nationalism  be  examined  and  if  due  recognition 
be  given  to  the  exacerbation  of  national  feelings  result- 
ing from  the  internecine  war. 


n 

NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY 


"  Une  nation  est  une  ame,  un  principe  spirituel.  Deux  choses 
qui,  a  vrai  dire,  ne  font  qu'une,  constituent  cette  ame,  ce  principe 
spirituel.  L'une  est  dans  le  passe,  I'autre  dans  le  present. 
L'une  est  la  possession  d'une  riche  legs  de  souvenirs,  I'autre  le 
consentement  actuel,  le  desir  de  vivre  ensemble,  la  volonte  de 
faire  valoir  I'heritage  qu'on  a  regu  indivis." 

— Ernest  Renan,  Qu'est  ce  qu'une  Nation f  (1882). 

"  Present  facts,  then,  demand  the  recognition  of  continuous 
and  normal  interdependence  of  States.  The  nature  of  the  State 
is  to  be  understood,  at  least  in  part,  from  its  relations  with  other 
States:  and  all  philosophies  which  even  imply  that  the  State  is 
isolated  are  out  of  date.  Indeed,  one  may  say  that  the  modern 
State  must  be  understood  by  this  external  reference." 

— C.  Delisle  Burns,  The  Morality  of  Nations,  p.  50. 


CHAPTER  II 

Nationalism  and  Sovereignty 

The  Theory  of  Sovereignty  —  Its  Disaccord  with  Actual  Facts 

—  The  Unity  of  Western  Civilization  —  Cultural  and  Economic 
Interdependence  —  The  Rise  of  Large  Political  Aggregates  — 
Their  Significance  —  Nation  and  State  —  Modem  Nationalism 

—  Effect  of  the  War  upon  National  Feeling  —  International 
Government  and  the  System  of  Alliances. 

The  stem  obstacle  to  the  political  organization  of  the 
world  is  the  sovereignty  of  the  state.  This  legal  doc- 
trine is  the  fundamental  corner-stone  of  the  modern  state- 
system  ;  and,  until  it  is  totally  abandoned  or  at  least  radi- 
cally altered,  there  is  no  possibility  of  a  really  effective 
super-state  political  system  securing  justice  and  right. 
The  most  essential  attribute  of  sovereignty  is  that  it  is 
supreme  and  unlimited,  which  means  that  it  is  subject  to 
no  earthly  authority.  A  limited  sovereignty  would  pat- 
ently be  an  unavoidable  contradiction  in  terms.  Hence 
its  absoluteness.  As  to  this,  there  has  been  a  general 
agreement  among  political  scientists,  but  in  recent  years 
there  has  arisen  some  serious  questioning  as  to  whether 
the  state  does  actually  exercise  unlimited  authority  either 
within  the  body  politic*  or  in  its  relations  with  other 
states.* 

The  literature  on  the  subject  is  almost  as  voluminous 

31 


32         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

and  as  subtle  ^  as  is  that  on  determinism  and  free  will ;  and 
the  questions  are  somewhat  akin.  While  it  is  unquestion- 
ably true  that  the  limitations  imposed  upon  the  state  are 
not  legal  in  nature,  they  are,  on  the  other  hand,  by  no 
means  mere  self -limitations  from  which  the  state  can  es- 
cape at  will.  Just  as  the  freedom  of  the  individual  is  re- 
stricted by  a  thousand  circumstances  and  conditions  over 
which  he  has  absolutely  no  control,  so  the  state's  activities 
are  constantly  being  determined  by  forces  outside  it.  It 
can  be  cogently  argued  and  proven  that  legally  the  state  is 
subject  to  no  superior  earthly  authority,  but  of  what 
avail  is  this  legal  sovereignty,  if  in  practice  the  state  is 
far  from  being  a  complete  free  agent?  The  theory  of 
sovereignty  serves  to  some  extent  merely  to  veil  the  real 
facts  and  to  perpetuate  a  condition  of  international  anar- 
chy that  is  becoming  increasingly  hazardous. 

The  indivisible  sovereignty  that  is  ascribed  to  the  state 
has  two  distinct  aspects,  an  internal  and  an  external  one. 
On  the  one  hand,  it  predicates  the  absolute  authority  of 
the  state  over  all  individuals  and  groups  within  its  terri- 
torial limits.  With  this  aspect,  we  here  are  not  directly 
concerned.  Its  corollary  is,  however,  of  immediate  im- 
portance, for  sovereignty  implies  not  only  the  absolute 
independence  of  the  state,  but  logically  also  its  isolation 
in  an  anarchic  world  of  equally  independent  politico-legal 
units.  It  is  an  atomistic  conception  of  the  world  that 
was  even  at  the  time  of  its  formulation  out  of  harmony 
with  the  actual  facts  and  which  has  become  increasingly 
so  with  the  passing  centuries. 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         33 

This  disharmony  between  actual  fact  and  legal  theory 
has  increased  at  an  accelerated  pace  since  the  mechanical 
inventions  of  the  past  century  have  made  mankind  a  unit 
in  a  concrete  sense  never  before  realized.  As  a  result 
of  the  improved  means  of  transportation  and  communi- 
cation, the  world  has  virtually  shrunk  to  a  fraction  of  its 
former  size  and  but  little  can  happen  anywhere  that  has 
not  its  reflex  action  in  the  remotest  corners  of  the  globe. 
This  is  especially  true  in  the  economic  field.  At  the 
present  day,  values  have  been  equalized  throughout  the 
world  and  a  crop  failure  or  a  financial  panic  in  one  coun- 
try has  repercussions  of  varying  intensity  in  most  distant 
regions.  Though  artificial  barriers  in  the  form  of  pro- 
tective tariffs  somewhat  prevent  the  full  realization  of 
this  process,  the  world  of  to-day  —  in  contrast  with  that 
of  the  past,  when  there  were  no  steamers,  cables  and 
wireless  —  constitutes  an  economic  unit.  Such  unity  is 
not  equally  apparent  in  the  cultural  field,  for  to  a  modified 
degree  East  is  still  East,  and  West  is  still  West. 

But  within  the  ever  growing  unity  of  all  mankind  re- 
sulting from  constantly  increasing  intercourse,  there  is  a 
more  clearly  defined  entity  composed  of  the  states  of 
western  civilization.  When  Romain  Rolland  speaks  of 
"  I'unite  morale  de  V Europe,"  *  he  is  not  merely  using  a 
glittering  phrase,  but  one  that  corresponds  to  a  reality. 
Apart,  however,  from  the  fact  that  Europe  is  the  radiat- 
ing centre  of  western  civilization,  this  unity  actually  in- 
cludes as  well  all  states  created  by  European  forces, 
whether  they  be  in  Europe,  in  Africa,  in  Australasia,  or  in 


34         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

America.  There  is  no  absolutely  uniform  level  of  civil- 
ization in  these  states.  Some,  conspicuously  a  number 
in  South  and  Central  America,  as  well  as  in  Eastern 
Europe,  are  still  markedly  backward;  and  there  are 
notable  and  even  portentous  differences  between  others 
on  approximately  the  same  level ;  but  all  in  all,  they  con- 
stitute a  unity  because  their  similarities  in  fundamentals 
far  outweigh  their  divergences  in  detail.*^  So  true  is  this, 
that  a  war  between  the  most  advanced  representatives  of 
this  group  is  in  the  nature  of  a  civil  war. 

Despite  marked  differences  that  are  of  the  utmost  sig- 
nificance, that  relieve  what  otherwise  would  be  a  depress- 
ing uniformity  and  by  their  interaction  stimulate  a  whole- 
some progress,  the  spiritual  and  moral  lives  of  these  west- 
ern peoples  conform  to  standards  that  are,  broadly  speak- 
ing, common.  There  is  a  substantial  uniformity  in  the 
general  ethical  code  of  the  western  man,  whether  he  pro- 
fesses a  formal  religion  or  be  an  agnostic.  Art,  liter- 
ature, science,  and  philosophy,  have  likewise  become  inter- 
national. New  forms  and  modes  of  expression  spread 
quickly;  discoveries  and  inventions  by  one  are  quickly 
adopted  by  all.  The  general  content  of  western  thought 
is  essentially  one.  Unless  differences  are  unduly  em- 
phasized, as  they  can  readily  be,  and  even  must  be  if  a 
deeper  and  fuller  understanding  is  to  be  reached,  it  is 
undeniable  that  the  peoples  of  western  civilization  have 
been  developing  on  ever  more  closely  converging  cultural 
lines. 

As  a  result,  binding  cultural  ties  have  been  established, 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         35 

but  far  more  concretely  cohesive  are  the  bonds  resulting 
from  the  commercial  and  financial  interdependence  of 
the  western  world.  A  large  proportion  of  the  citizens  of 
every  state  have  direct  or  indirect  interests  beyond  the 
bounds  of  their  own  country;  and  the  well-being  of  entire 
sections  is  determined  by  conditions  among  remote  peo- 
ples owing  an  entirely  distinct  political  allegiance.  The 
welfare  of  England  is  largely  dependent  upon  the 
food-stuffs  and  the  cotton  derived  from  America.  That 
of  the  United  States  has  hitherto  depended  in  great  part 
upon  the  willingness  of  Europe  to  furnish  capital  to  assist 
in  developing  its  resources  and  to  build  its  railroads. 
The  policy  of  Russia  toward  her  Jewish  population  has 
had  important  effects  upon  the  United  States  and  so  like- 
wise has  had  the  immigration  from  Italy.®  In  like  man- 
ner, the  return  of  the  partially  Americanized  immigrant 
to  his  native  land  has  had  significant  political  and  eco- 
nomic effects  in  Italy  and  in  the  Balkans."^  Insurance, 
banking,  shipping,  manufacturing,  and  commerce  have 
become  to  a  marked  extent  international  and  state  bound- 
aries are  ignored  by  large  financial,  industrial  and  com- 
mercial organizations  that  have  their  establishments  in 
various  countries.  Furthermore,  as  a  result  of  the  system 
of  incorporated  companies  with  a  joint  stock,  men  of  most 
diverse  national  and  political  ties  often  share  in  the  risks 
and  profits  of  one  common  enterprise.  Englishmen, 
Canadians,  Americans,  Germans,  as  well  as  citizens  of 
other  states,  are  joint  owners  of  such  undertakings  as 
the  Canadian  Pacific  Railway.     Instance  upon  instance 


36         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

might  be  cited  to  illustrate  this  internationalization,  which 
has  progressed  to  such  an  extent  that  many  a  man's  chief 
economic  interests  are  in  foreign  countries.  Further- 
more, to  an  increasing  extent,  citizens  of  one  state  are 
more  or  less  permanently  domiciled  within  the  limits  of 
another;  and,  with  the  downfall  of  the  older  doctrine  of 
perpetual  allegiance,  citizenship  is  shifted  with  great 
facility.  There  has  taken  place  a  significant  interpene- 
tration  of  nations. 

As  a  result  of  this  process,  both  in  the  general  cultural 
field  and  in  the  narrower  economic  one,  mankind  tends  to 
become  divided  along  horizontal  lines  of  various  nature, 
cutting  across  those  vertical  divisions  demarcated  by  state 
frontiers.  The  development  in  this  direction,  especially 
in  the  socio-economic  field,  has  not  been  so  marked  as  to 
some  it  seemed  likely  to  be  a  generation  ago,  but  it  is 
clearly  apparent.^  Many  international  organizations  of 
most  diverse  character,  some  scientific,  some  commercial, 
others  devoted  to  the  interests  of  labour,  have  developed 
out  of  the  inexorable  needs  of  the  situation.  It  is  of  the 
utmost  significance  that  in  the  year  before  the  war  no 
fewer  than  135  such  international  congresses  met.^  This 
interdependence  has  also,  as  has  already  been  pointed  out, 
necessitated  the  formation  of  international  organs  for 
the  administration  of  certain  interests  common  to  all 
states. 

As  a  result  of  these  intricate  and  vital  ties  binding 
together  citizens  of  most  diverse  states  in  a  network  of 
intimate  relations,  a  condition  of  interdependence  has 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         37 

arisen  that  is  at  variance  with  the  legal  sovereignty  of 
state.  The  state  can  no  longer  be  held  to  be  a  completely 
free  agent  either  in  internal  or  in  external  affairs.  The 
fiscal  system  of  one  state,  its  labour  legislation,  its  regula- 
tion of  emigration  and  immigration,  its  shipping  laws,  to 
mention  only  a  few  out  of  many  policies,  profoundly 
affect  at  times  other  states  and  shape  their  legislative 
enactments.  Similarly,  the  military  preparations  of  one 
state  largely  determine  those  of  others.  It  was  not  of  its 
own  free  volition,  but  as  a  consequence  of  conditions  in 
Europe,  that  the  United  States  in  19 16  felt  obliged  to 
increase  its  armaments  and,  as  a  result,  imposed  a  series 
of  taxes  whose  social  effects  may  be  far-reaching.  In 
the  same  way,  Germany's  naval  programme  obliged  Eng- 
land during  the  past  decade  greatly  to  expand  her  fleet 
and  to  divert  large  funds  from  other  public  services. 

Still  less  in  the  international  field  does  the  state  enjoy 
that  absolute  independence  and  unfettered  freedom  of 
action  predicated  by  its  sovereignty.  In  some  matters  of 
common  concern,  international  unions  with  deliberative 
and  administrative  functions  are  already  almost  in  full 
control.^^  But  even  in  the  still  unorganized  part  of  the 
international  system,  the  state's  independence  and  free- 
dom are  conditioned  by  the  wills  and  wishes  of  other 
states.  In  so  far  as  sovereignty  implies  freedom  of  action 
and  complete  independence,  it  is  inconsistent  with  a 
world  of  equal  states  each  one  of  which  conditions  and 
limits  the  actions  of  the  others.  Pushed  to  its  logical 
conclusion,  the  theory  of  absolute  sovereignty  means  that 


38         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

the  state  should  be  so  powerful  that  it  is  able  to  work  its 
will  regardless  of  its  fellows.  But  the  outcome  of  this 
would  be  that  there  would  be  really  only  one  sovereign 
state,  while  all  the  others  would  lose  even  the  relative 
freedom  and  independence  that  they  now  enjoy.  In  the 
world  of  to-day,  the  state  must  perforce  in  part  regulate 
its  conduct  by  the  wishes,  interests  and  rights  of  other 
states,  and  the  extent  of  this  restriction  of  its  freedom  of 
action  tends,  as  a  rule,  to  be  in  indirect  proportion  to 
its  resources  in  men,  in  treasure,  and  in  armaments. 
Furthermore,  all  pretence  to  the  complete  freedom  of 
action  implicit  in  the  concept  of  sovereignty  must  be 
abandoned  in  a  Europe  bound  in  a  network  of  alliances 
which  can  force  a  state  into  war  about  an  immediate 
issue  in  which  it  may  not  be  at  all  concerned.  Just  as 
the  individual  cannot  be  explained  apart  from  the  com- 
munity that  conditions  his  every  act,  so  the  state  cannot 
be  comprehended  if  its  environment  be  ignored.  The  iso- 
lated state  is  an  unreal  abstraction  that  obscures  funda- 
mental facts. ^^  Futhermore,  just  as  the  individual  can 
actually  obtain  real  liberty  only  from  membership  in  a 
community  which  necessarily  restrains  his  complete  free- 
dom of  action,  so  the  state  cannot  secure  independence 
and  liberty  in  isolation,  but  only  by  co-operation  with  its 
fellows. 

While  it  is  probably  patent  from  the  foregoing  that 
the  independence  implied  by  the  legal  sovereignty  of  the 
state  is  largely  fictitious  and  is  inconsistent  with  a  world 
that  has  become  a  unit,  yet  the  political  world  tenaciously 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         39 

clings  to  the  existing  system  which  draws  sharp  legal 
lines  between  groups  that  are  socially  and  economically 
interdependent.  As  yet  the  states  have  evinced  a  decided 
unwillingness  to  submit  themselves  to  a  supemational 
authority.  But  without  such  an  authority  there  is  no 
method  of  establishing  the  rule  of  law  in  interstate  rela- 
tions. Individual  man,  however,  yearns  for  such  an  out- 
come and  the  permanent  peace  that  will  come  with  it.  It 
was  predominantly  in  response  to  this  desire  and  need 
that,  ever  since  the  rise  of  the  modern  state  system,  there 
has  been  a  constant  tendency  toward  ever  larger  political 
aggregates.  It  is,  as  has  been  well  said,  pre-eminently 
necessary  that  "  self-governing  groups  of  men  should  be 
enabled  to  work  together  in  permanent  harmony  and  on 
a  great  scale."  **  In  this  kind  of  political  integration," 
to  quote  John  Fiske  again,  "  the  work  of  civilization  very 
largely  consists."  ^^  For  only  in  this  manner  can  peace 
be  established  on  a  comparatively  permanent  basis.  Civil 
war  is  always  a  possibility.  But,  unless  peaceful  condi- 
tions approximate  to  permanency,  there  can  be  only  slight 
progress  in  civilization.  Chronic  warfare  almost  abso- 
lutely bars  advance.  It  was  primarily  in  response  to 
such  need  for  peaceful  co-operation  that  the  larger  politi- 
cal groups  have  arisen.  The  demands  of  the  situation 
led  to  the  unification  of  France,  Spain,  Grermany,  and 
Italy.  Similar  factors  made  necessary  the  union  of  Scot- 
land and  England  and  are  manifest  even  in  the  forma- 
tion of  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 
They  are  plainly  visible  in  the  history  of  the  United  States 


40         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

and  also  in  the  unification  of  Canada,  Australia,  and 
South  Africa.  Furthermore,  although  such  is  not  widely 
recognized  to  be  the  case,  these  same  factors  were  the 
fundamental  ones  in  creating  that  amorphous  aggre- 
gate misleadingly  designated  as  the  British  Empire,  but 
more  appropriately  described  as  "  a  Commonwealth  of 
Nations."  In  contradistinction  to  some  other  attempts  to 
erect  a  similarly  extensive  and  intricate  political  structure, 
the  British  Empire  was  predominantly  the  result  of  pri- 
vate initiative  and  individual  enterprise.  The  Empire 
was  not  constructed  on  plans  carefully  elaborated  by  pre- 
scient statesmen,  but  grew  as  an  inevitable  consequence  of 
the  wide-spread  activities  of  British  pioneers.  Terri- 
torial acquisitions  were  not  systematically  and  deliber- 
ately planned  by  the  government,  but  were,  in  general, 
either  the  somewhat  accidental  result  of  European  wars 
into  which  Britain  had  been  drawn  or  the  unavoidable 
consequence  of  antecedently  established  interests  that  a 
not  infrequently  reluctant  government,  dreading  further 
responsibilities,  could  not  ignore.  The  entire  develop- 
ment has  been  admirably  summarized  by  Mr.  Philip  H. 
Kerr,  when  he  says: 

"The  British  Commonwealth,  indeed,  has  come  into  being, 
not  through  any  consciously  Imperial  design,  not,  as  Seeley  said, 
in  a  fit  of  absence  of  mind,  or  by  accident,  but  because  it  has 
supplied  the  needs  of  the  people  within  it.  Where  chaos,  or 
tyranny,  or  callous  exploitation,  or  perpetual  war  and  robbery 
reigned  before,  it  has  established  peace,  order,  and  justice.  Un- 
der the  protection  of  its  laws  one-quarter  of  the  people  of  the 
earth  live  in  peace  and  unity.  It  guarantees  to  every  individual, 
of  whatever  race  or  colour,  an  equal  liberty  before  the  law. 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         41 

It  protects  them  from  devastation  from  without,  and  from  dis- 
order within.  It  bridges,  in  its  laws  and  its  institutions,  the 
g^lf  between  East  and  West,  between  white  and  black,  between 
race  and  race.  It  is  even  able  to  give  full  liberty  to  nationalism, 
and  yet  combine  it  with  loyalty  to  a  greater  Commonwealth. 
To  all  it  promises  not  good  government  only,  but  eventual  self- 
government.  ...  It  is  easy  to  point  to  defects  in  its  administra- 
tion and  its  institutions.  The  room  for  improvement  and  prog- 
ress is  infinite.  None  the  less  it  does,  in  its  imperfect  human 
way,  meet  an  essential  human  need,  and  that  is  why  it  exists, 
and  why  it  must  continue  to  exist."  ^' 

However  inadequately  it  be  organized  and  however 
incompletely  as  yet  means  have  been  found  safely  to 
extend  the  sphere  of  self-government,  this  vast  Common- 
wealth, comprising  one  quarter  of  the  world's  population 
of  most  varied  races  and  creeds,  of  all  stages  of  civil- 
ization, is  in  itself  proof  of  the  ultimate  possibility  of  a 
world-community,  "  reconciling  the  freedom  of  indi- 
viduals and  of  individual  states  with  the  accomplishment 
of  a  common  aim  for  mankind  as  a  whole."  The  great 
barrier  to  this  ultimate  goal  outlined  by  Kant  and  in  fact 
to  the  necessary  steps  toward  the  preliminary  integration 
leading  to  it,  such  as  the  voluntary  coalescence  of 
Great  Powers  in  a  greater  body  politic  —  for  instance, 
the  merger  of  the  British  Commonwealth  and  the  United 
States,  or  that  of  Austria  and  Germany  —  is  not  merely 
the  legal  doctrine  of  state  sovereignty,  but  those  forces 
with  which  it  is  intricately  intertwined  and  which  are 
summed  up  in  the  inclusive  term,  nationalism. 

In  political  discussions  considerable  confusion  not  in- 
frequently results  from  the  use  of  terms  in  a  varying  and 


42  THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

undifferentiated  sense.  The  ordinary  interchangeable 
use  of  the  words,  state  and  nation,  is  a  case  in  point.  In 
this  instance,  the  confusion  could  readily  be  avoided  as 
the  concepts  are  quite  distinct.  But  in  other  instances, 
the  poverty  of  the  English  language  admits  of  no  such 
escape.  It  is  patent  that,  when  we  speak  of  international 
relations  we  mean  those  obtaining  between  states,  yet  the 
more  accurate  term,  interstate,  is  not  sanctioned  by  gen- 
eral usage.  Likewise,  the  expression,  supernational,  is 
commonly  used  when  super-state  is  really  meant.  The 
tyranny  of  language  has  led  to  considerable  muddled 
thinking  in  these  instances,  but  this  evil  has  been  even 
more  manifest  in  the  discussion  of  nationalism.  The 
psychological  forces  denoted  by  nationalism  are  two-fold 
in  nature,  both  those  springing  from  membership  in  a  cul- 
tural group  and  those  arising  from  allegiance  to  a  com- 
mon flag.  It  is  obvious  that  these  two  sets  of  gregarious 
feelings  are  quite  distinct  in  nature.  But  as  a  result  of 
the  rise  of  the  national  state,  they  have  in  varying  propor- 
tions become  merged  and  have  produced  modern 
nationalism.  Both  forces  are  usually  co-existent,  but 
the  diverse  manifestations  of  nationalism  are  sometimes 
predominantly  the  result  of  group  solidarity  based  upon 
the  nation  and  at  other  times  they  spring  mainly  from 
similar  feelings  toward  the  state.  Thus  what  is  known 
as  economic  nationalism  is  only  to  a  minor  extent  the 
expression  of  national  feeling,  but  is  predominantly  the 
attempt  of  men  united  in  a  state  to  further  the  economic 
interests    of    that   particular   political   unit.     Similarly, 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY  43 

when  one  speaks  of  Swiss  or  of  Belgian  nationalism,  what 
is  meant  is  chiefly  the  patriotic  devotion  of  men  of 
diverse  language  and  origin  to  a  common  body  politic. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Southern  Slav  movement  is  based 
primarily  upon  the  gregarious  instinct  of  the  politically 
separated  fragments  of  that  nation.  Not  only  is 
nationalism  a  most  complex  force,  but  its  content  varies  in 
nearly  every  instance.  Further  analysis  and  exposition 
will  probably  make  this  clearer. 

Though  frequently  and  misleadingly  confused  in  com- 
mon practice,  state  and  nation  are  two  fundamentally 
distinct  concepts.  The  former  is  an  exclusively  politico- 
legal  concept  and,  roughly,  is  merely  a  definite  segment 
of  mankind  united  in  one  body  politic.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  nation  is  etymologically  an  ethnical,  but  more 
accurately,  a  cultural  concept,  and  is  a  similar  portion  of 
humanity  bound  together  by  other  than  mere  political 
ties.  From  the  physical  standpoint  nation  and  state  are 
never  absolutely  identical,  for  their  boundaries  do  not 
follow  the  same  geographical  lines.  A  state  is  frequently 
composed  of  a  number  of  nations  or  parts  of  them,  and 
in  turn,  nations  are  often  split  up  into  a  number  of  states. 
This  is  true  even  of  Western  Europe,  though  not  to  the 
same  extent  as  in  the  eastern  section  of  that  continent. 
Considerable  portions  of  the  Teutonic  nation  are  under 
the  rule  of  Austria  and  Switzerland,  and  the  German 
Empire  as  constituted  in  1871  embraced  fragments  of 
the  French,  Danish,  and  Polish  nations.  Likewise,  parts 
of  the  French  nation  are  included  within  Belgium,  Ger- 


44         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

many,  and  Switzerland.  The  Italian  nation,  similarly, 
extends  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  territorial  state. 
This  intersection  of  national  and  political  lines  is  the 
direct  consequence  of  the  more  or  less  artificial  deter- 
mination of  state  frontiers  according  to  dynastic,  political, 
economic,  and  strategic  considerations.  It  has  been  a 
fertile  source  of  trouble,  especially  in  the  border-lands 
between  nation  and  nation,  because  the  pattern  made  there 
by  these  intersecting  lines  is  so  extremely  complicated  and 
intricate  as  to  render  well-nigh  impossible  a  solution  along 
national  lines  of  the  problems  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  Poland, 
Bohemia,  Macedonia  and  Transylvania  —  to  mention  only 
a  few  of  the  questions  that  the  existing  war  has  thrown 
into  the  crucible.  In  virtually  every  instance,  there  must 
remain  a  minority  that  will  fret  under  the  political 
affiliations  which  even  the  keenest  sense  of  justice  might 
assign  to  it.^* 

What  are  these  deeply  rooted  cultural  ties  that  bind 
together  individuals  into  groups  distinct  from  the  political 
associations  known  as  states?  It  is  essentially  true  that 
mankind  is  akin  and  that  its  common  humanity  consti- 
tutes a  primary  unity.  But  this  basic  unity  is  as  yet  less 
energetic  as  a  political  force  than  are  those  differences 
that  divide  mankind  into  distinct  groups.  Of  these  the 
most  important  politically,  though  possibly  not  the  most 
fundamental,  are  those  physical  differences,  primarily 
the  colour  of  the  skin,  that  constitute  unmistakable  fis- 
sures in  mankind's  unity.  The  white,  black,  and  yellow 
races  have  distinct  physical  characteristics  that  strike  the 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         45 

eye,  however  much  one  might  be  incHned  to  ignore  them. 
But  within  these  primary  divisions  —  and  politically  they 
are  still  primary,  however  factitious  and  superficial  they 
may  seem  to  be  from  an  ideal  standpoint  —  are  less 
marked  distinctions  that  establish  definite  groups  within 
them.  One  such  primary  division  is  the  Caucasian  race, 
which  is  a  definite  entity  that  has  produced  the  clearly 
defined  European  or  western  type  of  civilization.  But  it 
is  a  unity  embracing  infinite  diversity  and  these  diver- 
gences have  led  to  the  evolution  of  minor  groups  known 
as  nations.  A  nation  may  be  described  as  a  group  of  men 
united  by  a  consciousness  both  of  common  likeness  to  one 
another  as  well  as  of  difference  from  others.  The  re- 
sulting consciousness  of  belonging  together,  apart  from 
the  political  bond  of  the  state,  is  the  product  of  many 
factors,  of  which  the  most  important  are  common,  almost 
identical,  moral  standards,  ideals,  traditions,  customs, 
and  political  instincts.  As  this  unity  in  the  fundamental 
content  of  thought  is  most  likely  to  be  attained  by  means 
of  a  common  language,  its  possession  is  generally  the 
most  significant  outward  sign  of  nationality.  Far  less 
important  than  this  essential  like-mindedness  toward 
basic  values,  is  race  unity  or  community  of  blood.  For 
race,  in  so  far  as  divisions  within  the  Caucasian  group  are 
concerned,  is  primarily  a  cultural  not  a  physical  fact. 
The  Slav  brought  up  in  a  purely  Teutonic  environment 
is  apt  to  become  a  typical  German,  and  this  tendency  will 
become  overpowering  if  both  he  and  his  associates  are 
ignorant  of  his  racial  origins.     This  holds  true  as  well  of 


46         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

Englishmen,  Germans,  and  Italians  under  the  same  cir- 
cumstances. Treitschke,  the  most  Prussian  of  Prussians, 
was  a  Saxon  of  Tzech  descent;  and  Nietzsche,  the  un- 
conscious prophet  of  Prussianism,  prided  himself  on  his 
Polish  blood.  In  this  connection  also,  it  is  decidedly 
significant  that,  during  the  fateful  twelve  days  of  191 4, 
British  interests  at  Berlin  and  Vienna  were  in  charge  of 
men  whose  not  remote  ancestors  were  Germans. 

But  the  use  of  a  common  speech  with  its  ensuing  like- 
mindedness  and  community  of  civilization  both  in  essen- 
tials and  in  details,  though  they  be  the  basic  facts  of  true 
nationality,  do  not  always  establish  the  existence  of  a 
nation.  In  addition,  there  must  be  among  the  indi- 
viduals what  Sidgwick  called  "  a  consciousness  of  belong- 
ing to  one  another,  of  being  members  of  one  body,  over 
and  above  what  they  derive  from  the  mere  fact  of  being 
under  one  government."  ^^  In  other  words,  in  ultimate 
analysis,  nationality  is  predominantly  a  psychological 
fact. 

The  demand  of  such  self-conscious  national  groups  for 
full  expression  dominated  the  history  of  the  nineteenth 
century  and  gave  rise  to  the  doctrine  of  nationalism. 
This  creed,  as  Mr.  C.  Delisle  Burns  has  lucidly  demon- 
strated, was  the  joint  product  of  two  preceding  ideals, 
Renaissance  state-sovereignty  and  eighteenth-century 
revolutionary  rights. ^^  To  the  concept  of  sovereignty, 
according  to  which  each  state  was  politically  and  legally 
a  self-sufficient  unit,  was  joined  the  doctrine  of  the 
French  Revolution,  that  every  people  has  an  inalienable 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         47 

right  to  the  form  of  government  it  desires,  and  that  the 
imposition  upon  it  of  another  rule  is  inherently  inde- 
fensible. This  doctrine  justified  each  segment  of  man- 
kind in  establishing  its  own  form  of  government  and  in 
seeking  self-centred  isolation  by  means  of  complete  politi- 
cal separation  from  other  groups  of  varying  differences 
in  mind.  The  resulting  nationalism  was  the  basis  and 
justification  for  the  movement  that  led  to  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  English  and  Spanish  colonies  in  America 
as  well  as  to  the  successful  revolts  of  Greece  and  of  the 
other  Balkan  states  against  Turkish  dominion.  It  was 
on  the  strength  of  this  principle  of  nationalism,  then  gen- 
erally accepted  by  progressive  thinkers,  that  many  Eng- 
Hshmen  of  the  liberal  school  espoused  the  cause  of  the 
South  during  the  beginning  of  the  American  Civil  War, 
since,  in  the  absence  of  any  clear  and  avowed  intent  on 
the  part  of  the  North  to  uproot  negro  slavery,  it  seemed 
merely  an  attempt  of  one  group  of  men  to  force  a  dis- 
tasteful system  of  government  upon  others  of  a  kindred, 
but  clearly  divergent,  type.^^ 

But  nationalism  is  not  only  a  disintegrating  factor. 
The  same  forces  that  led  to  Greece's  independence  were 
predominant  in  the  unification  of  Italy  and  of  Germany. 
Consciousness  of  kind  binds  the  like  together  and  divides 
the  unlike.  But  as  absolute  identity  is  never  attainable, 
even  if  it  were  desirable,  there  are  innumerable  grada- 
tions of  likeness  and  dissimilarity  —  myriad  co-existent 
foci  of  attraction  and  repulsion  between  individual  and 
individual,  between  group  and  group.     Hence,  national- 


48         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

ism  may  at  one  and  the  same  time  be  a  consolidating  and 
a  disintegrating  force,  not  only  as  between  two  nationally 
kindred  states,  but  even  within  the  same  body  politic. 

Nationalism  is,  however,  primarily  a  disintegrating 
force,  because  the  average  man's  imagination  and  out- 
look are  restricted  and  his  sympathies  and  co-operation 
are  more  readily  enlisted  for  the  affairs  of  his  immediate 
neighbours  than  for  those  of  the  larger  community.  It 
is  predominantly  outside  pressure  and  the  necessity  of 
uniting  to  withstand  it  that  compel  small  communities  to 
unite  into  larger  aggregates  for  the  defence  of  their  com- 
mon interests.  It  was  the  alien  Austrian  rule  and  the 
dread  of  its  re-imposition  that  made  and  kept  modem 
Italy  united.  Similarly,  from  joint  military  action  in  the 
war  against  France  sprang,  as  Bismarck  had  shrewdly 
calculated,  modern  Germany.  Secretary  of  State  Seward 
likewise  relied  upon  the  consolidating  effect  of  such  pres- 
sure from  without  when,  shortly  after  the  secession  of  the 
Southern  States,  he  urged  upon  President  Lincoln  the 
advisability  of  provoking  a  foreign  war  as  the  most  effi- 
cacious means  of  restoring  the  union. ^^  In  final  analy- 
sis also,  the  marked  trend  toward  greater  cohesion  in 
the  British  Empire  during  the  past  decades  has  been  the 
direct  reaction  to  the  international  tension  and,  in  es- 
pecial, to  the  German  menace. 

Manifestly,  the  differences  that  divide  the  Caucasian 
race  into  separate  nations  are  not  always  sharply  defined. 
They  are  frequently  impalpable  in  that  they  are  pre- 
dominantly psychological,   for  the  saying  that  a  man 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         49 

belongs  to  the  nation  to  which  he  thinks  he  belongs  is 
essentially  true.  Between  some  of  the  nations,  as  for 
instance  the  Spanish  Republics  of  South  America,  the 
differences  in  civilization  are  so  slight  that  these  states 
may  be  described  as  almost  constituting  one  nation  split 
by  the  memory  of  past  quarrels  and  by  present  conflicting 
interests  into  separate  political  entities.  The  same  is 
essentially  true  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
As  Professor  John  W.  Burgess  expressed  it,  "  a  nation 
may  be  divided  into  two  or  more  states  on  account  of  ter- 
ritorial separation  —  as,  for  example,  the  English  and  the 
North  American  —  and  one  of  the  results  of  this  division 
will  be  the  development  of  new  and  distinct  national 
traits."  i» 

That  the  English-speaking  and  Spanish-speaking 
nations  are  largely  inchoate  and  are  not  more  vital  reali- 
ties is  due  primarily  to  the  fact  that  the  respective  peoples 
of  these  two  clearly  defined  groups  are  far  from  being 
fully  conscious  of  their  common  nationality.  Such  con- 
sciousness is  essential.  Under  these  circumstances  and 
in  the  absence  of  outside  pressure  compelling  them  to 
join  forces  for  the  purpose  of  withstanding  an  imminent 
and  common  danger,  distinct  antagonisms  based  upon 
historical  causes  and  mutual  rivalries  may  even  establish 
themselves.  While  economic  facts  do  not  determine 
nationality  and  the  economic  units  into  which  some 
economists  divide  the  world  are  predominantly  historical 
and  political  products,  nationalism  is  prone  to  seek  ex- 
pression in  economic  policy.     Attempts  of  the  state  to 


50         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

make  itself  economically  strong,  and  thus  politically 
powerful,  accentuate  in  turn  whatever  divergent  interests 
may  exist  between  politically  separated  but  kindred 
national  groups.  By  such  means  are  intensified  differ- 
ences that  under  a  system  of  free  trade  would  have 
scarcely  more  disruptive  tendency  than  the  competitive 
economic  rivalry  between  man  and  man  within  the  state. 
Economic  conditions  are  not  a  constituent  factor  of 
nationality, ^°  but  the  economic  policy  of  the  state  may 
still  further  disintegrate  the  inherent  unity  of  a  nation 
divided  into  separate  political  entities;  and  it  may,  on 
the  other  hand,  give  some  measure  of  unity  to  a  state 
composed  of  distinct  and  even  antagonistic  nationalities. 
Conflicting  political  ambitions  and  economic  interests, 
the  memories  of  past  strife,  self -regarding  particularism, 
or  even  the  mere  dread  of  change,  may  keep  kindred 
nations  politically  apart.  But,  at  the  same  time,  similar 
forces,  above  all  the  fear  of  more  powerful  neighbours, 
may  keep  mutually  repellent  nations  within  the  same 
body  politic.  Before  the  war,  Magyar  and  German- 
Austrian  detested  one  another  in  full  sincerity,  but  their 
common  opposition  to  Russia,  their  combined  ambitions 
in  the  Balkans,  and  their  joint  exploitation  of  the  Slavonic 
and  other  subject  nationalities  that  constituted  a  majority 
of  the  Dual  Empire,  preserved  the  unity  of  Austria- 
Hungary. 

Throughout  the  nineteenth  century  there  was  a  well- 
defined  tendency  to  accentuate  the  differences  between 
man  and  man.     Local  institutions,  provincial  history  and 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY  51 

antiquities  were  cherished  and  studied  with  a  painstak- 
ing care,  almost  incomprehensible  to  those  outside  the 
range  of  these  interests.  Declining  or  moribund  lan- 
guages, like  Tzech,  Hungarian,  Dutch,  Flemish,  and 
Gaelic,  have  been  revitalized,  despite  the  fact  that  they  are 
a  distinct  handicap  in  that  their  use  is  necessarily  con- 
fined to  small  numbers.^^  In  some  instances,  mere  dia- 
lects have  been  nurtured  into  literary  languages.  Many 
minor  groups,  little  nations  or  fragments  of  larger  ones, 
known  as  nationalities,  have  been  called  into  distinct  self- 
consciousness.  Even  in  France,  where  nation  and  state 
are  possibly  most  completely  identified,  voices  are  raised 
claiming  that  Brittany  is  in  spirit  a  nation,  though  an  in- 
separable part  of  a  larger  one,  and  demanding  recogni- 
tion of  this  fact  in  the  political  field  as  well  as  the  public 
teaching  of  the  Celtic  tongue  such  as  obtains  in  the 
schools  of  Wales. ^^ 

This  process  of  differentiation  with  its  particularistic 
tendencies  may  to  a  great  extent  be  attributed,  as  has 
been  done  by  Lecky,  to  the  spread  of  education  and  to  the 
ensuing  increased  interest  in  all  human  affairs.^^  But, 
coincident  with  this  disruptive  tendency,  increased  knowl- 
edge has  had  integrating  effects,  some  of  which  are  far 
from  wholesome.  Thus,  increased  historical  knowledge 
has  led  to  an  aggressive  nationalism  that  seeks  to  re- 
create a  remote  past.  The  Germany  of  the  Middle  Ages 
—  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  with  its  theoretical  claims 
to  universal  dominion  in  all  things  temporal  —  is  a  potent 
clement    in    modem    German    aspirations.     Similarly, 


52         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

Serbia  looks  back  to  the  time  when  she  was  the  leading 
nation  in  the  Balkans,  The  same  is  true  of  Bulgaria. 
Though  the  Polish  nation  has  by  no  means  as  yet  been 
re-established,  some  Poles  are  already  thinking  of  the 
greater  Poland  of  the  Jagiello  Princes !  Likewise,  "  the 
Glory  that  was  Greece  and  the  Grandeur  that  was  Rome  " 
play  an  important  part  in  the  aspirations  of  those  who 
look  upon  themselves  as  the  direct  descendants  and  heirs 
of  these  ancient  states.  Other  instances  might  also  be 
cited.  Irredentism  is  by  no  means  solely  an  Italian  pol- 
icy. In  order  to  justify  modem  national  ambitions,  the 
real  past  has  in  many  cases  been  transfigured  and,  in 
some  instances  even,  a  mythical  golden  age  has  been 
created.  To  such  an  extent  has  this  been  done  that  there 
is  almost  full  warrant  for  Froude's  cynical  saying  that 
history  is  "  like  a  child's  box  of  letters,  with  which  we 
can  spell  any  word  we  please." 

But  the  spread  of  knowledge  has  likewise  had  integrat- 
ing effects  of  a  far  more  beneficent  character.  Increased 
education  has  led  to  a  fuller  knowledge  of  other  groups. 
The  intellectual  interdependence  of  the  western  world  has 
in  varying  degrees  counteracted  the  particularistic  tend- 
encies inherent  in  the  increasing  differentiation  into  well- 
defined  groups.  The  stranger  is  no  longer  fully  a 
stranger  and  can  be  regarded  with  some  measure  of  un- 
derstanding and  sympathy.  But  to  some  extent  still,  as 
in  the  case  of  religion,  loyalty  to  one's  national  kin,  fre- 
quently expresses  itself  less  in  devotion  to  the  nation's 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY  53 

highest  ideals,  than  in  depreciation  and  dislike  of  other 
groups.** 

Thus,  in  general,  nationalism  and  internationalism  have 
developed  side  by  side  throughout  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury. There  is  no  inherent  antagonism  between  the  two. 
As  has  been  finely  and  truly  said  by  Mr.  G.  Lowes  Dick- 
inson :     "  Internationalism  does  not  attack  the   feeling 

*  We  belong  to  ourselves.'     It  attacks  only  its  perversion, 

*  We  do  not  belong  to  you.'  "  ^^  In  spite  of  the  increas- 
ing group  differentiation,  mankind's  fundamental  unity 
has  during  the  past  hundred  years  received  ever  more  ex- 
tensive recognition  and,  at  the  same  time  also,  the  tend- 
ency has  been  to  establish  increasingly  large  political  ag- 
glomerations, some  of  which  are  based  upon  the  fullest 
consent  of  the  self-conscious  groups  within  them.  This 
development  has  been  made  feasible  by  the  abandonment 
of  the  old  idea  of  a  unicellular  state  and  the  develop- 
ment of  the  federal  system.  When  unmolested,  national 
self-consciousness  is  not  apt  to  threaten  the  integrity  of 
the  state,  and  its  political  significance  then  consists  merely 
in  a  tendency  towards  administrative  decentralization  and 
increased  local  self-government.  It  is  not  necessarily 
separatist.  But  when  thwarted  in  its  attempts  at  self- 
expression,  nationalism  becomes  a  disruptive  force  of 
first  magnitude.  Any  attempt  of  a  dominant  race  to 
impose  its  religion,  language,  and  civilization  upon  a 
reluctant  minor  nationality  within  the  state  stimulates  the 
tendency  towards  particularism  and  markedly  accentu- 


54         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

ates  the  growth  of  differences.  Polish  national  senti- 
ment had  been  powerfully  stimulated  by  the  persistent 
attempts  of  Germany  and  Russia  to  uproot  the  native 
language.  The  Southern  Slav  question  and  the  renas- 
cence of  Bohemian  nationality  are  due  largely  to  the  re- 
pressive policies  of  Austria  and  Hungary.  Whether  it 
be  in  the  Ukraine,  in  Croatia,  in  Bosnia,  in  Transylvania, 
or  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  wherever  national  feeling  is  a 
serious  menace  to  the  state's  integrity,  this  is  due  pre- 
dominantly to  the  pressure  of  a  ruling  majority.  Even 
the  memory  of  such  a  past,  as  in  Ireland,  is  an  influential 
factor.  But  wherever  a  broad  policy  is  pursued,  one  not 
based  on  the  principle  of  toleration  —  which  implies 
superiority  and  inferiority  —  but  upon  the  recognition 
of  the  inherent  right  of  all  groups  to  self-expression  and, 
as  a  consequence,  the  constituent  nations  are  allowed  full 
freedom  in  the  preservation  of  their  own  peculiar  lan- 
guages, religions,  and  customs,  then  the  disintegrating 
tendency  is  minimized  and  may  become  even  negligible. 
These  underlying  facts  will  ultimately  make  possible  a 
world-state.  At  present,  the  nearest  approach  to  such 
an  ideal  is  the  British  Commonwealth,  wherein  the  va- 
rious nations  constituting  its  four  hundred  and  fifty 
millions  live,  not  in  complete  concord,  which  can  never 
be  realized  in  a  progressive  world  of  divine  discontent, 
but  in  sufficient  harmony  to  render  possible  the  meting 
out  of  a  measure  of  necessarily  imperfect  justice  to  all 
under  the  rule  of  its  far-flung  law. 

As  a  result  of  the  growing  interdependence  of  the 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY  55 

world  and  its  increasing  internationalism,  the  comity 
of  nations  had  before  the  war  outstripped  that  of  states. 
Between  individual  and  individual  of  different  national 
groups  there  was  markedly  less  hostility  and,  except  in 
Eastern  Europe,  the  antagonism  between  nation  and  na- 
tion as  such  had  greatly  declined.  In  every  field  of 
thought  and  activity,  the  western  world  was  closely  in- 
terrelated. There  were  even  in  existence  some  rudimen- 
tary organs  of  international  government.  But  legally 
the  world  was  divided  into  sharply  defined  units.  In  or- 
dinary times  of  peace,  the  consciousness  of  the  state  is 
largely  latent  and  the  most  real  associations  of  the  aver- 
age individual  are  with  religious,  scientific,  industrial, 
commercial,  labour,  and  other  professional  groups,  many 
of  which  cut  across  the  state  frontiers.  But,  as  a  con- 
sequence of  the  lack  of  interstate  organization,  when- 
ever the  state  is  in  danger  the  citizen  must  ruthlessly 
sever  all  ties  extending  beyond  its  bounds.  Under  the 
existing  international  anarchy,  the  ultimate  dedication 
must  be  to  the  state  and  not  to  mankind  as  a  whole.  The 
layman  or  official,  whose  final  allegiance  is  to  the  un- 
organized society  of  states,  is  inevitably  regarded  as  not 
only  derelict  in  his  duty  but  as  a  traitor.  The  so-called 
self -regarding  nationalism,  to  which  is  generally  attrib- 
uted the  conditions  that  made  this  war  possible,  is  not 
primarily  the  product  of  the  relations  existing  between 
nation  and  nation,  but  it  is  chiefly  the  inevitable  result  of 
the  anarchy  that  must  prevail  in  a  world  of  sovereign 
states.     Not  that  the  feelings  of  nation  to  nation,  as 


56         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

opposed  to  those  of  state  to  state,  were  without  antagon- 
ism. On  the  contrary,  there  was  considerable  antipathy, 
but  this  was  rapidly  decreasing  especially  in  the  most 
advanced  western  nations.  But  under  the  existing  in- 
terstate anarchy,  states  are  perforce  in  a  position  of  dis- 
trust and  suspicion  and  their  governments  cannot  es- 
cape from  acting  upon  competitive,  as  distinct  from  co- 
operative, principles.  Those  entrusted  with  foreign  af- 
fairs can  scarcely  avoid  disregarding  the  interests  of 
mankind  whenever  they  seem  to  be  in  conflict  with  those 
of  the  state. 

Hence,  before  the  war,  although  the  most  enlightened 
opinion  throughout  the  western  world,  especially  in  Eng- 
lish-speaking countries,  favoured  the  creation  of  some 
effective  super-state  authority  that  would  eliminate  the 
possibility  of  a  world  war,  the  problem  could  not  even 
be  adequately  approached  because  no  state  was  willing  to 
limit  its  sovereignty.  The  people  were  far  more  ready 
for  a  radical  solution  than  were  the  governments.  These 
were  bound  fast  by  the  view  that  above  all  else  it  was 
necessary  to  maintain  unimpaired  the  sovereignty  of  their 
respective  states.  The  war  has  to  some  extent  reversed 
this  situation.  The  governments  now  recognize  the  ne- 
cessity of  some  super-state  authority,  but  national  feel- 
ing has  become  so  exacerbated  that  the  prerequisite  basis 
for  the  effective  operation  of  such  an  all-inclusive  organ- 
ization has  been  undermined.  The  extensive  nature  of 
the  war  and  its  intensive  conduct  have  brought  non- 
combatant  as  well  as  combatant  within  its  direct  ravages ; 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         57 

while,  at  the  same  time,  details  of  every  phase  of  its 
course,  which  in  former  conflicts  reached  but  small  cir- 
cles, have  been  made  by  the  press  the  common  property 
of  all.  In  no  previous  war  has  each  people  been  so  fully 
and  intimately  acquainted  with  "  the  crimes  and  misdeeds 
of  the  enemy."  German  atrocities  in  Belgium  and  in 
Northern  France,  the  bombardment  of  peaceful  towns, 
the  Zeppelin  raids,  the  submarine  campaign,  the  brutali- 
ties in  Poland  ^^ —  everything  comprised  in  the  policy  of 
"  frightfulness  " —  the  Turkish  massacres  in  Armenia, 
and  the  Austro-Hungarian  outrages  in  Serbia,^^  have 
created  a  barrier  whose  temporary  nature  would  not  be 
light-heartedly  affirmed  if  it  were  remembered  that  Crom- 
well's deeds  in  Ireland  are  still  a  factor  in  keeping  the 
English  and  Irish  peoples  apart.  The  peoples  of  Cen- 
tral Europe  have  likewise  some  grievances  and,  no  mat- 
ter how  insignificant  relatively  they  actually  be,  in  their 
eyes  they  bulk  very  large.  Nor  does  it  matter  much  that 
the  Allied  blockade  is  a  time-honoured  measure  of  war; 
so  long  as  the  Teutonic  peoples  think  the  so-called  "star- 
vation policy  "  not  only  unlawful  but  heinous,  this  fact 
will  from  their  side  strengthen  and  raise  the  barrier  that 
their  own  conduct  of  the  war  had  already  established 
between  the  belligerent  peoples. 

As  a  result  there  has  developed  a  marked  fissure  in  the 
unity  of  western  civilization.  The  cleavage  was  already 
present  before  1914,  but  the  outbreak  and  the  course  of 
the  war  have  so  broadened  and  deepened  it  that  the  abyss 
in  view  is  formidable.     It  cannot  be  concealed  by  make- 


58         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

shift  contrivances  or  by  elaborate  bridges;  and  the  mills 
of  the  gods  grind  too  slowly  to  warrant  the  hope  of  its 
disappearance  for  a  number  of  decades.  Hence,  the  con- 
ditions are  really  less  favourable  for  the  establishment 
of  an  effective  aU-inclusive  super-state  authority  than 
t;hey  were  before  the  war.  One  may  be  created,  but  it 
will  have  no  real  vitality  until  the  suspicions  aroused  by 
Germany's  disregard  of  her  plighted  word  towards  Bel- 
gium are  dispelled.  Without  mutual  trust  in  one  an- 
other's good  faith,  there  can  be  no  real  interstate  co- 
operation in  fundamental  matters.  Suspicion  was  rife 
before,  but  for  decades  to  come  it  will  thoroughly  perme- 
ate the  atmosphere  of  all  international  conferences,  con- 
gresses, and  councils  composed  of  the  present  adver- 
saries. The  development  has,  however,  not  been  one  of 
unqualified  retrogression.  While  this  cleavage  in  west- 
em  unity  has  been  laid  bare  and  enlarged,  the  peoples 
divided  by  this  abyss  have  been  drawn  into  much  closer 
relations  with  those  ranged  on  their  own  side  of  it. 
Their  alliances,  as  a  consequence,  will  in  the  future  have 
a  much  broader  democratic  basis. 

Hitherto,  these  alliances  have  been  predominantly 
those  of  governments,  not  of  peoples ;  and  their  compell- 
ing motive  has  been  fear,  rather  than  any  mutual  attrac- 
tion. This  system  of  alliances  was  the  result  of  the  new 
conditions  created  by  the  rise  of  modern  Germany  after 
the  successive  defeats  of  Denmark,  Austria,  and  France 
from  1864  to  1 87 1.  Bismarck,  the  master-builder  of 
the  German  Empire,  was  not  looking  for  new  fields  to 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY  59 

conquer  but,  in  his  satiety,  sought  to  render  secure  the 
elaborate  structure.  He  frankly  admitted  that  the  idea 
of  hostile  coalitions  gave  him  a  nightmare.  Dreading 
such  a  union  of  Russia,  France,  and  Austria-Hungary, 
he  turned  to  the  latter  country  and,  in  1879,  concluded  a 
defensive  alliance  with  it.  On  many  grounds,  Bismarck 
vi^ould  have  preferred  an  alliance  with  Russia  and,  as  he 
tells  us,  such  an  arrangement  "was  popular  with  nearly 
all  parties."  ^®  The  alliance  actually  concluded  was  pre- 
dominantly one  of  governments;  its  popular  basis  was  at 
the  outset  most  slender,  though  since  then  it  has  con- 
siderably broadened.  Three  years  later,  in  1882,  Italy 
joined  these  two  Powers  and  in  this  alliance  were  even 
more  conspicuous  the  element  of  fear  and  the  absence  of 
a  democratic  factor.  Originally,  the  alliance  was  entered 
upon,  not  out  of  good  will  towards  the  Central  Powers, 
but  mainly  on  account  of  resentment  against  France  for 
acquiring  a  protectorate  over  Tunis  which  Italy  cov- 
eted.*® As  time  went  on,  this  alliance,  which  ran  coun- 
ter to  national  instincts,  was  kept  intact  chiefly  be- 
cause it  secured  Italy  from  the  hostility  of  Austria,  her 
traditional  enemy.  The  year  after  the  formation  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  Rumania  joined  this  group  on  the  same 
terms  as  had  Italy.^''  Here  again  the  same  negative 
forces  were  at  work.^*  This  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
remarks  of  the  Rumanian  statesman.  Take  Jonesco. 
Some  years  ago,  as  he  related  the  tale,  "  when  two  Min- 
isters of  Foreign  Affairs,  one  retired,  the  other  in  office, 
asked  me  at  Paris  how  it  was  possible  that  we  could  be 


6o         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

Allies  of  Hungary,  we  who  could  never  become  a  great 
country  except  at  the  expense  of  Hungary,  I  answered  — 
*  and  the  alliance  of  Italy  with  Austria,  do  you  under- 
stand that  ?  '  And  when  they  said  to  me,  *  Certainly,  it 
is  an  alliance  of  fear,'  I  replied  — '  Why  do  you  think 
that  Italy  alone  is  afraid?  '  "  ^^ 

The  Triple  Alliance,  although  originally  wholly  de- 
fensive in  character,  gravely  disturbed  the  European  Bal- 
ance and  inevitably  aroused  serious  misgivings  in  Russia 
and  France,  who  gradually  drifted  together  until,  in  1894, 
a  series  of  prior  agreements  culminated  in  a  similar  de- 
fensive alliance.  As  the  historian  of  this  development 
has  said,  both  France  and  Russia  were  suffering  from 
*'  I' hypertrophic  de  la  puissance  allemande  "  and  both  real- 
ized the  necessity  of  an  equilibrium  in  Europe.^^  This 
alliance  again  was  not  based  upon  popular  sympathies, 
but  on  fear. 

While  in  this  manner  a  fairly  stable  equilibrium  was 
being  established  in  Europe,  England  stood  in  general 
aloof  from  both  combinations.  Despite  a  tendency  to 
gravitate  towards  the  Central  Powers  due  to  the  dread 
of  Russian  expansion  in  Asia  and  to  annoyance  at 
France's  uncertain  colonial  policy,  these  were  really  years 
of  so-called  "  splendid  isolation."  ^*  This  policy  of  aloof- 
ness could,  however,  no  longer  be  maintained  after  Ger- 
many by  word  and  deed  had  plainly  manifested  exten- 
sive colonial  ambitions  and  was  building  a  navy  of  such 
extent  as  to  threaten  the  safety  of  the  British  Common- 
wealth.   With  Japan  was  concluded  an  alliance  that  per- 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         6i 

mitted  the  withdrawal  of  considerable  naval  forces  from 
the  Pacific.  Then  followed  successive  agreements  with 
France  and  Russia  that  eliminated  all  outstanding  dis- 
putes with  them  and  paved  the  way  for  the  co-operation 
of  the  three  contracting  Powers  in  international  affairs. 
It  would,  however,  require  abnormally  acute  discern- 
ment to  perceive  in  these  arrangements  any  marked  dem- 
ocratic elements.  They  were  primarily  agreements 
between  governments  to  meet  the  impending  German  on- 
slaught. 

One  of  the  most  far-reaching  results  of  the  war  prom- 
ises to  be  a  significant  change  in  the  nature  of  these 
alliances.  We  are  to-day  very  remote  from  the  eight- 
eenth century  when  alliances  were  largely  based  upon 
dynastic  considerations  and  when  the  partners  in  them 
changed  with  astonishing  celerity  and  frequency.  We 
are  also  rapidly  leaving  behind  the  age  of  merely  gov- 
ernmental alliances  based  chiefly  upon  the  negative  fac- 
tor of  fear.  As  a  result  of  the  stress  of  a  war  demand- 
ing untold  sacrifices  and  the  most  unselfish  collaboration, 
what  were  at  the  outset  predominantly  governmental  ar- 
rangements are  rapidly  becoming  co-operative  associa- 
tions of  peoples.  A  broad  and  firm  popular  basis  for 
these  alliances  is  being  gradually  developed.  This  is  es- 
pecially true  as  regards  the  democratic  combination  that 
aims  to  resist  the  aggression  of  Teutonic  autocracy  and 
to  quell  the  rebellion  of  the  Central  Powers  against  the 
free  and  progressive  spirit  of  western  civilization.  In 
the  relations  of  each  to  every  other  member  of  this  demo- 


62         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

cratic  group,  the  popular  element  will  vary  in  proportion 
to  the  amount  of  reciprocal  sympathy  and  understanding 
developed  and  must,  now  and  in  the  future,  depend  upon 
the  more  or  less  close  approximation  of  their  respective 
national  ideals.  But,  unless  Germany  is  so  decisively 
vanquished  that  all  danger  of  renewed  aggression  is  com- 
pletely eliminated,  the  element  of  fear  will  still  consti- 
tute an  important  factor  of  cohesion. 

It  is  reasonably  certain  that  the  two  existing  sets  of 
opposing  alliances  will,  in  some  form  or  other,  remain 
in  existence.  It  is  idle  to  expect  them  to  be  abandoned 
just  when  they  are  becoming  living  institutions.  They 
are  and  will  for  some  time  continue  to  be,  the  most  vital 
and  real  facts  in  interstate  relations.  They  cannot  with 
impunity  be  ignored  by  those  who  plan  to  organize  the 
world  and  to  create  a  supernational  authority.  That  or- 
ganization will  necessarily  have  to  rest  largely  upon  them. 
If  an  all-inclusive  league  of  states  to  enforce  peace  be 
established,  its  membership  will  for  a  considerable  time 
probably  consist  of  three  classes,  the  neutrals  during  the 
war  and  the  two  groups  of  erstwhile  belligerents.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  proposed  "  League  of  Honour  " 
be  restricted  to  the  world's  democracies,  this  concert  of 
purpose  and  action  would  be  predominantly  the  present 
alliance  against  the  Teutonic  Powers,  though  probably 
more  definitely  organized  and  presumably  also  endowed 
with  a  continuing  programme  for  maintaining  and  ex- 
tending the  public  right  of  the  world.  Whether  it  be  the 
all-inclusive  league  or  the  democratic  concert,  the  al- 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY         63 

liances  will  probably  continue  at  least  until  the  super- 
national  organization  has  satisfactorily  demonstrated  its 
full  effectiveness  as  a  bulwark  of  freedom.  In  fact, 
these  alliances  and  the  less  formal  associations  in  this 
war  against  Prussianism  may  in  some  instances  produce 
far  more  durable  results.  To  the  extent  that  they  are 
associations  of  peoples  based  upon  mutual  sympathy  and 
respect  and  dedicated  to  a  common  high  purpose,  they 
may  eventually  lead  to  a  new  form  of  political  union, 
unknown  to  a  political  science  whose  chief  concern  is  the 
state  of  indivisible  and  absolute  sovereignty.  Unless 
within  the  proposed  supernational  league  there  goes  on  a 
process  of  ever  closer  and  closer  association  between  the 
states  whose  people  are  nearest  akin  so  that  ultimately 
permanent  political  union  result  therefrom,  there  is  but 
scant  prospect  that  mankind  will  ever  emerge  from  the 
darkness  of  international  anarchy  into  the  full  sunlight 
of  a  world-wide  system  of  order  and  justice. 


Ill 

AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914 


"Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be  never  to  en- 
tangle ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe,  our  second  never  to 
suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  with  Cis-Atlantic  affairs.  Amer- 
ica, North  and  South,  has  a  set  of  interests  distinct  from  those 
of  Europe,  and  peculiarly  her  own.  She  should  therefore  have 
a  system  of  her  own,  separate  and  apart  from  that  of  Europe. 
— Thomas  Jefferson  to  James  Monroe, 

October  24,  1823. 


CHAPTER  III 

American  Foreign  Policy  Before  19 14 

Introductory  —  American  Political  Philosophy  and  Ideals  — 
Non-interference  in  Europe  —  The  Monroe  Doctrine  —  Opin- 
ions of  the  Elder  Statesmen  —  The  Policy  of  Non-intervention 

—  The  Assumption  of  Obligations  in  America  and  the  Far  East 

—  Some  Results  of  the  Policy  of  Isolation. 

The  modern  system  of  sovereign  states  divides  the 
world  into  sharply  segregated  politico-legal  units.  To 
the  extent  that  this  segregation  is  inconsistent  with  the 
growing  social,  cultural,  and  economic  unity  of  western 
civilization,  these  entities  are  somewhat  artificial.  This 
system,  however,  determines  the  spirit  and  nature  of 
interstate  relations.  As  a  result  thereof,  each  one  of 
these  states  is  primarily,  if  not  exclusively,  interested  in 
its  own  welfare  and,  in  pursuing  it,  tends  to  disregard 
the  rights  and  interests  of  its  fellows  and  to  ignore  those 
of  mankind  as  a  whole.  Under  existing  conditions,  it  is 
impossible  for  the  statesman  or  for  the  layman  to  act 
upon  the  principle  proclaimed  by  Mazzini :  "  You  are 
men  before  you  are  citizens  or  fathers."  ^ 

At  the  same  time,  however,  the  fundamental  unity  of 
mankind,  or  at  least  of  certain  great  portions  thereof, 
which  had  never  been  wholly  obscured  since  the  days 

67 


68         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

of  the  Stoics,  has  prevented  "the  final  and  deliberate 
outward  recognition  of  the  view  that  States  have  no 
duties  to  one  another  and  that  the  international  polity 
is  a  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms."  ^  But  in  case  of 
conflict  of  interest  between  state  and  mankind  and  be- 
tween state  and  state,  the  citizen  must  ineluctably  give 
his  ultimate  dedication  and  supreme  allegiance  to  his 
own  country.  It  follows  inevitably  from  this  situation 
that  states  are  forced  into  competitive  relations^  and 
that  those  in  charge  of  their  foreign  affairs  cannot  in 
all  respects  conform  to  the  ethical  code  binding  upon 
individuals.*  As  long  as  the  interests  of  the  state  are 
declared  paramount,  foreign  policy  must  be  dictated  by 
more  or  less  selfish  considerations.  All  states  are  in 
varying  degrees  infected  with  this  self -regarding  nation- 
alism, which  is  the  fundamental  cause  of  the  present 
war  and  which  will  cause  further  catastrophes  in  the 
future  unless  the  state  can  be  effectively  controlled  by 
some  adequate  and  practical  form  of  world-organiza- 
tion. Apparently,  such  a  consummation  cannot  be  fully 
realized  for  a  considerable  time,  because  the  sense  of 
international  obligation  and  responsibility  —  the  willing- 
ness to  forego  or  even  to  jeopard  national  advantage  in 
mutual  service  for  mankind  as  a  whole  —  is  more  or 
less  undeveloped  in  all  states  and,  hence,  virtually  no 
state  is  willing  to  limit  its  freedom  and  independence  to 
the  extent  necessary  to  establish  an  effective  supema- 
tional  authority. 

At  one  extreme  in  the  world  of  to-day  is  a  state  like 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914      69 

the  German  Empire  which,  goaded  on  by  the  aggressive 
tenets  of  a  reactionary  economic  and  political  philosophy, 
impelled  by  an  almost  pagan  worship  of  the  God  of 
War  and  at  the  same  time  imbued  with  the  self-imposed 
mission  to  redeem  a  "  decadent  world,"  ^  rides  rough-shod 
over  the  rights  of  others.  At  the  other  pole  is  England, 
whose  policy  is  not  only  controlled  by  powerful  moral 
inhibitions  but,  in  addition,  has  been  tempered  by  two 
generations  of  free  trade  and  by  centuries  of  intimate 
contact  with  most  diverse  peoples  in  all  corners  of  the 
globe.  As  the  head  of  a  world-wide  Commonwealth, 
whose  persistence  depends  upon  its  performing  a  world- 
function,  she  has  fully  learned  the  value  of  the  maxim, 
"  Live  and  let  live."  Had  this  vast  Empire  been  admin- 
istrated primarily  for  selfish  national  purposes,  its  ex- 
istence would  long  since  have  been  challenged  by  a  united 
Europe.  What  was  lacking  in  British  policy  was  not 
adequate  consideration  for  the  rights  and  interests  of 
other  states,  but  the  willingness  fully  and  betimes  to 
assume  the  responsibility  of  ensuring  peace  in  Europe. 
In  spite  of  the  fact  that  England  for  years  persistently 
strove  to  avert  the  threatening  world  war,  she  cannot 
escape  some  degree  of  negative  responsibility  for*  it, 
chiefly  in  that  she  refused  to  assume  the  unwelcome 
burden  of  adequate  military  preparedness  and  thus  in- 
directly encouraged  Germany  in  her  plan  to  dominate 
Europe  and  the  world.  The  responsibility  is  radically 
different  in  kind  and  degree  from  that  of  Germany  and 
must  be  shared  by  other  states,  some  belligerent  and 


70         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

some  neutral,  all  of  whom  have  over-emphasized  their 
rights  and  have  either  minimized  or  ignored  the  com- 
plementary obligations  to  the  still  unorganized  world- 
community  of  states.  Almost,  if  not  equally  as  disas- 
trous to  the  civilization  of  the  world  as  are  the  aims 
and  acts  of  Germany,  was  the  traditional  attitude  of  the 
United  States  which,  immersed  in  concern  for  its  own 
peace  and  liberty,  had  until  19 17  adhered  to  a  policy 
of  "  no  foreign  entanglements  "  outside  the  western  hemi- 
sphere that  is  tantamount  to  a  repudiation  of  all  respon- 
sibility for  maintaining  justice  and  right  in  interstate 
relations  other  than  such  as  directly  affected  the  Ameri- 
can continents. 

It  follows  from  these  premises  that  the  United  States 
cannot  escape  a  certain  degree  of  negative  responsibility 
for  the  deplorable  chaos  into  which  civilization  has 
fallen.  American  idealism  and  American  practice  in 
foreign  policy  presented  a  strange  contrast.  For*  al- 
though German  political  philosophy  has  been  widely 
taught  in  the  United  States  by  scientists  trained  in  Ger- 
man universities,  its  tenets  have  not  become  an  integral 
part  of  general  thought.  Above  all,  its  doctrines,  when 
accepted,  had  not  been  pushed  to  their  logical  extremes. 
The  German  theory  of  the  state  is  of  ancient  lineage  and 
has  profound  roots  in  German  thought  and  practice,^  and 
consequently  it  may  be  valid  in  so  far  as  the  German 
state  is  concerned.  This  is  not  questioned  here.  But 
when  an  American  speaks  of  the  state  as  an  organism, 
he  is  using  a  metaphor.'^     Nor  do  his  anthropomorphic 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914      71 

tendencies  lead  him  to  endow  the  state  with  living  per- 
sonality.® In  the  eyes  of  most  Americans,  this  German 
concept  of  the  state  as  a  living  organism  with  no  moral 
responsibility  but  to  itself,  is  a  metaphysical  abstraction 
corresponding  in  no  degree  to  an  actuality  within  their 
experience.  And  if,  at  times,  the  state  is  regarded  by 
Americans  as  a  persona  iicta,  the  fictitious  element  is, 
in  general,  always  kept  in  mind.  Nor  would  Americans 
agree  with  the  predominant  Grerman  view  that  the  state 
is  based  upon  constraint  and  power,  and  that  in  deter- 
mining the  inner  character  of  any  state  it  is  essen- 
tial to  find  out  whom  the  army  obeys.®  As  Ameri- 
cans view  it,  their  state  is  not  based  upon  power 
but  upon  general  consent,  and  the  body  politic  is 
a  co-operative  group  for  furthering  the  welfare  and 
the  ideals  of  the  individuals  composing  li}^  Hence, 
American  political  thought,  unlike  that  of  Germany,  does 
not  make  the  organization  an  end  in  itself,  to  which  the 
individual  must  be  completely  subordinated,^^  and  whose 
aim  must  inevitably  be  the  quest  of  power.^^  Liberty 
might,  somewhat  loosely,  be  named  as  the  American 
state's  supreme  end.  Nor  is  the  German  visualization 
I  of  the  world  as  an  incoherent  group  of  inherently  antag- 
onistic states,  each  a  law  unto  itself,  in  accord  with 
American  political  traditions  and  ideals.  The  value  of 
the  state  is  not  over-emphasized  nor  are  the  rights  and 
importance  of  mankind  as  a  whole  ignored.  The  pre- 
vailing concept  is  that  of  a  morally  responsible  state  con- 
forming to  the  public  opinion  of  the  still  unorganized 


Tz         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

world-community.  There  has  always  been  implicit  in 
American  thought  the  ideal  of  such  an  ultimate  com- 
munity based  on  the  essential  unity  of  humanity. 
America  is  deeply  impregnated  with  the  Kantian  aim  of 
universal  peace,  while  modern  Germany  generally  holds 
that  the  hope  of  banishing  war  from  the  world  is  not 
only  senseless,  but  deeply  immoral. ^^  Practically  noth- 
ing effective,  however,  had  been  done  by  the  United 
States  to  make  this  ideal  an  eventual  possibility.  It 
had  been  debarred  from  doing  so  by  the  deliberate  policy 
of  aloofness  from  European  affairs. 

The  traditional  American  course  of  self-centred  isola- 
tion was  the  joint  product  of  factors  within  the  body 
politic  and  of  conditions  in  a  Europe  almost  completely 
subject  to  autocracy  at  the  time  of  this  policy's  formula- 
tion. American  political  life  has  been  largely  dominated 
by  three  concepts  —  independence,  union,  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  The  independence  gained  after  years  of  strug- 
gle is  deemed  a  sacrosanct  heritage  that  should  not  in 
the  least  be  impaired.  This  ideal  of  independence  is 
interwoven  with  the  concept  of  sovereignty  and  both  have 
been  somewhat  technically  interpreted  by  the  lawyers, 
whose  influence  in  American  political  life  overshadows 
that  of  all  other  groups.  Most  of  these  lawyers  have 
sat  at  the  feet  of  Blackstone  and  his  definition  of  sov- 
ereignty as  "  the  supreme,  irresistible,  absolute,  uncon- 
trolled authority "  has  played  a  considerable  part  in 
American  history.  The  legalistic  bent  of  American  pub- 
lic men  and  the  intense  devotion  of  the  people  to  every- 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914      73 

thing  associated  with  independence  have  had  their  share 
in  keeping  the  United  States  aloof  from  Europe.  In 
addition,  and  as  in  the  case  of  all  English-speaking  peo- 
ples, American  political  thought  and  action  have  been 
largely  devoted  to  insistence  upon  the  rights  of  indi- 
viduals. What  Mazzini  called  "  the  sterile  Declaration 
of  Rights"  seemed  to  most  Americans  to  embody  the 
doctrines  essential  to  a  well-ordered  society.  The  pre- 
vailing political  creed  was,  and  to  some  extent  still  is, 
predominantly  the  individualistic  and  negative  one  of 
rights,  and  there  has  been  a  marked,  though  rapidly 
decreasing,  tendency  to  ignore  the  complementary  obli- 
gations. When  applied  in  interstate  relations,  this  atti- 
tude resulted  in  a  stress  on  the  value  of  American 
rights  together  with  a  notable  unwillingness  to  assume 
responsibilities  for  the  welfare  of  the  interstate  com- 
munity. The  conjoint  result  of  these  factors  is  that, 
while  the  United  States  advocated  the  highest  ideals  of 
international  comity,  no  other  state  was,  at  the  same 
time,  more  reluctant  to  restrict  its  freedom  of  action  by 
positive  and  active  co-operation  with  others  in  attaining 
this  goal. 

Many  of  the  fundamental  features  of  American  for- 
eign policy  —  insistence  upon  the  "  impregnable  inde- 
pendence and  the  equal  sovereignty  of  the  United  States 
with  any  or  all  other  nations  of  the  world,"  the  develop- 
ment of  the  doctrine  and  practice  of  absolute  neutrality, 
the  assertion  of  the  principle  of  the  freedom  of  the 
seas,  the  advocacy  of  international  arbitration,  and  the 


74         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

conclusion  of  extradition  treaties  —  date  from  Washing- 
ton's Administration,  when  an  embattled  Europe  pre- 
sented many  difficult  problems  to  the  young  Republic.^* 
But  even  more  far-reaching  than  were  these  specific  lines 
of  action,  was  the  general  policy,  adumbrated  earlier, 
but  clearly  outlined  by  Washington  in  his  famous  Fare- 
well Address  of  1796.     Herein  he  stated: 

"  The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to  foreign  nations 
is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations,  to  have  with  them 
as  little  political  connection  as  possible.  .  .  .  Europe  has  a  set 
of  primary  interests,  which  to  us  have  no,  or  a  very  remote, 
relation.  Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies, 
the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns. 
Hence  therefore  it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves, 
by  artificial  ties,  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her  politics,  or 
the  ordinary  combinations  and  collusions  of  her  friendships  or 
enmities.  Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites  and  en- 
ables us  to  pursue  a  different  course.  ...  It  is  our  true  policy 
to  steer  clear  of  permanent  alliances  with  any  portion  of  the 
foreign  world." 

This  advice  of  Washington  has  been  taken  literally, 
quite  apart  from  the  conditions  that  suggested  its  wis- 
dom to  him,  and  it  is  furthermore  usually  ignored  that 
in  the  same  address  he  not  only  advised  an  honourable 
adherence  to  the  existing  defensive  alliance  with  France, 
but  in  addition  stated  that,  "  taking  care  always  to  keep 
ourselves,  by  suitable  establishments  on  a  respectable  de- 
fensive position,  we  may  safely  trust  to  temporary  alli- 
ances for  extraordinary  emergencies." 

Five  years  thereafter,  in  his  notable  first  inaugural 
address,  Jefferson  advocated  the  same  general  attitude 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914      75 

in  the  following  trenchant  words :  "  Peace,  commerce, 
and  honest  friendship  with  all  nations,  entangling  alli- 
ances with  none."  ^^  At  the  same  time,  in  a  famous  letter 
to  Thomas  Paine,  he  elaborated  these  views,  writing: 
"  We  shall  avoid  implicating  ourselves  with  the  Powers 
of  Europe,  even  in  support  of  principles  which  we  mean 
to  pursue.  They  have  so  many  other  interests  different 
from  ours  that  we  must  avoid  being  entangled  in 
them."  i« 

This  principle  of  abstention  from  interference  in  Euro- 
pean affairs  formed  one  of  the  corner-stones  of  American 
foreign  policy  prior  to  19 14.  The  other  was  definitely 
laid  only  in  1823  when  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  formu- 
lated, but  it  was  a  logical  consequence  of  the  former 
action.  As  early  as  1808,  Jefferson  wrote  that  the  object 
"  must  be  to  exclude  all  European  influence  from  this 
hemisphere  "  ;'^'^  and,  twelve  years  later,  he  emphasized 
"  the  advantages  of  a  cordial  fraternization  among  all 
the  American  nations,  and  the  importance  of  their  co- 
alescing in  an  American  system  of  policy  totally  inde- 
pendent of  and  unconnected  with  that  of  Europe."  ^* 
From  Monroe's  famous  message  dates  the  definitive 
adoption  of  these  two  correlative  principles  as  inflexible 
rules  of  action.  This  outcome  was,  however,  not  reached 
without  some  struggle  which  served  to  emphasize  that  a 
clear-cut  parting  of  the  ways  had  been  reached. 

There  were,  at  that  time,  three  important  movements 
in  the  world  that  deeply  appealed  to  the  American  people. 
Greece  was  attempting  to  free  herself  from  the  Turkish 


76         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

yoke  and  the  South  American  colonies  had  all  but  suc- 
ceeded in  severing  their  political  ties  with  Spain.  In 
that  country  a  revolution  against  the  absolutist  Bourbon 
monarchy  was  in  full  swing  and  France,  acting  under  a 
mandate  of  the  Continental  Powers,  was  intervening  by 
force  to  suppress  the  uprising.  Furthermore,  it  was 
feared,  and  not  without  reason,  that  as  soon  as  Spanish 
liberalism  was  crushed,  the  reactionary  Concert  of  Eu- 
rope would  attempt  to  restore  Spanish  America  to  her 
former  European  allegiance.  South  America  was  far 
more  closely  connected  by  military^®  and  commercial 
ties  with  England  than  with  the  United  States,  and  her 
future  naturally  aroused  great  interest  there.  In  this 
conjuncture,  the  British  Foreign  Secretary,  George  Can- 
ning, suggested  to  Richard  Rush,  the  American  repre- 
sentative at  the  Court  of  St.  James,  that  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  should  co-operate  in  opposing  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  European  Concert  to  re-sub- 
ject South  America  to  Spanish  rule.  When  President 
Monroe  received  this  offer,  he  forthwith  sought  the  ad- 
vice of  his  experienced  predecessors  in  office,  Jefferson 
and  Madison.^^ 

Jefferson  fully  appreciated  the  momentous  nature  of 
the  question  and,  in  reply,  wrote :  "  Our  first  and  funda- 
mental maxim  should  be  never  to  entangle  ourselves  in 
the  broils  of  Europe,  our  second  never  to  suffer  Europe 
to  intermeddle  with  Cis- Atlantic  affairs.  America,  North 
and  South,  has  a  set  of  interests  distinct  from  those 
of  Europe,  and  peculiarly  her  own.     She  should  there- 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914     ^7 

fore  have  a  system  of  her  own,  separate  and  apart  from 
that  of  Europe.  While  the  last  is  labouring  to  become 
the  domicile  of  despotism  our  endeavour  should  surely 
be  to  make  our  hemisphere  that  of  freedom." 

These  historic  words  are  usually  quoted  apart  from 
their  context  in  order  to  justify  a  policy  far  other  than 
that  actually  advocated  by  Jefferson.  For  the  aged 
statesman  further  pointed  out  that  one  European  state, 
most  of  all,  could  frustrate  this  outcome  and  that,  by- 
accepting  Great  Britain's  proffer  of  co-operation,  the 
United  States  would  "detach  her  from  the  band  of 
despots,  bring  her  mighty  weight  into  the  scale  of  free 
government  and  emancipate  a  continent  at  one  stroke." 
Great  Britain,  he  continued,  "  is  the  nation  which  can 
do  us  the  most  harm  of  any  one,  or  all,  on  earth;  and 
with  her  on  our  side  we  need  not  fear  the  whole  world. 
With  her  then  we  should  the  most  sedulously  cherish 
a  cordial  friendship;  and  nothing  would  tend  more  to 
knit  our  affections  than  to  be  fighting  once  more,  side 
by  side,  in  the  same  cause."  ^^ 

Madison  entirely  concurred  with  Jefferson  and  went 
even  further.  He  advised  the  acceptance  of  Canning's 
offer  because  "with  that  co-operation  we  have  nothing 
to  fear  from  the  rest  of  Europe;  and  with  it  the  best 
reliance  on  success  to  our  just  &  laudable  views,"  "  Our 
co-operation,"  he  added,  "  is  due  to  ourselves  &  to  the 
world:  and  whilst  it  must  ensure  success  in  the  event  of 
an  appeal  to  force,  it  doubles  the  chance  of  success  with- 
out    that    appeal."     Furthermore,     Madison     queried: 


78         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

"  Will  it  not  be  honourable  to  our  country  &  possibly 

not  altogether  in  vain,   to   invite  the   British   Gov*  to 

extend  the  avowed  disapprobation  of  the  project  ag^  the 

Spanish  Colonies,  to  the  enterprise  of  France  ag^*  Spain 

herself;  and  even  to  join  in  some  declaratory  act  in 
behalf  of  the  Greeks? "22 

President  ^Monroe,  who  independently  was  inclining 
towards  the  opinion  that  the  present  exigency  justified 
a  departure  from  the  "  sound  maxim  "  of  political  isola- 
tion, was  confirmed  in  this  opinion  by  the  advice  of  his 
predecessors.^^  His  Secretary  of  State,  John  Quincy 
Adams,  however,  vigorously  dissented  from  this  view, 
partly  because  he  was  under  the  influence  of  Clay's  vision 
of  a  Pan-American  system,^  partly  because  the  proposed 
co-operation  with  Great  Britain  would  have  bound  the 
United  States  not  to  acquire  some  coveted  parts  of  the 
Spanish-American  possessions,^^  and  partly  also  because, 
as  an  ally  of  Great  Britain,  the  United  States  would  nec- 
essarily play  a  very  secondary  part.  Finally,  he  realized 
that  the  same  ends  would  be  accomplished  by  separate 
action  since  Great  Britain,  whose  sea  power  would  be 
the  determining  factor,  could  not  allow  Europe  to  con- 
quer South  America.^  Adams,  likewise,  opposed  the 
contemplated  action  in  favour  of  the  Greek  and  Spanish 
insurgents.^  His  views  prevailed.  Two  passages  in  the 
President's  message  —  one  "  speaking  in  terms  of  the 
most  pointed  reprobation  of  the  late  invasion  of  Spain 
by  France,"  the  other  recognizing  the  independence  of 
Greece  —  were  deleted.     The  British  offer  of  co-opera- 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914      79 

tion,  furthermore,  was  rejected.  Adams'  purpose,  as 
stated  by  himself,  was  to  remonstrate  "  against  the  inter- 
ference of  the  European  powers  by  force  with  South 
America,  but  to  disclaim  all  interference  on  our  part 
with  Europe."  Accordingly,  Monroe's  famous  message 
of  December  2,  1823,  apart  from  some  platonic  good 
wishes  to  Greece,  dissociated  America  from  the  European 
polity  and  disclaimed  any  American  interference  in  Eu- 
ropean affairs.  It  further  announced  as  an  exclusively 
American  policy  that  the  United  States  was  opposed  to 
the  extension  of  the  European  political  system  to  Amer- 
ica and  that  the  New  World  was  no  longer  open  to  colo- 
nization by  the  Old.^® 

Thus  for  a  mixture  of  weal  and  woe,  whose  exact 
proportions  a  critical  future  will  determine  better  than 
can  a  self-satisfied  present,  the  surviving  Elder  States- 
men were  over-ruled  and  the  United  States  became  bound 
to  a  policy  of  self -regarding  detachment  from  Europe. 
Daniel  Webster's  famous  speech  in  favour  of  the  Greek 
insurgents  delivered  in  Congress  shortly  after  Monroe's 
message,  led  to  no  action  on  the  part  of  the  government. 
In  view  of  the  overwhelming  opposition  to  it,  the  reso- 
lution in  connection  with  which  it  was  made  was  not 
even  pressed  to  a  vote.^®  For  two  full  generations  this 
continued  to  be  the  norm  of  conduct.  No  matter  how 
strongly  public  sentiment  was  aroused  in  the  United 
States,  as  for  instance  for  Kossuth  and  the  Hungarian 
rebellion,^^  the  government  refused  to  take  action.  At 
the  same  time,   while  not   interfering  in  Europe,   the 


8o         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

United  States  to  the  extent  that  it  was  prudently  able, 
opposed  all  European  action  in  the  American  continents. 
In  these  long  decades,  the  two  principles  became  organi- 
cally connected  in  the  popular  mind.  As  Secretary  Olney 
said  during  the  Venezuelan  dispute  of  1895-96: 
"  American  non-intervention  in  Europe  implied  Euro- 
pean non-intervention  in  America." 

In  the  conduct  of  its  foreign  relations,  the  United 
States  proceeded  strictly  upon  the  legal  theory  that  all 
states,  as  a  direct  consequence  of  their  sovereignty,  were 
absolutely  equal,  no  matter  to  what  extent  they  differed 
in  size  and  resources.  Hence,  while  no  other  state  was 
allowed  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  United 
States,  there  was,  in  turn,  to  be  no  intervention  on  its 
part  in  the  political  concerns  of  other  states.  Non-in- 
tervention was  the  prevailing  rule  of  conduct  not  alone 
towards  Europe,  but  also  towards  those  parts  of  America 
that  were  under  the  aegis  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.^^ 
The  situation  was  anomalous  and  could  not  last.  In 
1895,  during  the  Venezuela  boundary  negotiations,  Sec- 
retary Olney  informed  the  British  Government  that  "  the 
United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  this  continent, 
and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  confines 
its  interposition."  ^^  This  elicited  from  the  Marquess  of 
Salisbury  the  natural  reply  that  the  United  States  was 
not  "  entitled  to  affirm  .  .  .  with  reference  to  a  number 
of  states  for  whose  conduct  it  assumes  no  responsibility, 
that  its  interests  are  necessarily  concerned  in  whatever 
may  befall  those  states  simply  because  they  are  situated 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914     81 

in  the  western  hemisphere."  Shortly  thereafter,  the 
United  States  recognized  the  fundamental  truth  contained 
in  these  words,  namely,  that  all  rights  necessarily  imply 
corresponding  obligations.  The  war  with  Spain  for  the 
purpose  of  abating  the  intolerable  conditions  existing  in 
Cuba  was  a  signal  instance  of  this  principle  in  action. 
Its  theoretical  justification  was  elaborated  a  few  years 
later  by  Theodore  Roosevelt  in  connection  with  the  inter- 
vention in  Santo  Domingo.  He  then  absolutely  repudi- 
ated the  doctrine  of  non-intervention  in  cases  of  chronic 
wrong-doing  and  of  anarchy  in  the  western  hemisphere, 
and  asserted  that,  with  the  benefits  derived  from  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  must  be  accepted  certain  responsibilities.^* 
"  Just  as  there  has  been  a  gradual  growth  of  the  ethical 
element  in  the  relations  of  one  individual  to  another," 
he  declared,  "  so  we  are,  even  though  slowly,  more  and 
more  coming  to  recognize  the  duty  of  bearing  one  an- 
other's burdens,  not  only  as  among  individuals  but  also 
as  among  nations."  ^*  This  principle  of  intervention  in 
cases  of  chronic  disorder  in  the  western  hemisphere  was 
subsequently  applied  in  other  instances,  notably  in  Haiti 
and  in  Nicaragua.  It  has  been  half-heartedly  invoked  in 
the  increasingly  complex  and  disordered  conditions  ob- 
taining in  Mexico.  The  uncertain  course  of  President 
Wilson  towards  that  problem  has  only  in  part  proceeded 
from  the  fact  that  its  size  implied  the  assumption  of  far 
more  onerous  responsibilities  than  in  the  case  of  Haiti. 
But,  in  addition,  an  unfortunate  attempt  was  made  to 
act  simultaneously   upon  two   irreconcilable  principles. 


82         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

The  duty  to  assist  Mexico  in  restoring  order  upon  an 
equitable  social  system  was  recognized  and  thus  led  to 
a  measure  of  intervention  in  her  political  affairs.  But, 
at  the  same  time,  the  legalistic  trend  of  American  politi- 
cal thought  demanded,  inconsistently,  that  no  violence 
be  done  to  the  sovereignty  of  an  independent  state. 

While  the  United  States  was  thus  somewhat  hesitat- 
ingly and  with  faltering  steps  assuming  the  responsibility 
for  some  measure  of  justice  and  order  in  the  western 
hemisphere,  it  was  at  the  same  time  extending  the  scope 
of  its  interests  in  the  Far  East.  On  a  very  limited  scale, 
these  ante-dated  the  Spanish-American  War  but,  as  a 
result  of  its  unforeseen  course,  the  United  States  acquired 
extensive  possessions  not  only  in  the  Caribbean  but  also 
in  the  Pacific,  and,  as  a  consequence,  assumed  new  and 
far-reaching  obligations.  It  became  a  world-power  in  a 
sense  quite  different  from  what  it  had  been  in  the  years 
of  introspective  seclusion  when  it  limited  its  external 
action  to  advancing  the  comity  of  nations  by  lofty  pre- 
cepts and  to  encouraging  the  growth  of  democratic  liber- 
alism by  mere  expressions  of  sympathy.  This  newer 
attitude  was  clearly  expressed  in  1898  in  President  Mc- 
Kinley's  instructions  to  the  American  Peace  Commis- 
sioners about  the  retention  of  the  Philippines.     He  said : 

"Without  any  original  thought  of  complete  or  even  partial 
acquisition,  the  presence  and  success  of  our  arms  at  Manila 
imposes  upon  us  obligations  that  we  cannot  disregard.  The 
march  of  events  rules  and  over-rules  human  action.  Avowing 
unreservedly  the  purpose  which  has  animated  all  our  effort, 
and  still  solicitous  to  adhere  to  it,  we  cannot  be  unmindful  that, 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914      83 

without  any  desire  or  design  on  our  part,  the  war  has  brought 
us  new  duties  and  responsibilities  which  we  must  meet  and 
discharge  as  becomes  a  great  nation  on  whose  growth  and 
career  from  the  beginning  the  Ruler  of  Nations  has  plainly 
written  the  high  command  and  pledge  of  civilization." 

This  newer  attitude  towards  world-affairs  was  revealed 
not  only  in  the  assumption  of  responsibility  for  the  politi- 
cally backward  peoples  in  the  Philippines,  Hawaii  and 
Samoa,  but  also  in  the  policy  adopted  towards  the  Chinese 
question.  The  policy  of  the  "  open  door  "  in  China  as 
explicitly  formulated  by  Secretary  Hay  in  1899  and  the 
subsequent  participation  in  the  concerted  military  action 
of  the  European  Powers  during  the  Boxer  Rebellion  of 
1900  were  conspicuous  manifestations  of  the  emergence 
of  the  United  States  as  a  world-power.  But  here  again 
there  was  marked  hesitation.  This  was  due  to  many  fac- 
tors, of  which  not  the  least  was  the  underlying  dread  of 
weakening  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  For  many  feared  that 
action  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  beyond  the  bounds 
of  the  western  hemisphere  might  be  held  to  justify  Euro- 
pean interference  in  American  affairs. 

There  was  some  basis  for  these  fears.  To  obviate 
such  a  possibility,  the  aloofness  of  America  from  Europe 
was  again  strongly  emphasized.  Thus  the  assumption 
of  fresh  responsibilities  in  America  and  in  the  Far  East 
was  accompanied  by  renewed  formal  assertions  of  the 
policy  of  non-intervention  in  European  affairs.  At  the 
Hague  Conference  of  1899,  the  convention  for  the  pa- 
cific settlement  of  international  disputes  was  signed  by 
the  American  delegation  subject  to  the  following  declara- 


84         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

tion  and  it  was  subsequently  ratified  with  this  reservation 
attached.     The  declaration  reads: 

"  Nothing  contained  in  this  Convention  shall  be  so  construed 
as  to  require  the  United  States  of  America  to  depart  from  its 
traditional  policy  of  not  intruding  upon,  interfering  with,  or 
entangling  itself  in  the  political  questions  or  policy  or  inter- 
nal administration  of  any  foreign  state;  nor  shall  anything 
contained  in  the  said  Convention  be  construed  to  imply  a  relin- 
quishment by  the  United  States  of  America  of  its  traditional 
attitude  toward  American  questions." 

This  reservation,  which  significantly  joined  together 
the  policy  of  non-intervention  and  that  more  specifically 
embodied  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  was  repeated  at  the 
Hague  Conference  of  1907.  In  the  interval,  the  United 
States  had  enunciated  this  policy  in  another  connection 
as  well.  The  American  representatives  signed  the  Algeci- 
ras  Treaty  about  Morocco  without  assuming  for  their 
country  "  obligation  or  responsibility  for  the  enforcement 
thereof  " ;  and  the  Senate,  in  ratifying  the  treaty,  added 
the  further  proviso  that  attendance  at  the  Algeciras  Con- 
gress was  "without  purpose  to  depart  from  the  tradi- 
tional American  foreign  policy  which  forbids  participa- 
tion by  the  United  States  in  the  settlement  of  political 
questions  which  are  entirely  European  in  their  scope." 

This  traditional  policy  of  aloofness  from  European 
affairs  is  tantamount  to  a  refusal  to  assume  those  obliga- 
tions that  every  state  owes  to  the  unorganized  world- 
community.  This  negative  policy  may  have  been  expedi- 
ent, but  it  unquestionably  is  devoid  of  moral  value.  Its 
wisdom  cannot  be  measured  by  its  material  success,  for 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914      85 

the  great  danger  in  all  utilitarianism  is  the  concomitant 
deterioration  of  character.  No  attempt  can  here  be  made 
to  assay  it  according  to  this  standard.  But  even  in  the 
days  of  America's  weakness,  when  the  nation  was  still 
young,  it  had  some  unforttmate  consequences  that  a  pro- 
vincial outlook  almost  invariably  ignores.  The  myopic 
absorption  of  the  United  States  in  its  own  development 
was  an  unquestionable  factor  in  protracting  Europe's 
struggle  against  the  domination  of  Napoleon.  Writing 
of  that  period.  Admiral  Mahan  with  characteristic  in- 
sight pointed  out:  "The  United  States,  contrary  alike 
to  the  chief  interests  of  mankind  and  to  her  own,  sided 
upon  the  whole,  though  by  no  means  unanimously,  against 
Great  Britain."  ^'^  In  his  days  of  academic  freedom, 
Woodrow  Wilson  likewise  pointed  out  "  the  deep  im- 
policy" of  America's  attitude  and  actions  during  that 
earlier  world  crisis.     He  then  wrote: 

"  Napoleon  was  the  enemy  of  the  civilized  world,  had  been 
America's  own  enemy  in  disguise,  and  had  thrown  off  the 
disguise,  England  was  fighting  him  almost  alone,  all  Europe 
thrown  into  his  scale  and  hers  almost  kicking  the  beam;  and 
now  America  had  joined  the  forces  of  Napoleon,  in  fact  if 
not  in  intention,  as  he  had  subtilely  planned.  It  was  natural 
that  the  raw  and  rural  nation  should  thus  have  seen  its  own 
interests  in  isolation  and  indulged  fts  own  passion  of  resent- 
ment with  selfishness.  England's  policy  had  cut  America  to 
the  quick  and  had  become  intolerable,  and  it  did  not  lessen 
America's  exasperation  that  that  policy  had  been  a  measure  of 
war  against  the  Corsican,  not  against  her.  It  was  a  tragical  but 
natural  accident  that  the  war  should  be  against  England,  not 
against  France."" 

The  only  legitimate  defence  for  such  a  policy  of  self- 


86         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

centred  aloofness  from  the  questions  that  determine  the 
broad  course  of  history  is  impotence;  but  the  United 
States  steadfastly  adhered  to  this  attitude  even  after  it 
had  become  one  of  the  Great  Powers  and  it  thus  for- 
feited the  influence  it  could  have  exerted  upon  the  affairs 
of  mankind. 

It  is  true  that  the  United  States  attempted  in  various 
directions  to  exert  its  influence  for  the  advancement  of 
humanity,  but  except  to  a  limited  extent,  and  then  well- 
nigh  exclusively  in  Central  and  South  America,  it  refused 
to  assume  any  obligations  for  the  application  of  its  politi- 
cal ideals.  One  does  not  have  to  be  an  adherent  of  the 
German  theory  of  force  to  realize  that  in  interstate  rela- 
tions, as  at  present  regulated,  mere  words,  unless  there 
is  a  willingness  if  necessary  to  back  them  up  by  deed,  are 
futile.  Force  alone  leads  to  Prussianism,  to  the  doctrine 
that  might  makes  right,  with  its  dire  consequences  both 
to  victor  and  victim.  But  mere  words,  no  matter  how 
cogent  be  the  moral  arguments,  are  on  many  occasions 
totally  ineffective,  especially  when  it  is  known  that  there 
is  no  intention  whatsoever  of  wielding  anything  more 
warlike  than  the  pen.  The  futility  of  such  a  course  in 
the  unorganized  world  of  to-day  was  sadly  realized  by 
Secretary  Hay  when  he  was  obliged  to  witness  the  break- 
down of  his  Chinese  policy  by  Russia's  action  in  Man- 
churia.    In  1903,  he  wrote  to  Henry  White: 

"  The  Chinese,  as  well  as  the  Russians,  seem  to  know  that 
the  strength  of  our  position  is  entirely  moral,  and  if  the  Rus- 
sians are  convinced  that  we  will  not  fight  for  Manchuria  —  as 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914      87 

I  suppose  we  will  not  —  and  the  Chinese  are  convinced  that 
they  have  nothing  but  good  to  expect  from  us  and  nothing  but 
a  beating  from  Russia,  the  open  hand  will  not  be  so  convincing 
to  the  poor  devils  of  Chinks  as  the  raised  club.  Still,  we  must 
do  the  best  we  can  with  the  means  at  our  disposition."  '' 

In  that  the  United  States  resolutely  refused  to  become 
involved  in  any  European  matters  and,  furthermore,  in 
that,  because  of  its  patent  unwillingness  to  use  more  than 
moral  suasion,  it  left  to  others  the  protection  of  its  poli- 
cies in  the  Far  East,  Americans  cannot  escape  a  degree 
of  negative  responsibility  for  the  existing  world-wide 
war.  An  examination  of  recent  international  history 
and  of  the  fundamental  aim  of  German  world  politics 
will  make  this  nexus  more  apparent. 


IV 
THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 


"With  Austria,  with  France,  with  Russia,  we  have  already 
squared  accounts;  the  last  settlement,  that  with  England,  seems 
likely  to  be  the  most  protracted  and  most  difficult." 

— Treitschke. 

"  In  the  great  conflicts  of  the  future,  the  German  people, 
whose  loss  of  millions  of  Germans  to  Anglo- Saxondom  in  the 
nineteenth  century  has  moved  the  world's  centre  of  gravity  in  a 
sense  unfavourable  to  them,  will  need  all  inner  powers  of 
shoulders,  fists,  and  heads,  the  people's  power,  and  the  produc- 
tion-power, the  fighting-power,  the  mind-power,  and  the  master- 
power,  in  order  to  guard  their  rights  among  the  peoples  by  land 
and  sea." 

— Ernst  von  Halle  (1902). 

"  In  the  future,  however,  the  importance  of  Germany  will 
depend  on  two  points :  firstly,  how  many  millions  speak  German  ? 
secondly,  how  many  of  them  are  politically  members  of  the 
German  Empire  ?  " 

— Friedrich  von  Bernhardi. 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Background  of  the  War 

Position  of  the  English-Speaking  Peoples  —  German  Ambi- 
tions—  The  Duel  with  "  Anglo-Saxondom " — The  German 
Menace  and  its  Efifects  —  Proposals  for  an  Anglo-American 
Alliance  —  British  Foreign  Policy  —  The  European  Defensive 
Coalition  —  Morocco  —  Persia  —  China  —  The  Anglo-German 
Settlement  of  1914  —  The  Bagdad  Railroad  —  Central  Africa  — 
Summary. 

There  is  a  disconcerting  vagueness  about  Germany's 
ambitious  plans  and  there  has  been  some  indecision  and 
discussion  as  to  the  steps  required  to  reach  the  desired 
goal,  but  the  underlying  thought  is  unmistakable. 
Whether  the  immediate  aim  was  expansion  in  the  Near 
and  Middle  East  ^  or  over-seas  in  Africa,  America  and 
China,  the  ultimate  end  was  identical.  Somewhat  over 
a  generation  ago,  an  American  historian  wrote  as  follows : 

"  The  work  which  the  English  race  began  when  it  colonized 
North  America  is  destined  to  go  on  until  every  land  on  the 
earth's  surface  that  is  not  already  the  seat  of  an  old  civilization 
shall  become  English  in  its  language,  in  its  political  habits  and 
traditions.  .  .  .  The  race  thus  spread  over  both  hemispheres,  and 
from  the  rising  to  the  setting  sun,  will  not  fail  to  keep  that 
sovereignty  of  the  sea  and  that  commercial  supremacy  which 
it  began  to  acquire  when  England  stretched  its  arm  across  the 
Atlantic  to  the  shores  of  Virginia  and  Massachusetts.  .  .  .  The 
world's  business  will  be  transacted  by  English-speaking  people 

91 


92         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

to  so  great  an  extent,  that  whatever  language  any  man  may 
have  learned  in  his  infancy  he  will  find  it  necessary  sooner  or 
later  to  learn  to  express  his  thoughts  in  English.  ...  By  the 
end  of  the  twentieth  century  such  nations  as  France  and  Ger- 
many can  only  claim  such  a  relative  position  in  the  political 
world  as  Holland  and  Switzerland  now  occupy."  ^ 

The  fundamental  truth  of  these  descriptive  and  pro- 
phetic words,  uttered  by  John  Fiske  in  1880,  has  been 
amply  proven  by  subsequent  events,  despite  the  fact  that 
in  this  interval  Germany  had  annexed  a  vast  colonial 
domain  and  had  developed  an  extensive  over-sea  com- 
merce. Since  1880,  the  United  States  has  acquired  the 
Philippines  and  other  islands  in  the  Pacific  and  has  as- 
sumed a  virtual  protectorate  over  the  backward  countries 
bordering  on  the  Caribbean  Sea.  Egypt,  together  with 
large  sections  of  Central  Africa,  have  come  under  the 
British  aegis  and  South  Africa  has  been  united  in  an 
autonomous  system  whose  lingua  franca  is  destined  to 
be  in  increasing  measure  English.  British  Indja  has 
expanded  over  the  outlying  turbulent  border  regions  and 
the  Malay  States  have  gradually  come  within  the  orbit 
of  British  order  and  justice.  In  19 12,  somewhat  over 
37  per  cent,  of  the  world's  foreign  trade  was  credited  to 
English-speaking  countries  and  their  dependencies,  which 
was  three  times  the  share  of  Germany  in  this  total.^  Un- 
less arrested  by  military  force,  the  progressive  spread  of 
the  English  language  and  of  English  political  institutions 
was  destined  to  proceed  with  the  slow  and  irresistible 
momentum  of  a  glacier,  because  it  sprang  from  the  needs 
of  the  situation  itself.     The  strength  of  the  movement 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR  93 

came  from  its  response  to  human  wants.     It  is  a  living 
process,  growing  with  the  changing  demands  of  the  times 
—  one  spontaneously  generated  by  the  activities  and 
needs  of  countless  individuals  following  their  own  im- 
mediate private  ends.     Only  to  a  very  minor  extent  is  it 
the  result  of  prescient  planning,  for  governmental  pol- 
icies have  been  as  a  rule  determined  and  shaped  by  the 
inexorable  logic  of  pre-existing  facts  and  circumstances. 
The  development  of  the  British  Empire  and  the  growth 
of  the  United  States,  together  with  the  spread  of  English 
political  civilization  throughout  the  length  and  breadth 
of  the  world,  has  been  the  most  momentous  political 
development  of  the  past  three  centuries.     Although  in 
general  very  imperfectly  understood  in  Germany,  its  sig- 
nificance was  by  no  means  minimized.     In  fact,  it  became 
an  obsession  with  a  people  indoctrinated  with  the  creed 
of  Germanic  superiority  and  impressed  with  the  belief 
that  they  were,  in  the  words  of  the  Kaiser,  "  the  salt  of 
the  earth."     When  the  German  statesmen,  economists, 
and  publicists  tried  to  pierce  the  veil  of  the  future  and 
to  picture  the  world  toward  the  end  of  the  present  cen- 
tury,  they   saw  three  great  political   aggregates  —  the 
American,  the  British,  and  the  Russian  *  —  outranging  in 
cultural  influence  and  in  potential  strength  all  other  states 
of  western  civilization  and  dwarfing  a  Germany  whose 
political  growth  under  existing  territorial  arrangements 
could  apparently  not  compete  with  theirs.     Hence  the 
insistent  striving  for  a  repartition  of  the  world  in  con- 
formity both  with  Germany's  actual  military  strength 


94         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

and  with  some  hypothetical  future  need  for  more  land 
for  her  growing  population,  as  well  as  for  new  markets 
and  fresh  sources  of  supply  for  her  expanding  industries. 
There  was  no  question  of  any  real  need  or  of  any- 
actual  handicap  under  existing  conditions.  Germany  was 
exceptionally  prosperous.  Her  foreign  trade  was  rap- 
idly expanding  and  her  busy  work-shops  and  thriving 
agriculture  were  more  than  absorbing  her  growing  popu- 
lation. Concurrently,  the  birth-rate  was  falling  rapidly, 
more  rapidly  even  than  was  the  death-rate.  As  a  result, 
emigration  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word  had  virtually 
ceased.  In  fact,  entirely  apart  from  the  seven  or  eight 
hundred  thousand  foreign  wandering  labourers  who  came 
yearly  to  Germany,  mainly  from  Poland,  Austria,  Italy, 
and  the  Netherlands,  to  assist  in  the  harv^est  and  in  gen- 
eral industry,  the  number  of  foreigners  permanently  domi- 
ciled in  Germany  was  constantly  increasing.  As  their 
numbers  considerably  exceeded  those  of  the  emigrants, 
Germany  had  actually  become  a  land  of  immigration,  like 
the  United  States,^  This  fundamental  change  did  not, 
however,  preclude  the  possibility  of  a  return  to  condi- 
tions existing  in  the  nineteenth  century,  when  millions 
of  Germans  settled  in  English-speaking  countries.  Ac- 
cording to  the  official  German  view,  such  emigration  was 
a  distinct  calamity  for  it  not  only  negatively  and  rela- 
tively weakened  the  German  State  by  decreasing  its  po- 
tential economic  and  military  strength,  but  it  added  to 
the  forces  of  competing  aggregates.  Moreover,  the  chil- 
dren of  these  emigrants  had,  as  a  very  general  rule,  no 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR  95 

cultural  affiliations  with  Germany,  but  became  integral 
parts  of  their  English-speaking  environment. 

Weltpolitik  and  Kulturpolitik  went  hand  in  hand.  The 
desire  to  play  a  commanding  political  part  in  the  world 
and  the  wish  to  impress  German  civilization  upon  it,  both 
made  the  existing  partition  of  the  world  seem  inequitable. 
In  reaching  this  judgment,  some  vital  factors  were  ig- 
nored. The  spread  of  German  civilization  was  hampered 
by  the  undeniable  fact  that,  wherever  German  civilization 
was  in  close  contact  with  another  advanced  type,  it  grad- 
ually lost  ground.  This  was  true  not  only  of  the  German 
nuclei  in  English-speaking  countries,  where  the  circum- 
stances were  distinctly  unfavourable,  but  it  was  also  quite 
marked  in  German  Poland,  Bohemia,  Moravia,  Hungary, 
and  elsewhere.^  Prince  von  Buelow  attributes  to  political 
ineptitude  this  failure  of  Germany  to  make  moral  con- 
quests. "  How  can  it  otherwise  be  explained,"  he  asks, 
"  that  in  the  struggle  between  different  nationalities  the 
German  has  so  often  succumbed  to  the  Czech  and  the 
Slovene,  the  Magyar  and  the  Pole,  the  French  and  the 
Italian?  —  that  in  this  sphere  the  German  has  usually 
come  off  second  best  in  comparison  with  almost  all  his 
neighbours  ?  "  ^  Similarly,  Friedrich  Naumann  has  dem- 
onstrated "  that  the  modern  Germans  almost  everywhere 
in  the  world  are  unfortunately  bad  Germanizers."  * 

Germany's  egregious  failure  not  only  to  germanize,  but 
even  to  conciliate  her  Polish,  French  and  Danish  sub- 
jects, is  primarily  due  to  the  fact  that  her  policy  was 
based  upon  the  theory  that  wherever  two  nationalities 


96         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

live  side  by  side,  one  must  be  the  hammer  and  the  other 
the  anvil.  But  blows  serve  only  to  intensify  the  anvil's 
national  feelings.  While  the  cause  of  this  lack  of  suc- 
cess was  not  generally  understood  in  Germany,  the  con- 
dition itself  was  fully  appreciated  and  there  was,  before 
the  war,  a  distinct  realization  of  the  fact  that  further  con- 
quests in  Europe  itself  were  futile  and  that  the  balance 
must  be  redressed  by  acquisitions  over  the  seas.  The 
course  of  military  events  during  the  war  has  forcibly  di- 
verted Germany's  ambitions  towards  Eastern  Europe. 
But  the  diversion  in  intent  is  presumably  only  temporary, 
and  at  most  it  is  intended  to  establish  German  military 
predominance  in  Europe  on  so  unassailable  a  basis  that 
a  policy  of  extra-European  expansion  may  in  the  future 
be  safely  pursued.  The  experiences  with  her  Polish  and 
French  subjects  had  convinced  Germany  that  her  future 
was  largely  on  the  water  and  that  her  enemy  of  enemies 
was  the  English-speaking  world. 

Before  the  war,  Germany  possessed  a  colonial  domain 
approximately  six  times  as  large  as  her  own  area.  While 
its  resources  are  undeniably  large,^  they  had  never  been 
thoroughly  tested,  primarily  because  the  German  emigrant 
refused  to  settle  there.  The  few  who  did  seek  their  for- 
tunes outside  of  Europe  either  had  not  the  pioneer  spirit 
or  were  better  fitted  by  education  to  the  complex  civi- 
lization of  already  settled  communities.  Moreover,  the 
bureaucratic  methods  and  the  military  spirit  of  the  Ger- 
man colonies  repelled  settlers,  while  the  freedom  of  the 
English-speaking  communities  was  exercising  a  powerful 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR  97 

counter-attraction.  Germans  especially  have  forgotten 
that  it  is  individual  initiative  and  the  hard  labour  of  the 
settler  and  trader  that  have  developed  the  United  States, 
Canada,  Australasia,  and  South  Africa,  as  v^rell  as  Singa- 
pore and  Hong  Kong.  The  English  colonial  domain  of 
the  seventeenth  century  was  largely  what  Spain  and 
Portugal  in  their  desire  for  facile  wealth  had  not  con- 
sidered worth  the  taking,  and  every  land  is  mainly  what 
man  makes  of  it.  Disregarding  or  ignoring  these  con- 
siderations, Germany  looked  with  envious  eyes  upon  the 
flourishing  English-speaking  communities  scattered  over 
the  globe.  They  said  to  themselves  that  Spain  and  Portu- 
gal had  once  divided  the  world  between  them,  before 
France,  Holland,  and  England  had  emerged  as  colonizing 
nations  and  that  another  repartition  was  by  no  means 
out  of  the  question.  "  Was  einst  geschah,  kann  wieder 
geschehen" 

Thus  it  came  about  that  of  the  three  great  political 
aggregates  that  Germany  foresaw  as  dominant  in  the 
future  world,  the  Russian  was  regarded  as  fundamenta- 
bly  unassailable,  because  its  Slavonic  peoples  could  not 
be  assimilated  or  profitably  governed  and  exploited.  The 
great  obstacle  both  to  the  further  progress  of  German 
power  and  prestige,  and  to  the  spread  of  German  civili- 
zation, appeared  to  be  the  English-speaking  peoples  with 
their  ability  to  absorb  German  and  other  alien  elements. 
Moreover,  the  non-military  character  of  their  political 
systems  and  the  looseness  of  their  general  social  organi- 
zation seemed  in  the  minds  of  those  impressed  with  oppo- 


98         THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

site  ideals  to  be  infallible  indications  of  inherent  weak- 
ness and  incontrovertible  proof  that  this  entire  historical 
process,  from  the  days  of  Shakespeare  on,  had  been 
largely  fortuitous.  As  Germany's  future  was  deemed  to 
depend  upon  a  radical  overthrow  of  these  conditions  and 
as  their  plans  for  expansion  could  be  realized  only  at 
the  expense  of  the  British  Commonwealth  or  in  con- 
travention of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  arch-enemy  to 
Germanism,  cultural  as  well  as  political,  appeared  to  be 
the  so-called  "  Anglo-Saxon  block," 

In  his  widely  read  and  influential  book,  "  Der  Deutsche 
Gedanke  in  der  Welt,"  Paul  Rohrbach  said: 

"  It  is  not  necessary  to  claim  for  the  German  idea  that  it  will 
exist  like  the  Roman  either  as  the  mistress  of  the  world  or  not  at 
all,  but  it  is  right  to  say  that  it  will  exist  only  as  the  co-mistress 
of  the  culture  of  the  world,  or  it  will  not  exist  at  all.  The 
Anglo-Saxons  have  spread  over  such  vast  expanses  that  they 
seem  to  be  on  the  point  of  assuming  the  cultural  control  of  the 
world,  thanks  to  their  large  numbers,  their  resources,  and  their 
inborn  strength."  ^° 

Similarly,  Maximilian  Harden  wrote  with  alarm  about 
what  he  called  Anglo-Saxon  hegemony  in  the  New  and 
Old  World.     According  to  him: 

"  Great  Britain  and  North  America  tend  to  form  a  community 
of  interests.  On  the  two  oceans,  the  Anglo-Saxons  of  the  two 
continents  group  themselves  together  in  unity  of  will.  The 
hegemony  of  the  white  race  will  be  theirs,  if  we  do  not  make 
up  the  old  quarrel.  United  with  France,  we  should  be  invincible 
on  land  and  sea."  ^^ 

This  was  written  during  the  Agadir  crisis.     Two  years 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR  99 

later,  in  19 13,  another  well-known  publicist,  Friedrich 
Naumann,  called  attention  to  the  millions  of  Germans 
that  had  been  absorbed  by  English-speaking  communities, 
and  proclaimed  that  this  English  factor  was  not  only  a 
national  danger,  but  the  national  danger. ^^  The  press 
likewise  lamented  the  slow  but  sure  disappearance  of  the 
German  elements  in  the  English-speaking  countries  of 
America,  Africa,  and  Australia. ^^  The  great  duel  of  the 
present  and  future  was  widely  held  to  be  an  ineluctable 
combat  a  I'outrance  between  Germanism  and  Anglo-Sax- 
ondom.^*  Germany,  said  an  influential  Pan-German 
writer  in  1902,  must  take  the  lead  in  South  America 
against  American  "  jingoism  "  and  must  establish  her- 
self firmly  in  the  Far  East,  "  or  the  great  duel  between 
Germany  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  races  will  end  in  favour 
of  the  latter  "  and  Germany  will  then  politically  sink  to 
the  level  of  Holland.^*^  To  counteract  this  tendency  in 
the  cultural  sphere,  there  was  organized  in  1881  the 
"  Educational  Alliance  for  the  Preservation  of  German 
Culture  in  Foreign  Lands,"  whose  principles  declare  that 
"  not  a  man  can  we  spare  if  we  expect  to  hold  our  own 
against  the  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  millions  who 
already  speak  the  English  language  and  who  have  pre- 
empted the  most  desirable  fields  for  expansion."  ^® 

Not  only  is  the  cultural  solidarity  of  English-speaking 
peoples  fully  recognized,  but  also  the  fact  that  their  sep- 
arate developments  have  formed  part  of  what  is  essen- 
tially one  historical  process.  Briefly,  the  broad  purpose 
of  German  imperialism  was,  and  presumably  still  will 


loo       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

be  unless  its  illusory  basis  is  clearly  demonstrated  in  this 
war,  to  eject  the  English-speaking  peoples  from  the  prom- 
inent positions  that  they  have  acquired  in  all  continents. 
What  English-speaking  pioneers  —  discoverers,  adven- 
turers, traders,  and  settlers  —  have  slowly  and  laboriously 
accomplished  by  individual  enterprise,  the  German  Em- 
pire with  its  consciousness  of  military  strength  and  its 
contempt  for  non-military  states  planned  to  duplicate  in 
a  few  decades. 

The  detached  observer,  whose  interest  is  in  the  progress 
of  civilization  itself  rather  than  in  the  comparative  politi- 
cal importance  of  different  states,  would  naturally  not 
be  disturbed  by  the  prospective  relative  decline  in  Ger- 
many's political  rank.  Nor  would  he  be  dismayed  at  the 
fact  that  a  constantly  smaller  percentage  of  humanity  — 
though  actually  an  ever  increasing  number  of  individuals 
—  was  habitually  using  the  German  language.  All  that 
is  valuable  in  German  civilization  would  still  be  the  heri- 
tage of  an  interdependent  world.  According  to  his  super- 
national  view,  a  real  grievance  would  arise  only  if  the 
English-speaking  peoples  were  selfishly  to  debar  German 
individuals  from  sharing  in  the  advantages  that  they 
had  acquired.  This  was  conspicuously  not  so  either  in 
the  British  Commonwealth  or  in  the  United  States. 
With  the  self-regarding  nationalism  of  our  prevailing 
international  anarchy,  it  is,  however,  quite  comprehensi- 
ble and  almost  inevitable  that  Germany's  leaders  should 
look  upon  the  situation  with  different  eyes.  Membership 
in  large  aggregates  is  a  potent  psychological  force.    As 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         loi 

Mr.  Dickinson  has  said,  "  men  who  are  insignificant  as 
individuals  acquire  a  sense  of  extended  life  by  belonging 
to  a  powerful  nation."  They  feel  a  pride  in  large  num- 
bers, in  great  areas,  in  swelling  statistics  of  trade  and 
finance,  and  "  they  do  enjoy,  in  that  gross  way,  the  sense 
of  power."  *^  There  is,  of  course,  a  good  deal  that  is 
ignoble  in  this  gregarious  pride  and  a  good  deal  that  is 
false  in  this  sense  of  vicarious  accomplishment,  but  mem- 
bership in  such  large  nations  is  in  many  respects  a  distinct 
advantage.^®  With  patriotism  the  largely  self -regarding 
sentiment  that  it  is,  it  was  quite  natural  that  Germany 
should  desire  to  maintain  her  relative  political  and  cul- 
tural rank  in  the  world.  Had  she  proceeded  to  do  so 
by  peaceful  methods,  by  conciliating  her  subject  popu- 
lations, by  attracting  within  her  orbit  the  bordering  peo- 
ples of  kindred  stock,  and  by  populating  her  vast  colonial 
domain,  she  would  have  escaped  condemnation  and  prob- 
able disaster.  Her  methods,  however,  were  the  aggres- 
sive ones  of  the  time-honoured  Prussian  philosophy  of 
"  blood  and  iron  "  and  her  aim  was  to  construct  a  Greater 
Germany  by  undermining  and  grasping  what  others  had 
laboriously  built  up.  The  German  language  with  its  ac- 
companying civilization  was  to  be  forced  upon  unwilling 
peoples,  and  those  Germans  who  had  emigrated  to  Eng- 
lish-speaking countries  were  to  be  induced  to  retain  their 
cultural,  and  even  political,  affiliations  with  the  Father- 
land. 

This  distinctly  hostile  purpose  towards  the  English- 
speaking  peoples  first  manifested  itself  overtly  and  plainly 


102        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

during  the  years  when  the  difficulties  between  Briton  and 
Boer  in  South  Africa  were  reaching  a  cHmax  and  when 
Spain  was  forced  by  the  United  States  to  relinquish  the 
last  remnants  of  her  old  colonial  empire  in  the  East  and 
the  West.  One  direct  result  of  this  menace  was  the 
significant  movement  for  greater  cohesion  that  has  made 
the  British  Empire  a  unit  during  the  present  war  and 
which  promises,  after  its  conclusion,  to  lead  to  the  crea- 
tion of  rpore  or  less  adequate  political  machinery  for  the 
continuous  expression  of  this  solidarity.  Another  simul- 
taneous result,  just  as  truly  although  somewhat  less  obvi- 
ously traceable  to  the  German  peril,  was  the  marked  in- 
crease in  friendship  between  England  and  the  United 
States  and  their  cordial  co-operation  in  some  international 
questions,  especially  in  the  open  door  and  territorial  in- 
tegrity policy  as  regards  China.^^  In  England,  where  the 
sense  of  international  realities  was  keener  than  in  the 
United  States  and  where,  on  the  whole,  there  was  a 
deeper  feeling  of  kinship  and  of  high  regard  than  that 
prevailing  in  America,^*'  there  was  some  attempt  to  em- 
body this  growing  friendship  in  a  formal  alliance.  On 
the  eve  of  the  Spanish-American  War,  Earl  Grey  said  to 
John  Hay,  the  American  Ambassador  in  London: 
'*  Why  do  not  the  United  States  borrow  our  navy  to 
make  a  quick  job  of  Cuba?  They  could  return  us, the 
favour  another  time."  ^^  On  the  same  day,  Joseph 
Chamberlain  told  Hay  that  he  was  extremely  desirous 
of  a  close  alliance  with  the  United  States,  or,  if  that  were 
prevented  by  American  traditions,  "  of  an  assurance  of 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         103 

common  action  on  important  questions."  "  Shoulder  to 
shoulder,"  so  Hay  reported  Chamberlain's  words  to  Presi- 
dent McKinley,  "  we  could  command  peace  the  world 
over."  2^  A  few  weeks  later,  in  an  address  before  the 
Birmingham  Liberal-Unionist  Association,  Chamberlain 
specifically  proposed  an  Anglo-American  alliance.^* 
With  characteristic  courage  and  clarity,  he  said: 

"  What  is  our  next  duty  ?  It  is  to  establish  and  to  maintain 
bonds  of  permanent  amity  with  our  kinsmen  across  the  Atlantic. 
There  is  a  powerful  and  generous  nation.  They  speak  our 
language.  They  are  bred  of  our  race.  Their  laws,  their  litera- 
ture, their  standpoint  upon  every  question,  are  the  same  as 
ours.  Their  feeling,  their  interests  in  the  cause  of  humanity 
and  the  peaceful  developments  of  the  world  are  identical  with 
ours.  I  don't  know  what  the  future  has  in  store  for  us;  I 
don't  know  what  arrangements  may  be  possible  with  us;  but 
this  I  do  know  and  feel,  that  the  closer,  the  more  cordial,  the 
fuller,  and  the  more  definite  these  arrangements  are,  with  the 
consent  of  both  peoples,  the  better  it  will  be  for  both  and  for 
the  world." 

In  the  United  States  such  proposals  did  not  elicit  any 
notable  response.  A  few,  very  few,  it  is  true,  isolated 
Americans  raised  their  voices  in  favour  of  such  an  alli- 
ance,^* and  the  plan  unquestionably  appealed  to  John  Hay 
when  he  presided  over  the  State  Department.  Against 
its  realization,  however,  stood  not  only  the  traditions  of 
aloofness  inherited  from  "  The  Fathers  of  the  Republic," 
but  also  the  prepossessions  of  many  Americans  against 
Britain  as  the  historic  foe,  as  well  as  the  prejudices  of 
some  elements  of  America's  heterogeneous  population. 
Some  of  the  difficulties  were  somewhat  impatiently  em- 


I04        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

phasized  in  John  Hay's  letter  of  June  23,  1900,  to  Henry 
White.     Herein  he  wrote: 

"  What  can  be  done  in  the  present  diseased  state  of  the  public 
mind?  There  is  such  a  mad-dog  hatred  of  England  prevalent 
among  newspapers  and  politicians  that  anything  we  should 
now  do  in  China  to  take  care  of  our  imperilled  interests,  would 
be  set  down  to  '  subservience  to  Great  Britain.'  .  .  .  All  I 
have  ever  done  with  England  is  to  have  wrung  great  concessions 
out  of  her  with  no  compensation.  .  .  .  Every  Senator  I  see  says, 
'  For  God's  sake,  don't  let  it  appear  we  have  any  understanding 
with  England.'  How  can  I  make  bricks  without  straw?  That 
we  should  be  compelled  to  refuse  the  assistance  of  the  greatest 
power  in  the  world,  in  carrying  out  our  own  policy,  because  all 
Irishmen  are  Democrats  and  some  Germans  are  fools  —  is 
enough  to  drive  a  man  mad."  ^^ 

The  great  mass  of  the  American  people  were  immersed 
in  their  own  diverse  affairs  and  had  only  the  most  super- 
ficial knowledge  of  international  politics,  while  their 
leaders,  with  lack  of  courageous  foresight,  refused  to 
question  the  traditional  policy.  It  was  realized  by  only 
an  infinitesimally  small  fraction  of  the  American  people 
that  what  was  primarily  protecting  South  America  from 
German  ambitions  was  not  so  much  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
as  British  sea  power.  Had  the  United  States  entered 
into  such  an  alliance,  it  is  more  than  probable  that  Ger- 
many would  at  the  outset  have  realized  the  futility  of  a 
forcible  attempt  to  change  the  course  of  history.  As  a 
cultural  entity,  "  the  Anglo-Saxon  block  "  did  not  seem 
to  be  an  insuperable  obstacle,  but  a  clearly  defined  alli- 
ance upon  this  solid  foundation  would  presumably  have 
given  Germany  pause.     Had  such  an  alliance  been  con- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         105 

summated  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  the  entire  course  of 
history  would  have  been  quite  different  and  far  more  con- 
formable to  American  ideals  and  interest ;  and  its  crown- 
ing climax,  the  present  world-wide  agony,  would  in  all 
probability  have  been  avoided.  Americans  can  well  ask 
themselves  whether  they  can  claim  entire  dissociation 
from  the  slaughter  on  Europe's  blood-stained  fields.  The 
world  is  so  closely  interrelated  that  no  great  state  can 
selfishly  decline  to  assume  the  obligations  resulting  from 
membership  in  the  world  community  without  disastrous 
consequences  not  only  to  others  but  in  the  end  to  itself 
as  well.  It  has  been  well  said  that  a  better  international 
future  depends  upon  whether  or  no  Terence's  oft-quoted 
saying,  "  Humani  nil  a  me  alieniim  puto"  is  translated 
by  every  intelligent  citizen  as,  "  I  will  treat  nothing  of 
human  import  as  a  foreign  question."  Such  a  counsel  of 
perfection  was  the  very  antithesis  of  American  practice. 
Clinging  to  its  self-regarding  isolation,  the  United  States 
left  the  defence  of  English-speaking  civilization  to  the 
British  Commonwealth. 

Britain  is  the  centre  of  a  vast  political  aggregate,  mis- 
leadingly  designated  as  an  Empire,  but  rapidly  develop- 
ing into  a  genuine  Commonwealth  of  diverse  nations  and 
races.^^  It  covers  approximately  one  fifth  of  the  world's 
area  and  includes  somewhat  more  than  one  quarter  of 
mankind.  Its  foreign  commerce  was  in  volume  even 
more  than  proportionately  extensive  and  its  mercantile 
marine  was  equal  to  about  one  half  of  the  world's  entire 
tonnage.    On  account  of  these  facts,  the  British  Empire  is 


io6       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

in  more  or  less  close  contact  with  all  peoples  throughout 
the  world,  and  every  political  change  even  in  the  most 
remote  places  must,  to  some  extent  at  least,  affect  its 
fortunes.     Yet  the  foreign  policy  of  this  vast  Common- 
wealth was  during  the  past  fifteen  years  completely  domi- 
nated by  one  single  element  —  the  German  peril.     That 
was  the  determining  factor  in  recent  international  history 
and   explains   many   apparently   unconnected   events   in 
Africa,  China,  Persia,  the  Balkans,  and  Asiatic  Turkey. 
The  dreaded  menace  was  not  economic,  for  in  spite  of 
some  apprehensions  aroused  by  Germany's  commercial 
expansion,  the  British  Government  steadfastly  adhered 
to  the  free  trade  policy  and  claimed  full  justification  for 
this  course  in  the  remarkable  growth  of  Britain's  foreign 
trade.^^     Nor  was  Germany's  desire  for  additional  ter- 
ritory in  Africa  and  for  economic  expansion  in  Asiatic 
Turkey  deemed  menacing.     The  peril  consisted  in  the 
fact  that  Germany,  at  a  time  when  her  publicists  were 
evincing  the  most  extravagant  ambitions,  was  intent  upon 
adding  to  the  most  powerful  army  in  the  world  a  navy 
of  such  dimensions  as  to  render  precarious  the  safety  of 
the  British  Commonwealth.     In  1910,  a  well-known  stu- 
dent of  German  life  and  institutions  discussed  the  Anglo- 
German  tension  with  Count  Paul  Metternich,  the  German 
Ambassador  at  London.     Mr.  Dawson  opened  the  con- 
versation with  a  remark  to  the  effect  that  "  trade  jealousy 
was  no  longer  a  cause  of  serious  friction,  nor  was  colonial 
rivalry,"  when  the  Ambassador  interrupted,  saying:     "  I 
know  what  you  are  going  to  say  —  it  is  the  navy,  and  you 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         107 

are  right."  ^®  This  menace  diverted  British  foreign  pol- 
icy from  its  hitherto  general  support  of  liberty  —  such, 
for  instance,  as  had  been  given  to  the  cause  of  Greek 
freedom  and  to  that  of  Italian  liberation  and  unification 
—  and  concentrated  it  upon  national  security.  In  many 
respects  this  had  unfortunate  consequences,  as  in  the 
Balkans,  where  England  w^as  predominantly  disinterested 
and  was  prevented  from  exerting  her  full  influence  from 
fear  of  precipitating  a  general  war.^^  Under  the  circum- 
stances, it  was  inevitable  that  the  main  object  of  British 
policy  should  be  security  and  that  all  efforts  should  be 
made  to  avert  a  European  war  into  which  the  British 
Empire  would  inevitably  be  drawn.  The  plan  adopted  to 
prevent  the  impending  German  attack  was  to  settle  all 
outstanding  disputes  with  other  states  and  to  create  a 
diplomatic  combination  —  an  informal  league  to  enforce 
peace  —  that  would  hold  Germany  back. 

In  1902  was  concluded  the  alliance  with  Japan  that 
enabled  England  to  concentrate  her  naval  forces  in  the 
West.  Two  years  later,  the  Entente  Cordiale  disposed 
of  all  outstanding  questions  with  France;  and,  in  1907, 
a  general  settlement  with  Russia  was  made.  The  crea- 
tion of  this  defensive  combination,  however,  necessitated 
the  reversal  of  certain  policies  that  not  only  were  in  full 
accord  with  British  liberalism,  but  had  also  seemed  essen- 
tial to  national  security.  This  was  notably  the  case  in 
Morocco  and  in  Persia.  In  both  of  these  countries  the 
grave  initial  disorder  had  set  in  that  always  results  from 
the  close  contact  of  backward  peoples  with  the  progres- 


io8       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

sive  western  world.^*^  The  situation  was  much  the 
same  as  that  prevailing  in  Mexico  since  1913,  only 
whereas  in  this  case,  as  in  the  similar  ones  of  Haiti, 
Santo  Domingo,  and  Nicaragua,  it  was  generally  recog- 
nized that  the  United  States  alone  had  the  right  to  inter- 
vene, in  the  cases  of  Morocco  and  Persia,  unsanctioned 
interference  by  one  European  Power  would  inevitably 
be  resented  by  one  or  more  of  the  others. 

In  Morocco,  both  England  and  France  had  quite  im- 
portant commercial  interests  of  approximately  equal  ex- 
tent. In  addition,  apart  from  historic  political  ties,  Eng- 
land had  a  strategic  concern  in  the  future  of  Morocco. 
This  was,  however,  far  less  vital  than  was  France's  con- 
nection arising  from  the  long  frontier  between  Algeria 
and  Morocco  with  its  record  of  chronic  disorder.  Spain 
likewise  had  a  deep  political  concern  in  the  fate  of  Mo- 
rocco and  also  some  commercial  interests,  of  about  the 
size  of  Germany's.  That  country's  existing  trade  was 
quite  insignificant,  but  its  possible  future  expansion  de- 
manded the  maintenance  of  the  open-door  and,  at  the 
same  time,  some  Pan-Germans  were  clamouring  for  the 
acquisition  of  the  southern  part  of  Morocco.^^  The  tra- 
ditional British  policy  had  been  to  preserve  the  integrity 
of  Morocco  and  to  assist  its  government  in  the  work  of 
administrative  regeneration.^^  It  may  be  that  the  ideal- 
ism which  in  part  dictated  this  policy  was  misplaced,  and 
that,  in  preventing  France  from  introducing  into  Morocco 
what  is  generally  deemed  to  be  civilization,  England  was 
retarding  the  course  of  progress.     It  is  quite  probable 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         109 

that  the  hope  of  reform  from  within  was  entirely  illusory, 
but  even  a  cursory  elucidation  of  this  question  would 
carry  one  far  afield.  What  is  germane  in  the  present  dis- 
cussion is  that  England  in  1904  completely  reversed  her 
policy  and,  in  so  far  as  she  was  concerned,  virtually 
allowed  France  to  establish  a  protectorate  with  the  com- 
mercial open-door  in  Morocco.  It  is  idle  to  speak  of 
France's  recognition  of  England's  established  and  admit- 
ted position  in  Egypt  as  an  adequate  equivalent.  These 
two  elements  of  the  agreement  were  entirely  dispropor- 
tionate in  value.^^  The  essential  point  is  that,  under  the 
pressure  of  the  German  peril,  England  without  com- 
mensurate return  abandoned  a  cherished  policy  that  was 
based  both  upon  liberal  principles  and  upon  what  prior 
thereto  had  been  deemed  the  exigencies  of  national  safety. 
This  German  factor  was  the  decisive  one  and  it  likewise 
played  a  great  part  in  determining  British  policy  towards 
Persia. 

For  essentially  the  same  reasons,  conditions  very  simi- 
lar to  those  in  Morocco  prevailed  in  Persia.  Chronic 
disorder  —  political,  economic,  and  financial  —  had  re- 
sulted from  intimate  contact  with  the  complicated  eco- 
nomic machinery  of  the  western  world.  The  great 
bulk  of  Persia's  foreign  commerce  was  with  her  two 
mighty  neighbours,  Russia  and  the  British  Empire. 
Economically,  and  politically  also,  due  to  closer  physical 
contact,  Russia's  interests  predominated.  In  the  back- 
ground stood  Germany,  again  with  but  a  most  insignifi- 
cant trade,  but  interested  in  an  unknown  future  that  was 


no       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

largely  dependent  upon  the  possible  extension  of  the  un- 
built Bagdad  Railway  to  the  Persian  frontier.  As  in 
the  case  of  Morocco,  British  policy  towards  Persia  had 
idealistic  as  well  as  self -regarding  elements.  For  a  long 
time  Russia  had  regarded  Persia  as  "  irretrievably 
doomed."  As  Lord  Curzon  wrote  in  1892,  "  she  regards 
the  future  partition  of  Persia  as  a  prospect  scarcely  less 
certain  of  fulfilment  than  the  achieved  partition  of 
Poland."  ^  Russia's  intention,  apparently,  was  ulti- 
mately to  annex  the  entire  North,  with  its  robust  Turkish 
peasantry.  A  decade  later,  another  competent  student  of 
this  problem  wrote  that  Russia  "  holds  the  Shah  and  the 
Central  Government  of  Persia  in  the  hollow  of  her  hand 
by  the  two-fold  power  of  the  sword  and  the  purse."  ^^ 
Here  again  the  question  arises  whether  or  no,  in  support- 
ing the  integrity  of  Persia  and  in  resisting  the  Russian 
advance  so  that  Asia  should  not  become  "  a  field  of  con- 
tiguous European  ambitions,"  England  was  not  hamper- 
ing the  spread  of  civilization.  In  this  connection,  it 
should  be  remembered  that  the  northwestern  province  of 
Persia,  Azerbaijan,  has  no  national  connection  with  that 
country.  Its  population  is  well-nigh  entirely  Chaldsean 
and  Tatar,  and  their  cultural  affiliations  are  wholly  with 
peoples  under  either  Turkish  or  Russian  rule.  Moreover, 
Russia's  record  of  pacification  and  civilization  in  Central 
Asia  is  a  remarkably  favourable  one.  In  fact,  the  con- 
trast between  the  conditions  of  progress  north  of  Persia 
and  the  disorder  in  that  country  was  startling.^® 

However  this  may  be,  England  consistently  opposed 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         in 

Russia's  undertaking  the  work  of  pacification  in  Persia, 
partly  in  order  to  preserve  that  country's  integrity  so  as 
to  permit  of  a  national  regeneration  from  within,  but 
probably  even  more  so  to  keep  Russia  and  British  India 
as  far  as  possible  apart.  In  1907,  the  friction  over  this 
problem  was  removed  by  the  agreement  that  settled  the 
disputes  outstanding  between  Russia  and  England.  In 
so  far  as  Persia  was  concerned,  this  agreement  provided 
that  the  two  interested  Powers  were  to  respect  the  integ- 
rity and  independence  of  that  country.  What  the  nego- 
tiators had  in  mind  was  not  the  absolute  independence 
of  the  sovereign  state,  but  such  independence  as  existed 
at  that  very  time  when  Persia  was  virtually  a  quasi-pro- 
tectorate,  jointly  of  Russia  and  England.  It  was  not  the 
independence  of  a  Germany  or  of  a  France,  but  some- 
thing less  than  that  of  a  Mexico  and  something  more 
than  that  of  a  Santo  Domingo  that  was  meant.  Further- 
more, in  order  to  obviate  friction,  Persia  was  divided  into 
three  spheres,  of  which  the  Russian  was  to  the  North- 
west and  the  British  to  the  Southeast,  while  between 
them  was  that  denominated  as  neutral.  Either  country 
was  at  liberty  to  secure  commercial  and  political  conces- 
sions in  this  central  sphere,  but  neither  was  allowed  to 
do  so  in  that  reserved  exclusively  to  the  other  country. 
It  has  frequently  been  assumed  that  this  agreement  was 
tantamount  to  a  partition  of  Persia.  Such  are  its  poten- 
tialities ;  but  such  was  not  the  intent  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, nor  as  yet  has  this  been  the  outcome.  In  so 
far  as  England  was  concerned,  the  agreement  was  "  in 


112        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

reality  of  the  nature  of  a  renunciation,"  ^^  The  so-called 
British  sphere  from  which  Russian  concessions  were  ex- 
cluded, consists  mostly  of  desert;  it  has  only  one  town 
of  importance  and  is  very  sparsely  inhabited.^^  More- 
over, this  arid  region  is  virtually  co-extensive  with  Per- 
sian Baluchistan,  which  is  separated  from  British  Balu- 
chistan only  by  artificial  political  frontiers. 

The  agreement  has  worked  far  from  well,  especially 
from  the  standpoint  of  Persia.^®  It  did  not  meet  the 
crying  needs  of  Persian  anarchy  and  was  at  best  only  a 
makeshift.  Moreover,  it  was  concluded  at  a  time  when 
an  attempt  was  being  made  to  establish  a  modern  consti- 
tutional regime  in  Persia.  This  had  led  to  ever  increas- 
ing disorganization.  The  administration  was  intermit- 
tently paralysed  and  brigandage  was  rampant.  Under 
these  circumstances,  Russia  intervened  and  occupied 
Azerbaijan  in  the  Northwest.  She  could  largely  justify 
her  action  by  the  prevailing  disorder  which  was  injuring 
Russian  subjects  and  their  property.^  But,  in  addition, 
it  would  appear  that  Russia  tended  to  interpret  the  agree- 
ment of  1907  as  leading  to  an  actual  partition  of  Persia. 

While  England  objected  to  the  Russian  occupation  of 
the  northwestern  province  of  Persia,  her  opposition  was 
presumably  far  less  vigorous  than  it  would  have  been, 
had  the  general  European  situation  not  been  so  menacing. 
One  of  the  periodical  collapses  of  Persian  administration 
occurred  during  Mr.  W.  Morgan  Shuster's  energetic  at- 
tempt to  reorganize  the  chaotic  financial  system.  His 
brief  career  of  tactless  efficiency,**  in  which  he  signifi- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         113 

candy  aroused  the  opposition  of  both  Russia  and  Ger- 
many/2  exactly  synchronized  with  the  Agadir  crisis  in 
Europe.  If  during  these  tense  months  of  191 1,  when 
Europe  was  on  the  very  brink  of  war,  England  and  Rus- 
sia had  seriously  quarrelled  over  what,  compared  to  the 
gravity  of  the  threatening  world  war,  was  but  a  most  in- 
significant issue,  there  is  but  slight  reason  to  believe  that 
the  greater  peace  would  have  been  preserved.  A  break 
in  the  Entente  combination  would  in  all  probability  have 
been  the  signal  for  Germany  actually  to  use  the  sword 
that  had  already  been  drawn  from  the  scabbard. 

In  the  Far  East,  also,  the  German  peril  decidedly  af- 
fected British  action  and  policy.  Although  the  principle 
of  the  open-door  and  the  policy  of  maintaining  the  integ- 
rity and  independence  of  China  were  mainly  formulated 
by  Secretary  Hay,  their  advocacy  by  the  United  States 
had  been  largely  futile,  simply  because  it  was  generally 
recognized  that  under  no  circumstances  would  armed  sup- 
port be  offered.  Hence  England,  whose  aims  were  iden- 
tical with  those  of  America,  had  to  seek  co-operation  else- 
where. In  1900  was  concluded  the  Anglo-German  Con- 
vention regarding  the  territorial  integrity  of  China  and 
the  open  door  there.  But  when,  immediately  thereafter, 
Russia  refused  to  withdraw  from  Manchuria  the  troops 
that  had  been  used  in  suppressing  the  Boxer  Rebellion, 
Germany  declined  to  intervene  on  the  plea  that  the  con- 
vention applied  only  to  China  proper  exclusive  of  Man- 
churia.^^ Having  failed  by  these  means  to  check  Russian 
ambitions,  England  contracted  in  1902  an  alliance  with 


114       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

Japan,  which  fully  recognized  the  independence  of  China 
and  Korea.* ^  As  the  ostensible  upholder  of  the  Anglo- 
American  policy  of  Chinese  integrity  and  equality  of  com- 
mercial opportunity  for  all  foreigners,  Japan  secured  the 
sympathy  and  support  of  the  English-speaking  world  dur- 
ing the  ensuing  war  with  Russia.  The  Treaty  of  Ports- 
mouth of  1905  that  concluded  this  war  likewise  recognized 
the  Anglo-American  policy.  But,  in  the  meanwhile,  the 
German  menace  in  Europe  had  become  acute  —  the  first 
Morocco  crisis  of  1905  had  aroused  grave  forebodings 
in  England  —  and  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  the  fu- 
ture of  Korea  and  of  Manchuria,  as  well  as  British 
interests  there,  seemed  naturally  far  less  important  than 
a  general  European  war  and  the  possible  disruption  of 
the  Empire.  This  was,  of  course,  quite  patent  both  to 
Japan  and  to  Russia,  and  they  did  not  hesitate  to  take 
advantage  of  it.  Unostentatiously,  except  in  regard  to 
Korea,  but  steadily,  the  open-door  policy  was  repudiated 
and  the  integrity  of  China  was  undermined  by  the  for- 
mer enemies,  Japan  and  Russia.  The  efforts  of  Secre- 
tary Knox  under  the  Taft  Administration  to  thwart  this 
outcome  were  mere  empty  gestures  since  it  was  known 
that  there  was  never  the  slightest  intention  to  follow 
word  by  deed.  They  served  merely  to  bring  Russia  and 
Japan  closer  together.  In  view  of  the  Grerman  peril, 
England's  hands  were  tied  when  Manchuria  and  Mon- 
golia were  being  gradually  detached  from  China  and  the 
open  door  was  being  slowly  shut.*'' 

While  the  German  menace  and  the  dread  of  a  general 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         115 

war  dominated  England's  policy  and  made  it  subservient 
to  the  aims  of  her  Allies  in  the  defensive  combination,  at 
the  same  time  every  effort  was  made  to  reach  a  complete 
settlement  with  Germany.  Even  an  alliance  had  been 
suggested  by  Chamberlain  during  the  Boer  War  and, 
thereafter,  a  number  of  attempts  were  made  to  lessen 
the  naval  rivalry.  After  the  grave  Morocco  crisis  of 
191 1,  these  efforts  were  even  more  energetically  renewed. 
As  the  Belgian  representative  in  London  at  that  time 
wrote :  "  Ce  qui  est  certain  est  que  le  but  que  Ton  a  en 
vue  est  pacifique.  On  voudrait  a  tout  prix  diminuer  la 
tension  existante  entre  les  deux  pays."  *^  The  crux  of 
the  difficulty  was  Germany's  determination  to  build  a 
powerful  navy  and  England's  equally  firm  resolution  to 
retain  her  relative  position  among  maritime  powers.  In 
view  of  German  obduracy,  no  agreement  for  the  limita- 
tion of  naval  armaments  could  be  reached  and  the  insen- 
sate rivalry  continued  with  virtually  no  change  in  the 
comparative  naval  strength  of  the  two  competitors.*'^ 
But  at  the  same  time,  other  negotiations  were  begun  with 
the  object  of  satisfying  Germany's  insistent  demand  for 
economic  and  territorial  expansion.  Thus  Professor  Hans 
Delbrueck  wrote  in  191 2:  "It  cannot  be  doubted  that 
since  the  fear  of  almost  certain  war  during  last  summer, 
England  is  honestly  ready  to  accord  us  a  large  and  good 
place  in  the  sun."  **  The  negotiations  were  continued  in 
this  spirit  and  had  been  carried  to  a  successful  conclusion 
before  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  At  that  time,  there  was 
no  issue  between  Germany  and  Great  Britain  except,  as 


ii6       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

has  been  pregnantly  said,  the  issue  of  the  geographical 
position  of  the  British  Isles  and  the  existence  of  the 
British  Empire.  This  is  by  far  the  most  instructive 
chapter  in  the  diplomatic  history  of  the  ante-bellum  years, 
but  its  significance  has  been  obscured  by  the  fact  that  full 
details  are  not  as  yet  available.  Sufficient  is,  however, 
known  to  outline  its  main  features.^* 

This  far-reaching  settlement  referred  to  two  widely- 
separated  regions,  Asiatic  Turkey  and  Central  Africa, 
where  German  colonial  ambitions  conflicted  with  vital 
interests  of  the  British  Empire.  In  Turkey,  the  dis- 
agreement arose  in  the  main  from  the  fact  that  the  con- 
struction of  an  extensive  system  of  railroads  under 
German  control  would  place  a  great  military  power  on 
the  flank  of  both  routes  to  India  and  Australasia,  the 
shorter  one  by  Suez  and  the  longer  one  by  the  Cape. 
During  the  prolonged  negotiations  over  the  Bagdad  Rail- 
way, England's  chief  aim  had  been  to  render  it  impossi- 
ble for  Germany  to  establish  a  formidable  naval  base  on 
the  Persian  Gulf  and  to  make  these  waters,  which  Eng- 
land had  effectively  and  from  a  world  viewpoint  satisfac- 
torily policed  and  controlled  for  over  a  century,  a  scene 
of  tense  international  rivalry.'^^  Hence,  for  years,  the 
exclusively  German  control  of  the  projected  extension  of 
the  largely  unbuilt  Bagdad  Railroad  to  the  vicinity  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  had  been  opposed.  On  June  29,  19 14,  the 
day  after  the  assassination  of  Archduke  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand at  Serajevo,  Sir  Edward  Grey  gave  the  House  of 
Commons  the  main  outlines  of  the  settlement  of  this  com- 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         117 

plex  matter.^  ^  He  announced  that  various  agreements 
with  Turkey  and  with  Germany  had  been  or  were  being 
concluded  and  that  their  final  signature  and  publication 
was  delayed  by  one  point  only,  namely,  the  completion 
of  the  necessary  separate  negotiations  between  Turkey 
and  Germany. °  2  The  essential  features  were  that  Ger- 
many was  to  continue  the  Bagdad  Railway  to  Basra,  a 
deep-water  port  on  the  Shatt-al-Arab,  some  sixty  miles 
from  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf  proper,  and  that  the 
railroad  was  not  to  be  extended  beyond  that  point  except 
by  some  future  agreement.  Equal  rates  were  guaranteed 
and,  in  order  to  see  that  there  was  no  discrimination,  "  so 
far  as  the  conditions  of  commerce  of  all  nations  are  con- 
cerned," two  British  directors  were  to  be  admitted  to  the 
German  operating  board.  In  return,  Turkey  recognized 
the  status  quo  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  which  was  equivalent 
to  the  admission  of  Great  Britain's  long-established  pre- 
dominance there. ^^  While  apparently  safeguarding  the 
economic  and  strategic  interests  of  the  British  Empire, 
this  entire  agreement  gave  Germany  practically  a  free- 
hand in  the  economic  exploitation  of  the  potentially  im- 
portant region  between  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates.  If 
Germany's  intentions  were  limited  to  making  Mesopo- 
tamia and  Irak  again  the  garden-spots  that  they  had  been 
in  antiquity,  she  could  have  no  complaint  against  the  set- 
tlement. At  all  events,  the  chief  champion  of  the  Bag- 
dadbahn  greeted  the  adjustment  with  very  marked  satis- 
faction.^^ 
Concurrently  also,  an  agreement  in  reference  to  Africa 


ii8       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

was  concluded.  Here  the  ambitions  of  the  two  nations 
were  apparently  irreconcilable.  The  British  plan,  frus- 
trated in  1894  by  the  opposition  of  France  and  Germany 
but  still  deeply  cherished  by  not  a  few,  was  to  link  up 
Rhodesia  and  South  Africa  with  the  Soudan  and  Egypt 
by  a  railroad  passing  entirely  through  British  territory. 
Germany's  conflicting  aim  was  to  join  her  separated  pos- 
sessions on  the  eastern  and  western  coasts  into  one  com- 
pact mass  dominating  the  centre  of  Africa  from  the  At- 
lantic to  the  Pacific.  The  realization  of  either  scheme 
not  only  implied  the  abandonment  of  the  other,  but  was 
dependent  upon  some  territorial  re-arrangements  in  the 
Belgian  Congo,  while  the  German  plan  furthermore  im- 
plied a  complete  change  in  the  status  of  Portuguese  An- 
gola, north  of  German  Southwest  Africa. 

The  spirit  in  which  England  conducted  these  negotia- 
tions was  clearly  fore-shadowed  in  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
speech  of  November  2^,  191 1,  after  the  Agadir  crisis 
had  been  surmounted  by  a  tenuous  margin.  He  then 
said  : 

"  If  there  are  to  be  big  territorial  changes  in  Africa,  brought 
about,  of  course,  by  the  good  will  of  and  negotiation  with  other 
Powers,  then  we  are  not  an  ambitious  competing  party;  and 
being  not  an  ambitious  competing  party  ourselves,  if  Ger- 
many has  friendly  arrangements  to  negotiate  with  other  foreign 
countries  with  regard  to  Africa,  we  are  not  anxious  to  stand 
in  her  way  any  more  than  in  theirs." 

In  19 12,  when  the  negotiations  about  this  African  im- 
passe were  initiated,  Hans  Delbrueck  stated  that  a  re- 
arrangement of  the  African  map  such  as  would  make 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         119 

forever  impossible  Cecil  Rhodes's  scheme  of  a  Cape  to 
Cairo  railroad  "  would  be  the  strongest  proof  imaginable 
that  England  recognized  us  as  having  equal  colonial 
rights  with  herself."  It  is  not  quite  clear  that  the  Lib- 
eral Government,  in  its  efforts  to  avert  war,  went  to  this 
extreme  length,  but  it  is  unquestionable  that  important 
concessions  were  made.  To  what  extent  British  terri- 
torial concessions  were  involved  and  what  success,  if  any, 
Germany  had  in  negotiating  with  Portugal  and  Belgium 
about  their  respective  African  possessions,  has  not  as  yet 
been  divulged  by  the  interested  chancelleries.''^  But  Paul 
Rohrbach,  one  of  Germany's  most  ardjent  advocates  of 
extensive  African  expansion,  who  evidently  had  access 
to  official  information,  declared  that  in  Africa  English 
policy  had  shown  itself  to  a  surprising  degree  accommo- 
dating.^® 

From  this  brief  summary  of  British  policy  during  the 
past  decade,  it  is  apparent  that  some  important  British 
interests  were  impaired  and  some  political  principles  were 
jettisoned  in  the  hope  of  averting  the  world  war  that  was 
England's  nightmare.  The  chronicle  is  one  of  almost 
constant  renunciation.  The  course  was  the  reverse  of 
aggressive;  nor  was  it  provocative,  except  to  the  nega- 
tive extent  that  avowed  pacific  tendencies  constitute  a 
goad  to  those  who  regard  juxtaposed  states  as  neces- 
sarily and  ever  in  the  dynamic  relation  of  hammer  and 
anvil.  The  entire  policy  was  unquestionably  what  Pro- 
fessor Keutgen  of  Hamburg  dubbed  it :  "  Eine  Politik 
der  Schwaeche."     It  certainly  is  a  far  cry  back  to  1849, 


120        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

when  Palmerston  instructed  the  British  representative  at 
Vienna  to  express  to  the  Austrian  Prime  Minister  "  openly 
and  decidedly "  England's  indignant  disgust  at  the 
rigours  adopted  in  suppressing  the  rebellions  in  Italy  and 
Hungary.  Its  very  weakness,  verging  on  pacificism, 
convinced  Germany  that  England  was  a  negligible  factor 
and  in  this  way  it  stimulated  the  German  "  will  to  war  " 
and  conduced  to  bring  about  the  catastrophe  whose  funda- 
mental purpose  it  was  to  avert.  On  the  other  hand,  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  policy  of  a  defensive  coalition  was  based 
upon  a  fuller  realization  of  the  imminence  and  gravity 
of  the  German  peril  than  obtained  in  most  well  informed 
quarters  in  England.  Despite  the  bitterest  criticism  — 
whose  foundation  has  since  been  completely  destroyed 
by  Germany's  conduct  during  the  fateful  fortnight  of 
19 14  —  he  persisted  in  his  course  and  succeeded  in  keep- 
ing intact  a  diplomatic  group  of  such  strength  as  will,  in 
all  likelihood,  thwart  the  German  plan  of  world  domina- 
tion. 

During  the  course  of  these  vicissitudes  of  the  past 
decade,  not  a  few  things  were  done  which  were  repugnant 
to  the  American  conscience  and  which  affronted  Ameri- 
can idealism.  Whether  or  no  this  conscience  was  always 
accurately  informed  and  this  idealism  always  free  from 
mischievous  sentimentalism  is  not  at  present  a  pertinent 
question.  The  essential  point  is  that  the  American  Gov- 
ernment, pursuing  its  traditional  course,  was  silent  ex- 
cept when  China  was  concerned;  and  that  the  vehement 
complaints  of  a  few  individual  Americans  totally  ignored 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR         121 

the  possibility  of  their  country's  having  some  duty  in 
these  matters.  In  the  complacency  of  their  negative 
rectitude,  Americans  did  not  contemplate  the  undeniable 
fact  that  those  who  might  have  prevented  the  deeds  that 
seemed  to  be  objectionable,  in  the  Balkans,  China,  Per- 
sia, and  elsewhere,  were  well-nigh  helpless  so  long  as  the 
United  States  adhered  to  its  policy  of  self -regarding  iso- 
lation. In  addition,  definite  American  interests  were 
prejudiced.  The  policy  of  the  open  door  in  China  could 
not  be  maintained  by  England  alone  without  breaking 
up  the  European  defensive  combination  against  Ger- 
many and  the  knowledge  that  the  United  States  would 
under  no  circumstances  use  more  than  moral  suasion  ren- 
dered American  advocacy  of  it  wholly  ineffective.  A 
reconstruction  of  what  the  past  might  have  been,  had  the 
United  States  been  willing  to  assume  obligations  for  the 
welfare  of  the  world,  is  not  a  futile  pastime,  but  is  a  val- 
uable object  lesson  for  the  future. 


V 
AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR 


"  Questo  misero  modo 
tengon  I'anime  triste  di  colore, 
che  visser  senza  infamia  e  senza  lodo. 
mischiate  sono  a  quel  cattivo  coro 
degli  angeli  che  non  furon  ribelli, 
ne  fur  fedeli  a  Dio,  ma  per  se  foro." 

— Dante,  Inferno,  Canto  iii. 

"My  friends,  so  sure  am  I  that  liberty  and  security  in  this 
land  of  ours  depends  upon  the  destruction  and  abandonment  of 
the  hated  principle  of  national  aggrandizement  and  immorality, 
and  the  enthronement  of  the  principles  of  national  responsibility 
and  morality,  that  for  all  the  countless  generations  to  come  after 
us  in  our  dear  land,  I  am  grateful  with  all  my  heart  to  those 
men  who  are  fighting  in  the  trenches  in  France  and  Belgium 
and  Russia  and  Italy  and  the  Balkans  to-day  for  the  liberty  and 
peace  of  my  children's  children." 

— Elihu  Root,  January  25,  1917. 

"Neutrality  is  no  longer  feasible  or  desirable  where  the  peace 
of  the  world  is  involved  and  the  freedom  of  its  peoples." 

— WooDRow  Wilson,  April  2,  1917. 


CHAPTER  V 

America's  Reaction  to  the  War 

The  Issue  —  Its  Relation  to  the  United  States  —  American 
Public  Opinion  —  Neutrality  and  Pacificism  —  Preparedness 
and  Pan- Americanism  —  The  Administration's  Policy  —  The 
League  to  Enforce  Peace  —  President  Wilson's  Endorsement  of 
this  Programme  —  Its  Possibilities  and  Limitations  —  Amer- 
ica's Entrance  into  the  War  —  An  Inclusive  League  or  one  of 
Democracies  —  The  Entente  Group  —  An  Alliance  of  the  Eng- 
lish-Speaking Peoples. 

To-day  the  world  is  in  the  throes  of  an  agonizing  war 
in  which  certainly  the  immediate,  if  not  the  ultimate,  fate 
of  western  civilization  is  at  stake.  In  the  background  is 
the  imperilled  future  of  all  English-speaking  peoples.  In 
the  middle  field  lies  the  fate  of  the  Balkan  countries  as 
well  as  those  of  Turkey  and  of  the  projected  Mittel- 
europa.  Prominent  in  the  very  immediate  foreground 
stands  the  issue  of  German  domination  over  Europe. 
Upon  the  decision  of  this  last  issue  inevitably  depends 
the  outcome  of  the  two  others,  for  all  three  are  insep- 
arably interrelated.  In  the  days  of  Louis  XIV  and  of 
Napoleon,  the  fundamental  issue  was  whether  or  no  Eu- 
rope, primarily,  was  to  be  saved  from  the  domination 
of  one  supreme  military  power.  But  the  present  strug- 
gle involves  not  only  the  freedom  of  Europe,  but  in  addi- 

125 


126       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

tion  that  of  the  whole  world  as  well,  for  the  attempted 
hegemony  of  Europe  was  to  serve  as  the  basis  for  Ger- 
man mastery  of  the  other  continents.  German  ambitions 
avowedly  looked  to  an  extra-European  goal.  Further- 
more, as  a  result  of  the  subjection  of  this  greater  issue 
to  the  arbitrament  of  arms,  all  the  vexatious  and  stub- 
born European  problems,  arising  from  artificial  boundary 
lines  based  upon  political,  economic,  and  military  con- 
siderations and  resulting  in  suppressed  and  exploited  na- 
tionalities, are  in  the  crucible.  However  vitally  impor- 
tant be  some  of  these  questions,  they  are  completely  over- 
shadowed by  the  attempt  of  Germany  to  dominate  Eu- 
rope and  to  impose  her  will  by  military  force,  regardless 
of  fundamental  treaties  and  of  established  interstate  cus- 
tom and  morality.  Her  success  would  mean  in  the  fu- 
ture no  freedom  of  action  for  any  of  the  western  con- 
tinental powers.  France,  Italy,  Spain,  together  with 
Holland,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  and  the  Scandinavian 
countries,  would  be  forced  into  the  Prussian-German 
orbit  and  their  policies  would  be  completely  dominated 
by  Berlin  as  the  capital  of  Central  Europe.  The  free- 
dom so  vociferously  and  violently  demanded  by  Ger- 
many for  herself  is  tantamount  to  slavery  for  the  rest  of 
Europe. 

This  ascendency  once  established,  it  would  be  easy 
for  Germany,  by  means  of  the  added  economic  re- 
sources, to  create  a  navy  of  such  strength  as  to  be  able 
successfully  to  challenge  the  British  Commonwealth  or 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  if  the   English-speaking  peoples 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      127 

should  not  be  re-united,  and  possibly  even  if  they  should 
join  forces  to  resist  their  declared  enemy.  Hence  the 
continued  insistence  of  the  Entente  Allies  that  they  will 
not  make  peace  until  the  menace  of  German  domination 
has  been  removed.  When  he  was  Britain's  official  spokes- 
man, Mr.  Asquith  clearly  defined  the  supreme  end  in 
view  in  the  following  carefully  measured  words ; 

"  We  intend  to  establish  the  principle  that  international  prob- 
lems must  be  handled  by  free  peoples,  and  that  this  settlement 
shall  no  longer  be  hampered  and  swayed  by  the  overmastering 
dictation  of  a  Government  controlled  by  a  military  caste.  That 
is  what  I  mean  by  the  destruction  of  the  military  domination  of 
Prussia:  nothing  more,  but  nothing  less." 

The  aim  of  the  Allies  is  to  secure  an  unbound  and  a 
free  Europe,  to  which  Germany  shall  no  longer  have 
either  the  will  or  the  power  to  dictate  by  intermittent 
threats  of  war.  Both  Germans  and  Englishmen  are  in 
essential  agreement  as  to  the  only  means  of  accomplish- 
ing this  destruction  of  Prussian-German  militarism.  In 
the  course  of  a  most  lucid  analysis  of  this  militaristic 
system,  Professor  Hans  Delbrueck  said  that  the  decisive 
question  in  determining  the  inner  character  of  a  state 
always  is :  "  Whom  does  the  army  obey  ?  "  In  demo- 
cratic countries  like  England  or  France,  it  is  of  course 
a  minister  responsible  to  the  legislature,  but  such  an  ar- 
rangement, he  shows,  would  be  inconceivable  in  Ger- 
many. There  the  old  personal  connection  between  the 
primitive  Teutonic  chieftain  and  his  following  of  faith- 
ful warriors  perdures  in  the  similar  personal  relation  of 
army  and  War  Lord.    According  to  Delbrueck,  this  per- 


128       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

sonal  bond  is  the  greatest  force  in  the  Prussian-German 
State;  it  is  the  rock-foundation  of  the  German  polity 
and  could  be  destroyed  only  by  the  most  terrible  of  mili- 
tary defeats  — "  durch  die  allerfurchtbarste  der  Nieder- 
lagen."  ^  Mr.  Balfour  clearly  recognized  this  fact  when 
he  stated  that  one  of  the  three  essential  conditions  of  a 
durable  peace  is  that  "  the  aggressive  aims  and  the  un- 
scrupulous methods  of  the  German  Powers  should  fall 
into  disrepute  among  their  own  peoples."  ^  The  same 
truth  is  likewise  lucidly  expressed  by  Bismarck's  biog- 
rapher, Mr.  J.  W.  Headlam.  Peace  will  come,  he  writes, 
when  "  Germany  has  learnt  the  lesson  of  the  war  .  .  . 
that  the  voice  of  Europe  cannot  be  defied  with  im- 
punity." In  the  following  vigorous  sentences  this  un- 
derlying idea  is  further  amplified  by  him. 

"  Germany  asks  for  security ;  she  shall  have  it  —  precisely  the 
same  security  that  France  and  Russia  and  Italy  and  Holland 
enjoy;  a  security  based  partly  on  her  own  strength,  but  even 
more  on  the  recognition  of  the  laws  and  principles  of  Europe. 
Germany  asks  for  guarantees,  she  shall  have  them  —  precisely 
the  same  guarantees  with  which  every  other  State  has  to  be 
content;  the  guarantee  that  the  tyrannical  overgrowth  of  any 
one  State  or  confederation  of  States  will  arouse  in  the  rest 
of  Europe  a  coalition  before  which  every  nation,  even  the 
strongest,  must  bow.  These  laws  of  European  life  have  been 
learnt  in  the  course  of  centuries  by  all  nations  and  accepted, 
and  they  have  always  been  learnt  in  the  same  way,  in  the  bitter 
school  of  experience  and  war.  Germany  is  now  learning  the 
lesson,  and  the  war  will  continue  until  the  lesson  has  been  com- 
pleted ;  then  it  will  stop.  It  will  stop  when  it  has  been  burnt 
into  the  heart  of  the  whole  nation  so  that  it  will  never  be  for- 
gotten. Men  talk  of  the  terms  of  peace.  They  matter  little. 
With  a  Germany  victorious  no  terms  would  secure  the  future 
of  Europe;  with  a  Germany  defeated  no  artificial  securities  will 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      129 

be  wanted,  for  there  will  be  a  stronger  security  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  defeat."  * 

It  is,  however,  open  to  the  most  serious  question, 
whether  the  oft-drawn  distinction  between  the  German 
people  and  their  government  is  really  sound.  The  German 
people  have  for  generations  been  so  impregnated  with 
the  creed  of  Teutonic  racial  superiority,  they  are  in  large 
part  so  thoroughly  permeated  with  the  over-weening 
ambitions  of  an  aggressive  Kulturpolitik  and  Weltpolitik 
based  upon  the  doctrines  of  ascendency,  and  they  have  so 
widely  accepted  a  materialistic  code  that  rejects  all  moral 
considerations  in  interstate  relations,  that  even  the  over- 
throw of  an  autocracy  supported  by  the  army  and  a  sub- 
servient bureaucracy  would  by  no  means  guarantee  the 
liberties  of  the  world  and  make  it  safe  for  the  peace- 
loving  democracies.  The  systematic  educational  drill  of 
two  generations  cannot  be  nullified  and  discredited  in  a 
day.  But  the  overthrow  of  militarism  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  democracy  would  at  least  allow  the  entrance 
of  the  light. 

In  comparison  with  the  menace  of  Prussian-German 
ascendency  over  the  world,  the  future  of  Constantinople, 
of  Alsace-Lorraine,  of  Bohemia,  of  Jugo-Slavia,  and  of 
Poland  are  relatively  of  subsidiary  importance.  What 
matters  in  first  line  is  that  one  state  shall  not  have  either 
the  purpose  or  the  means  to  impose  its  sway  upon  Eu- 
rope. Thus  the  immediate  issue  at  stake  is  the  freedom 
of  Europe  and  directly  involved  in  it  are  the  ultimate 
liberties  of  the  world  and  the  fate  of  all  English-speaking 


I30       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

peoples.  In  addition,  the  future  of  democracy  hinges 
upon  the  outcome.  This  was  true  from  the  very  outset, 
but  the  war  has  become  quite  patently  one  of  democracy 
against  autocracy  since  the  Russian  Revolution  and  the 
entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  crusade  for  pub- 
lic right  and  liberty  in  alignment  with  the  Entente.  In 
a  world  so  unorganized  politically  that  its  peace  is  at  the 
mercy  of  one  Power  and  its  satellites,  the  crucial  test  of 
any  form  of  social  organization  cannot  be  the  more  or 
less  satisfactory  character  of  its  internal  political  life, 
but  must  perforce  be  its  ability  to  defend  itself  and  to 
survive  in  a  struggle  imposed  by  others.  The  world's 
democracy  is  being  subjected  to  this  crucial  test.  While, 
on  the  one  hand,  upon  the  utter  discrediting  of  German 
militarism  largely  depends  the  growth  of  German  liberal- 
ism, on  the  other  hand,  the  maintenance  of  free  institu- 
tions in  Western  Europe  and  even  throughout  the  entire 
world  is  contingent  upon  an  Allied  victory.  Such  victory, 
however,  does  not  at  all  imply  the  disintegration  or  crush- 
ing of  Germany,  which  never  were  the  avowed  or  im- 
plied aims  of  Britain's  official  spokesmen.  Were  de- 
mocracy to  fail  in  this  grave  crisis,  were  its  efforts  un- 
availing to  secure  for  itself  an  unmolested  future  in 
Europe,  then  indeed  would  its  fate  there  be  sealed  and 
its  fortunes  in  America,  Africa,  and  Australia  would  be 
dangerously  imperilled.  Upon  the  defeat  of  Germany 
depends  the  future  of  liberalism  throughout  the  entire 
world.  The  welfare  of  the  United  States  is  only  some- 
what less  directly  contingent  upon  the  frustration  of  Ger- 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      131 

man  ambitions  than  is  that  of  the  British  Commonwealth. 
It  is  naturally  in  the  extreme  difficult  to  gauge  ac- 
curately the  opinion  of  a  country  of  such  vast  dimensions 
and  of  such  striking  economic  and  social  differences  as 
are  those  of  the  United  States ;  and  this  difficulty  is  ag- 
gravated by  the  fact  that  its  civilization  is  in  large  sections 
still  fluid  in  character.  Nor  is  it  possible  to  define  in 
static  terms  and  in  brief  compass  a  body  of  dynamic 
thought  and  feeling  that  is  constantly  fluctuating  from 
month  to  month."*  That  there  should  be  unanimity  of 
thought  in  a  democracy  of  free  speech  and  unfettered 
opinions  is  of  course  out  of  the  question,  but  the  first 
thirty  months  of  the  war  before  American  participation 
in  it  disclosed  certain  marked  cleavages  that  denoted 
most  imperfect  integration.  It  was  inevitable  that  the 
foreign-born  population  should  in  large  measure  have 
been  polarized  by  its  former  connections  with  the  bellig- 
erents. Although  the  immigrant  may  be  wholly  loyal  to 
the  United  States,  he  cannot  as  a  general  rule  be  com- 
pletely Americanized  and  must  inevitably  retain  some 
affiliations  with  his  native  land.  In  the  second  genera- 
tion, however,  and  even  more  so  in  the  third,  the  process 
of  Americanization  has  been  nearly  complete.  The  main 
failures  of  the  melting-pot  have  occurred  sporadically, 
where  quickly  acquired  wealth  or  prominence  united  with 
education  enabled  the  immigrants  of  such  inclinations 
to  maintain  their  imported  culture  in  the  home  circle 
and  thus  to  transmit  it  in  a  modified  form  to  their  chil- 
dren.   On  the  whole,  such  instances  are  rare,  and  hy- 


132       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

phenism  is  a  less  serious  problem'*  than  is  the  marked 
abyss  that  exists  between  the  comparatively  few  who, 
enfranchised  from  the  thraldom  of  catchwords,  think  in- 
dependently and  the  great  general  public  that  is  in  servi- 
tude to  head-lines  and  to  traditional  formulae.  With  the 
latter,  in  a  democracy  based  upon  theoretical  equality  all 
along  the  line  and  with  universal  suffrage  as  a  potent 
factor,  are  inevitably  aligned  the  bulk  of  the  politicians. 
In  addition  to  this  striking  divergence  between  the  opin- 
ion of  the  intelligentsia  and  the  views  of  the  great  mass 
of  Americans,  there  was  revealed  a  new  sectionalism  of 
considerable  gravity.  The  Northern  Atlantic  sea-board, 
the  South,  the  Middle  West,  and  the  Pacific  Coast,  each 
developed  a  distinct  public  opinion  on  the  questions  aris- 
ing out  of  the  European  War.  In  general  also,  there  was 
manifest  a  marked  flaccidity  of  national  temper  that 
would  have  astounded  the  robust  generation  bred  in  the 
rigours  of  the  Civil  War  which,  until  very  recently,  con- 
trolled the  destinies  of  the  United  States.^ 

But  the  mere  aggregate  of  the  diverging  views  of 
different  individuals,  groups,  classes,  and  sections  does 
not  constitute  the  opinion  of  the  body  politic.  This  ef- 
fective opinion  can  usually  be  summarized  in  definite 
terms.  On  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War,  a  wave 
of  mingled  horror  and  despair  ran  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Pacific  and  these  feelings  were  subsequently  intensi- 
fied by  the  systematically  barbarous  and  ruthless  charac- 
ter of  the  war  waged  by  Germany  on  land  and  sea.  The 
fate  meted  out  to  Belgium  made  an  indelible  impression 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      133 

and  was  a  powerful  factor  in  creating  the  strong  anti- 
German  sentiment  that  with  many  variations  and  vicissi- 
tudes consistently  pervaded  the  United  States  during  the 
thirty  months  of  the  war,  prior  to  the  severance  of  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Germany  on  February  3,  191 7.  The 
sympathy  for  the  Allies  was  more  a  reflex  of  this  feeling 
than  a  positive  sentiment  for  a  cause  which,  in  general, 
was  imperfectly  understood  by  a  people  largely  ignorant 
of  affairs  beyond  the  confines  of  America.  Although 
the  American  people  always  had  some  vague  perception 
that  the  most  far-reaching  issues  were  at  stake,  they  had 
for  a  long  time  only  the  faintest  realization  of  the  extent 
to  which  their  own  future  welfare  was  dependent  upon 
the  defeat  of  German  ambitions.  As  a  consequence, 
Americans  did  not  quickly  perceive  that  their  own  inter- 
ests not  only  warranted  but  even  demanded  participation 
in  the  struggle  against  Germany.  Naturally,  with  the 
still  undeveloped  sense  of  responsibility  for  the  welfare 
of  the  rest  of  the  world,  the  cause  of  public  right  and 
international  morality  in  itself  made  no  compelling  ap- 
peal. Hence,  quite  apart  from  any  tendencies  towards 
pacificism,  the  United  States  was  for  over  two  years 
preponderantly  averse  from  being  drawn  into  the  war. 
In  fact,  as  the  conflict  developed,  its  ruthless  intensity 
greatly  strengthened  the  normally  pacific  temper  of  the 
people  and  made  overwhelming  the  popular  demand  for 
a  strict  adherence  to  neutrality,  unless  Germany  should 
render  such  a  course  absolutely  impossible. 

In  the  eyes  of  not  a  few  Americans,  there  seemed  to 


134       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

be  something  dignified  in  this  neutrality,  as  if  the  United 
States  had  been  placed  in  the  position  of  a  judge  ap- 
praising the  actions  of  the  warring,  and  hence,  as  they 
thought,  necessarily  erring  nations.  Others  prided  them- 
selves on  some  moral  quality  that,  they  assumed,  was  in- 
herent in  an  attitude  of  neutrality.  A  distinct  echo  of 
such  sentiments  is  to  be  found  in  the  remark  made  by 
Mr.  N.  B.  Baker,  the  Secretary  of  War,  during  the  spring 
of  1916,  that  the  United  States  was  "now  in  the  dom- 
inant moral  position  in  the  world."  "^ 

To  the  Entente  Allies,  who  were  sacrificing  their  best 
blood  and  their  accumulated  treasure  to  safeguard  the 
ideals  to  which  the  United  States  has  always  expressed 
fullest  allegiance,  such  claims  were  totally  incomprehen- 
sible and  in  the  extreme  irritating.®  They  denoted  com- 
pletely divergent  points  of  view  and  led  to  estrangement. 
In  fact,  a  little  sober  reflection  would  have  demonstrated 
that  there  was  no  warrant  whatsoever  for  self -righteous- 
ness on  the  score  of  neutrality.  Neutrality  is  essentially 
passive  in  nature  and  is  merely  a  right  or  privilege  sanc- 
tioned by  interstate  usage.  In  no  sense,  however,  is  it 
a  moral  duty.  It  may  even  be  the  very  reverse.  As 
Mazzini  truly  said,  "neutrality  in  a  war  of  principles  is 
mere  passive  existence,  forgetfulness  of  all  that  makes 
a  people  sacred,  the  negation  of  the  common  law  of  na- 
tions, political  atheism."  According  to  him,  the  injunc- 
tion to  remain  passive  spectators  between  good  and  evil 
was  "  the  word  of  Cain."  ®  In  the  absence  of  the  effec- 
tive general  leadership  that  American  democracy  has  for 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      135 

some  time  sorely  needed,  the  issue  was,  however,  not 
quite  so  clear-cut  in  the  mind  of  the  American  people. 
Yet,  it  is  patent  that  a  great  Power  which,  in  a  crisis  that 
is  determining  the  destiny  of  the  world,  and  hence  also 
its  own  future,  deliberately  remains  passive  and  refrains 
from  actively  aiding  what,  even  only  in  a  general  way,  it 
considers  to  be  the  cause  of  justice  and  civilization  is  by 
this  inaction  placed  upon  the  moral  defensive.  Its  neu- 
trality, instead  of  being  as  was  generally  assumed  a  priori 
meritorious,  requires  vindication  if  it  is  to  escape  con- 
demnation. Whether  this  justification  will  commend  it- 
self to  the  judgment  of  the  future  is  another  matter. 
Naturally,  the  comparatively  few  Americans  who  saw  the 
issue  clearly  fretted  under  the  restraints  of  neutrality, 
but  in  addition  the  disharmony  between  creed  and  deed 
created  the  wide  moral  unrest  that  attends  an  uneasy 
conscience.^^  Mere  vehement,  even  though  sincere,  as- 
severations of  ideals  without  the  slightest  willingness  or 
intention  to  assume  any  risks  or  responsibilities  is  futile 
and  demoralizing.  It  rots  the  moral  fibre  of  the  asser- 
tor,  especially  when  what  is  lacking  is  merely  the  will, 
not  the  power,  to  give  them  effect. 

The  overwhelming  desire  of  the  American  people  to 
remain  aloof  from  the  war  was,  however,  accompanied 
by  a  deeper  insight  into  the  dynamics  of  interstate  re- 
lations. Hitherto  a  world  war  had  seemed  to  the  aver- 
age American  to  be  an  utter  impossibility,  something 
with  which  he  was  not  likely  to  come  into  closer  contact 
than  that  vicariously  afforded  in  reading  of  a  barbaric 


136       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

past.  The  ensuing  rude  awakening  directed  the  atten- 
tion of  America  to  problems  that  had  formerly  seemed 
almost  academically  remote.  It  was  then  generally  real- 
ized that  a  considerable  increase  in  military  and  naval 
armaments  was  necessary.  At  the  same  time  also,  all 
plans  for  securing  the  future  peace  of  the  world  received 
an  attentive  hearing.  In  fact,  the  progressive  horrors 
of  the  war  in  Belgium,  Serbia,  Poland,  and  Armenia  led 
to  a  notable  growth  of  pacificism.  Simultaneously  also, 
American  foreign  policy  was  subjected  to  a  critical  exam- 
ination. In  some,  the  European  agony  produced  such  a 
revulsion  that  they  sought  salvation  in  a  Pan- Americanism 
that  seemed  to  them  to  promise  renewed  and  reinforced 
isolation  in  the  western  hemisphere.  They  were  ready 
to  relinquish  the  Philippines,  to  abandon  China  to  what- 
ever fate  the  ambitions  of  others  might  allot  to  her  and, 
under  the  spell  of  a  somewhat  fetichistic  republicanism, 
they  desired  "  to  complete  and  round  out  the  immunity 
from  entangling  foreign  alliances  proposed  by  Washing- 
ton and  Monroe,  by  asking  our  European  friends  to  lib- 
erate all  territory  in  any  of  the  Americas  now  held  by 
them."  ^*  Canada,  of  course,  was  excepted.  Such  men 
wished  to  carry  to  its  logical  conclusion  Secretary  Olney's 
dictum  that  any  permanent  political  union  between  a  Eu- 
ropean and  an  American  state  is  "  unnatural  and  inex- 
pedient," and  to  make  real  the  Pan-American  unity  that 
John  Quincy  Adams  and  Clay  had  planned  and  which 
Blaine  had  energetically  fostered. 

But  the  solidarity  upon  which  this  unity  is  premised 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      137 

is  largely  fictitious  in  its  spiritual,  cultural,  political,  eco- 
nomic, and  even  in  its  geographical  elements.  The  cul- 
tural and  economic  ties  between  Europe  and  America  are 
far  stronger  than  are  those  binding  together  the  Amer- 
icas. ^^  English-speaking  America  and  Latin  America 
are  not  mere  geographical  terms,  but  express  vital  his- 
torical and  social  facts.  To  ignore  this  is  to  court  dis- 
aster. Hence  while  many  favoured  Pan-Americanism, 
partly  because  it  promised  distinct  commercial  advantages 
and  partly  also  because  it  is  a  step  in  the  direction  of  in- 
terstate co-operation,  others  again  saw  in  it  the  assump- 
tion of  additional  responsibilities  without  in  any  way 
adding  to  the  security  of  the  United  States.  Moreover, 
they  deemed  it  dangerous  to  the  extent  that  it  tended  to 
ignore  the  essential  and  real  interdependence  of  Europe 
and  America.  This  interdependence  had  been  conspicu- 
ously emphasized  by  the  war.  As  a  consequence,  ever 
growing  numbers  of  Americans  had  rejected  the  gospel 
of  renewed  isolation,  and  had  reached  the  conclusion  that 
the  policy  of  aloofness  from  Europe  was  obsolete  and 
that  the  United  States  must  in  the  future  assume  its  share 
of  the  burden  of  upholding  the  public  right  of  the  world. 
The  policy  of  the  Administration  followed  the  course 
of  public  opinion  closely.  The  neutrality  maintained  by 
President  Wilson  was  not  only  an  expression  of  the  pop- 
ular will,  but  was  also  a  direct  continuation  of  America's 
traditional  policy  of  detachment  from  European  affairs. 
For  two  and  a  half  years  the  efforts  of  the  Administra- 
tion were  largely  devoted  to  unsuccessful  attempts  to 


138        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

assert  America's  rights  as  a  neutral  against  practices 
that  the  belligerents  claimed  were  founded  upon  well- 
established  principles  of  international  law,  though  not 
in  accord  with  all  the  niceties  of  previous  custom,  as  well 
as  against  those  rights  and  pretensions  that  were  exer- 
cised merely  in  virtue  of  the  recognized  principle  of  re- 
prisal and,  at  times,  in  defiance  of  all  humanitarian  prin- 
ciples.^^ In  addition,  after  more  than  a  year  for 
consideration,  measures  were  adopted  to  increase  ma- 
terially both  the  army  and  navy.  At  the  same  time  also, 
closer  relations  with  the  other  twenty  republics  of  the 
western  hemisphere  were  assiduously  cultivated.  But  as 
time  went  on,  President  Wilson  perceived  that  Europe 
and  America  had  become  so  interdependent  that  the  des- 
tiny of  one  could  not  be  separated  from  that  of  the  other. 
He  recognized  that  the  American  doctrine  of  rigid  neu- 
trality, to  which  he  had  consistently  adhered  as  far  as  the 
circumstances  would  permit,  was  becoming  untenable  in 
a  closely  interrelated  world  and  would  grow  increasingly 
impracticable  in  the  future.  Hence,  he  advocated  with 
increasing  insistence  the  future  formation  of  a  world- 
wide union  of  states  such  as  was  being  actively  promoted 
by  an  unofficial  organization  known  as  the  League  to  En- 
force Peace.-^* 

The  object  of  this  purely  private  association  was  to 
advocate  the  creation  of  a  league  of  nations,  of  which  the 
United  States  was  naturally  to  be  one,  whose  members 
should  bind  themselves  to  four  proposals.  Of  these,  the 
first  is  that  all  justiciable  questions  arising  between  the 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      139 

signatory  powers,  not  settled  by  negotiation,  shall  be 
submitted  to  an  international  judicial  tribunal  for  hear- 
ing and  judgment.  The  second  provides  that  all  other 
questions  arising  between  the  signatories  and  likewise  not 
settled  by  negotiation  shall  be  submitted  to  a  council  of 
conciliation  for  hearing,  consideration,  and  recommen- 
dation. By  the  third  provision,  the  signatories  agree 
that  they  will  jointly  use  both  their  economic  and  mili- 
tary forces  against  any  member  of  the  league  that  com- 
mits acts  of  hostility  against  any  one  of  the  signatories 
before  the  question  at  issue  shall  have  been  submitted  to 
the  judicial  tribunal  or  to  the  council  of  conciliation, 
according  to  the  stipulations  of  the  first  two  proposals. 
Finally,  provision  is  made  for  holding  periodic  confer- 
ences of  the  signatory  powers  for  the  purpose  of  formu- 
lating and  codifying  international  law;  and,  unless  some 
member  shall  dissent  within  a  stated  time,  the  law  so 
defined  shall  govern  in  the  decisions  of  the  international 
judicial  tribunal.  Apart  from  this  last  provision,  all  that 
is  stipulated  is  the  creation  of  an  international  council 
of  conciliation  and  an  international  court,  to  either  one 
of  which,  as  the  case  may  be,  a  member  of  the  league 
must  before  having  recourse  to  war  submit  his  dispute 
with  another  member,  on  pain  of  having  the  economic 
and  military  forces  of  all  the  members  used  against  him. 
Only  incidentally  and  indirectly  is  it  the  aim  of  this 
projected  league  to  establish  justice  and  right;  its  pri- 
mary purpose  is  merely  the  maintenance  of  peace.  Even 
in  that  respect  it  is  only  a  minimum  programme,  for  no 


I40       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

obligation  to  accept  the  judgments  of  the  tribunal  or  the 
recommendations  of  the  council  is  incurred.  The  sub- 
mission of  the  case  to  these  international  agencies  and 
the  abstention  from  hostilities  during  its  hearing,  absolve 
any  member  from  the  league's  economic  and  military 
penalties  and  leave  him  in  the  end  free  to  carry  out  his 
purposes  by  means  of  arms.  "  We  are  willing  to  con- 
cede," said  Mr.  Taft,  "  that  there  may  be  governmental 
and  international  injustice  which  cannot  be  practically 
remedied  except  by  force."  The  legitimate  presumption, 
however,  is  that  in  nearly  all  instances  these  judgments 
and  recommendations  will  be  accepted.  It  is  also  rea- 
sonably assumed  that  delay,  accompanied  by  a  full  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts,  will,  as  a  rule,  prevent  nations  from 
being  stampeded  into  Armageddon. 

On  its  face  the  project  would  appear  to  be  one  of  com- 
pulsory arbitration,  with  no  expressed  or  even  directly 
implied  obligation  to  abide  by  the  recommendation  or 
decree.  It  is,  however,  considerably  less  than  that. 
The  members  of  the  league  do  not  specifically  agree  to 
submit  their  unsettled  disputes  to  arbitration,  but  only 
not  to  go  to  war  before  doing  so.  The  economic  and 
military  forces  of  the  league  are  to  be  used  against  such 
members  only  as  threaten  or  commit  hostilities  against 
a  fellow  member  without  submitting  their  case,  but  not 
against  those  who  refuse  to  go  before  the  tribunal  or 
council  to  answer  a  complaint  against  them.  This  is  a 
vital  distinction.  Thus  one  of  the  most  active  exponents 
of  this  movement  has  stated : 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      141 

"  Under  the  League  a  dispute  may  go  on  indefinitely  without 
any  attempt  to  bring  the  disputants  into  Court.  ...  A  people 
may  be  practising  a  gross  injustice  toward  another  people,  may 
refuse  the  demand  of  the  latter  for  a  hearing,  and  the  dispute 
may  even  flame  up  into  war  without  the  League  having  the 
right  to  interfere.  For  there  is  only  one  act  which  the  League 
punishes,  namely,  the  making  of  war  against  a  fellow  sig^natory 
without  a  previous  hearing  of  the  dispute  or  an  honest  attempt 
to  secure  one."  ^"^ 

Before  the  effectiveness  of  this  programme  can  be 
judged,  one  other  point  requires  elucidation.  Much, 
obviously,  depends  upon  the  membership  of  the  proposed 
league.  As  yet  no  official  decision  has  been  reached, 
but  the  general  opinion  is  clear.  It  is  naturally  realized 
that  the  essential  prerequisite  is  to  secure  the  adhesion 
of  as  many  of  the  Great  Powers  as  is  possible,  preferably 
of  all.  There  is  also  one  very  considerable  advantage 
in  restricting  the  membership  to  these  states.  Such 
limitation  would  obviate  the  grave  difficulties  arising 
from  the  legal  doctrine  of  the  equality  of  all  sovereign 
states,  which  wrecked  "  The  Judicial  Arbitration  Court " 
planned  by  the  Second  Hague  Conference.  But  such 
limitation  would  violate  some  fundamental  liberal  princi- 
ples. Hence,  the  general  intention  is  to  admit  all  the 
Great  Powers  and  also  those  minor  states  that  have  a 
long  tradition  of  progress  and  order,  as  well  as  consid- 
erable resources  in  numbers  and  wealth.  This  canon 
would  make  eligible  Argentina,  Chile,  Brazil,  Spain, 
Holland,  and  the  Scandinavian  countries,  but  would  ex- 
clude such  states  as  Venezuela,  Colombia,  Serbia,  Greece, 


142        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

and  Persia,  not  to  mention  such  pigmies  of  the  inter- 
national family  as  San  Marino  and  Lichtenstein. 

The  effectiveness  of  such  a  league  can  be  estimated 
only  by  submitting  its  machinery  to  the  concrete  tests  of 
a  known  past  and  of  a  hypothetical  future.  In  the  case 
of  continuing  injury  inflicted  by  one  member  upon 
another,  apparently  very  little  could  be  accomplished. 
It  would  be  distinctly  in  the  interests  of  the  party  com- 
mitting the  injury  to  refuse  a  hearing  and  to  remain 
quiescent.  Unless  the  obligation  to  answer  a  complaint 
were  explicit  and  unless  refusal  to  do  so  would  bring  to 
the  support  of  the  complainant  the  economic  and  military 
forces  of  the  league,  the  question  would  still  remain,  as 
it  now  is,  a  problem  of  power  tempered  in  varying 
degrees  by  moral  considerations.  In  such  cases,  justice 
would  be  on  the  side  of  the  apparent  aggressor  who 
sought  his  remedy  by  arms.  If  Turkey  had  been  a 
member  of  such  a  league  during  the  nineteenth  century, 
the  continued  maltreatment  of  her  Christian  subjects  in 
the  Balkans  and  in  Armenia  could  not  without  her  con- 
sent have  come  before  the  league's  tribunals,  no  matter 
how  insistent  Russia  and  the  other  Powers  had  been. 
Likewise,  if  such  a  league  had  been  in  existence  without 
Turkey  having  had  membership  in  it,  no  relief  could  have 
been  afforded  by  the  league's  agencies.  In  all  prob- 
ability, however,  in  this  instance  the  league  would  have 
proceeded  ultra  vires  and  would  have  acted  in  much  the 
same  manner  as  did  the  Concert  of  Europe  towards 
Balkan  questions. 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      143 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  such  a 
league  could  have  composed  the  dispute  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  about  the  intolerable  condi- 
tions in  Cuba,  provided  both  parties  had  been  willing  to 
submit  the  case  to  the  council  of  conciliation.  The  out- 
come for  all  concerned  would  presumably  then  not  have 
been  just  what  it  now  is.  But  if  Spain  had  refused  a 
reference  of  the  dispute,  then  the  course  of  events  would 
have  been  much  the  same  as  it  was.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  United  States,  not  Spain,  had  been  the  unwilling 
party  and  had  insisted  upon  attacking  the  Spanish  forces 
in  Cuba,  then  the  league's  members  would  have  been 
obligated  to  join  their  economic  and  military  forces  to 
those  of  Spain  in  repelling  this  attack. 

Leaving  this  tentatively  reconstructed  past,  it  will  be 
found  instructive  to  test  the  league's  programme  by  the 
course  of  events  leading  up  to  the  existing  war.  As 
Serbia  presumably  would  not  have  been  a  member  of  the 
hypothetical  league,  Austria-Hungary's  attack  upon  her 
would  not  have  concerned  this  organization  until  Russia 
had  intervened  with  a  complaint  to  the  council  of  con- 
ciliation. If  Austria-Hungary  had  agreed  to  allow  the 
case  to  go  before  the  council,  this  in  itself  would  have 
provided  no  remedy  unless  the  league  had  the  power,  as 
it  is  proposed  it  shall  have,  to  enjoin  the  military  proceed- 
ings against  Serbia.^®  Otherwise,  in  trying  to  prevent 
the  military  coercion  of  Serbia  by  attacking  Austria-Hun- 
gary, Russia  would  have  become  subject  to  the  league's 
full  penalties.     But  judging  by  what  actually  did  happen, 


144        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

there  is  little  reason  to  assume  that  Austria-Hungary 
would  have  agreed  to  a  hearing  and  investigation.  In 
that  case,  the  course  of  events  v^ould  probably  have 
duplicated  the  actual  one,  except  for  one  possible  con- 
tingency. This  arises  from  the  relation  of  existing 
treaties  of  alliance  to  the  proposed  league.  It  is  scarcely 
conceivable  that  these  alliances  will  be  abandoned  until  in 
the  fulness  of  time  the  projected  league  shall  have  demon- 
strated its  effective  vitality.  Admitting,  solely  however 
for  the  purposes  of  the  argument,  that  the  alliance  with 
Germany  had  been  abrogated  as  a  condition  of  Austria- 
Hungary's  admission  to  the  league,  in  that  most  unlikely 
event,  fear  of  Russia's  teeming  millions  might  have  given 
Austria-Hungary  pause.  As  now,  it  then  still  would 
have  been  largely  a  Machtfrage,  a  question  of  relative 
power.  The  league  would  in  that  event,  of  course,  have 
had  no  right  to  interfere;  for  Russia,  after  having 
offered  to  submit  her  case  and  been  denied  a  hearing, 
would  have  been  at  full  liberty  to  attack  Austria-Hun- 
gary. But,  even  if  the  treaty  of  alliance  had  been  in 
full  vigour,  the  existence  of  such  a  league  might  have 
considerably  altered  the  course  of  events.  For  if  Ger- 
many had  proceeded  exactly  as  she  did,  the  whole  forces 
of  the  league  would  probably  have  been  called  into  action 
against  her.  On  the  other  hand,  this  result  might  have 
been  avoided  by  an  adaptation  of  Germany's  military 
strategy  to  this  probability.  One  thing  alone  is  certain, 
that  the  situation  arising  from  the  conflicting  obligations 
to  league  and  to  alliances  would  have  been  a  most  intri- 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      145 

cate  and  puzzling  one,  not  for  Germany  alone,  but  for  all 
the  Powers.*'  Presumably,  though  by  no  means  as- 
suredly, its  outcome  would  have  been  an  embattled  world, 
had  "  the  will  to  war  "  dominated  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary. 

If,  however,  we  look  behind  the  occasions  of  the 
present  war  to  its  causes,  if  we  leave  the  incidents  of 
a  fortnight  and  concentrate  our  attention  upon  the  inter- 
national travail  of  an  entire  generation,  then  it  would 
appear  that  the  result  might  possibly  have  been  an  alto- 
gether different  one.  Everything  would  have  depended 
upon  the  vitality  of  the  league  and  the  assurance  that 
every  member  would  have  fully  abided  by  his  pledge  to 
oppose  aggression  by  force.  Assuming  such  circum- 
stances, if  a  united  world  in  arms  had  unquestionably  to 
be  encountered,  the  aggressive  aims  of  Austria-Hungary 
in  the  Balkans  and  the  world-wide  ambitions  of  Germany 
would  probably  never  have  emerged  from  their  academic 
phases  into  Realpolitik.  The  superstate  organization 
would  probably  have  hastened  the  development  of  an  in- 
ternational mind. 

Turning  to  the  unpredictable  future,  it  will  be  advisable 
to  apply  the  machinery  to  possible  contingencies  that 
affect  most  closely  the  policies  of  the  United  States. 
These  concern  primarily  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the 
open  door  in  the  Far  East.  Let  it  be  assumed  that  for 
some  more  or  less  valid  reason  Germany  were  to  pro- 
ceed against  Venezuela,  Colombia,  or  any  one  of  the 
backward    Latin-American    States   that   had  not   been 


146       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

admitted  to  the  league.  Presumably  the  United  States 
would  protest.  In  that  event,  an  appeal  would  be  made 
to  the  council  of  conciliation  and  an  injunction  against 
Germany's  proceedings  would  be  demanded.  It  is  true 
that  this  would  involve  submitting  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
to  arbitration;  but  the  United  States  had  already  vir- 
tually agreed  to  this,  though  it  is  not  generally  realized, 
when  the  Bryan  Treaties  of  19 13  and  19 14,  providing 
for  the  submission  of  all  disputes  to  an  international  com- 
mission of  enquiry,  were  concluded.  If  Germany,  how- 
ever, should  refuse  to  submit  the  case,  then  no  injunc- 
tion could  be  issued  and  the  United  States,  as  under  exist- 
ing arrangements,  would  have  to  appeal  to  the  arbitra- 
ment of  arms.  Even  were  Germany  to  consent  to  a 
submission  of  the  case,  the  United  States  would  still  be 
at  liberty  to  enforce  its  views,  in  the  event  of  dissatis- 
faction with  the  recommendations  of  the  international 
tribunal.  Thus  it  is  not  apparent  that  the  league  pro- 
gramme would  weaken  the  fundamental  purpose  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  which  is  to  prevent  European  Powers 
from  interfering  with  the  free  development  of  Latin 
America.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Argentina,  Brazil,  and 
Chile  were  to  join  the  league,  it  is  quite  probable  that 
Europe  might  be  obligated  to  interfere  in  some  purely 
American  question.  In  itself,  this  probably  would  bode 
no  evil.  But  while  the  essential  purpose  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  would  presumably  not  be  impaired,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  how  it  would  to  any  extent  be  strengthened 
by  the  establishment  of  the  league.     The  maintenance  of 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      147 

its  fundamental  purposes  would  in  final  analysis  have  to 
rest  upon  the  same  forces  as  it  now  does. 

Similarly  doubtful  would  appear  to  be  the  efficacy  of 
the  proposed  machinery  in  securing  the  principle  of  equal 
commercial  opportunities  for  all  foreign  nations  in 
China  and  in  maintaining  that  country's  territorial  in- 
tegrity and  political  independence.  Much  would  depend 
upon  China's  membership  in  the  league.  As  a  member, 
China  could  appeal  to  the  league  against  aggressive  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  her  neighbours.  But  if  these  refused 
to  agree  to  a  hearing,  China  might  not  be  able  to  enlist 
the  support  of  the  league,  as  it  would  not  be  easy  to 
establish  the  overt  act  of  war  in  the  slow  process  of 
penetration  that  has  characterized  the  advance  of  Russia 
and  Japan  in  Mongolia  and  Manchuria.  On  the  surface, 
China  might  even  be  made  to  appear  as  the  aggressor. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  China  were  not  admitted  to  mem- 
bership, the  league  could  not  take  cognizance  of  any  com- 
plaints by  a  member  against  encroachments  upon  China, 
unless  the  offending  states  should  consent  to  such  action. 

Following  some  previous  public  expressions  manifest- 
ing general  approval  of  the  principles  for  which  the 
League  to  Enforce  Peace  stands,^^  President  Wilson,  on 
May  T.'j,  1916,  stated  that  the  United  States  believed  in 
the  following  fundamental  propositions:  first,  that  every 
people  have  a  right  to  choose  the  sovereignty  under  which 
they  shall  live ;  second,  that  the  small  states  have  the  same 
right  to  their  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity  as  the 
great  nations ;  and  third,  "  that  the  world  has  a  right  to 


148       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

be  free  from  every  disturbance  of  its  peace  that  has  its 
origin  in  aggression  and  disregard  of  the  rights  of  peo- 
ples and  nations."  Continuing,  he  expressed  the  firm 
conviction  that  the  American  people  were  willing  to  be- 
come partners  "  in  any  feasible  association  of  nations 
formed  in  order  to  realize  these  objects  and  make  them 
sure  against  violation."  The  type  of  international  or- 
ganization that,  in  his  opinion,  the  United  States  was 
willing  to  join,  he  defined  as : 

"An  universal  association  of  the  nations  to  maintain  the 
inviolate  security  of  the  highway  of  the  seas  for  the  common 
and  unhindered  use  of  all  nations  of  the  world,  and  to  prevent 
any  war  begun  either  contrary  to  treaty  covenants  or  without 
warning  and  full  submission  of  the  causes  to  the  opinion  of  the 
world, —  a  virtual  guarantee  of  territorial  integrity  and  political 
independence." 

In  the  course  of  the  following  weeks,  President  Wilson 
reiterated  these  principles'^  and  in  the  middle  of  June, 
19 16,  they  were  formally  included  in  the  platform  of  the 
Democratic  Party  on  which  he  ran  for  re-election.  Thus 
these  principles  became  an  official  part  of  the  Democratic 
creed.  In  his  formal  speech  accepting  the  re-nomination, 
on  September  2,  President  Wilson  emphasized  this  fea- 
ture of  the  platform,  stating: 

"  No  nation  can  any  longer  remain  neutral  as  against  any 
wilful  disturbance  of  the  peace  of  the  world.  .  .  .  The  nations 
of  the  world  must  unite  in  joint  guarantees  that  whatever  is 
done  to  disturb  the  whole  world's  life  must  first  be  tested  in  the 
court  of  the  whole  world's  opinion  before  it  is  attempted." 

Although  the  principles  of  the  League  to  Enforce 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      149 

Peace  were  not  embodied  in  the  platform  of  the  Republi- 
can Party,  Mr.  Hughes  endorsed  these  doctrines  un- 
equivocally. ^°  He  omitted,  however,  to  give  them  any 
prominence  during  his  campaign.  On  the  other  hand, 
President  Wilson  on  several  occasions  emphatically  urged 
the  necessity  of  the  United  States  joining  such  a  league 
of  nations  to  prevent  aggression  and  to  maintain  peace. ^^ 
Although  popular  attention  had  not  turned  towards  this 
phase  of  his  campaign,  President  Wilson  was  to  a  large 
extent  justified  in  holding  that  his  re-election  gave  him  a 
mandate  to  carry  this  plan  into  effect.  It  was  obviously 
important  for  the  outside  world  to  know  this.  Accord- 
ingly, it  was  proposed  to  inform  the  belligerents  in  order 
that  they  should  take  this  new  factor  into  account  in 
determining  what  territorial  re-arrangements  were  neces- 
sary to  give  them  the  desired  future  security.  In  his 
eirenicon  of  December  18,  1916,  after  referring  to  the 
fact  that  some  of  the  opposing  belligerents  had  already 
expressed  their  willingness  "  to  consider  the  formation  of 
a  league  of  nations  to  ensure  peace  and  justice  throughout 
the  world,"  President  Wilson  stated  that  the  people  and 
government  of  the  United  States  "  stand  ready,  and  even 
eager,  to  co-operate  in  the  accomplishment  of  these  ends 
when  the  war  is  over  with  every  influence  and  resource 
at  their  command." 

Some  time  previously,  in  discussing  this  general  plan, 
Viscount  Grey  had  pointed  out  that  "  it  is  not  merely  a 
sign  manual  of  Sovereigns  or  Presidents  that  is  required 
to  make  a  thing  like  that  worth  while ;  it  must  also  have 


I50        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

behind  it  Parliaments  and  national  sentiment."  ^^  The 
American  people  as  a  whole  were  as  yet  far  from  ready  to 
abandon  their  traditional  isolation  and  to  join  a  league 
with  such  unlimited  obligations.  In  addition,  the  plan 
could  be  put  into  effect  only  by  a  treaty  which  would  have 
to  be  ratified  by  a  vote  of  two  thirds  of  the  members 
present  in  the  Senate.  Furthermore,  Congress  alone  has 
the  right  to  declare  war  and  the  entrance  of  the  United 
States  into  the  proposed  league  would  deprive  Congress 
in  a  general  way  and  in  many  unpredictable  circumstances 
of,  the  right  to  determine  the  belligerency  of  the  United 
States. ^^  Some  of  the  grave  obstacles  in  the  path  of  this 
project  were  disclosed  by  the  debate  in  the  Senate  on 
President  Wilson's  Note  of  December  i8.  The  league 
programme  was  aggressively  assailed,  partly  on  the 
ground  that  it  undermined  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
partly  because  it  committed  the  United  States  to  un- 
limited obligations. 

This  debate  and  the  discussion  in  the  press  directed 
considerable  popular  attention  towards  the  league  plan. 
Partly  in  order  to  explain  more  definitely  his  own  views 
as  to  the  proposed  international  organization  and  as  to 
the  circumstances  under  which  he  favoured  membership 
of  the  United  States  in  it,  President  Wilson,  on  January 
22,  1917,  personally  addressed  the  Senate.  He  stated 
that,  in  every  discussion  of  the  future  peace,  it  is  taken 
for  granted  that  its  establishment  must  be  followed  by 
"  some  definite  concert  of  power,"  which  will  prevent  the 
recurrence  of  any  such  catastrophic  war.     "  It  is  incon- 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR       151 

ceivable,"  he  added,  "  that  the  people  of  the  United  States 
should  play  no  part  in  that  great  enterprise."  They  can- 
not in  honour  withhold  the  service  to  which  they  are  now 
about  to  be  challenged,  namely,  "  to  add  their  authority 
and  their  power  to  the  authority  and  force  of  other 
nations  to  guarantee  peace  and  justice  throughout  the 
world."  This  address  led  to  renewed  discussion  in  the 
Senate,  during  which  it  was  again  very  apparent  that 
grave  opposition  would  have  to  be  surmounted  before  the 
Senate  would  be  ready  to  ratify  a  treaty  embodying  this 
project.  In  the  midst  of  the  debate  came  Germany's  sud- 
den announcement  of  her  unrestricted  submarine  cam- 
paign. The  ensuing  severance  of  diplomatic  relations 
with  Germany  naturally  stopped  all  further  discussion. 

Germany's  flagrant  disregard  of  American  rights  and 
her  fixed  determination  to  delimit  arbitrarily  the  high 
seas  and  to  treat  all  vessels  venturing  within  the  barred 
zones  of  this  commonage  of  all  peoples  as  trespassers  to 
be  sunk  at  sight  forced  the  United  States  to  depart  from 
the  chosen  course  of  neutrality.  However  unwelcome,  in 
general,  was  this  necessity,  the  other  alternative  was  the 
impossible  one  of  unmistakable  national  humiliation.  At 
first,  it  was  the  intention  merely  to  protect  American 
rights  and  to  maintain  a  neutral  attitude  towards  the  great 
aim  for  which  the  Entente  Allies  were  contending.  But 
this  very  issue  was  directly  involved  in  the  submarine 
controversy,  because  Germany's  defiance  of  America's 
well-established  and  unquestioned  rights  proceeded  in 
essence  from  the  non-moral  code  that  animates  Germany's 


152        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

entire  foreign  policy.  It  was  a  concrete  manifestation  of 
the  spirit  that  had  led  to  the  invasion  of  Belgium.  Pro- 
tection of  American  rights  meant  the  vindication  of  "  pub- 
lic right "  for  which  the  Entente  was  fighting.^*  The 
tw^o  were  inseparable. 

This  was  further  emphasized  by  Germany's  inept 
attempt  to  embroil  the  United  States  with  Mexico  and 
Japan.  The  direct  challenge  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
inherent  in  the  offer  to  Mexico  of  the  "  lost "  provinces 
of  Texas,  New  Mexico,  and  Arizona,  disclosed  the  in- 
sidious nature  of  the  German  menace.  When  Russia 
burst  the  shackles  of  autocracy,  the  situation  became  even 
more  clarified.  It  was  increasingly  realized  that  the  fate 
of  democracy  was  involved  in  the  war  and  that  no  stable 
or  just  international  future  was  possible  in  a  world  where 
one  state  arrogated  to  itself  the  right  to  ignore  solemn 
treaties,  long-established  interstate  usage,  and  generally 
accepted  principles  of  morality  and  humanity,  whenever 
they  interfered  with  its  imperious  will  to  power. 

The  negative  policy  of  "  armed  neutrality  "  could  not 
be  maintained.  It  was  not  only  ineffective  in  accomplish- 
ing its  purposes,  but  it  ignored  the  fact  that  it  implied 
also  a  negotiated  settlement.  The  German  proposal  to 
Carranza  to  "  make  war  together  and  together  make 
peace  "  disclosed  the  far  from  alluring  prospect  of  having 
to  arrange  terms  with  a  Germany  unhampered  by  war 
with  the  Entente.  But,  in  addition,  "  armed  neutrality  " 
falsified  the  fundamental  facts  of  the  situation.  It 
degraded  a  great  issue  of  international  morality  and  right 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR       153 

into  a  relatively  paltry  question  of  neutral  rights.  Doubts 
early  began  to  beset  President  Wilson  and,  in  his  in- 
augural address  on  March  5,  he  stated  that  the  United 
States  might  be  drawn  by  circumstances  to  "  a  more  im- 
mediate association  with  the  great  struggle  itself,"  A 
month  later,  all  doubts  had  disappeared.  In  addressing 
Congress  on  April  2,  President  Wilson  characterized  the 
German  submarine  campaign  as  "  a  war  against  all 
nations  "  and  he  frankly  admitted  that  armed  neutrality 
was  impracticable.  He  advised  Congress  to  declare  that 
the  course  of  the  German  Government  was  nothing  less 
than  war  against  the  United  States  and  to  take  immediate 
steps  "  to  bring  the  Government  of  the  German  Empire  to 
terms  and  end  the  war."  In  addition  to  the  mobilization 
of  America's  economic  and  military  resources,  this  will 
involve,  he  pointed  out,  "  the  utmost  practicable  co-oper- 
ation in  counsel  and  action  with  the  governments  now  at 
war  with  Germany." 

President  Wilson,  however,  did  not  allow  the  matter  to 
rest  here,  but  he  again  urged  his  plan  for  a  league  of  na- 
tions and  he  definitely  aligned  the  United  States  with  the 
Entente  Allies  by  fully  accepting  their  interpretation  of 
the  deeper  meaning  of  the  war.  In  ringing  words,  he 
proclaimed  his  firm  adherence  to  the  programme  of  an 
organized  society  of  states,  renounced  the  constraints  of 
neutrality  and  arraigned  the  Prussian-German  code.  He 
declared  that  the  object  of  the  United  States  in  entering 
the  war  was : 

"  To  vindicate  the  principles  of  peace  and  justice  in  the  life 


154        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

of  the  world  as  against  selfish  and  autocratic  power  and  to 
set  up  amongst  the  really  free  and  self-governed  peoples  of  the 
world  such  a  concert  of  purpose  and  action  as  will  henceforth 
ensure  the  observance  of  those  principles.  Neutrality  is  no 
longer  feasible  or  desirable  where  the  peace  of  the  world  is 
involved  and  the  freedom  of  its  peoples,  and  the  menace  to 
that  peace  and  freedom  lies  in  the  existence  of  autocratic  gov- 
ernments backed  by  organized  force  which  is  controlled  wholly 
by  their  will,  not  by  the  will  of  their  people.  We  have  seen 
the  last  of  neutrality  in  such  circumstances." 

The  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war  for  this 
positive  ideal  is  in  many  respects  a  transcendent  event  of 
far-reaching  potentialities.  Apart  from  its  effect  upon 
the  war  itself,  it  marks  the  definite  abandonment  of  the 
policy  of  isolation  and  the  inception  of  new  traditions 
of  international  responsibility.  It  means  a  clear  recog- 
nition of  the  fact  that  the  peoples  of  the  world  constitute 
a  society  and  that  each  member  thereof  is  responsible  for 
order  and  justice  therein.  In  addition,  the  full  co- 
operation with  the  Entente  Allies  in  their  high  purpose 
is  equivalent  to  the  practical  establishment  of  a  league  to 
enforce  peace.  The  paramount  aim  of  the  Allies  is  that 
of  pacification.  Their  purpose  is  to  quell  the  Germanic 
rebellion  against  the  moral  law,  the  established  customs, 
and  the  liberal  spirit  of  western  civilization.  In  this  con- 
nection, the  fundamental  question  has  inevitably  arisen: 
"Shall  this  existing  league  perpetuate  itself?"  "Shall 
its  membership  be  confined  to  those  engaged  in  the  work 
of  pacification  with  the  addition  of  some  of  the  neutral 
states ;  or,  shall  the  rebels  against  public  right  be  admitted 
as  soon  as  peace  is  concluded,  regardless  of  whether 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      155 

their  spirit  be  chastened  or  still  remain  recalcitrant?" 
In  this  connection,  Mr.  Wilson  made  some  significant 
suggestions  in  his  memorable  address  of  April  2.  He 
emphasized  a  fundamental  fact  that  had  not  escaped  the 
attention  of  American  and  English  critics  who  had 
pointed  out  that  the  success  of  the  projected  league  of 
nations  depended  upon  reciprocal  confidence  among  its 
members  and  upon  a  universal  will  to  co-operation.  One 
insincere  member  could  work  incalculable  havoc  with  its 
delicate  machinery  and  could  use  it  to  delude  his  fellows 
with  a  false  sense  of  security.  With  such  thoughts  in 
his  mind,  President  Wilson  said: 

"A  steadfast  concert  for  peace  can  never  be  maintained  ex- 
cept by  a  partnership  of  democratic  nations.  No  autocratic 
government  could  be  trusted  to  keep  faith  within  it  or  observe 
its  covenants.  It  must  be  a  league  of  honour,  a  partnership  of 
opinion.  Intrigue  would  eat  its  vitals  away;  the  plottings  of 
inner  circles  who  could  plan  what  they  would  and  render  ac- 
count to  no  one  would  be  a  corruption  seated  at  its  very  heart. 
Only  free  peoples  can  hold  their  purpose  and  their  honour 
steady  to  a  common  end  and  prefer  the  interests  of  mankind  to 
any  narrow  interest  of  their  own." 

Instead  of  an  all-inclusive  league  of  the  world's  stable 
states,  President  Wilson  here  proposed  one  confined  to 
the  self-governing  democracies.^'^  Either  alternative  has 
its  advantages,  as  well  as  its  concomitant  disadvantages. 
In  general,  the  more  comprehensive  the  league,  the  more 
slowly  will  it  acquire  vitality  and  less  positive  must  be  its 
purposes.  The  programme  of  "  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace "  was  especially  devised  for  such  an  inclusive 
league  and  it  is  avowedly  only  a  palliative  to  lessen  the 


156       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

risk  of  war.  Its  champions  merely  claim  that  it  is  the 
first  step  towards  world  organization.  Other  proposals 
go  considerably  further  in  advocating  the  compulsory  sub- 
mission of  disputes  and  even  the  enforcement  of  the 
awards.  Such  apparently  also  was  Mr.  Wilson's  pur- 
pose when,  on  December  i8,  1 916,  he  spoke  of  "  a  league 
of  nations  to  ensure  peace  and  justice  throughout  the 
world." 

The  advantages  of  an  inclusive  league,  even  with  only 
the  minimum  programme,  are  patent,  provided  the 
equally  obvious  dangers  are  not  ignored.  Of  these  the 
gravest  is  that  pacific  peoples  may  too  confidingly  place 
an  undue  reliance  upon  what  is  confessedly  only  a  pal- 
liative and  neglect  those  other  safeguards  that  will  be 
necessary  if  they  are  to  remain  fully  secure  against  ag- 
gressive states.  In  general,  the  effect  of  the  comprehen- 
sive plan  would  be  to  diminish  the  risk  of  war  by  foster- 
ing recourse  to  arbitration  and  thus  injecting  the  factors 
of  publicity,  delay  and  reason  into  situations  that  are  too 
often  controlled  by  panic  and  passion.  Moreover,  even 
if  war  could  by  no  means  be  eliminated  by  these  agencies, 
force  would  not  as  now  be  predominantly  used  at  the 
discretion  of  directly  interested  parties,  but  would  in  an 
increasing  number  of  instances  be  applied  under  an  inter- 
national mandate.  Instead  of  being  exclusively  national 
instruments,  the  several  and  distinct  armies  and  navies 
would  tend  to  become  the  policing  force  of  a  still  imper- 
fectly organized  society  of  states.^^ 

Concomitantly  also,  the  inevitable  friction  resulting 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR       157 

from  the  inherent  conflict  between  the  rights  of  belliger- 
ents and  those  of  neutrals  would  tend  towards  elimina- 
tion. These  disputes  have  inevitably  occurred  in  every 
great  war  in  which  sea  power  has  been  an  important  fac- 
tor. But  if  such  power  were  exercised  under  an  inter- 
national mandate,  there  would  be  no  demand  for  its 
emasculation.  In  such  authorized  wars,  in  which  the 
world  would  be  divided  between  the  policing  states  and 
those  engaged  in  riot  and  rebellion,  neutral  rights  would 
automatically  cease  to  hamper  the  application  of  every 
ounce  of  pressure  of  which  sea  power  is  capable,  pro- 
vided the  generally  accepted  dictates  of  humanity  were 
not  violated.  Carried  to  its  logical  conclusion,  the  league 
programme  implies  that  the  aggressor  would  be  con- 
fronted by  a  completely  belligerent  world.  But  the 
league's  machinery  is  not  devised  to  prevent  all  wars  of 
aggression.  In  such  unauthorized  wars,  neutral  rights 
would  still  remain  fully  intact.  Furthermore,  in  such 
instances,  a  canon  would  be  established  for  determining 
aggression,  upon  which,  in  turn,  could  be  based  the  at 
present  legally  questionable  right  to  practise  a  benevolent 
neutrality  towards  the  injured  party." 

Finally,  such  a  league  of  nations  will  be  indispensable 
as  a  link  between  the  two  groups  of  a  disrupted  western 
world.  Some  bridge  must  be  kept  open.  No  one  is  so 
pessimistic  as  to  assume  that  western  unity  has  disap- 
peared for  all  time.  But  the  cleavage  in  it  is  very  real 
and  it  cannot  be  made  to  vanish  merely  by  ignoring  it, 
or  by  denying  its  existence.     Failure  to  face  facts  is  the 


158        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

cardinal  sin  in  statesmanship.  Unless  Germany  purge 
herself  of  her  materialistic  and  non-moral  creed,  either  as 
a  result  of  a  democratic  upheaval  or  as  a  consequence  of 
economic  and  military  collapse,  the  fundamental  factor  in 
interstate  relations  for  the  next  generation  or  so  cannot 
but  be  this  abyss  between  the  Allies  and  the  Central 
Powers.  It  has  been  created  by  moral  and  political  forces 
of  great  potency.  Its  depths  cannot  be  lessened  merely 
by  the  earnest  desire  of  those  who  regret  its  existence. 
Under  these  conditions,  when  mutual  confidence  is  lack- 
ing, sincere  co-operation  between  the  two  groups  of  states 
will  for  a  considerable  time  be  out  of  the  question.  In 
this  more  or  less  long  interval,  the  proposed  league  would 
at  least  act  as  a  serviceable  bridge  until  ultimately  the  dis- 
rupted unity  be  restored.  From  the  very  fact  that  they 
will  live  in  the  same  world,  the  two  sets  of  belligerents 
must  meet  to  regulate  matters  that  are  common  to  all. 
However  great  be  the  efforts  made  to  lessen  it,  their  inter- 
dependence will  still  remain  an  important  factor. 

The  immediate  programme  of  the  inclusive  league 
would  be  essentially  the  negative  one  of  diminishing  the 
chance  of  war.  If  carried  into  effect,  it  would  remain 
for  a  long  time  an  artificial  organization  with  little  in- 
herent vitality.  As  opposed  to  such  an  unlimited  union 
with  indefinite  and  negative  objects,  President  Wilson's 
"  League  of  Honour  "  presents  the  possibility  of  a  limited 
union  with  definite  and  positive  aims.  In  order  to  render 
either  organization  effective  to  any  satisfactory  extent,  it 
would  seemingly  be  necessary  to  create  a  code  of  public 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      159 

right  embodied  in  a  series  of  fundamental  treaties  to 
which  all  members  were  parties.  These  treaties  should 
guarantee  in  explicit  terms:  first,  the  independence,  in- 
tegrity, and  neutrality  of  all  minor  states  occupying 
economic  and  strategic  points  of  vantage,  such  as  Bel- 
gium, Holland,  Switzerland,  and  Serbia;  secondly,  the 
independence  and  integrity  of  China  and  of  other  back- 
ward independent  countries,  with  the  wide-open  door 
there  and,  possibly  also,  in  the  undeveloped  dependencies 
of  Europe  and  America ;  thirdly,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  based  upon  the  foregoing  principles  and  not 
upon  either  the  imperialistic  aims  or  the  exclusive  eco- 
nomic ambitions  of  some  elements  in  the  United  States. 
Finally,  it  should  be  realized  that,  whether  it  be  an 
inclusive  league  or  the  limited  concert  of  democracies, 
the  project  will  in  either  case  remain  largely  an  unreality 
if  the  rigid  categories  of  the  current  political  science  are 
not  modified.  If  the  world  adheres  to  the  accepted  theory 
of  sovereignty  which  demands  a  supreme  and  undivided 
allegiance  to  the  absolute  state,  the  league  will  be  a  victim 
of  infantile  paralysis.  As  Sir  Frederick  Pollock  has 
wisely  said,  an  effective  league  "  involves  a  considerable 
delegation  of  authority  by  sovereign  States;  but  those 
who  desire  the  end  of  effectual  concerted  action  must  be 
prepared  to  grant  the  means."  ^^  In  order  to  avoid  any 
infringement  of  sovereignty,  "  the  League  to  Enforce 
Peace "  has  specifically  made  its  programme  one  of 
optional  arbitration  and  of  non-enforcement  of  the  judg- 
ments.;   To  go  further  is  to  secure  increased  effective- 


i6o        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

ness  at  the  expense  of  sovereignty.  The  dilemma  is  self- 
evident.  Senator  Cummins,  assuming  that  Mr.  Wilson 
favoured  enforcement  of  the  league's  decision,  attacked 
the  project,  declaring  that  it  meant  the  surrender  of  sov- 
ereignty by  the  United  States  to  "  a  new  vi^orld  sov- 
ereignty "  and  "  the  formation  of  a  new  and  supreme 
government  which  is  to  command  our  resources  in  both 
blood  and  treasure."  To  his  not  abnormally  national- 
istic mind,  it  was  a  "  humiliating  reflection  that  the  United 
States  will  be  reduced  to  a  mere  principality,  pursuing  the 
path  of  obscurity  to  an  ignominious  future,  doing  the 
bidding  of  a  higher  power."  ^^ 

It  is  easy  to  criticize  such  sentiments,  but  it  would  be 
folly  to  ignore  them  as  they  are  held  far  and  wide,  not 
only  in  the  United  States  but  throughout  the  world. 
They  are  part  and  parcel  of  the  current  political  thought 
upon  which  is  based  the  modem  state-system.  Hence 
the  grave  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  creation  of  an 
effective  superstate  authority  and  the  extreme  improb- 
ability that,  whatever  be  the  type  of  league  formed,  it  will 
rapidly  become  an  independently  robust  organization.^'' 
The  vital  factor  in  interstate  relations  will  be  the  co- 
operative spirit  engendered  among  the  members  of  the 
two  groups  by  the  war.  The  democratic  basis  which  is 
establishing  itself  in  support  of  the  existing  alliances  has 
given  them  a  fresh  vitality.  This  is  especially  true  of 
the  group  with  which  the  United  States  has  thrown  in 
its  fortunes.  Except  in  the  most  improbable  event  of 
military  or  naval  disaster  undermining  its  vitality,  this 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR       i6i 

group  will  continue  in  existence  after  the  war  in  some 
form  or  another.  If  an  inclusive  league  of  nations  be 
formed,  the  members  of  this  group  will  inevitably  tend  to 
act  in  concert  within  it.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  league 
be  restricted  to  the  world's  democracies,  its  membership 
and  that  of  this  group  will  largely  coincide.  In  either 
case,  this  group  will  be  a  vital  fact.  It  may  be  bound 
together  in  one  general  agreement  or  its  solidarity  may 
express  itself  in  a  mere  entente.  In  all  likelihood,  the 
members  will  be  united  in  a  network  of  separate  alliances, 
whose  general  effect  will  be  to  make  them  a  unit  in 
defence  and  to  create  separate  combinations  for  the  attain- 
ment of  specific  ends. 

Within  this  group,  the  relations  of  each  to  every  other 
member  will  vary  considerably  in  accordance  with  many 
factors.  Of  these  the  most  important  will  be  the  more 
or  less  close  approximation  of  national  ideals.  But,  in 
addition,  geographical  facts  will  play  a  leading  part. 
Contiguity  cannot  be  ignored.  Similarly,  these  relations 
will  be  greatly  influenced  by  the  closeness  of  the  economic 
bonds  and  by  the  degree  of  parallelism  in  policy  as  re- 
gards common  purposes  and  interests.  Hence  the  rela- 
tions of  France  and  Italy  are  bound  to  be  very  intimate. 
Cultural  similarity,  juxtaposition,  and  economic  in- 
terests, all  favour  such  an  outcome.  Thus  the  Italian 
Deputy,  Giuseppe  Bevione,  significantly  said: 

"  We,  the  old  Latin  races,  in  whom  the  historical  sense  is 
deeply  ingrained,  have  already  acquired  the  feeling  that  this 
alliance  which  has  been  consecrated  on  the  field  of  battle  must 


i62       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

continue  after  the  war,  if  we  wish  to  preserve  the  fruits  of 
victory.  Woe  to  those  who  find  they  stand  alone  after  the 
struggle !  France  and  Italy,  by  uniting  their  forces,  can  con- 
stitute a  powerful,  uniform  and  united  hloc  of  80  millions 
of  Latins.  ...  If  the  Latin  hloc  is  formed,  it  will  be  a  factor 
of  the  first  importance  in  the  Europe  of  to-morrow  —  a  factor 
whose  counsels  will  be  respected  and  whose  strength  will  be 
feared."  " 

It  will  probably  be  impossible  and  it  would  presumably 
be  highly  injudicious  for  the  United  States  to  retire  after 
the  war  from  this  group  to  its  former  hermit-like  isola- 
tion. America's  clearly  defined  purpose  in  the  war  is  to 
establish  public  right  and  to  make  the  world  safe  for  its 
democracies.  A  more  or  less  artificial  league  of  nations 
will  confessedly  not  be  sufficient  to  accomplish  this. 
Nor,  unless  an  extensive  code  of  right  be  formulated,  will 
it  in  itself  give  any  added  strength  to  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  adequately  safeguard  the  integrity  of  China 
and  the  open  door  to  her  undeveloped  markets  and  re- 
sources. Direct  co-operation  with  others  is  necessary 
and  the  more  explicitly  and  publicly  the  basis  of  this  co- 
operation is  defined,  the  more  effective  will  it  be.  The 
outbreak  of  the  war  proved  the  inefficacy  of  the  policy 
of  understandings  with  ill-defined  obligations.  If  Ger- 
many had  faced  the  positive  fact  that  her  attack  upon 
France  would  bring  the  British  Empire  into  the  war,  she 
would  probably  not  have  drawn  the  sword.  Nor  is  co- 
operation merely  in  certain  specific  questions  adequate. 
For  instance,  it  is  quite  plain,  even  to  the  most  casual 
observer,  that  Japan  is  at  present  attempting  to  gain  an 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      163 

exclusive  and  predominant  economic  and  political  posi- 
tion in  China.  The  ultimate  success  of  this  scarcely  dis- 
guised attempt  will  depend  primarily  upon  whether  or 
no  England  after  the  war  will  be  in  a  position  that,  in 
opposing  Japan,  she  can  afford  to  run  the  risk  of  that 
country  joining  the  Central  Empires.  In  the  formation 
of  this  decision,  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  this 
special  instance  will  necessarily  count  for  little ;  the  main 
consideration  will  ineluctably  be  the  general  balance  of 
power  and  purpose  throughout  the  world,  because  on  it 
will  depend  the  safety  of  the  British  Commonwealth. 
The  greater  need  must  over-ride  the  lesser.  America's 
co-operation  in  some  isolated  case  alone  with  no  firm 
assurance  of  immediate  active  support  if  again  the  greater 
issue  be  raised,  would  be  no  compensation  for  the  possible 
defection  of  Japan  to  the  Teutonic  Powers.  Whether  or 
no  China's  fate  is  to  be  determined  by  factors  entirely 
extraneous  to  the  problem  itself  and  independent  of  the 
ethical  elements  involved  in  it,  rests  chiefly  with  the 
United  States.  Until  the  Prussian-German  peril  is  com- 
pletely eliminated  beyond  possibility  of  resuscitation, 
many  fundamental  questions  will  be  decided  in  the  main 
by  their  bearing  upon  it  to  the  neglect  of  their  intrinsic 
merits.  So  long  as  this  fear  of  military  domination 
haunts  the  world,  it  will  control  foreign  policy  and  will 
render  full  co-operation  of  its  intended  victims  highly 
essential. 

The  post-bellum  relations  of  the  United  States  to  its 
associates  in  the  present  war  are  a  momentous  problem. 


i64       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

A  general  defensive  alliance  with  the  group  as  a  whole 
would  apparently  be  highly  inadvisable  as  the  United 
States  wisely  does  not  want  to  be  drawn  deeply  into  the 
welter  of  European  politics.  Nor  would  such  an  arrange- 
ment effectively  safeguard  the  two  chief  American  poli- 
cies, the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  Chinese  integrity.  For 
essentially  the  same  reasons,  a  general  alliance  with 
France  is  out  of  the  question,  in  spite  of  the  depth  of 
American  sympathy  for  a  harassed  sister-republic.  The 
future  security  of  France  and  also  that  of  Italy  and  Bel- 
gium could  be  served  as  well  by  an  alliance  of  the  United 
States  with  the  British  Commonwealth. 

Physically,  economically,  and  spiritually  the  United 
States  is  in  closest  contact  with  the  English-speaking 
peoples  of  this  world-wide  Commonwealth  of  Nations. 
The  unfortified  boundary  between  Canada  and  the  United 
States  was  an  envied  marvel  to  a  Europe  armed  cap-a-pie. 
The  economic  ties  connecting  these  kindred  peoples  are 
ever  becoming  more  extensive  and  more  binding.  Their 
common  civilization  represents  a  distinctive  branch  of  the 
western  type.  The  success  of  a  league  of  nations  de- 
pends predominantly  upon  their  intimate  and  genuine 
co-operation  within  it.  Its  vitality  would  be  drawn 
chiefly  from  this  source.  An  alliance  of  the  United 
States  with  the  British  Commonwealth  on  clearly  defined 
terms  of  unquestionable  explicitness,  made  in  the  open 
light  of  the  day,  so  that  those  planning  aggression  could 
realize  clearly  the  formidable  obstacle  in  their  path,  would 
effectively,  though  not  absolutely,  secure  the  general  peace 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR      165 

of  the  future  world.  In  addition,  such  an  alliance  would 
well-nigh  guarantee  the  development  of  the  world  along 
progressively  democratic  lines.  It  would  give  nearly 
absolute  security  to  the  English-speaking  peoples,  and 
relative  safety  to  all  Europe.  More  than  anything  else, 
it  would  prevent  the  persistence  of  the  German  menace. 
In  it  largely  lies  the  hope  of  curtailing  the  term  of  reac-f 
tion  towards  economic  and  political  nationalism  that  is 
to  be  the  war's  inevitable  aftermath  and  in  it  lies  also  the 
prospect  of  an  ultimate  better  all-inclusive  international 
future  when  the  fissure  in  western  civilization  shall  have 
finally  grown  together. 


/ 

VI 

THE  UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 


"The  international  relationship  constituted  by  the  alliances 
and  antagonisms  known  as  the  Balance  of  Power,  in  which  the 
factors  are  governments  and  armaments,  is  a  social  relation- 
ship of  a  lower  order  than  the  Bond  of  Peoples  between  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States,  in  which  there  is  a  liv- 
ing force." 

—  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East,  p.  6. 

"  But  there  were  some  half-dozen  of  us  who  hammered  away 
—  I  dare  say  we  bored  our  audience  at  these  ideas :  that  the 
growth  of  the  Colonies  into  self-governing  communities  was  no 
reason  why  they  should  drop  away  from  the  Mother  Country  or 
from  one  another;  that  the  complete  separation  of  the  two 
greatest  sections  of  the  English-speaking  race  was  a  dire  dis- 
aster, not  only  in  the  manner  in  which  it  came  about,  but  for 
coming  about  at  all;  that  there  was  no  political  object  compar- 
able in  importance  with  that  of  preventing  a  repetition  of  such 
a  disaster,  the  severance  of  another  link  in  the  great  Imperial 
chain.  The  greatest  local  independence,  we  then  argued,  was 
not  incompatible  with  closer  and  more  effective  union  for  com- 
mon purposes." 

—  Lord  Milner,  March  29,  1897. 

"  The  German  Emperor  has  become  a  great  Empire-builder, 
but  it  is  not  his  Empire  that  he  is  building." 

—  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  February  7,  1917. 


CHAPTER  VI 
The  Unity  of  English-Speaking  Peoples 

Modern  British  Imperialism  —  The  British  Commonwealth  — 
Imperial  Reconstruction  —  The  Dominions  and  Foreign  Policy 

—  The  Imperial  War  Cabinet  —  The  United  States  an  English- 
Speaking  Country  —  The  Language  Factor  —  The  British  Stock 

—  Anglo-American  Relations  in  the  Past  and  Future. 

While  war  is  certainly  not  the  father  of  all  things,  as 
the  Greek  philosopher  sweepingly  claimed,  it  unquestion- 
ably clears  away  many  a  mental  cobweb  and  hastens  the 
course  of  many  a  slowly  progressing  movement.  Daily 
more  and  more  Americans  are  realizing  the  perils  of 
future  isolation  and  a  growing  minority  are  urging  the 
necessity  of  intimate  Anglo-American  co-operation.^ 
But  the  war  has  definitely  rendered  impossible  such  an 
alliance  as  Joseph  Chamberlain  proposed  in  1898.  An 
Anglo-American  alliance  is  now  out  of  the  question, 
simply  because  in  the  future  British  foreign  policy  will  be 
controlled  and  directed  by  organs  representative  of  the 
Empire  as  a  whole,  not  of  Britain  alone.  An  alliance 
with  the  British  Commonwealth,  in  which  not  only  Great 
Britain,  Canada,  and  South  Africa  with  their  systems  of 
free  government,  but  also  the  most  advanced  democracies 
of  the  world,  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  are  to  have  a 

169 


170       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKIN'G  PEOPLES 

direct  voice  in  determining  foreign  policy,  is  patently 
something  quite  different  from  one  contracted  only  with 
the  people  of  the  British  Isles.  For  uniting  these  self- 
governing  Dominions  and  the  United  States  is  not  only 
that  fundamental  identity  of  civilization  which  is  charac- 
teristic of  the  Mother  Country  as  well,  but  also  other 
points  of  likeness  arising  from  their  similar  evolutions 
under  frontier  conditions.  All  these  growing  democra- 
cies have  this  great  feature  in  common  that  they  are  the 
off -shoots  of  a  little  sea-girt  isle  that  only  so  recently  as 
Shakespeare's  day  contained  fewer  people  than  does  the 
present  city  of  New  York. 

While  the  United  States  has  severed  all  political  ties 
with  the  parent  country,  the  other  outlying  democracies 
have  not  only  kept  alive  this  bond,  but  in  recent  years,  and 
more  especially  since  the  South  African  War,  they  have 
been  drawing  it  tauter.  This  spontaneous  and  volun- 
tary movement  towards  closer  union  is  the  predominant 
characteristic  of  modern  British  imperialism.  Its  nature 
has  been  considerably  obscured  by  an  inadequate  ter- 
minology and  by  misleading  associations  inherited  from 
a  past  animated  by  a  different  spirit.  "  Man  is  a  crea- 
ture," said  Robert  Louis  Stevenson,  "  who  lives  not  upon 
bread  alone,  but  principally  by  catchwords."  From  his- 
torical analogies,  imperialism  is  a  term  that  automatically 
suggests  the  extension  of  rule  by  military  force  over 
unwilling  peoples.  Similarly,  colony  conveys  a  distinct 
concept  of  inferiority  of  status  and  also  the  idea  of 
ownership  by  the  parent  community.     These  misleading 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    171 

implications  have  not  only  somewhat  alienated  sympathy 
from  what  is  essentially  a  movement  towards  greater  co- 
hesion among  kindred  peoples,  but  they  have  retarded 
progress  towards  the  real  goal  by  keeping  alive  vestiges 
of  the  old  system.  Hence  the  mischievous  nomenclature 
and  obsolete  labels  are  being  rapidly  discarded.  Since 
1907,  the  self-governing  democracies  are  no  longer  offi- 
cially known  as  Colonies,  but  as  Dominions.^  Likewise, 
in  order  to  escape  from  the  tyranny  of  words,  a  wide- 
spread effort  is  being  made  to  substitute  for  Empire  the 
more  truly  descriptive  term.  Commonwealth.  As  Mr. 
Steel-Maitland,  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  the  Col- 
onies, has  said,  "  the  first  savours  of  command,  the  second 
of  service :  the  one  of  servitude,  the  other  of  freedom."  ^ 
These  words  represent  the  finest  spirit  of  modern  Brit- 
ish imperialism  and  it  is  this  type  that  is  very  rapidly 
gaining  ground.  One  of  its  chief  exponents,  Lord  Mil- 
ner,  has  defined  its  temper  in  the  following  words : 

"  Imperialism  as  a  political  doctrine  has  often  been  repre- 
sented as  something  tawdry  and  superficial.  In  reality  it  has 
all  the  depth  and  comprehensiveness  of  a  religious  faith.  Its 
significance  is  moral  even  more  than  material.  It  is  a  mistake 
to  think  of  it  as  principally  concerned  v^^ith  extension  of  terri- 
tory, with  '  painting  the  map  red.'  There  is  quite  enough 
painted  red  already.  It  is  not  a  question  of  a  couple  of  hun- 
dred thousand  square  miles  more  or  less.  It  is  a  question  of 
preserving  the  unity  of  a  great  race,  of  enabling  it,  by  main- 
taining that  unity,  to  develop  freely  on  its  own  lines,  and  to 
continue  to  fulfil  its  distinctive  mission  in  the  world."  * 

In  1908,  five  years  before  these  sentences  were  writ- 


172        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

ten,  Lord  Milner  addressed  a  Canadian  audience  as  fol- 
lows : 

"  I  am  so  intensely  conscious  of  all  that  the  Empire  stands 
for  in  the  world,  of  all  that  it  means  in  the  great  march  of 
human  progress,  I  am  so  anxious  to  give  full  and  yet  unexag- 
gerated  expression  to  my  sense  of  the  high  privilege  of  British 
citizenship.  But  there  is  nothing  so  odious  as  cant,  and  this  is 
a  subject  on  which  it  is  particularly  easy  to  seem  to  be  canting. 
Not  that  I  am  afraid  of  falling  into  a  strain  of  boastfulness.  The 
last  thing  which  the  thought  of  the  Empire  inspires  in  me  is  a 
desire  to  boast  —  to  wave  a  flag,  or  to  shout  'Rule  Britannia.' 
When  I  think  of  it,  I  am  much  more  inclined  to  go  into  a 
corner  by  myself  and  pray."  ' 

The  purpose  and  spirit  of  such  imperialism  is  closely 
akin  to  that  of  Abraham  Lincoln.^  In  fact,  this  move- 
ment has  drawn  much  of  its  inspiration  from  American 
statesmen.  From  Washington's  steadfast  and  noble 
character,  from  Hamilton's  firm  grasp  of  fundamental 
principles,"^  and  from  Lincoln's  passion  for  freedom  and 
union  have  been  gained  many  valuable  lessons.  These 
modern  imperialists  look  upon  the  British  Empire  as  a 
vast  Commonwealth  of  Nations.  The  bond  which  unites 
all  its  citizens  and  "  constitutes  them  collectively  as  a 
state  is,  to  use  the  words  of  Lincoln,  in  the  nature  of 
dedication.  ...  Its  foundation  is  not  self-interest,  but 
rather  some  sense  of  obligation,  however  conceived,  which 
is  strong  enough  to  over-master  self-interest."  *  With 
Mazzini,  they  totally  reject  the  sterile  doctrine  of  rights 
and  demand  a  positive  creed.  According  to  their  views, 
"  it  is  obligation,  not  privilege,  duties,  and  not  rights, 
which  lie  at  the  root  of  citizenship,  and  which,  in  conse- 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    173 

quence,  are  the  foundations  upon  which  every  healthy 
and  progressive  state  must  build  its  communal  life." 
But  this  obligation  is  not  to  an  abstraction,  the  state, 
but  to  the  whole  body  of  one's  fellow  citizens,  organized 
as  a  community  under  a  common  law.  In  their  eyes,  the 
state  is  based  upon  the  irrevocable  dedication  of  the  mem- 
bers to  one  another  for  the  practical  conduct  of  social 
life.» 

With  obvious  qualifications  and  reservations,  for  full 
realization  still  lags,  this  is  a  far  truer  picture  of  the 
actual  British  Empire  than  that  visualized  by  many  Eng- 
lishmen, by  most  Americans,  and  by  nearly  all  Germans. 
If  one  thinks  of  a  little  island  in  the  North  Sea  as  the 
owner  of  one  fifth  of  the  habitable  globe,  some  doubts 
as  to  the  equity  of  the  distribution  must  arise.  But  if 
such  a  gross  and  palpable  distortion  of  actuality  is  dis- 
pelled and  one  regards  Great  Britain  merely  as  the  head, 
but  not  as  the  owner,  merely  as  one  member  of  a  world- 
wide Commonwealth  of  Nations,  then  the  aspect  is  radi- 
cally different.  The  latter  view  is  a  close  approximation 
to  reality.  In  no  sense  of  the  word  can  it  be  said  that 
England  owns  Canada,  Australia,  or  South  Africa;  nor 
is  such  a  possessive  term  truly  descriptive  of  the  relations 
to  India,  Egypt,  and  the  rest  of  the  Dependent  Empire. 
The  concept  of  ownership  is  applicable  only  in  the  case 
of  Gibraltar,  Malta,  Aden,  and  those  other  outposts 
whose  chief  function  is  to  secure  the  safety  of  communi- 
cations in  the  far-flung  Commonwealth  so  aptly  called 
"  that  new  Venice  whose  streets  are  the  oceans."  ^° 


174        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

This  fundamental  change  in  the  spirit  animating  Brit- 
ish imperiaHsm  did  not  come  over-night.  When,  during 
the  early  Victorian  period,  was  established  in  Canada 
the  system  of  responsible  government  upon  which  rests 
the  present  autonomy  of  the  Dominions,  all  but  a  care- 
fully remembered  corporal's  guard  of  England's  public 
men  regarded  this  step  as  the  logical  precursor  to  the 
Empire's  dismemberment.  The  rest  were  agreed  upon 
this  inevitable  outcome,  though  they  envisaged  it  with 
varying  attitudes  ranging  from  trepidation  through  in- 
difference to  positive  relief.  Practically  no  one  contem- 
plated the  use  of  force  to  prevent  it.  Even  a  generation 
later,  when  imperial  federation  became  a  much  discussed 
question  as  a  result  of  Seeley's  writings  and  of  Parkin's 
activities,  few  judged  that  the  Empire's  integrity  would 
be  able  to  stand  the  shock  of  a  foreign  war.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  Lord  Morley's  imagination  could  not  then 
conceive  of  Australia  participating  in  some  future  war 
"  for  the  defence  of  Belgian  neutrality,"  ^^  but  the  father 
of  the  modem  imperial  movement,  Joseph  Chamberlain, 
was  also  at  the  time  somewhat  similarly  pessimistic.^^  It 
is  a  far  cry  from  those  days  to  the  grim  present,  when 
Dominion  troops  are  conspicuously  active  on  the  plains 
of  France  and  have  proven  their  mettle  in  the  deserts  of 
Egypt  and  amidst  the  hills  of  Gallipoli  Peninsula.  What 
produced  this  change  of  temper  with  its  complete  trans- 
mutation of  imperial  values? 

In  reality,  despite  the  confident  predictions  of  public 
leaders,  there  was  in  the  mass  of  men  in  Britain  and  in 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    175 

the  Dominions  no  desire  for  absolute  separation,  but  each 
community  wished  to  work  out  its  own  destiny  unham- 
pered by  outside  interference.  Thirty  years  ago,  the  in- 
terests common  to  the  various  groups  were  abnormally 
inconspicuous,  primarily  because  the  international  situa- 
tion was  such  that  Great  Britain's  supremacy  at  sea 
seemed  unassailable.  As  a  consequence,  each  of  the 
Dominions  had  apparently  before  it  the  prospect  of  an 
undisturbed  development  of  its  own  individual  life,  and 
the  dangers  from  which  the  British  Navy  protected  them 
seemed  scarcely  to  be  real  ones.  But  this  calm  rapidly 
gave  place  to  a  period  of  keen  international  rivalry.  The 
rise  of  Japan,  to  a  limited  extent  also  American  expan- 
sion in  the  Pacific,  but  above  all  the  emergence  of  Ger- 
many as  a  world  power  with  alarmingly  vague  ambitions 
brought  the  Dominions  face  to  face  with  the  underlying 
facts  of  international  relations.  A  rude  shock  was  ad- 
ministered by  the  Kaiser's  telegram  to  Kruger  in  1896 
and  by  subsequent  German  intrigues  in  South  Africa, 
which  greatly  aggravated  the  difficulties  of  British  states- 
men in  securing  relief  from  conditions  that  Lord  Bryce 
had  accurately  described  as  intolerable.*^  This  was  fur- 
ther emphasized  during  the  Boer  War,  not  only  by  the 
bitter  animosity  of  the  German  people,  but  also  by  the 
covert  hostility  of  their  government.**  At  the  same  time 
also,  considerable  feeling  was  aroused  by  Germany's  at- 
tempt to  penalize  Canada  for  granting  preferential  treat- 
ment to  commodities  imported  from  the  United  King- 
dom.**^     These  and  other  incidents  awakened  the  Domin- 


176       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

ions  from  their  dream  of  security,  but  they  were  brought 
into  even  closer  contact  with  the  dynamics  of  inter- 
national politics  by  the  gradual  withdrawal  of  the  British 
fleet  from  the  Seven  Seas  and  its  concentration  in  the 
North  Sea.  As  the  international  tension  became  more 
and  more  acute,  the  desire  for  a  closer  union  became 
stronger,  and  a  growing  number  of  men,  unconsciously 
and  consciously,  transferred  their  ultimate  dedication 
from  the  local  community  to  the  world-wide  state  of 
which  it  constituted  merely  a  member.  U am  our  du 
clocher  was  expanding  into  an  imperial  patriotism,  which 
many  found  to  be  entirely  consistent  with  colonial  nation- 
alism. 

In  the  changed  international  situation,  imperial  defence 
became  a  vital  problem ;  and,  in  facing  it,  the  whole  im- 
perial system  was  subjected  to  close  scrutiny.  Accord- 
ing to  the  strictly  legal  view,  which  was  based  upon 
Roman  precedents  and  analogies,  the  British  Colonies 
were  provinces  of  Great  Britain  and  were  subject  to  the 
sovereignty  of  Parliament.  This  legal  theory  was  not 
wholly  in  accord  with  the  actual  political  facts  even  as 
they  were  in  the  days  of  the  *'  Old  Colonial  System  " 
before  the  schism  of  the  American  Revolution,  and  it  had 
become  quite  untenable  towards  the  middle  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  when  the  Dominions  became  almost  com- 
pletely self-governing  entities  under  the  system  of  respon- 
sible government.  The  theory  of  parliamentary  sover- 
eignty was,  however,  still  retained,  but  in  recent  years 
this  legal  fiction  is  being  more  and  more  abandoned. 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    177 

Chamberlain  called  the  Dominions  "  states  which  have 
voluntarily  accepted  one  crown  and  one  flag,  and  which 
in  all  else  are  absolutely  independent  of  one  another." 
According  to  Mr.  Asquith,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
Dominions  are  *  each  master  in  its  own  household,  a  prin- 
ciple which  is  the  life  blood  of  the  Empire  —  articulus 
stantis  aut  cadentis  Imperii.'  ^^  The  Crown  is  now  re- 
garded as  the  connecting  link  binding  together  Great  Brit- 
ain, Canada,  Newfoundland,  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and 
South  Africa;  and,  in  so  far  as  these  Dominions  are  con- 
cerned, the  Empire  has  assumed  the  outward  character 
of  a  league  of  autonomous  nations.  The  Dominions  are 
no  longer  regarded  as  daughter  states,  but  rather  as  sis- 
ter nations;  and  loyalty  is  expressed  not  to  the  original 
Mother  Country,  but  to  the  Empire  as  a  whole. 

In  a  loosely  organized  Commonwealth  of  this  charac- 
ter, one  of  the  most  difficult  problems  is  to  apportion  the 
burdens  that  are  common  to  all  —  especially  that  of  im- 
perial defence  —  in  such  a  manner  that  their  weight  shall 
fall  equitably  on  each  member  without  at  the  same  time 
doing  violence  to  political  principles  that  underlie  free 
government.  Hitherto,  as  in  the  colonial  period  of  the 
United  States,  the  burden  of  imperial  defence  had  rested 
almost  exclusively  upon  the  taxpayers  of  Britain.  The 
attempt  to  solve  this  problem  by  parliamentary  taxation 
brought  on  the  American  Revolution,  and  that  experience 
rendered  easy  the  avoidance  of  the  pitfalls  then  encoun- 
tered. In  those  days,  as  Professor  Maitland  most  sug- 
gestively said: 


iy%       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKIN'G  PEOPLES 

"The  State  that  Englishmen  knew  was  a  singularly  unicel- 
lular State,  and  at  a  critical  time  they  were  not  too  well 
equipped  with  tried  and  traditional  thoughts  which  would  meet 
the  case  of  Ireland  or  of  some  communities,  commonwealths, 
corporations  in  America  which  seemed  to  have  wills  —  and 
hardly  fictitious  wills  —  of  their  own,  and  which  became  States 
and  United  States."" 

There  was  at  that  time  no  statesman  in  England  or  in 
America  to  whom  the  possible  solution  occurred.  All 
thought  in  terms  of  the  alternatives:  independence  and 
imperial  disruption,  or  subjection  to  Parliament  and 
union.  Since  then  the  world  has  had  considerable  expe- 
rience in  federated  and  federal  governments  of  most 
diverse  types. 

When  brought  face  to  face  by  the  German  menace 
with  this  problem  of  imperial  defence,  the  Dominions 
recognized  not  only  that  the  distribution  of  the  load  was 
inequitable,  but  also  that  it  was  totally  out  of  harmony 
with  the  newer  concept  of  imperial  relations,  which  predi- 
cated "  equality  of  status,  though  not  of  stature  "  between 
them  and  Britain.  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  Canada 
were  willing  to  assume  some  share  of  the  burden  of 
imperial  defence,  but  the  question  became  more  than  ever 
complicated  when  adequate  means  were  sought  to  give 
effect  to  this  desire.  While  they  chafed  at  the  undigni- 
fied immaturity  inherent  in  their  position  as  protected 
communities,  they  could  not,  in  attempting  to  emerge 
from  it,  fail  to  realize  that  their  deeply  cherished  and 
much  vaunted  autonomy  was  incomplete  in  that  they  had 
no  control  over  foreign  policy  and  no  voice  in  the  decisive 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    179 

issue  of  peace  or  war.  Some  considerable  influence  they 
might  have,  but  in  final  analysis  their  destiny  was  not  in 
their  hands,  but  was  largely  determined  for  them  by 
others.  Whether,  as  in  Australia,  local  navies  were  to  be 
created,  or,  as  was  proposed  in  Canada,  funds  were  to  be 
granted  for  strengthening  the  British  Navy,  mattered 
not;  in  both  cases  the  Dominions  would  have  no  direct 
voice  in  deciding  why,  when,  and  how  these  armaments 
that  they  supplied  or  supported  were  to  be  used. 
Stripped  to  its  essentials,  it  was  the  same  difficulty  that 
had  brought  about  the  American  Revolution,  the  impos- 
sibility ©f  a  complete  reconciliation  of  libertas  with  im- 
perium  imder  the  existing  political  machinery.  It  was 
the  old  question  of  "  taxation  without  representation  "  in 
a  different  guise.     This  gave  Canada  pause. 

The  situation  was  an  exceedingly  difficult  one,  because 
a  full  and  satisfactory  solution  would  necessitate  radical 
changes.  The  new  institutions  that  had  been  devised  to 
meet  the  demand  for  greater  imperial  co-operation  were 
not  adapted  to  the  purpose.  The  Imperial  Conferences 
at  which  the  Dominion  Ministers  were  to  meet  their  Brit- 
ish colleagues  in  London  every  four  years,  and  the  occa- 
sional presence  of  colonial  statesmen  at  the  meetings  of 
the  Committe  of  Imperial  Defence,  however  admirable 
for  the  purpose  of  consultation  and  mutual  enlighten- 
ment, did  not  meet  the  situation.  Under  the  system  of 
responsible  government,  the  executive  of  the  United 
Kingdom  cannot  follow  the  commands  of  several  entirely 
distinct  legislatures  and  electorates.     This  Cabinet,  which 


i8o        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

controlled  the  foreign  policy  of  the  British  Common- 
wealth, had  to  act  in  conformity  with  the  views  of  the 
legislature  to  which  it  was  responsible,  and  the  Parlia- 
ment at  Westminster  could  in  turn  embody  only  the  will 
of  the  people  that  elected  it.  The  constitutional  problem 
is  to  devise  means  by  which  "a  British  citizen  in  the 
Dominions  can  acquire  the  same  control  of  foreign  policy 
as  one  domiciled  in  the  British  Isles." 

The  existing  war  has  greatly  aggravated  the  urgency 
of  this  problem.  It  has  furnished  concrete  proof  of  the 
momentous  increase  of  imperial  sentiment  and  of  the 
solidity  of  the  Commonwealth's  spiritual  foundations. 
From  all  comers  of  the  globe  came  fervent  expressions 
of  loyalty  and  concrete  demonstrations  of  their  sincerity. 
The  Dominions  have  manifested  the  vitality  of  the  new 
conception  of  imperial  partnership  by  active  participation 
in  the  titanic  struggle  on  a  scale  and  in  a  manner  without 
any  parallel  or  even  analogy  in  the  Empire's  long  history. 
This  participation  was  entirely  spontaneous,^^  and  the 
motive  that  prompted  it  was  predominantly,  though  not 
exclusively,  patriotic  devotion  to  the  Empire,  not  loyalty 
to  the  Mother  Country.  The  very  extent  of  this  partici- 
pation and  the  enormous  sacrifices  that  it  involved  have 
forcibly  emphasized  the  anomaly  in  that  these  free  peo- 
ples are  engaged  to  an  unlimited  extent  in  a  war  that  was 
the  outcome  of  an  international  situation  over  which  they 
had  no  direct  control.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to 
burke   this   vital    fact     Early   in    19 16,    Mr.   Andrew 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    i8i 

Fisher,  the  High  Commissioner  of  Australia,  bluntly 
said: 

"  If  I  had  stayed  in  Scotland,  I  should  have  been  able  to 
heckle  my  member  on  questions  of  Imperial  policy,  and  to  vote 
for  or  against  him  on  that  ground.  I  went  to  Australia.  I 
have  been  Prime  Minister.  But  all  the  time  I  have  had  no 
say  whatever  about  Imperial  policy  —  no  say  whatever.  Now 
that  can't  go  on.    There  must  be  some  change." 

Similarly,  Sir  Robert  Borden,  the  Prime  Minister  of 
Canada,  has  stated  that  "  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that 
the  existing  status  (of  the  Dominions),  so  far  as  con- 
cerns the  control  of  foreign  policy  and  extra-imperial 
relations,  can  remain  as  it  is  to-day."  As  to  this  there 
is  general  agreement.  It  is  universally  admitted  that  the 
Dominions  must  have  a  voice  in  determining  the  peace 
terms  and  in  shaping  the  future  foreign  policy  of  the 
Empire.  But  as  yet  no  proposal  has  secured  the  general 
support  of  the  different  peoples  concerned. ^^  The  diffi- 
culty of  welding  "  the  stubborn  and  refractory  material  " 
of  the  Empire  into  indissoluble  union  is  admittedly  great. 
This  patent  fact  is  reflected  in  Lord  Rosebery's  eloquent 
words : 

"  I  cannot  doubt  that  when  the  arduous  efforts  of  the  peace 
congress  are  over  —  an  awful  task,  far  surpassing  a  dozen  con- 
ferences of  Vienna  —  there  will  appear  higher  peaks  behind 
mountain  summits,  there  will  appear  the  almost  more  gigantic 
task  of  reorganizing  the  British  Empire." 

In  the  meanwhile,  pending  this  final  comprehensive 
adjustment  of  institutions  to  spirit  and  fact,  certain  steps 
have  been  taken  that  are  one  further  proof  of  the  gulf 


i82        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

that  separates  the  England  of  19 17  from  that  of  19 14. 
In  1915  and  1916,  Sir  Robert  Borden,  the  Prime  Minister 
of  Canada,  and  Mr.  Hughes,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Aus- 
tralia, attended  meetings  of  the  British  Cabinet  in  Lon- 
don. This  was  an  entirely  unprecedented  step,  and  was 
followed,  late  in  19 16,  by  an  invitation  to  the  Premiers 
of  the  Dominions  and  to  an  official  representative  o£ 
India  to  attend  an  Imperial  War  Council  in  London.  In 
this  connection,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  said: 

"  I  regard  the  Council  as  marking  the  beginning  of  a  new 
epoch  in  the  history  of  the  Empire.  The  war  has  changed  us. 
Heaven  knows,  it  has  taught  us  more  than  we  yet  understand. 
It  has  opened  a  new  age  for  us,  and  we  want  to  go  into  that 
new  age  together  with  our  fellows  overseas  just  as  we  have 
come  through  the  darkness  together,  and  shed  our  blood  and 
treasure  together.  .  .  .  The  Empire  War  Council  will  deal  with 
all  general  questions  affecting  the  war.  The  Prime  Ministers  or 
their  representatives  will  be  temporary  members  of  the  War 
Cabinet,  and  we  propose  to  arrange  that  all  matters  of  first- 
rate  importance  should  be  considered  in  a  series  of  special  meet- 
ings. Nothing  affecting  the  Dominions,  the  conduct  of  the  war, 
or  the  negotiations  of  peace  will  be  excluded  from  its  purviewj 
There  will,  of  course,  be  domestic  questions  which  each  part  of 
the  Empire  must  settle  for  itself —^questions  such  as  recruiting 
in  the  United  Kingdom,  or  home  legislation.  Such  domestic 
matters  will  be  our  only  reservation.  But  we  propose  that 
everything  else  should  be,  so  to  speak,  on  the  table."  20 

On  this  occasion,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  prudently  re- 
fused to  discuss  the  problems  of  constitutional  recon- 
struction after  the  war,  although  he  pointed  out  in  the 
following  words  that  things  could  never  be  the  same  as 
they  were  before: 

"  Five  democracies,  all  parts  of  an  Empire,  cannot  shed  their 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    183 

blood  and  treasure  with  a  heroism  and  disregard  of  cost  which 
have  been  beyond  all  praise,  without  leaving  memories  of  com- 
radeship and  of  a  great  accomplishment  which  will  never  die. 
Of  this  I  am  certain,  the  peoples  of  the  Empire  will  have  found 
a  unity  in  the  war  such  as  never  existed  before  it  —  a  unity  not 
only  in  history,  but  of  purpose.  .  .  .  We  stand  at  this  moment 
on  the  verge  of  the  greatest  liberation  which  the  world  has 
seen  since  the  French  Revolution.  And  do  you  tell  me  that 
the  peoples  who  have  stood  together  and  staked  literally  every- 
thing in  order  to  bring  that  liberation  about  are  not  going  to 
find  some  way  of  perpetuating  that  unity  afterwards  on  an 
equal  basis  ?  " 

The  convocation  of  this  Imperial  Cabinet  was  a  mo- 
mentous step.  For  the  first  time  India  and  the  Domin- 
ions were  called  to  the  councils  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment "not  merely  in  an  advisory  but  in  an  executive 
capacity."  ^^  The  Imperial  Conferences  that  had  been 
convened  at  irregular  intervals  from  1887  on  were  purely 
consultative  bodies,  but  these  representatives  of  the  Do- 
minions and  India,  together  with  the  British  War  Cabi- 
net, constituted  a  new  executive  for  the  Commonwealth 
as  a  whole.^^  When  this  Imperial  Cabinet  met  in  Lon- 
don on  March  20,  191 7,  the  constitutional  position  was 
quite  unique.  It  is  succinctly  described  in  the  following 
words  of  Sir  Robert  Borden : 

"  For  the  first  time  in  the  Empire's  history  there  are  sitting  in 
London  two  Cabinets,  both  properly  constituted  and  both  ex- 
ercising well-defined  powers.  Over  each  of  them  the  Prime 
Minister  of  the  United  Kingdom  presides.  One  of  them  is 
designated  as  the  *  War  Cabinet,'  which  chiefly  devotes  itself 
to  such  questions  touching  the  prosecution  of  the  war  as  prima- 
rily concern  the  United  Kingdom.  The  other  is  designated  as 
the  '  Imperial  War  Cabinet,'  which  has  a  wider  purpose,  juris- 
diction, and  personnel."  ^^ 


i84        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

The  function  of  the  Imperial  Cabinet  was  to  determine 
the  policy  to  be  pursued  in  waging  the  war  and  in  settling 
the  problems  arising  out  of  it.  Its  formation  was  a  radi- 
cally new  development  in  the  constitutional  machinery  of 
the  Empire.  This  experiment  worked  so  successfully 
that  the  British  Government  formally  proposed  to  adopt 
it  as  a  permanent  constitutional  expedient  and  to  make 
the  Imperial  Cabinet  at  least  an  annual  institution  to  be 
held  whether  the  conditions  be  those  of  peace  or  of  war. 
This  proposed  Cabinet,  which  will  be  responsible  as 
an  entity  to  the  whole  citizenry  of  the  Commonwealth,  is 
to  be  composed  of  the  Prime  Minister  of  Britain,  such 
of  his  colleagues  as  deal  especially  with  imperial  concerns 
(foreign  affairs,  defence,  and  dependencies),  the  Pre- 
miers of  each  of  the  Dominions,  and  a  specially  accredited 
representative  of  British  India.  The  official  considera- 
tion of  this  suggested  solution  of  an  exceedingly  stubborn 
problem  has,  however,  been  deferred  until  after  the  con- 
clusion of  the  war,  when  an  Imperial  Conference  is  to 
be  convened  for  the  specific  purpose  of  devising  institu- 
tions in  which  the  solidarity  of  the  Commonwealth  can 
find  expression.^* 

As  in  the  case  of  the  formation  of  an  effective  super- 
national  authority,  probably  the  most  formidable  obstacle 
to  such  a  reorganization  of  the  British  Empire  as  will 
bring  its  institutions  into  accord  with  its  spirit,  consists 
in  the  rigid  concepts  of  an  obsolescent  political  science. 
The  unitary  state  with  central  legislative  and  executive 
organs  of  the  existing  type  unfortunately  suggests  the 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    185 

potential  coercion  of  minorities  that  are  concrete  entities 
with  a  definite  geographical  location  and  not  merely  more 
or  less  coherent  groups  dispersed  throughout  the  body 
politic.  While  there  is  no  necessary  opposition  between 
Dominion  patriotism  and  the  larger  patriotism  to  the 
Commonwealth  of  Nations,  while  the  two  may  co-exist  in 
full  vigour,  the  theory  of  a  supreme  sovereignty  demand- 
ing an  undivided  allegiance  creates  a  disharmony  between 
two  concurrent  loyalties  and  establishes  an  unreal  an- 
tithesis between  colonial  nationalism  and  imperialism. 
The  problem  is  to  create  the  political  framework  for  a 
multicellular  commonwealth  of  co-operating  nations,  unit- 
ing them  for  their  common  purposes  but  allowing  full 
scope  to  the  development  of  their  distinctive  ideals.  In 
this  connection,  Lieutenant-General  Smuts  has  very  sug- 
gestively said : 

"  Let  me  give  you  one  word  of  warning.  In  thinking  of  this 
matter,  do  not  try  to  think  of  existing  political  institutions  which 
have  been  evolved  in  the  course  of  European  developments. 
The  British  Empire  is  a  much  larger  and  more  diverse  problem 
than  anything  we  have  seen  hitherto,  and  the  sort  of  constitution 
we  read  about  in  books,  the  sort  of  political  alphabet  which  has 
been  elaborated  in  years  gone  by,  does  not  apply  and  would  not 
solve  the  problems  of  the  future.  We  should  not  follow 
precedents,  but  make  them."  ^5 

Although  this  problem  is  one  of  absorbing  interest,  it 
is  not  necessary  in  the  present  discussion  to  attempt  a 
forecast  of  either  the  nature  or  the  details  of  its  solution. 
In  this  connection,  the  only  important  point  is  that  here- 
after British  foreign  policy  will  be  directed  and  controlled 
by  organs  representative  of  all  the  English-speaking  peo- 


i86       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKIN-G  PEOPLES 

pies  in  the  Empire  and  that  future  alliances  will  be  con- 
tracted by  such  imperial  agencies  and  not  by  the  Foreign 
Secretary  and  Parliament  of  the  United  Kingdom  alone. 
The  new  situation  was  explained  by  Sir  Robert  Borden 
after  his  return  to  Canada  in  the  following  words : 

"  It  is  not  proposed  that  the  Government  of  the  United  King- 
dom shall,  in  foreign  affairs,  act  first  and  consult  us  afterwards. 
The  principle  has  been  definitely  and  finally  laid  down  that  in 
these  matters  the  Dominions  shall  be  consulted  before  the  Em- 
pire is  committed  to  any  policy  which  might  involve  the  issues  of 
peace  or  war." 

There  is  no  more  important  question  than  the  relations 
of  the  American  people  to  those  of  the  British  Common- 
wealth. It  is  far  more  important  to-day  than  it  was  a 
generation  ago  when  "the  ideal  of  English-speaking  re- 
union "  was  the  centre  of  Cecil  Rhodes's  political  aspira- 
tions.^* Their  future  relations  will  be  determined  by  a 
variety  of  causes,  cultural,  psychological,  economic,  and 
political.  But  the  most  potent  influence  of  all  is  the  fact 
that  English  is  their  common  tongue.  As  a  result  of  this 
alone,  whether  the  relations  of  the  two  great  branches  of 
the  English-speaking  people  are  to  be  those  of  sympa- 
thetic co-operation  or  those  of  antagonistic  competition, 
the  ties  cannot  fail  to  be  intimate  ones.  When  asked 
what  was  the  greatest  political  fact  of  modem  times,  Bis- 
marck is  reported  to  have  responded,  that  it  was  "  the 
inherited  and  permanent  fact  that  North  America  speaks 
English."  2'^  Whether  the  saying  be  authentic  or  not,  the 
remark  is  certainly  worthy  of  its  reputed  author's  keen 
insight  into  political  fundamentals. 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    187 

The  United  States  is  not  only  a  body  politic  whose 
structure  and  cuJtural  life  spring  from  British  origins 
that  have  determined  the  entire  course  of  its  evolution, 
but  in  addition  it  has  always  been  and  still  is  an  English- 
speaking  country  with  all  the  far-reaching  consequences 
that  this  vital  fact  implies.  It  has  been  said  by  an  Eng- 
lish historian  who  was  so  thoroughly  imbued  with  Ger- 
man political  thought  as  to  be  conspicuously  un-English 
in  outlook,  that  the  purpose  of  the  British  Empire  in  the 
past  had  been  "to  give  all  men  within  its  bounds  an 
English  mind."  ^^  Such,  however,  has  not  been  the 
Empire's  purpose,  nor  has  such  been  its  general  efiFect, 
except  on  the  self-governing  English-speaking  peoples  in 
the  United  States,  Canada,  Australasia,  and  Africa.  The 
spirit  of  British  imperialism  is  predominantly  super- 
national.  In  this  connection,  the  following  sentences  of 
Lord  Milner  may  well  be  quoted.     In  1913,  he  wrote: 

"  Do  not  let  me  be  thought  to  advocate  the  '  anglicization  *  of 
the  non-British  races  of  the  Empire,  or  to  wish  to  force  them 
into  a  British  mould.  Imperialism  is  something  wider  than 
'  Anglo-Saxondom '  or  even  than  '  Pan-Britannicism.'  The 
power  of  incorporating  alien  races,  without  trying  to  dis- 
integrate them,  or  to  rob  them  of  their  individuality,  is  char- 
acteristic of  the  British  imperial  system.  It  is  not  by  what 
it  takes  away,  but  by  what  it  gives,  not  by  depriving  them  of 
their  own  character,  language,  and  traditions,  but  by  ensuring 
them  the  retention  of  all  these,  and  at  the  same  time  opening 
new  vistas  of  culture  and  advancement,  that  it  seeks  to  win  them 
to  itself."  " 

The  American  system  is  just  the  reverse.    It  is  not 

cosmopolitan  or  supernational,   but  intensely  national. 

Its  success  depends  upon  giving  the  child  an  American 


i88       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

mind.  Despite  systematic  attempts  to  emphasize  the 
national  characteristics  of  this  mind,  it  is  in  all  essen- 
tials identical  with  that  of  the  other  English-speaking 
peoples  in  Britain,  Canada,  Australasia,  and  South 
Africa.  The  "  melting-pot  "  fuses  the  child  into  an  ap- 
proximately uniform  type,  which  is  clearly  discernible 
despite  infinite  individual  variations.  Any  radical 
divergence  from  the  normal  is  regarded  askance,  and 
hence  the  immigrant's  son  is  prone  to  "  out-Herod 
Herod  "  in  his  Americanism.  He  resents  the  slightest 
intimation  that  he  is  not  as  thorough  and  as  good  an 
American  as  is  his  neighbour.  He  keeps  his  father's 
native  country  in  the  obscure  background,  because  he 
realizes  that  such  external  ties  are  a  bar  to  success  in  that 
they  establish  the  existence  of  differences  between  him 
and  his  fellow  citizens.  Despite  the  heterogeneous  ori- 
gins of  America's  population,  American  civilization  is  not 
an  amalgam  of  the  civilizations  of  various  European  coun- 
tries. Extreme  nationalists  are  prone  to  insist  that  the 
United  States  had  no  especial  cultural  affiliations  with 
any  one  European  people.  Philosophical  idealists,  who 
would  fain  have  American  civilization  be  a  composite 
of  the  best  of  all  nations,  tend  to  take  the  same  view.  It 
is  both  contrary  to  the  facts  and  to  the  course  of  social 
evolution. 

Ever  since  Darwin  demonstrated  the  potential  adapt- 
ability of  the  primitive  Fuegian  to  civilized  conditions,  it 
has  been  recognized  that  race  is  far  more  a  cultural  than 
a  physical  fact.     If  the  consciousness  of  outward  physi- 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    189 

cal  differences  could  be  altogether  eliminated,  as  can  to  a 
great  extent  be  done  in  the  case  of  the  Caucasian,  race 
might  even  be  termed  a  predominantly  cultural  fact. 
There  is  no  scientific  evidence  that  those  psychological 
and  mental  traits  that  are  deemed  the  peculiar  attributes 
of  Englishmen,  Frenchmen,  Italians,  or  Germans  are  in- 
herited in  a  physical  sense.^^  If  a  number  of  German 
new-born  were  transferred  into  a  purely  English  environ- 
ment, they  would,  provided  neither  they  nor  any  one  else 
knew  anything  at  the  time  about  their  origin,  develop  in 
all  likelihood  into  as  typical  Englishmen  as  a  similar  num- 
ber of  native-born  who  had  been  subjected  to  the  same 
social  and  educational  influences.  To  a  great  extent,  this 
is  what  has  happened  in  the  United  States.  That  the  fu- 
sion has  not  been  perfect  is  due  to  the  impossibility  of  en- 
tirely eliminating  in  the  course  of  the  second  generation, 
and  even  later,  both  the  inner  consciousness  and  the  outer 
knowledge  of  external  origin.^ ^  The  immigrant  brought 
his  own  standards  from  Europe,  but  his  children  acquired 
the  typical  American  viewpoint  from  their  environment. 
The  main  agency  has  been  the  free-school  system,  which 
tends  to  produce  uniformity  of  t)T)e  and  homogeneity  of 
outlook.  The  barriers  that  cut  these  children  off  from 
the  civilization  of  their  parents'  country  are,  on  the  one 
side,  social  compulsion,  because  divergence  from  the  typi- 
cal is  a  handicap ;  and,  on  the  other  side,  differences  of  lan- 
guage that  prevent  the  English-speaking  child  from  un- 
derstanding his  father's  original  countrymen.  The  part 
played  by  language  can  scarcely  be  over-estimated,  for 


I90        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

"  an  individual  is  a  mental  slave  to  the  tongue  he  speaks," 
It  determines  the  limits  of  his  intellectual  life  which  can 
be  transcended  only  by  the  man  of  extraordinary  gifts  or 
of  exceptional  opportimities.  The  social  mind  and  the 
contents  of  his  language  exercise  absolute  sway  over  the 
average  man.  He  is  slave  to  "  that  incalculable  potency 
broadly  called  literature,  spoken  or  written  —  the  ora- 
tory, romance,  poetry,  philosophy,  history,  and  science  — 
which  is  his  daily  mental  food  all  the  years  of  his  con- 
scious life."  ^^ 

Hence,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  population  of  the 
United  States  is  composed  of  many  European  strains, 
there  is  an  essential  unity  in  so  far  as  the  Caucasian 
native-born  elements  are  concerned.  This  unity  of  lan- 
guage has  given  to  these  Caucasians  born  in  the  United 
States  a  common  mind,  and  this  mind  does  not  dififer  in 
essentials  from  that  of  the  other  English-speaking  peo- 
ples. As  has  been  said  by  Professor  Hart,  "  the  stand- 
ards, aspirations  and  moral  and  political  ideals  of  the 
original  English  settlers  not  only  dominate  their  own 
descendants,  but  permeate  the  body  of  immigrants  of 
other  races."  ^^  The  son  of  the  immigrant  into  the 
United  States  finds  himself  at  home  in  Canada,  Australia 
or  Britain,  while  he  feels  himself  a  detached  stranger 
within  his  own  ancestral  gates  in  Continental  Europe. 

The  efficiency  of  the  "  melting-pot "  is,  however,  far 
from  perfect,  and  in  recent  decades  its  capacity  has  been 
sorely  overtaxed.  In  addition,  there  is  a  largely  uncon- 
scious, but  very  real,  determination  on  the  part  of  those 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    191 

of  British  ancestry  not  to  allow  the  control  of  affairs  to 
pass  out  of  their  hands.  This  is  reinforced  by  no  small 
measure  of  racial  and  religious  prejudice  on  the  part  of 
the  dominant  majority  and  by  an  instinctive,  though  not 
avowed  and  generally  recognized,  distrust  of  those  of 
different  origin.  It  is  of  decided  significance  that  the 
Americanism  of  neither  candidate  in  the  presidential 
campaign  of  1916  was  impugned,  although  Mr.  Wilson's 
grandfather  came  from  North  Ireland  as  recently  as 
1807,  while  Mr.  Hughes  missed  a  Welsh  nativity  by  only 
a  few  years.  In  the  case  of  none  but  those  of  British 
ancestry  would  such  close  proximity  to  European  ances- 
tors have  escaped  unchallenged,  especially  during  a  world- 
wide war.  In  1895,  President  Wilson  said:  "The 
common  British  stock  did  first  make  the  country,  and  has 
always  set  the  pace."  ^*  That  there  is  such  a  leading 
and  dominant  majority  of  Anglo-Saxon  descent  even  the 
most  cursory  examination  of  the  facts  will  demonstrate. 
Some  twenty  years  ago,  Senator  Lodge  made  a  study 
of  the  distribution  of  ability  in  the  United  States,  using 
as  his  material  a  well-known  cyclopaedia  of  American 
biography,  whose  concluding  volume  had  appeared  in 
1889.^^  This  work  aimed  to  list  all  Americans  who  had 
attained  eminence  as  statesmen,  soldiers,  clergymen,  au- 
thors, lawyers,  scientists,  or  in  any  other  capacity,  and 
contained  14,243  biographies.  Of  these  12,519  bore 
British  names,^^  659  German  and  589  Huguenot.  These 
results  were  confessedly  defective  in  that  only  the  descent 
on  the  paternal  side  was  traced  and  there  is  some  reason 


192       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  .PEOPLES 

to  believe  that  ability  is  more  often  transmitted  through 
the  mother.  Moreover,  eminence  is  not  synonymous 
with  ability;  other  factors  are  just  as  influential,  and  in 
many  instances  they  are  even  more  so.  More  recent  in- 
vestigations have  confirmed  these  general  results.^'^  The 
patronymics  of  the  President  and  his  Cabinet,  of  the 
Supreme  Court,  and  of  the  Senate  are  overwhelmingly 
British  in  origin.  To  a  less  extent  this  is  also  true  of 
Congress.  In  191 5,  it  was  found  that  out  of  the  383 
higher  officials  of  the  State  Governments,  no  less  than 
326  had  British  names.  At  that  time  also,  29  out  of  the 
32  generals  on  the  active  list  of  the  American  Army,  and 
23  out  of  the  27  admirals  on  the  active  list  of  the  Ameri- 
can Navy  bore  family  names  of  the  same  origin.  Simi- 
larly, it  has  been  found  that  the  parents  of  American  men 
of  science  are  predominantly  British-American,  "  with  an 
admixture  of  nearly  8  per  cent,  of  Germans  and  about  5 
per  cent,  from  other  nationalities."  ^^ 

In  discussing  the  results  of  his  tabulations,  Senator 
Lodge  stated  his  belief  that  "  in  proportion  to  their  num- 
bers the  Huguenots  have  produced  more  and  the  Germans 
fewer  men  of  ability  than  other  races  in  the  United 
States."  The  explanation  offered  is  convincing.  The 
Germans  settled  originally  in  compact  groups  in  only 
three  of  the  thirteen  colonies.  Retaining  their  language 
and  customs  for  approximately  a  century,  they  kept  them- 
selves more  or  less  separated  from  the  balance  of  the 
community.  As  was  complained  in  colonial  days, 
"  being  ignorant  of  our  language  and  laws,  and  settling 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES     193 

in  a  body  together,"  they  constituted  "  a  distinct  people 
from  his  Majesty's  subjects."  As  an  inevitable  result, 
they  handicapped  themselves  in  competing  for  those 
prizes  of  life  which  depend  to  a  great  extent  upon  the 
support  and  confidence  of  the  public  as  a  whole. 

These  researches  prove  two  things  beyond  peradven- 
ture:  first,  the  overwhelming  predominance  of  the  British 
stock  in  the  upbuilding  of  the  United  States  and  its  pres- 
ent ascendancy  in  directing  the  affairs  of  the  nation;  sec- 
ondly, that  those  immigrants  and  their  children  have  best 
succeeded  who  have  become  most  speedily  and  most  com- 
pletely Americanized,  and  that  only  under  such  an  even- 
tuality can  they  expect  a  free  field  for  the  development 
of  their  potential  abilities.  Not  only  is  the  United  States 
governed  by  men  who  are  predominantly  of  British  stock, 
but  in  addition  its  native-born  Caucasian  population  is 
fully  impregnated  with  the  ideals  and  standards  that  are 
the  common  intellectual  heritage  of  all  English-speaking 
peoples.  These  find  expression  in  like  political  principles 
and  institutions.  The  rule  of  law  and  the  equality  of  all 
before  it,  an  untrammelled  and  compelling  public  opinion, 
self-government  as  against  autocracy  and  bureaucracy, 
the  absence  of  a  military  spirit  and  caste,  and  the  stress 
laid  upon  individual  rights  as  against  the  undue  claims  of 
the  state,  are  some  of  the  characteristic  features  uniting 
in  one  common  civilization  all  the  English-speaking  peo- 
ples. Over  a  century  ago,  before  science  had  revealed 
the  effect  of  language  upon  thought,  Wordsworth  seems 
intuitively  to  have  divined  this  relation  when  he  wrote : 


194       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

"  We  must  be  free  or  die,  who  speak  the  tongue 
That  Shakespeare  spake;  the  faith  and  morals  hold 
Which  Milton  held." 

A  common  literature  in  the  past  and  to  a  great  extent 
also  in  the  present  creates  common  ideals.  Of  these  the 
most  fundamental  is  that  of  liberty  —  the  qualified  lib- 
erty of  self-realization  in  the  ordered  freedom  of  a  self- 
governing  community.^® 

"  An  intimate  like-mindedness,"  such  as  connects  all 
branches  of  the  wide-spread  English-speaking  people  is, 
as  Professor  Dunning  has  well  said,  "  the  indispensable 
factor  in  permanent  international  amity."  *°  But  it  does 
not  necessarily  cause  such  amity.  Until  the  past  two 
decades,  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Eng- 
land constituted  a  strange  series  of  misunderstandings 
that  kept  the  kindred  peoples  apart.  The  War  of  Inde- 
pendence, which  in  many  of  the  colonies  assumed  the 
character  of  a  civil  war,  left  a  legacy  of  bitterness  such 
as  only  conflicts  of  that  nature  can  generate.  Before  it 
could  disappear,  this  feeling  was  implanted  in  the  next 
generation  by  the  War  of  1 8 12.  As  fate  willed  it,  the 
declaration  of  war  was  signed  by  President  Madison  two 
days  after  the  British  Government  had  announced  that 
the  Orders  in  Council  constituting  the  grievance  would  be 
immediately  withdrawn.  Within  a  few  days,  this  repeal 
was  actually  issued.  But  as  there  was  no  telegraphic 
communication,  the  news  of  this  action  could  not  arrive  in 
time  to  avert  the  conflict.^^  Its  conclusion  ushered  in  a 
century  of  peaceful   relations,  but  left  outstanding  many 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    195 

unsettled  matters  resulting  from  the  fact  that  the  British 
Empire  is  an  important  American  Power  with  great  terri- 
torial and  economic  interests  both  on  the  continent  and 
in  the  Caribbean.  These  differences  were  all  settled 
peacefully,  and  on  the  whole  equitably,  leaving  little, 
or  no  aftermath  of  ill-feeling.  The  prospect  of  sin- 
cerely harmonious  relations  was,  however,  again  de- 
ferred by  the  Civil  War.  The  path  of  a  neutral  during 
an  internecine  war,  in  which  both  belligerents  are  firmly 
convinced  of  the  righteousness  of  their  respective  causes, 
is  beset  with  grave  perils.  England  did  not  escape  the 
inevitable  consequences  of  her  Government's  fundamen- 
tally impartial  conduct.*^  Both  North  and  South  re- 
sented this  official  neutrality.  Moreover,  the  generally 
unfriendly  attitude  of  the  governing  classes  to  the  North, 
which  was  especially  marked  before  the  abolition  of 
slavery  became  an  avowed  issue,  obscured  the  deep  sym- 
pathy of  a  constantly  growing  majority  of  the  English 
people.  The  resentment  arising  from  these  factors  pro- 
foundly influenced  Anglo-American  relations  and  is  still 
an  element  that  has  vitality. 

A  marked  change  in  the  feelings  between  England  and 
the  United  States  set  in  after  the  settlement  of  the  Ven- 
ezuelan dispute  in  1896,  which  had  brought  home  to  the 
consciousness  of  both  peoples  the  tragedy  involved  in  a 
war  between  them.  The  gradually  increasing  friend- 
ship had  apparently  secured  an  unassailable  foundation 
when  the  Great  War  broke  out.  During  the  first  thirty 
odd  months  of  the  conflict,  Great  Britain  and  the  Do- 


196       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

minions  became  distinctly  estranged  from  the  United 
States.  The  fundamental  cause  of  this  estrangement 
was  the  neutral  course  of  the  Government.  If  in  deed, 
though  not  in  word,  the  policy  of  President  Wilson  was 
one  of  benevolent  neutrality  towards  the  Entente  Powers, 
as  some  contend  it  was,  this  good-will  was  not  overt  and 
its  surreptitiousness  deprived  it  of  all  moral  value  and 
of  all  political  advantage.  Among  sorely  tried  peoples, 
keenly  conscious  of  fighting  for  a  cause  with  which  the 
United  States  was  closely  identified,  this  apparently  rigid 
neutrality  of  the  Government  outweighed  the  openly  ex- 
pressed sympathy  of  the  great  majority  of  the  American 
people.  With  the  parts  reversed,  it  was  much  the  same 
situation  as  during  the  Civil  War  when  Lowell  thus 
addressed  John  Bull : 

"  We  know  we  've  got  a  cause,  John, 
Thet  's  honest,  just,  an'  true ; 
We  thought  'twould  win  applause,  John, 
Ef  nowheres  else,  from  you." 

Before  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  war 
on  the  broad  issue  for  which  the  Allies  were  contending, 
there  was  the  gravest  danger  of  a  renewed  schism  be- 
tween the  English-speaking  peoples.  This  would  have 
been  disastrous  to  them,  for  their  fortunes  are  really  in- 
separable. In  19 1 6,  before  this  menacing  probability 
had  been  removed,  an  American  publicist  truly  and 
forcibly  said: 

"Which  will  win?  I  do  not  know.  Which  is  best?  I  will 
not  say.     But  one  thing  I  do  know  and  will  say.    Yea,  I  will 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    197 

proclaim  it  from  the  housetops.  The  British  civilisation  is  ours. 
In  it  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being.  Outside  it  we 
have  no  future.  Let  no  man  deceive  us.  Let  us  listen  to  no 
specious  sophistries  about  our  composite  people  and  our  dis- 
tinctive civilization.  We  speak  one  language,  we  cherish  one 
literature,  we  recognize  one  political  principle  of  temperate  cen- 
tral rule  and  local  freedom,  and  these  are  the  language,  the 
literature  and  ideal  of  Britain.  .  .  .  Our  civilization,  like  our 
language,  is  the  gift  of  a  single  people,  and  the  difference  be- 
tween here  and  there  is  hardly  greater  in  civilization  than  in 
speech.  .  .  .  And  this  civilization  will  survive  or  perish  as  a 
unit  If  it  triumphs  in  the  present  struggle,  we  share  in  its 
triumph.  ...  If  it  fails,  we  shall  as  certainly  see  these  in- 
stincts and  these  institutions  discredited  and  ultimately  dis- 
carded." *» 

These  fundamental  facts  are  more  than  sufficient  war- 
rant for  the  fullest  solidarity  with  the  Entente  Allies 
during  the  present  war,  and  for  an  intimate  democratic 
alliance  with  the  other  English-speaking  peoples  after  its 
close.**  It  is  not  a  question  of  mere  sentiment  based 
upon  the  inherent  unity  of  these  peoples.  Like-minded- 
ness,  even  when  accompanied  by  consciousness  thereof, 
does  not  in  itself  lead  to  the  voluntary  association  of 
kindred  groups,  though  it  furnishes  the  essential  basis 
for  genuine  co-operation.*'*  Outside  pressure  is  usually 
required  to  counteract  the  inertia  of  peoples  bred  in  tra- 
ditions of  isolation.  The  German  menace  is  emphatically 
supplying  the  pressure  that  makes  such  close  and  intimate 
co-operation  imperative.**  Upon  the  outcome  of  the  war 
will  depend  the  survival  and  future  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  English-speaking  civilization.  The  result  may, 
however,  not  be  decisive;  and,  under  all  circumstances, 


198       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

constant  vigilance  demands  preparedness  against  a  re- 
currence of  the  peril,  even  if  it  take  a  somewhat  differ- 
ent guise. 


VII 
ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE 


"As  defence,  however,   is  of  much  more  importance  than 
opulence,  the  Act  of  Navigation  is,  perhaps,  the  wisest  of  all 
commercial  regulations  of  England." 
—  Adam  Smith,  The  Wealth  of  Nations,  Book  IV,  chapter  ii. 

•'  In  the  light  of  experience  gained  during  the  War,  we  con- 
sider that  special  steps  must  be  taken  to  stimulate  the  produc- 
tion of  foodstuffs,  raw  materials  and  manufactured  articles 
within  the  Empire  wherever  the  expansion  of  production  is 
possible  and  economically  desirable  for  the  safety  and  welfare 
of  the  Empire  as  a  whole." 

—  Resolution  of  the  British  Committee  on 
Commercial  and  Industrial  Policy,  Feb- 
ruary, 1917. 


CHAPTER  Vn 
Economic  Interdependence 

Economic  Determinism  —  Economics  and  War  —  The  Monop- 
oly Factor  —  Tariff  Systems  of  the  United  States,  Germany,  and 
Great  Britain  —  Colonial  Policies  of  the  United  States,  France, 
and  Great  Britain  —  The  Central  European  Project  —  The 
Paris  Economic  Conference  —  British  Economic  Policies  — 
Economic  Interdependence  of  the  British  Commonwealth  and 
the  United  States. 

The  human  mind  has  an  inveterate  tendency  to  seek 
a  simple  explanation  for  complex  phenomena  and  to 
select  from  a  multitude  of  contributing  and  convergent 
causes  one  that  is  hailed  as  dominant.  "  Man's  instinct 
is  to  define,  to  establish  some  sort  of  order  and  sequence 
amid  the  seeming  chaos  of  the  universe.  That  which 
will  not  submit  itself  to  reason  threatens  reason."  ^  The 
choice  of  such  a  supreme  factor  is  not  infrequently  de- 
pendent upon  subjective  considerations  —  upon  a  man's 
interests  and  purposes  in  life,  as  well  as  upon  his  moral 
and  intellectual  qualities.  This  point  of  view  once  firmly 
established,  there  is  in  turn  a  marked  tendency  to  dis- 
regard facts  and  to  twist  them  into  preconceived  for- 
mulae. As  a  result,  the  visualization  of  the  world  is  far 
from  being  in  accord  with  reality.    The  mental  lens 

aox 


202        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

produced  by  the  craving  for  a  monistic  explanation  of 
phenomena  gives  a  distorted  picture. 

In  their  efforts  to  explain  the  complex  facts  of  eco- 
nomic life,  the  classical  economists  created  "  the  economic 
man,"  an  imaginary  being  solely  influenced  by  regard 
for  his  own  material  interests.  This  abstraction  was 
based  upon  a  false  psychology.  It  failed  to  take  into 
account  not  only  the  altruistic  and  co-operative  instincts, 
but  also  those  self -regarding  impulses  —  the  craving  for 
power,  prestige,  and  prominence  —  that  frequently  over- 
shadow the  desire  for  mere  wealth  and  well-being. 
Moreover,  this  theory  assumed  not  only  that  man  was 
predominantly  moved  by  his  material  interests,  but  also 
that  he  was  generally  able  to  recognize  what  these  were. 
The  force  of  ingrained  habit  and  custom,  the  wide- 
spread ignorance,  and  the  frequent  subordination  of  rea- 
son to  emotion  were  largely  overlooked.  This  counter- 
feit presentment  underestimated  man's  moral  nature  and 
overestimated  his  rationality. 

As  a  result  of  such  destructive  criticism,  "  the  economic 
man "  was  relegated  to  the  dust-bin  of  discarded  hy- 
potheses, only  to  be  resuscitated  later  in  a  different  guise. 
During  recent  decades  there  has  been  a  marked  tendency 
among  one  school  of  thinkers  to  explain  all  historical 
phenomena  by  purely  economic  causes.  It  is  a  facile 
method  of  writing  history,  since  it  obviates  the  necessity 
of  studying  all  the  facts  intensively,  and  demands  merely 
the  selection  of  those  that  fit  in  with  the  preconceived 
theory.     Its  results,   furthermore,  have  the  charm  in- 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  203 

herent  in  a  simple  explanation  of  complex  phenomena. 
But  the  fallacy  of  this  purely  economic  interpretation 
is  the  same  as  that  of  "  the  economic  man."  It  is  based 
upon  the  same  narrow  psychology  and  results  in  a  pic- 
ture of  the  world  that  bears  only  a  slight  resemblance 
to  actuality.  That  the  economic  explanation  is,  as  a 
rule,  deemed  insufficient  and  incomplete  by  professional 
historians,  whose  paramount  function  is  to  study  all  the 
facts  of  the  past  and  to  see  them  whole,  is  decidedly 
significant.  The  chief  adherents  of  economic  determin- 
ism are  economists  and  socialists,  to  whom  the  past  is, 
for  the  most  part,  merely  a  mine  for  illustrative  material. 
The  latter,  strangely  enough,  while  explaining  all  past  de- 
velopment by  a  theory  that  conceives  man  to  be  a  mere 
self-regarding  automaton,  yet  demand  a  reorganization 
of  society  that  postulates  a  far  less  selfish  average  man 
than  history  has  as  yet  evolved. 

While  the  influence  of  the  economic  factors  can  read- 
ily be  exaggerated,  their  importance  can  also  easily  be 
minimized.  Economic  forces  work  in  two  ways,  directly 
and  indirectly,  both  as  causes  and  as  motives.  The  con- 
scious motive  for  a  policy  may  be  entirely  non-economic 
in  character,  while  economic  causes  have  had  considerable 
influence  in  the  adoption  of  the  policy.  The  crude  facts 
of  life,  the  need  for  nourishment,  covering,  and  shelter, 
are  always  somewhere  in  the  background.  They  are  the 
fundamental  facts  in  primitive  society  but,  as  civilization 
progresses  and  as  nature  is  mastered,  they  become  less 
prominent  though  actually  no  less  vital. 


204       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

"  To  get  the  whole  world  out  of  bed 
And  washed,  and  dressed,  and  warmed,  and  fed. 
To  work,  and  back  to  bed  again. 
Believe  me,  Saul,  costs  worlds  of  pain." 

Man  is,  however,  not  satisfied  with  mere  subsistence. 
His  wants  have  a  capacity  of  infinite  expansion  and  the 
process  of  historical  evolution  is  largely  one  of  satisfying 
this  demand.  Only  some  of  these  wants  are  material; 
others  are  non-economic.  The  inner  cry  for  self-realiza- 
tion demands  satisfaction  for  the  moral,  emotional,  intel- 
lectual, and  aesthetic  faculties,  as  well  as  for  the  baser 
and  nobler  cravings  of  ambition.  As  civilization  ad- 
vances, economic  forces  work  in  the  main  silently  in  the 
background,  while  man's  interpretation  of  his  wants, 
both  economic  and  other,  accelerate  and  retard  that  work 
and  sometimes  even  deform  it.  The  two  processes  usu- 
ally go  on  side  by  side,  seemingly  disconnected,  but  in 
varying  degrees  always  interacting.  The  great  factor  in 
modern  western  civilization  was  the  Industrial  Revolution 
that  made  coal,  steam,  and  machinery  man's  servant. 
This  momentous  change  was  effected  in  England,  silently 
and  gradually,  during  the  forty  years  from  1775  to  18 15, 
of  which  thirty  were  years  of  war.  This  far-reaching 
economic  revolution  did  not  bring  about  the  Anglo- 
French  and  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  nor  in  turn  were  these 
wars  either  a  direct  or  a  contributing  cause  of  the  new 
industrial  system.  Among  the  factors  that  pushed  Revo- 
lutionary France  into  a  war  of  conquest  against  Europe 
were  probably  some  of  an  economic  nature.     But  they 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  205 

were  distinctly  subordinate.  Similarly,  England's  pre- 
dominant motive  in  opposing  the  French  attempt  to  rule 
a  conquered  Europe  was  the  desire  for  security,  which 
had  negative  economic  elements  in  it.  To  characterize  it 
as  essentially  economic  would  be  equivalent  to  such  an  ex- 
tension of  the  connotation  of  the  term  as  to  make  it  mean- 
ingless. It  would  then  be  synonymous  with  all  of  life. 
But  the  economic  revolution,  distinct  though  it  was  from 
this  bitter  international  struggle,  had  a  bearing  upon  it; 
and  the  war,  in  turn,  influenced  the  progress  of  the  revo- 
lution. The  new  economic  system  added  to  England's 
resources;  and  the  fact  that  Continental  Europe  was  for 
twenty  odd  years  the  scene  of  constant  fighting  delayed 
the  introduction  of  the  system  there,  gave  England  an  in- 
valuable advantage  and  made  possible  her  so-called  com- 
mercial supremacy.  The  economic  causes  of  the  French 
Revolutionary  and  Napoleonic  Wars  were  remote,  but 
their  indirect  economic  consequences  were  most  impor- 
tant, while  the  economic  resources  of  the  combatants  ex- 
ercised an  important  influence  on  the  ultimate  outcome. 

Similar  are  the  factors  in  the  existing  world-wide  war. 
The  connection  between  economic  rivalry  and  war  among 
primitive  peoples  is  patent.  Excessive  population  and 
the  need  of  more  land  for  hunting,  grazing,  and  agri- 
culture led  to  constant  warfare,  whose  economic  advan- 
tages were  enhanced  by  the  enslavement  of  the  conquered 
peoples  and  by  the  confiscation  of  their  lands  and  private 
property.^  This  nexus  becomes  less  conspicuous  as  we 
approach  civilized  conditions.     Other  factors,  the  lure 


2o6       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

of  glory  and  prestige,  the  quest  of  dominion  and  power, 
the  gregarious  pride  of  nationalism,  and  the  dynastic 
interests  and  ambitions  of  autocracies  play  their  part  in 
producing  war.  In  addition,  there  is  also  active,  to  a 
varying  extent,  the  commercial  rivalry  of  groups  segre- 
gated into  sharply  defined  entities  under  the  modern 
state  system.  The  wars  of  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth, 
and  eighteenth  centuries  were  largely  due  to  conscious 
economic  motives.^  This  was  especially  true  of  those 
conflicts  resulting  from  the  attempts  of  Portugal  and 
Spain  to  exclude  by  force  all  traders  of  other  nationali- 
ties from  the  East  and  from  America.  After  much 
fighting,  the  Dutch,  English,  and  French  succeeded  in 
breaking  these  monopolies.  Similarly,  the  Anglo-Dutch 
Wars  of  the  seventeenth  century  resulted  largely  from 
the  efforts  of  Holland  to  exclude  Englishmen  from  com- 
mercial intercourse  with  the  East  Indies  and  with  West 
Africa,  as  well  as  from  friction  resulting  from  England's 
Navigation  Acts  which  curtailed  the  wide-spread  activities 
of  the  Dutch  mercantile  marine.  Cromwell  suggested 
a  radical  solution  of  the  difficulty  when  he  proposed  a 
political  imion  of  the  two  nations  which  would  have 
permitted  Englishmen  and  Dutchmen  to  share  in  the 
commercial  preserves  of  each  other.*  The  willingness 
to  enter  such  a  union  is  the  infallible  test  for  determining 
which  group  is  benefiting  by  monopolies  and  privileges 
other  than  those  conferred  by  nature. 

The  economic  motive  was  not  quite  so  predominant  in 
the  Anglo-French  commercial  and  colonial  wars  of  the 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  207 

eighteenth  century,  but  it  was  important.  Here  again 
the  element  of  monopoly  entered,  since  under  the  old 
colonial  system  the  trade  of  the  colony  was  largely  con- 
fined to  the  metropolis.  Such  monopolies  were  a  direct 
cause  of  war,  because  force  could  break  them.  War 
cannot,  however,  act  so  effectively  in  the  case  of  the 
more  normal  rivalry  between  the  various  groups  forming 
the  modem  state-system,  whose  political  separation  was 
in  most  instances  further  emphasized  by  the  erection  of 
customs  barriers.  States  so  protected  are  frequently  in 
active  economic  strife  with  their  fellows,  but  their  tariff 
wars  have  rarely  caused  actual  armed  conflicts,  chiefly 
because  force  could  accomplish  little. 

At  the  present  day,  conditions  have  considerably  al- 
tered. With  the  equalization  of  values  throughout  the 
world,  the  inordinate  profits  that  were  formerly  gained 
in  trade  with  outlying  regions  have  disappeared.  Hence, 
the  economic  inducement  to  monopolize  such  trade  has 
been  greatly  diminished.  At  the  same  time  also,  the 
growing  interdependence  of  the  world  and  the  increas- 
ing internationalization  of  commerce  and  finance  have 
weakened  the  former  view  that  the  state,  and  not  the  in- 
dividual, is  engaged  in  foreign  commerce.  There  still 
remain,  however,  important  vestiges  of  the  older  per- 
sistent attempts  to  monopolize  exclusive  sources  of  sup- 
ply and  markets  in  the  East  and  West  which  characterized 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  when  the  mari- 
time states  of  Europe  sought  to  create  self-sufficient 
commercial  empires.^     National  monopolization  of  co- 


2o8        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

lonial  trade  is  still  widely  current.  Even  to-day,  the 
policy  of  statesmen  is  influenced  by  these  older  ideas 
and  public  opinion  is  largely  affected  by  them.®  It  is 
not  difficult  to  demonstrate  that  with  the  shrinkage  of 
the  world  and  its  increasing  economic  interdependence, 
these  ideas  are  largely,  if  not  wholly,  outworn.'^  The 
dramatic  terms  of  neo-mercantilism  —  invasion,  capture 
and  loss  of  markets,  commercial  supremacy  —  do  not,  as 
a  rule,  convey  an  accurate  picture  of  the  present  economic 
process.  They  tend  to  give  the  impression  that  the  for- 
eign trade  of  the  world  is  a  fixed  quantity  for  which  the 
commercial  nations  are  fighting  as  dogs  for  a  bone.  But, 
while  it  is  true  that  the  trade  of  the  world  has  an  in- 
finite capacity  for  expansion,  and  that  one  nation's  com- 
mercial prosperity  does  not  mean  its  competitor's  de- 
cline, this  truth  must  be  generally  realized  before  it  can 
fully  affect  political  action. 

Modern  mercantilism  is  far  less  crude  than  was  its 
prototype  and  its  aims  are  less  predominantly  economic 
and  are  more  thoroughly  permeated  with  political  objects. 
Its  purpose  is  not  so  much  to  increase  wealth  as  to  safe- 
guard the  nation's  economic  development.  It  bases  its 
calculations  more  upon  conditions  during  war  than  upon 
those  of  peace.  Provided  goods  in  transit  are  free  from 
duties,  as  they  generally  are  in  such  instances,  it  can  be 
of  slight  economic  importance  to  Germany  to  control  the 
mouth  of  the  Rhine  or  to  Russia  to  acquire  the  Dar- 
danelles. Only  in  time  of  war  is  such  direct  access  to 
open  water  important  and  then  its  value  is  entirely  de- 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  209 

pendent  upon  control  of  the  sea.  In  fact,  if  the  enemy 
control  the  sea,  it  is  obviously  of  quite  some  utility  to 
have  a  neutral  interposed  between  the  hinterland  and 
the  dominant  sea  power.  But  lack  of  control  over  im- 
portant commercial  outlets,  while  inevitable  under  exist- 
ing conditions,  creates  a  feeling  of  insecurity.  Similarly, 
under  modern  conditions,  the  industrial  states  are  be- 
coming more  and  more  dependent  upon  foreign  markets 
and  upon  foreign  sources  of  supply.  This  again  results 
in  a  desire  to  secure  physical  control  over  such  markets 
and  sources  of  supply  so  as  to  be  sure  of  retaining  them. 

This  feeling  of  insecurity  is  inevitable  in  an  econom- 
ically interdependent  world  that  is  politically  completely 
unorganized.  It  was  raised  to  a  morbid  pitch  in  some 
quarters  in  Germany  because  there  the  theory  of  sov- 
ereignty is  carried  more  fully  to  its  logical  conclusion 
and  limitations  upon  complete  freedom  of  action  to  which 
all  other  states  must  comply  are  looked  upon  as  intol- 
erable grievances.  The  modern  state  system  was  not 
devised  for  industrial  states  dependent  for  their  very 
existence  upon  factors  outside  their  borders  and  beyond 
their  control. 

While  Germany  was  not  suffering  from  any  economic 
pressure,  this  state  of  mind  among  many  of  her  leaders, 
especially  among  the  captains  of  industry  and  the  pundits 
of  economic  lore,  greatly  reinforced  the  aggressive  tend- 
encies that  rested  upon  non-economic  motives.  In  view 
of  the  plain  facts,  it  would  be  incorrect  to  say  that  eco- 
nomic  conditions   impelled   Germany  to   war.    Before 


210       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

they  are  translated  into  policy  and  action,  economic  facts 
must  become  psychological  forces.  It  was  the  way  some 
Germans  interpreted  the  situation  and  the  future  possi- 
bilities inherent  in  it  that  added  to  the  aggressive  spirit 
of  a  nation  imbued  with  the  idea  of  an  almost  sacred 
mission  to  rehabilitate  a  "  decadent  world." 

It  is  impossible  to  escape  from  the  conclusion  that, 
while  the  growing  economic  interdependence  of  the  world 
is  a  bond  of  union  between  the  citizens  of  different  states, 
it  may  be  and  often  is  at  the  same  time  a  source  of  dis- 
cord between  the  states  themselves.  There  is  an  increas- 
ing disharmony  between  this  interdependence  and  the 
freedom  of  action  and  independence  that  the  theory  of 
sovereignty  attributes  to  the  modern  state.  This  dis- 
harmony produces  unrest  and  leads  to  international  fric- 
tion. The  more  the  theory  of  sovereignty  is  pushed  to 
its  logical  conclusion,  the  more  irksome  appears  to  be 
dependence  on  factors  beyond  the  state's  frontiers  and 
the  more  keen  is  the  desire  to  secure  actual  control  over 
these  necessary  complements  to  the  national  economic 
life.  It  is  largely  to  lessen  such  dependence  that  tariff 
barriers  have  been  erected.  Their  aim  in  part  is  to  bring 
the  economic  system  of  each  state  into  harmony  with  the 
legal  and  political  self-sufficiency  that  sovereignty  postu- 
lates. As  long  as  the  modem  state  system  remains  intact 
and  tariffs  further  divide  people  from  people,  economic 
interdependence  cannot  exert  its  full  strength  in  the 
direction  of  international  amity.  An  element  of  eco- 
nomic discord  of  varying  intensity  remains.     This  dis- 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  211 

cord  may  be  counteracted  by  other  factors,  as  it  has  been 
in  the  case  of  the  relations  between  England  and  the 
United  States,  whose  growing  friendship  has  synchro- 
nized with  a  period  when  the  United  States  adopted  ex- 
ceedingly high  tariffs  that  greatly  injured  some  important 
British  industries.  Nor  did  the  growing  American  com- 
petition in  neutral  markets  avail  to  overcome  the  friendly 
tendencies.  International  amities  are  based  largely  upon 
other  than  economic  factors.  While,  on  the  one  hand, 
commercial  rivalry  may  not  lead  to  ill-feeling,  on  the 
other,  a  markedly  unequal  degree  of  interdependence  be- 
tween two  states  —  that  is,  a  clearly  one-sided  dependence 
of  one  upon  the  other  —  has  this  tendency.  From  the 
earliest  colonial  days  to  the  close  of  the  last  century  there 
existed  towards  England  on  the  part  of  Americans  a 
general  feeling  similar  to  that  of  the  debtor  West  to- 
wards the  industrial  and  capitalistic  East  of  the  United 
States.  When  financial  independence  from  British  capi- 
tal was  all  but  secured  toward  the  end  of  the  last  century, 
this  feeling  largely  disappeared. 

The  whole  subject  of  international  friendships  and 
antipathies  is  one  of  such  infinite  complexity,  involving 
so  many  converging  and  contrasting  factors,  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  formulate  any  brief  generalization  about  their 
causes.  If,  however,  the  economic  factor  be  segregated, 
it  cannot  but  be  recognized  that  tariff  barriers  are  in 
themselves  not  productive  of  international  good-will. 
As  in  the  case  of  military  and  naval  armaments,  pro- 
tective tariffs  in  one  state  lead  to  the  same  fiscal  policy 


212       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

in  others.  Carried  to  its  logical  conclusion,  the  system 
of  protection  cannot  fail  to  lead  to  international  antag- 
onisms. It  is  essentially  an  indirect  denial  of  the  unity 
of  mankind.  Of  all  the  Great  Powers,  England  was  the 
only  one  that  steadfastly  adhered  to  free  trade  and,  re- 
gardless of  whether  her  policy  was  from  the  purely  eco- 
nomic standpoint  wise  or  injudicious,  it  had  an  ines- 
timable moral  value  in  fashioning  among  her  leaders 
something  that  at  least  approached  an  international  mind. 
Closely  connected  with  the  protective  system,  is  the  ideal 
of  economic  self-sufficiency.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
state  this  ideal  is  defensible,  but  from  a  broader  stand- 
point it  is  a  denial  of  economic  interdependence  and  runs 
counter  to  the  integration  of  the  world.  Moreover,  it 
is  not  based  upon  conditions  of  peace,  but  contemplates 
a  state  of  war.  It  is  apparently  defensive  in  its  nature, 
but  it  has  aggressive  implications.  By  reason  of  its  im- 
munity from  some  of  the  perils  of  war,  the  diplomacy 
of  the  self-contained  state  tends  to  become  aggressive. 
During  the  century  stretching  from  the  fall  of  Napoleon 
to  the  present  war,  England  was  only  once  involved  in 
war  with  a  European  Power.  The  Crimean  War,  how- 
ever, was  not  only  an  evitable  one,  but  it  was  due  to  a 
policy  that  is  now  generally  regarded  to  have  been  a  mis- 
taken one.  This  pacific  attitude  was  due  in  large  part  to 
the  fact  that  England  is  the  centre  of  a  widely  scattered 
and  hence  very  vulnerable  Empire  and  that  her  existence 
is  dependent  upon  an  extensive  foreign  trade  of  which 
two  parts  in  three  are  with  countries  under  foreign  flags. 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  213 

Abuse  of  power  would  inevitably  have  led  to  the  forma- 
tion of  a  European  coalition  against  England,  as  did 
actually  happen  once.  Its  result  at  that  time  was  the 
independence  of  the  United  States.  Napoleon  could 
never  understand  why  Great  Britain  had  derived  so  little 
benefit  from  the  long  struggle  culminating  at  Waterloo. 
"  In  the  position  of  affairs  nothing  could  have  been  re- 
fused to  you,"  he  said,  and  "  your  ministers,  too,  should 
have  stipulated  for  a  commercial  monopoly  in  the  seas 
of  India  and  China."  "  You  ought  not  to  have  allowed 
the  French  or  any  other  nation  to  put  their  nose  beyond 
the  Cape."  ®  Had  the  great  militarist's  policy  been  fol- 
lowed, the  British  Navy's  record  from  1815  to  1914 
would  not  have  been  so  uneventful  a  one,  nor  might  the 
British  Empire  have  developed  into  what  it  is  to-day.' 

The  spirit  of  international  relations  in  the  future  will 
depend  largely  upon  the  fiscal  policies  of  the  various  states. 
Cobden  was  unquestionably  correct  when  he  argued  that 
free  trade  made  for  international  good-will  and  peace. 
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  indication  that  one  of  the 
war's  results  will  be  an  immediate  step  forward  towards 
less  restricted  trade.  In  fact,  the  opposite  bids  fair  to 
be  its  result  and  this  will  become  the  more  inevitable  as 
the  financial  burdens  incurred  by  the  belligerents  become 
greater.  What  the  future  has  in  store  can  in  a  measure 
be  estimated  by  the  course  of  opinion  in  the  leading  in- 
dustrial nations. 

There  are,  in  general,  three  distinct  types  of  fiscal 
policy  exemplified  by  the  different  practices  of  the  three 


214        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

chief  industrial  states  —  the  United  States,  Germany, 
and  Great  Britain.  The  American  policy  is  distinctly 
defensive  in  nature,  its  main  purpose  being  to  protect  the 
high  standard  of  life  prevailing  among  the  labouring  and 
producing  classes  of  the  United  States  by  reserving  to 
them,  as  far  as  is  possible  and  advisable,  the  American 
market.  With  this  object  in  view,  high  tariff  walls  were 
built  to  protect  not  alone  the  manufacturer  but  the  pro- 
ducer of  raw  materials  and  foodstuffs  as  well.  When, 
however,  the  exportation  of  manufactured  articles  began 
to  increase  rapidly,  as  happened  towards  the  end  of  the 
last  century,  and  this  foreign  trade  became  an  important 
element  in  the  national  economy,  it-  was  realized  that  the 
imposition  of  heavy  import  duties  on  raw  materials  and 
foodstuffs  was  detrimental.  Hence,  the  Underwood 
Tariff  of  191 5,  in  general  either  removed  or  greatly  re- 
duced these  duties,  but  it  retained  the  system  of  high 
protective  duties  on  imported  manufactured  articles. 
Although  this  law  has  been  hailed  as  marking  the  advent 
of  a  new  commercial  freedom,  this  is  true  in  only  a  very 
relative  sense.  The  barrier  against  manufactures  was 
distinctly  lowered,  but  not  to  such  an  extent  as  to  imperil 
the  monopoly  of  the  American  market  that  the  domestic 
manufacturer  was  enjoying.  In  the  ten  months  ending 
July  31,  1914  —  the  ante-bellum  period  of  normal  opera- 
tion —  free  goods  consisting  predominantly  of  raw  ma- 
terials and  foodstuffs  amounted  to  61.5  per  cent,  of  the 
total  imports.  The  remainder,  consisting  largely  of  man- 
ufactured goods,  paid  average  duties  of  37.1  per  cent.^° 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  215 

These  rates  are  very  far  from  low.^^  Nor  is  there 
manifest  any  tendency  further  to  decrease  them.  On  the 
contrary,  there  is  very  wide-spread  the  opinion  that  with- 
out further  protection,  the  American  manufacturer's  hold 
on  the  domestic  market  will  be  weakened  owing  to  the 
increased  efficiency  and  improved  organization  of  post- 
bellum  Europe.  Those  industries  that  have  been  estab- 
lished as  a  result  of  the  stoppage  of  the  European  supply 
insistently  demand  future  security  —  such  provision  was 
made  in  the  summer  of  1916  for  the  dye-stuff  industry  — 
and  the  older  established  trades  are  likewise  clamor- 
ous. Thus,  there  is  slight  prospect  of  a  relaxation  of  the 
commercial  restrictions.  Free  trade,  as  it  was  under- 
stood in  ante-bellum  England,  is  altogether  beyond  the 
political  horizon.  It  is  the  ultimate  goal  of  some  reform- 
ers, but  only  a  small  and  negligible  fraction  of  the  elec- 
torate would  vote  for  its  immediate  introduction.  The 
economic  results  of  so  sudden  and  drastic  a  readjustment 
would  be  appallingly  disastrous. 

While  the  fiscal  policy  of  the  United  States  has  been 
predominantly  defensive  in  character,  a  wide-spread  cam- 
paign is  being  made  to  enlist  the  government's  support  in 
maintaining  and  extending  the  country's  foreign  trade. 
As  has  been  said  by  one  of  the  leaders  of  this  movement, 
"  governmental  policy  has  been  developed  for  every  other 
activity  that  has  made  this  country  great,"  such  as  west- 
ward expansion,  internal  development,  railway  construc- 
tion, and  the  growth  of  industry.^^  Up  to  the  present 
time,  however,   American   foreign  trade  has  been  but 


2i6        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

little  aided  by  the  government.  This  distinguishes  the 
policy  of  the  United  States  from  that  of  Germany. 
While  the  one  is  purely  defensive,  the  other  is  in  addi- 
tion also  offensive. 

In  its  purely  defensive  character  the  German  pro- 
tective system  is  very  much  like  that  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  more  systematic  and  scientific,  but  its  aim 
is  fundamentally  the  same  —  that  of  protecting  the  home 
market  from  foreign  importations.  While  in  the  United 
States  the  duties  on  foodstuffs  were  imposed  largely  for 
political  purposes  and  had  little  economic  effect,^^  in  Ger- 
many, however,  agricultural  protection  was  a  most  im- 
portant element  in  the  system.  It  was  deemed  essential 
to  national  security  to  preserve  in  full  vigour  the  agri- 
cultural life.^*  But,  in  addition,  the  German  Govern- 
ment co-operated  actively  with  the  individual  in  fostering 
the  export  trade.  This  was  largely  conducted  by  inter- 
locking combinations  of  producers  and  manufacturers,  in 
some  of  which  the  government  was  even  financially  in- 
terested and  whose  operations  as  a  whole  it  supervised. 
Every  facility  and  assistance,  such  as  exceptionally  low 
railroad  rates,  was  given  to  the  exporter.  Goods  were 
systematically  sold  for  considerably  less  in  the  foreign 
than  in  the  domestic  market.^^  In  addition,  the  diplo- 
matic resources  of  the  government  were  used  to  secure 
advantageous  commercial  arrangements  for  Germany. 
The  favoured  nation  proviso  in  the  outstanding  commer- 
cial treaties  did  not  stand  in  the  way  of  such  discrimina- 
tion, for  it  was  easily  circumvented  by  the  skilful  wording 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  217 

of  tariff  schedules.^®  In  addition,  Germany's  military 
power  and  the  scarcely-veiled  threat  implied  in  it  was 
used  to  obtain  commercial  advantages.  It  was  under 
duress,  during  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  that  Russia 
finally  agreed  to  the  unfavourable  commercial  treaty  of 
1904.^^  The  German  system  was  essentially  a  national 
one.^^  The  German  exporters  did  not  trade  so  much  as 
individuals  but  as  members  of  a  state  and  their  activities 
were  carefully  supervised  by  the  government.  The  Ger- 
man Government  was  waging  a  systematic  economic  war 
of  an  offensive  nature  against  all-comers,  but  especially 
against  Great  Britain. 

The  prosperity  of  the  two  large  German  shipping  com- 
panies, the  Hamburg-American  and  the  North  German 
Lloyd,  was  largely  dependent  upon  the  European  emigra- 
tion to  America.  With  the  virtual  cessation  of  emigra- 
tion from  Germany  during  the  past  twenty  years,  Italy 
and  Eastern  Europe  have  been  the  sources  whence  the 
American  melting-pot  was  supplied.  The  German  Gov- 
ernment used  all  means  to  secure  this  passenger  traffic 
from  Eastern  Europe  for  the  Hamburg  and  Bremen 
lines.  Every  difficulty  was  placed  in  the  way  of  the 
Russian  and  Polish  emigrant  who  desired  to  traverse 
Germany  unless  he  had  purchased  a  transportation  ticket 
for  these  lines.  Those  with  tickets  for  the  British  and 
French  lines  were  harassed  and  obliged  to  return  home.^® 
In  contrast  with  this  practice,  the  British  Government 
did  not  impose  port  dues  when  the  German  liners  made 
their  financially  indispensable  stop  off  Southampton,  even 


2i8        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

though  the  Enghsh  companies  in  the  American  passenger 
traffic  had  to  pay  such  fees.  These  contrasting  practices 
well  illustrate  the  fundamental  difference  between  Ger- 
man policy  and  that  of  Great  Britain.  While  the  former 
was  intensely  and  aggressively  national,  the  latter  was 
that  of  governmental  non-interference  which  the  theory 
of  free  trade  postulates.  As  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell  has 
said,  "  most  Germans  think  of  trade  in  nationalist  terms, 
but  in  England  this  habit  is  not  very  common."  ^ 

Despite  some  quite  minor  and  not  wholly  incidental 
protective  features,^^  the  British  customs  tariff  was  pre- 
eminently designed  to  raise  revenue.  It  was  not  a  pro- 
tective but  a  fiscal  measure.  Under  it,  the  British  market 
was  open  on  equal  terms  to  all  producers  and  manufac- 
turers the  world  over.  Not  only  was  the  system  that  pre- 
vailed before  the  war  an  almost  absolute  expression  of 
free  trade  doctrines,  but  laissez  faire  principles  in  other 
respects  had  in  a  measure  converted  it  into  the  positive 
antithesis  of  a  protective  system.  The  railroad  rates  en- 
couraged the  importer  at  the  expense  of  the  domestic 
producer  and  acted  as  virtual  bounties  on  imports. ^^ 

At  the  turn  of  the  century  there  was  a  marked  revolt 
against  this  general  policy,  but  the  wide-spread  prosperity 
during  the  decade  preceding  the  outbreak  of  the  war  ena- 
bled the  traditional  free  trade  doctrines  to  withstand  this 
assault.  It  is  self-evident  that  a  state  which  admits  freely 
everything  that  others  can  produce  more  cheaply,  while 
everything  in  which  it  has  an  advantage  must  overcome 
customs  barriers,  is  not  in  an  advantageous  position. 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  219 

Moreover,  a  policy  of  free  imports  leaves  a  state  largely 
defenceless  against  commercial  discrimination.  The 
Japanese  tariff  of  191 1  advanced  the  duties  on  British 
goods  considerable  more  than  those  on  imports  from 
other  countries.  The  reason  for  such  discrimination 
against  an  ally  is  to  be  found  in  Count  Komura's  blunt 
words :  "  Great  Britain  has  what  is  called  a  free-trade 
policy;  there  is  no  reason  for  a  convention  with  that 
country."  ^^  At  the  present  stage  of  the  discussion  it 
is,  however,  not  so  necessary  to  evaluate  the  relative 
economic  benefits  and  disadvantages  to  a  state  of  a  pol- 
icy of  free  trade  in  a  world  of  highly  protected  com- 
petitors, as  to  realize  that  such  freedom  is  a  powerful 
force  making  for  international  good-will. 

It  is  impossible  fully  to  understand  the  economic  sys- 
tem of  the  ante-bellum  world  without  a  knowledge  of  the 
policies  adopted  in  regulating  the  trade  of  colonies  and 
dependencies.  There  is  considerable  variety  in  practice, 
but  the  fundamental  characteristics  will  be  made  evident 
by  an  analysis  of  the  systems  of  the  United  States, 
France,  and  Great  Britain.  In  general,  the  policy  of  the 
United  States  is  to  include  all  territorial  accessions  within 
the  national  customs  domain.  Hawaii  and  Porto  Rico 
are  enclosed  within  the  American  tariff  barriers  and,  since 
1909,  the  same  system  has  been  applied  with  some  limi- 
tations to  the  Philippines.  With  Cuba,  a  different  ar- 
rangement was  effected.  The  reciprocity  treaty  of  1903 
provides  for  mutual  preferential  treatment  of  imports. 
Thus,   the  most  important  articles  imported   from  the 


220       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

United  States  into  Cuba  pay  there  30  per  cent,  less  than 
the  regular  customs  duties.  Largely  as  a  result  of  this, 
the  United  States  has  virtually  monopolized  the  trade 
of  Hawaii  and  Porto  Rico  and  to  a  less  extent  also  that 
of  the  Philippines  and  of  Cuba.^^  The  total  external 
commerce  of  these  islands  in  19 13  amounted  to  the  very 
considerable  sum  of  569  million  dollars,^^  of  which  392 
millions  or  70  per  cent,  was  with  the  United  States.  The 
free  admission  of  the  products  of  these  islands,  especially 
of  sugar,  has  been  equivalent  to  a  direct  bounty  and  has 
been  of  enormous  benefit  to  them.^^  On  the  other  hand, 
largely  as  a  result  of  this  general  arrangement,  nearly 
two  thirds  of  their  imports  came  from  the  United  States. 
In  1894,  merchandise  to  the  value  of  only  $362,878  was 
imported  into  the  Philippines  from  the  United  States, 
but  twenty  years  later  this  insignificant  amount  had  ex- 
panded to  nearly  27  million  dollars.^^ 

Although  France  has  a  colonial  domain  far  vaster  in 
extent  and  far  more  populous  than  is  that  of  the  United 
States,^^  the  aggregate  amounts  of  their  respective  co- 
lonial trades,  provided  that  with  Cuba  be  included  in  the 
American  total,  are  virtually  the  same.^^  The  French 
system  of  regulating  colonial  trade  is  likewise  similar  to 
that  of  the  United  States,  but  it  is  far  more  complicated 
and  varied. ^°  In  some  of  the  dependencies,  notably  in 
Morocco,  the  open  door  to  all  comers  on  equal  terms  has 
been  guaranteed  by  international  agreement.  The  same 
freedom  of  trade  prevails  also  in  French  India.  But  in 
some  of  the  most  important  colonies,  such  as  Algeria, 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  221 

Indo-China,  and  Madagascar,  the  policy  of  tariff  assimi- 
lation had  been  pursued  and  the  colony  has  been  included 
within  the  customs  sphere  of  the  metropolis.  In  other 
instances,  such  as  the  French  West  Indies,  this  policy  of 
assimilation  has  been  modified  to  meet  special  conditions. 
Again,  in  some  instances,  fiscal  policy  has  been  even 
more  adapted  to  local  needs,  but  with  this  is  generally 
combined  preferential  treatment  of  French  goods,  as  well 
as  similar  advantages  to  the  colonial  products  in  France. 
The  general  result  of  this  policy  is  to  confine  the  colonial 
trade  largely  to  the  French  market.  In  Algeria,  espe- 
cially, other  factors,  such  as  proximity  and  the  relatively 
large  European  population,  have  the  same  tendency.  It 
is  also  undeniable  that  Algeria  has  benefited  greatly  from 
the  absence  of  customs  barriers  between  her  and  France. 
The  total  over-sea  trade  of  this,  the  most  important  of 
French  colonies,  amounted  in  1912  to  1153  million 
francs,  of  which  969  million  or  84  per  cent,  was  with 
France.^^  Similar  conditions  obtained  in  Tunis,  but  to 
a  decidedly  less  marked  extent.^^  The  remaining  French 
colonies,  whose  aggregate  foreign  trade  is  somewhat  less 
than  that  of  Algeria  and  Tunis  together,  do  not,  how- 
ever, trade  so  exclusively  with  the  metropolis.  Only  43 
per  cent,  of  their  aggregate  exports  and  imports  had  such 
respective  destination  and  origin  in  191 1.** 

As  England  is  not  only  the  centre  of  a  world-wide 
Empire  embracing  one  quarter  of  all  mankind,  but  is 
also  predominantly  an  industrial  state,  her  commerce  with 
the  other  parts  of  this  Commonwealth  is  not  only  abso- 


222        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

lutely  far  larger  than  is  that  of  France  with  her  depend- 
encies, but  it  is  furthermore  a  more  important  factor  in 
her  national  economy.  In  19 13,  the  total  foreign  trade 
of  the  United  Kingdom  amounted  to  1,403.5  million 
pounds  sterling,  of  which  431.7,  equivalent  to  30.7  per 
cent.,  was  with  countries  under  the  British  flag  or  under 
British  protection.  Of  the  exports,  34.5  per  cent,  had 
such  destination,  and  28  per  cent,  of  the  imports  had 
such  derivation.^* 

These  colonial  products  received  no  preferential  treat- 
ment in  the  home  market  but  were  treated  on  a  parity 
with  those  of  foreign  origin.  Nor  did  England  impose 
upon  those  parts  of  the  Commonwealth  controlled  from 
London  a  fiscal  policy  that  favoured  her  products.  In 
them  the  door  was  left  fully  open  to  the  goods  of  all  com- 
ers on  terms  of  absolute  equality.  The  self-governing 
Dominions  of  the  Commonwealth  had,  however,  of  their 
own  accord  granted  preferential  duties  to  imports  from 
the  United  Kingdom.  This  system  was  first  inaugurated 
by  Canada  in  1897,  and  had  subsequently  been  adopted 
by  South  Africa,  New  Zealand,  and  Australia.^ ^  The 
general  purpose  of  this  policy  was  to  draw  closer  the 
bonds  of  imperial  union  and  also  to  compensate  the 
United  Kingdom  for  the  inordinate  share  in  the  burden 
of  imperial  defence  borne  by  it.  It  is  usually  admitted 
that  this  arrangement  does  not  violate  the  principle  of 
the  open  door,  since  the  Dominions  and  the  United  King- 
dom are  essentially  parts  of  one  political  aggregate.  The 
foreigner,  it  is  contended,  has  no  more  justification  to 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  223 

complain  on  this  score  than  he  has  against  the  free  ad- 
mission of  Prussian  goods  into  Bavaria  or  of  Pennsyl- 
vania's manufactures  into  California.  The  soundness  of 
this  argument  will,  however,  become  more  manifest  as 
new  institutions  are  created  to  express  the  inherent  unity 
of  the  Commonwealth. 

The  total  external  commerce  of  the  dependent  and  self- 
governing  parts  of  the  British  Commonwealth,  exclusive 
of  the  United  Kingdom,  amounted  in  1913  to  1,116.4 
million  pounds,  of  which  475.7,  or  43  per  cent.,  was  with 
the  United  Kingdom.^"  The  imports  and  exports  were 
about  equal  and  the  same  proportion  prevailed  in  both 
cases.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  this  percentage  is 
very  considerably  less  than  those  prevailing  in  the  colonial 
domains  and  protectorates  of  the  United  States  and  of 
France. 

This  trade  of  the  British  over-sea  countries  with  the 
United  Kingdom  naturally  divides  itself  into  three  parts, 
that  of  the  Dominions,  that  of  British  India,  and  that  of 
the  remaining  widely  scattered  dependencies.^^  The  Do- 
minions contributed  somewhat  over  one  half  of  the  total, 
to  be  exact  56  per  cent.  Of  their  aggregate  external 
trade,  48  per  cent,  was  with  the  United  Kingdom. ^^ 
This  percentage,  which  is  higher  than  the  general  aver- 
age, is  due  to  many  factors,  such  as  the  large  exports  of 
gold  from  South  Africa,  but  an  influential  element  is 
unquestionably  the  system  of  preferential  duties. 

While  the  exports  from  the  Dominions  to  the  United 
Kingdom  exceeded  the  imports  thence,  the  reverse  is  the 


224       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

case  with  British  India.  Here  also  special  factors,  de- 
spite the  full  open  door,  contribute  to  directing  a  large 
proportion  of  this  country's  trade  to  the  United  King- 
dom. Long  and  intimate  commercial  intercourse  has 
contributed  to  an  adaptation  of  British  production  to 
Indian  needs  and,  furthermore,  England  has  certain 
marked  advantages  in  the  manufacture  of  cotton  goods, 
which  constituted  in  19 13  one  quarter  of  the  Indian  im- 
ports.^^  In  that  year,  the  trade  of  British  India  with 
the  United  Kingdom  amounted  to  143.7  million  pounds 
and  was  equivalent  to  30  per  cent,  of  the  aggregate  com- 
merce of  the  over-sea  British  areas  with  the  European 
metropolis.  It  constituted  42  per  cent,  of  British  India's 
total  external  commerce,  but  it  was  very  unevenly  di- 
vided as  to  imports  and  exports.  The  former  were  two 
and  a  half  times  as  large  as  the  latter .*° 

The  external  trade  of  the  remaining  colonies  and  pro- 
tectorates amounted  to  229.2  million  pounds,  of  which 
67.1,  or  29  per  cent.,  was  with  the  United  Kingdom. 
The  proportions  in  individual  cases  varied  largely,  some 
being  far  above  and  some  considerably  below  the  aver- 
age. Proximity  to  a  large  market,  such  as  that  of  the 
British  West  Indies  to  the  United  States,  is  an  important 
factor  among  many  others  of  infinite  diversity.*^ 

Of  the  total  external  commerce  of  the  Dependent  Em- 
pire, in  which  free  trade  rules,  somewhat  less  than  38 
per  cent,  is  with  the  United  Kingdom.  It  is  impossible 
to  estimate  with  any  degree  of  accuracy  to  what  extent 
the  political  connection  is  an  element  in  this  situation. 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  225 

The  percentage  is  quite  in  line  with  the  conditions  pre- 
vailing in  an  independent  country  like  China,  41  per  cent, 
of  whose  foreign  trade  in  191 3  was  with  the  British  Em- 
pire.*^ Certain  general  considerations  are,  however,  in- 
contestable. While  it  is  true  that  the  flag  tends  to  fol- 
low trade,  the  converse  is  equally  a  fact.  Business  is  not 
solely  an  equation  of  supply  and  demand  or  a  mere 
question  of  comparative  cheapness  and  dearness.  As  in 
all  human  transactions,  there  enter  here  the  elements  of 
inertia  and  habit,  and  the  psychological  factors  of  confi- 
dence and  distrust,  of  attraction  and  aversion.  Unques- 
tionably, these  forces  work  in  favour  of  the  trade  of  the 
colonizing  or  protecting  power  even  under  a  regime  of 
fullest  free  trade  and  they  somewhat  handicap  the  for- 
eigner.*^ They  are  naturally  more  active  in  the  matter 
of  governmental  contracts  and  in  the  granting  of  con- 
cessions, even  when  the  public  authorities  have  the  best 
of  intentions.**  It  is  easy  to  overestimate  the  national 
economic  advantage  derived  from  these  facts  when  the 
policy  is  one  of  free  trade  and  the  door  has  been  hon- 
estly kept  open  to  all,  as  it  has  been  done,  in  the  main, 
by  England.  Under  such  circumstances,  it  is  by  no 
means  clear  that  the  economic  advantage  gained  counter- 
balances the  assumption  of  the  added  responsibilities  and 
the  concomitant  expenses  of  administration  and  protec- 
tion.** 

The  intricate  and  inclusive  network  of  international 
commerce  was  rudely  torn  to  shreds  on  the  outbreak 
of  the  Great  War.    The  former  extensive  trade  between 


226       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

the  two  groups  of  belligerents  was  immediately  cut  off, 
and  more  gradually  the  commercial  intercourse  of  neu- 
trals with  the  Central  Powers  was  also  in  increasing  meas- 
ure restricted.  The  resulting  dislocation  necessitated  an 
extensive  readjustment  to  war  conditions,  which  has,  in 
the  main,  perforce  been  in  the  direction  of  increasing  the 
economic  self-sufficiency  of  each  belligerent  state  and  in 
general  also  that  of  the  two  allied  groups  with  which 
they  have  thrown  in  their  fortunes.  At  the  same  time, 
likewise,  the  future  was  envisaged.  Plans  had  to  be 
made  betimes  for  a  world  again  at  peace.  The  war  abro- 
gated a  vast  series  of  commercial  treaties  with  their 
favoured  nation  clauses  and  threw  this  refractory  mat- 
ter into  the  overflowing  crucible  of  unsettled  problems. 
At  the  same  time  also,  the  heavy  financial  burdens  in- 
curred necessitated  a  reconsideration  of  the  existing  and 
future  fiscal  policies. 

The  adjustment  of  these  closely  related  questions  is 
intimately  dependent  upon  the  spirit  of  future  political 
interstate  relations.  Their  nature  will  determine  whether 
the  reorganized  economic  systems  are  to  be  based  upon  a 
state  of  peace  as  the  normal  condition  of  international 
society  or  shall  be  shaped  to  meet  the  more  or  less  prob- 
able contingency  of  renewed  war.  All  thought  on  this 
subject  has  been  profoundly  affected  by  the  intensifica- 
tion of  national  feeling  resulting  from  the  internecine 
conflict.  An  exacerbated  nationalism  is  almost  bound 
to  find  expression  in  economic  policy.  The  general  trend 
of  opinion  in  belligerent  and  also  in  neutral  countries  is 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  227 

towards  further  increasing  in  the  future  the  economic 
self-sufficiency  of  the  state  with  the  object  of  thus  ren- 
dering it  the  better  able  to  withstand  the  shocks  and  sur- 
prises of  war.  Everywhere  plans  are  being  formulated 
to  decrease  the  economic  interdependence  of  the  ante- 
bellum world.  The  wide-spread  movement  in  the  United 
States  during  191 6  for  the  creation  of  a  merchant  ma- 
rine proportionate  to  the  country's  foreign  trade  was 
part  and  parcel  of  the  programme  of  economic  and  naval 
preparedness.  In  the  belligerent  countries,  naturally,  the 
movement  towards  self-sufficiency  was  at  that  time  even 
more  accentuated,  but  there  is  in  addition,  a  more  or  less 
clearly  defined  tendency  to  consider  the  allied  groups  as 
constituting  in  themselves  somewhat  incoherent  economic 
units.  When  Mr.  William  Massey,  the  Prime  Minister 
of  New  Zealand,  said:  "  We  should  aim  at  a  self-con- 
tained Empire,  just  consideration  being  given  to  our 
Allies,"*®  he  echoed  the  opinions  of  many  in  all  belliger- 
ent countries. 

The  first  and  clearest  expression  of  this  policy  natur- 
ally came  from  Germany,  because  the  sea  power  of  the 
Allies  had  largely  cut  off  her  foreign  trade  and  had 
made  self-sufficiency  a  dire  necessity.  The  course  of 
military  events  —  pre-eminently  the  Battle  of  the  Marne 
and  the  subsequent  failures  to  reach  the  Channel  ports  — 
together  with  the  apparently  unassailable  supremacy  of 
Britain  on  the  water,  had  forcibly  demonstrated  to  Ger- 
many that  in  this  war  the  great  goal  of  over-sea  expan- 
sion was  not  attainable.     Hence,  attention  was  diverted 


228       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

from  the  more  radiant  West  to  the  inherently  less  attrac- 
tive East  and  the  plan  was  devised  to  create  a  large  Cen- 
tral European  economic  and  political  unit,  consisting  of 
the  Teutonic  Allies  and  the  lands  that  they  had  con- 
quered. 

In  its  purely  economic  features,  the  projected  Mid- 
Europe  is  largely  a  mere  revival  of  a  scheme  that  ever 
since  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  has  intermit- 
tently dazzled  the  imagination  of  a  number  of  Central 
European  statesmen  and  publicists.'*'^  There  is,  however, 
this  vast  difference,  that  now  its  political  purposes  com- 
pletely dwarf  the  economic  ones.  The  abortive  German 
peace  overtures  of  December  12,  19 16,  were  designed 
to  secure  a  settlement  which  would  leave  Germany  dom- 
inant over  the  regions  between  Verdun  and  Riga  and 
from  Antwerp  to  Bagdad.  As  has  been  tersely  said, 
the  peace  that  Germany  desired  was  one  that  would  "  en- 
able her  to  fulfil  in  the  next  war  the  aims  she  had  failed 
to  fulfil  in  this."  There  is  not  the  slightest  indication 
that  the  major  German  plan,  which  most  directly  threat- 
ened the  future  of  all  English-speaking  peoples,  has  been 
abandoned.  It  has  merely  been  deferred  until  the  times 
be  more  propitious.  Prince  von  Buelow's  significant 
words,  that  "  England  was  the  only  country  with  which 
Germany's  account  in  world  policy  showed  a  balance  on 
the  wrong  side,"  *®  still  hold  true,  except  that  the  United 
States  should  now  be  joined  to  England. 

In  the  background  of  the  Mitteleuropa  project,  as  in 
that  of  the  more  ambitious  scheme  of  world  empire  to 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  229 

which  the  narrower  plan  is  to  serve  as  a  stepping-stone, 
is  the  haunting  fear  that  the  Germany  of  the  future  will 
be  dwarfed  by  the  British  Commonwealth,  the  United 
States,  and  Russia.  The  great  apostle  of  Central  Eu- 
rope, Friedrich  Naumann,^®  sees  these  three  aggregates 
as  the  sole  members  of  "  the  first  class  of  economic  world- 
group  Powers,"  and  for  him  the  vital  question  at  the 
moment  is  the  formation  of  a  similar  unit  in  Central 
Europe  that  by  its  wealth  and  resources  shall  automat- 
ically enter  this  class.''^  With  this  object  in  view,  it  is 
proposed  to  create  a  loosely  federated  combination  of  the 
Teutonic  Allies  with  parts,  if  not  with  all,  of  the  con- 
quered lands  to  the  West,  East  and  South  and  to  enclose 
this  populous  area  within  tariff  barriers.  But  within 
these  barriers  free  trade  is  not  to  prevail  between  the 
members  of  the  confederation.  The  system  is  to  be 
equivalent  to  one  of  mutual  preference  as  against  all 
outsiders. 

The  economic  goal  in  view  is  pre-eminently  self-suffi- 
ciency. The  aim  is  to  liberate  Central  Europe  so  far 
as  it  is  possible  from  dependence  on  imports  by  sea  and 
to  develop  the  varied  resources  of  this  large  land  area. 
Not  only  is  the  production  of  foodstuffs  to  be  increased, 
but  the  Balkans  and  Turkey  are  to  furnish  supplies  of 
cotton,  copper,  and  wool.'^  From  the  Elbe  to  the  Per- 
sian Gulf  there  is  to  be  "  a  closed  economic  system  by 
the  side  of  those  of  the  other  world-Empires,"  proclaims 
a  well-known  Socialist  member  of  the  Reichstag.  More- 
over, this  self-contained  agglomeration  is  to  exert  eco- 


230        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

nomic  pressure  on  all  its  peripheries  and  thus  gradually 
to  draw  the  smaller  neighbouring  states  within  its  politi- 
cal orbit.  The  manufactured  products  of  its  political 
rivals  are  to  be  rigorously  excluded  or  penalized,  while 
those  of  Central  Europe  are  by  the  forcible  imposition  of 
commercial  treaties  to  secure  exceptionally  favourable 
treatment  throughout  the  entire  European  Continent.^^ 

There  are  serious  internal  and  external  obstacles  in  the 
way  of  the  accomplishment  of  this  project.  Part  of  it 
apparently  has  already  been  frustrated  by  military  events, 
and  its  future  is  largely  contingent  upon  the  terms  of 
peace.  Moreover,  as  a  political  structure,  Central  Eu- 
rope would  rest  on  frail  fundaments,  which  the  repressed 
national  feelings  of  the  subject  Slav  peoples  would  be 
constantly  undermining.  Economically  also,  it  has  en- 
countered considerable  opposition  among  Turks,  Mag- 
yars, and  Austrians,  who  aim  to  develop  their  own  in- 
dustries and  do  not  complacently  look  forward  to  a  state 
of  economic  dependence  on  the  German  over-lord.  As 
a  result  of  all  these  factors,  the  idea  of  a  close  customs 
union  is  giving  way  to  the  less  rigid  and  less  obtrusive 
programme  of  general  economic  rapprochement,  whose 
ultimate  political  aim  is  essentially  the  same. 

As  a  direct  result  of  these  preparations  of  the  Central 
Powers  for  "  a  contest  on  the  economic  plane  "  after  the 
cessation  of  armed  hostilities,  representatives  of  the  Al- 
lied Governments  met  in  Conference  at  Paris  during 
June  of  1916.^^  This  assembly  devoted  itself  to  con- 
sidering the  means  of  increasing  the  economic  solidarity 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  231 

of  the  Allies  and  recommended  specific  measures  for  this 
purpose.  Some  of  these  were  purely  for  the  duration 
of  the  war;  others  were  transitory  expedients  to  facili- 
tate the  post-bellum  reconstruction;  and  finally,  some 
were  devised  to  secure  permanent  collaboration.  It  was 
proposed  that  during  the  transitional  period  of  rehabili- 
tation, the  Allied  countries  should  have  a  prior  claim, 
before  all  others,  on  all  their  own  natural  resources  and 
on  all  available  means  of  reconstruction.  With  this  ob- 
ject in  view,  the  benefit  of  "  most  favoured  nation  treat- 
ment "  was  not  to  be  granted  for  a  number  of  years  to 
any  of  their  enemies.  Furthermore,  in  order  to  defend 
their  economic  life  against  aggression,  the  commerce  of 
the  enemy  Powers  and  goods  originating  in  these  coun- 
tries were  to  be  subjected  for  an  indeterminate  period 
either  to  prohibitions  or  to  differential  treatment. 

As  permanent  measures,  the  Conference  recommended 
that  the  Allies  should  take  immediate  steps  to  render 
themselves  independent  of  the  enemy  countries  as  regards 
materials  and  manufactures  "  essential  to  the  normal 
development  of  their  economic  activities."  In  order  to 
facilitate  the  interchange  of  their  own  products,  the  Al- 
lies were  to  improve  and  cheapen  all  means  of  communi- 
cation with  one  another  and  also  to  assimilate,  so  far  as 
might  be  possible,  their  laws  governing  patents,  indica- 
tions of  origin  and  trade-marks. 

The  general  aim  of  these  elastic  recommendations  was 
to  expedite  the  work  of  reconstruction,  to  strengthen 
both  the  solidarity  of  the  Entente  Powers  and  their  eco- 


232        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

nomic  independence  and  also  to  erect  barriers  against  a 
recurrence  of  the  German  state-aided  system  of  economic 
penetration.  The  defensive  character  of  the  proposals 
was  especially  emphasized.  They  were  not,  however, 
purely  economic  in  purpose.  In  part,  their  aim  was  to 
prevent  the  Central  Powers  from  recuperating  more  rap- 
idly  than  the  Allies  and  at  their  expense,  and  from  then 
being  able  to  resume  the  military  contest  under  possibly 
more  favourable  auspices.  The  scope  of  this  entire  pro- 
gramme, as  well  as  the  details  of  the  measures  to  be 
adopted,  will  finally  be  determined  by  the  nature  of  the 
military  settlement  and  by  the  degree  of  security  which 
the  Allies  feel  that  they  have  attained.^* 

It  would  be  in  the  extreme  difficult,  if  not  quite  impos- 
sible, to  devise  a  comprehensive  arrangement  that  would 
satisfy  the  divergent  interests  of  each  of  the  Entente 
Powers  and  fashion  them  into  a  fairly  self-contained 
economic  unit.  For  instance,  the  agricultural  products 
of  Russia  and  those  of  Italy  will  still  need  the  Central 
European  markets.®^  Such  a  comprehensive  plan  was, 
however,  never  in  view.'*®  But  it  is  entirely  feasible, 
though  by  no  means  simple,  to  develop  a  system  of  re- 
ciprocal preferential  treatment  among  these  allied  coun- 
tries. And,  finally,  it  is  to  a  varying  extent  a  fairly 
simple  matter  for  each  one  of  these  states  to  lessen  its 
own  dependence  upon  Germany  for  basic  products  and 
to  prevent  the  aggressive  invasion  of  its  home  market 
through  "  dumping,"  export  premiums  and  other  devices 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  233 

of  the  German  Government  and  the  interlocking  indus- 
trial combinations  known  as  cartels. 

As  a  consequence  of  the  resolutions  of  the  Paris  Con- 
ference, the  British  Government  appointed  a  Committee 
to  consider:  v^hat  industries  are  essential  to  the  future 
safety  of  the  nation  and  what  steps  should  be  taken  to 
maintain  and  establish  them ;  what  steps  should  be  taken 
to  recover  home  and  foreign  trades  lost  during  the  war 
and  to  secure  new  markets;  to  what  extent  and  by  what 
means  the  resources  of  the  Empire  should  be  developed 
and  could  "  be  prevented  from  falling  under  foreign  con- 
trol." The  chairman  of  this  non-partisan  Committee, 
Lord  Balfour  of  Burleigh,  was  an  ardent  free  trader  and 
among  its  members  were  others  of  that  school  as  well 
as  pronounced  tariff  reformers,  such  as  Mr.  W.  A.  S. 
Hewins.  On  February  2,  19 17,  in  view  of  the  approach- 
ing Imperial  Conference,"  this  Committee  submitted  a 
preliminary  report  on  commercial  policy  between  the 
various  self-governing  peoples  of  the  Commonwealth, 
stating  that  they  had  reached  their  conclusions  chiefly 
because  "  we  think  it  necessary  that  for  the  sake  of  the 
unity  of  the  Empire  a  serious  attempt  should  now  be 
made  to  meet  the  declared  wishes  of  the  Dominions  and 
Colonies  "  for  the  development  of  closer  economic  rela- 
tions with  the  United  Kingdom  by  means  of  preferential 
treatment  of  their  products.  The  Committee  further 
stated  that  they  intended  to  submit  an  additional  report 
on  the  tariff  policy  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  on  the 


234       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

question  of  how  far  the  wishes  of  the  Dominions  could 
be  met  "  by  the  granting  of  subsidies  in  Heu  of  tariff 
preferences."  '^^  The  report  itself  recommended  that 
special  steps  be  taken  "  to  stimulate  the  production  of 
foodstuffs,  raw  materials  and  manufactured  articles 
within  the  Empire,"  that  adherence  to  the  principle  of 
preference  be  officially  declared,  and  that  early  consider- 
ation be  given  to  "  the  desirability  of  establishing  a  wider 
range  of  Customs  Duties  which  would  be  remitted  or 
reduced  on  the  products  and  manufactures  of  the  Empire, 
and  which  would  form  the  basis  of  commercial  treaties 
with  Allied  and  Neutral  Powers."  ^®  The  fact  that  this 
report  received  the  unanimous  support  of  the  Committee 
shows  how  far  England  had  travelled  from  the  laissez 
faire  doctrines  that  for  over  two  generations  had  domi- 
nated her  fiscal  policy.^® 

Just  as  Germany's  colonial  and  naval  imperialism  had 
stimulated  the  movement  towards  greater  imperial  unity, 
so  German  military  and  economic  .aggression  was  lead- 
ing to  a  somewhat  belated  recognition  of  the  disadvan- 
tages of  a  system  of  unrestricted  imports  in  a  world  of 
tariff  barriers.  When  the  Imperial  War  Conference 
met  in  London  some  six  weeks  later,  the  preferential 
principle  came  up  for  consideration.  After  an  exhaust- 
ive and  favourable  discussion  in  the  Imperial  Cabinet,  the 
Conference  unanimously  agreed  that  each  part  of  the 
Empire,  "  having  due  regard  to  the  interests  of  our  Al- 
lies," shall  give  specially  favourable  treatment  and  facili- 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  235 

ties  to  the  produce  and  manufactures  of  other  parts  of 
the  Empire.^  ^ 

When  forwarding  their  report,  the  Balfour  Committee 
stated  that  in  developing  the  system  of  mutual  tariff 
preferences,  "  the  special  position  of  India,  as  well  as  of 
Egypt  and  the  Sudan,  will  require  consideration."  In 
the  meanwhile,  the  Government  of  India  was  investigat- 
ing the  entire  question  of  that  country's  future  tariff 
policy.®^  For  the  past  fifteen  years  the  Indian  National- 
ists had  with  increasing  insistence  been  demanding  a 
protective  system  that  would  foster  the  development  of 
India's  industrial  life.®^  In  this  connection,  the  most 
bitter  attacks  were  concentrated  upon  the  excise  duty  of 
3^  per  cent,  imposed  upon  cotton  goods  manufactured 
in  India  to  offset  the  customs  of  the  same  amount  col- 
lected on  such  goods  when  imported.  This  question  had 
before  the  war  assumed  a  prominence  entirely  dispropor- 
tionate to  its  intrinsic  economic  importance,  unless  it  be  re- 
membered that,  in  Indian  eyes,  the  excise  stood  pre-emi- 
nently for  the  denial  to  India  of  an  autonomous  protec- 
tive system.  The  cotton  excise  was  the  chief  fact  cited 
to  substantiate  the  oft-repeated  allegation  of  the  Nation- 
alists that  Indian  interests  were  being  deliberately  sacri- 
ficed to  those  of  Britain,  and  it  gave  a  certain  plausibility 
to  what  was  on  the  whole  a  groundless  contention.  Its 
imposition  in  1896  was  most  ill-advised  and  its  retention 
in  the  face  of  native  opposition  was  unwise  in  the  ex- 
treme.    While  other  manufactures  in  India  were  allowed 


236       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

at  least  a  modicum  of  protection  —  moderate  import 
duties,  but  no  countervailing  excises,  were  levied  on  virtu- 
ally all  other  wares  —  the  British  Government  adhered 
to  the  free  trade  principle  in  the  case  of  cotton  goods 
largely  because  they  were  convinced  of  its  inherent  sound- 
ness and  thought  that  protective  duties  would  merely 
benefit  the  clamant  few  at  the  expense  of  the  inarticulate 
multitude  of  consumers.  The  situation  would,  however, 
alter  considerably  were  England  herself  to  abandon  free 
trade.  Thus,  in  19 12,  Lord  Crewe  had  said  that  a  pro- 
tectionist Government  in  England  would  have  no  right 
to  prevent  India  from  following  such  a  policy.®* 

Accordingly,  in  the  spring  of  19 17,  the  Indian  Govern- 
ment, with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
India,  proposed  to  increase  the  customs  on  imported 
cotton  goods  from  3^  per  cent,  to  7^  per  cent,  without 
imposing  a  countervailing  excise  duty  on  the  products 
of  the  Indian  looms.  This  decision,  which  was  equiva- 
lent to  inaugurating  a  moderate  protective  tariff  on  cot- 
ton goods,  aroused  a  storm  of  protest  from  the  Lan- 
cashire manufacturers.  It  also  produced  misgivings  in 
disinterested  quarters,  where  the  fear  was  expressed  that 
its  effect  would  be  merely  that  the  struggling  ryot  would 
have  to  pay  tribute  to  the  wealthy  Indian  millowners.®'' 
Despite  this  opposition,  the  increase  in  duties  was  sanc- 
tioned by  the  British  Parliament,  on  the  understanding 
that  the  subject  was  open  to  reconsideration  after  the 
war.  This  action  is  of  considerable  significance,  not 
only  in  that  it  involves  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  237 

Indian  fiscal  policy  must  be  determined  by  the  weight  of 
Indian  public  opinion,  but  also  because  it  may  point  the 
way  to  a  great  extension  of  the  protective  system  in 
India  and,  possibly  also,  to  the  application  of  the  prefer- 
ential system  to  her  trade  from  and  to  other  parts  of  the 
British  Commonwealth. 

Lord  Balfour's  Committee  had  also  been  instructed 
to  consider  "  to  what  extent  and  by  what  means  the 
resources  of  the  Empire  should  and  can  be  developed." 
This  work  had  in  reality  been  already  undertaken  by 
others.  As  a  result  of  the  Imperial  Conference  of  191 1, 
a  Royal  Commission  had  been  appointed  which,  in  March 
of  19 1 7,  published  its  final  report  on  the  economic  re- 
sources of  the  Empire.^^  This  influential  body,  com- 
posed of  representatives  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  of 
the  Dominions,  unanimously  urged  that  it  was  vital  that 
"  the  Empire  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  placed  in  a 
position  which  would  enable  it  to  resist  any  pressure 
which  a  foreign  Power  or  group  of  Powers  could  exer- 
cise in  time  of  peace  or  war  in  virtue  of  a  control  of  raw 
materials  and  commodities  essential  to  its  well-being." 
They  divided  such  commodities  into  three  classes:  i, 
those  of  which  the  world's  requirements  were  mainly  or 
wholly  produced  within  the  Empire;  2,  those  of  which 
the  Empire's  requirements  were  approximately  equalled 
by  its  production;  3,  those  mainly  produced  and  con- 
trolled outside  the  Empire.  The  essential  commodities 
of  the  first  class,  such  as  nickel,  asbestos,  and  jute  fur- 
nished, as  they  pointed  out,  **  a  valuable  means  of  eco- 


238       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

nomic  defence  and  commercial  negotiation."  As  re- 
gards some  of  those  of  the  second  category,  such  as  wheat 
and  wool,  they  suggested  the  promotion  of  their  exchange 
within  the  Empire.  But  in  respect  to  others  of  this  class, 
such  as  zinc,  tungsten,  and  monazite,  they  indicated 
"  special  action  in  order  to  secure  the  control  and  utiliz- 
ation of  Imperial  supplies  for  the  Empire's  use."  As 
regards  commodities  of  the  third  class,  such  as  cotton, 
petroleum,  nitrates,  and  potash,  they  proposed  investi- 
gations of  the  possibilities  of  developing  new  sources  of 
supply  and  of  finding  substitutes  within  the  Empire.  For 
this  purpose,  as  well  as  for  others,  they  suggested  the 
creation  of  an  Imperial  Development  Board,  containing 
representatives  of  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Dominions, 
the  Crown  Colonies,  and  the  Protectorates.  In  conclu- 
sion, this  Royal  Commission  —  the  first  one  comprising 
representatives  of  all  the  self-governing  communities  of 
the  Empire  —  expressed  the  hope  and  belief  that  their 
conclusions  and  recommendations  would  not  "  be  found 
to  conflict  with  the  systems  to  be  evolved  by  the  Allied 
Nations  after  the  war." 

In  the  meanwhile,  an  important  unofficial  committee 
composed  of  men  of  wide  experience,  such  as  Earl 
Grey,  Lord  Selborne,  Sir  Horace  Plunkett,  and  Sir  Starr 
Jameson,  had  been  investigating  this  subject  from  a 
different  angle.  Their  point  of  approach  was  the  vast 
increase  of  the  National  Debt  caused  by  the  war  and  its 
future  burden  upon  the  taxpayers.  In  order  to  alleviate 
this  burden,  they  proposed  the  development  of  the  im- 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  239 

mense  latent  resources  of  the  Empire  "  for  State  purposes, 
under  State  auspices."  With  this  object  in  view,  they 
advocated  the  conservation  for  the  benefit  of  the  Empire 
of  such  natural  resources  as  can  be  controlled  by  the 
Imperial,  Dominion,  or  Indian  Governments,  the  devel- 
opment of  selected  resources  "  under  such  conditions  as 
will  give  to  the  State  an  adequate  share  of  the  proceeds," 
and  the  appointment  of  "  a  Board  for  the  Conservation 
and  Development  of  the  Resources  of  the  Empire." 

This  organization  proposes  plans  whereby  the  State 
on  its  own  account  should  develop  some  of  the  unworked 
resources  of  the  Empire,  so  as  to  pay  both  the  interest 
and  ultimately  also  the  principal  of  the  huge  War  Debt. 
For  instance,  it  has  been  suggested  in  this  connection  that 
200  million  acres  of  arable  land  in  Western  Canada  be 
reserved  for  this  purpose.  Again  another  proposal  is 
that  the  State  should  assume  control  of  some  of  the 
tropical  and  sub-tropical  products  of  Africa.  This  radi- 
cal departure  from  the  British  individualistic  tradition 
has  received  considerable  support  which  is  qualified,  how- 
ever, by  the  strict  injunction  that  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  British  imperialism,  "  government  in  the  interests 
of  the  governed,"  must  not  in  any  way  be  infringed  by 
the  projected  imperial  brand  of  state  socialism.®"^ 

The  experiences  of  the  war  have  also  markedly  em- 
phasized the  danger  of  relying  so  predominantly  on  im- 
ported foodstuffs  as  does  England,  and  have  led  to  a 
wide-spread  demand  for  the  rehabilitation  of  English 
agriculture.    As  a  war  measure,  in  order  to  encourage 


240       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

the  home  production,  minimum  prices  for  grain,  coupled 
with  a  minimum  wage  for  the  agricultural  labourer,  have 
already  been  guaranteed  by  the  Government.  In  addi- 
tion, the  Committee  which  was  appointed  by  the  Govern- 
ment to  consider  the  methods  of  increasing  the  agricul- 
tural output  "  in  the  interest  of  national  security  "  have, 
with  one  dissenting  voice,  recommended  the  permanent 
adoption  of  this  policy. 

The  greater  portion  of  this  official  and  unofficial  pro- 
gramme naturally  came  up  for  discussion  by  the  Imperial 
War  Conference,  when  it  met  in  London  in  the  spring  of 
1917.  In  addition  to  endorsing  the  principle  of  imperial 
preference,  this  body  —  composed  of  representatives  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  of  the  Dominions  (except  Aus- 
tralia), and  of  India  —  unanimously  agreed  upon  the 
following  economic  policies:  the  establishment  of  an 
Imperial  Mineral  Resources  Bureau  at  London ;  the  devel- 
opment of  the  Empire's  military  and  naval  supplies;  the 
encouragement  of  the  development  of  imperial  resources 
so  that  the  Empire  should  be  independent  of  other  coun- 
tries as  regards  food  supplies,  raw  materials  and  essential 
industries.®^ 

These  various  projects  and  plans  —  Mitteleuropa,  the 
Paris  Economic  Conference,  the  British  proposals  —  were 
virtually  all  in  an  inchoate  state,®®  when  the  United 
States  entered  the  war.  Whether  or  no  they  crystallize 
in  actual  policy  will  be  largely  influenced  by  this  new 
factor.  For  the  fate  of  all  these  proposals  will  to  a 
varying  extent  be  determined  by  the  military  outcome  of 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  241 

the  war  and  by  the  degree  of  interstate  security  that  will 
be  attained  when  peace  is  re-estabUshed.  The  partici- 
pation of  the  United  States  has  decidedly  lessened  the 
possibility  of  a  German  victory  or  even  of  a  stale-mate 
peace,  and  thus  has  made  highly  improbable  the  inter- 
necine economic  war  after  the  war  which  a  few  unofficial 
extremists  had  advocated.  But  if,  in  addition,  the 
United  States  should  break  with  the  past  traditions  of 
isolation  and  should  continue  to  co-operate  effectively 
with  its  present  allies  to  ensure  justice  and  peace  in  the 
future,  the  programme  of  the  Entente  will  probably  be 
even  further  modified  in  the  direction  of  less  restricted 
trade  relations.  Yet,  even  under  the  most  favourable 
circumstances  of  a  decisive  Allied  victory  and  an  un- 
limited guarantee  of  the  settlement  by  the  United  States, 
the  economic  future  will  not  be  that  of  the  past.  In 
general,  it  may  be  assumed  that  measures  will  be  taken 
to  prevent  Germany  from  nullifying  the  most  favoured 
nation  principle  by  the  specialization  of  duties  and  from 
undermining  her  neighbours'  industries  by  "  dumping  " 
and  other  obnoxious  means.  In  so  far  as  England  is 
concerned,  it  would  appear  that  the  days  of  unrestricted 
imports  are  gone  and  that,  as  in  the  days  before  Cobden, 
a  national  trade  policy  will  be  evolved.''^^  Even  in  the 
bitterest  days  of  the  struggle  there  was  a  very  consider- 
able free  trade  party  in  England  and  at  no  time  was  it 
proposed  to  erect  tariff  barriers  of  the  height  of  those 
surrounding  the  United  States.  Many  of  these  free 
traders,  however,  without  disavowing  their  firm  belief 


242       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

in  the  economic  efficacy  of  laissez  faire  doctrines,  have 
reached  the  conclusion  that  security  is  more  important 
than  opulence.  With  tariff  reformers  they  are  in  favour 
of  stimulating  British  agriculture  either  by  bounties  or 
by  protective  duties  and  they  approve  of  the  protection  of 
certain  so-called  "  key  industries,"  such  as  the  manufac- 
ture of  aniline  dyes,  magnetos  and  optical  glass.  More- 
over, the  very  need  for  revenue  to  pay  interest  on  the 
debt  and  the  war  pensions  will  make  almost  inevitable 
recourse  to  an  extended  customs  system  and  attached  to 
this  will  necessarily  be  some  protective  elements.  And 
again,  apart  from  the  prejudice  against  German  goods, 
which  will  be  an  important  factor  for  a  considerable  time, 
positive  measures  will  in  all  probability  be  taken  to  curtail 
their  free  and  unrestricted  access  to  the  British  markets 
so  as  to  counteract  the  German  system  of  state-aided 
penetration.  Finally,  it  should  be  remembered  that  the 
increased  nationalism  produced  by  the  war  will  seek  ex- 
pression in  economic  policy;  and  that  territories  which 
have  been  defended  and  acquired  at  the  expense  of  im- 
measurable sacrifices  inevitably  seem  more  part  and  par- 
cel of  the  body  politic  than  those  whose  administration 
has  been  assumed  somewhat  in  the  role  of  trustee  for  the 
world.  Closely  associated  with  such  feelings  is  the 
natural  sentiment  that  those  who  have  defended  civiliz- 
ation should  have  a  prior  claim,  both  before  those  who 
attacked  and  those  who  remained  neutral  during  the  crisis, 
on  all  the  means  of  rebuilding  their  shattered  economic 
structures. 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  243 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  clear  that  if  the  British 
Commonwealth  and  the  United  States  were  to  join  in  a 
co-operative  alliance,  there  would  be  very  much  less  like- 
lihood of  an  application  of  the  preferential  principle  to 
the  dependent  or  non-self-governing  parts  of  the  Empire 
and  also  that  the  general  arguments  in  favour  of  a  pro- 
tective policy  would  lose  much  of  their  force.  With  its 
high  protective  system  and  a  colonial  policy  that  largely 
excludes  foreign  goods  from  its  dependencies,  the  United 
States  is  not  in  a  position  to  object  to  the  application  of 
these  principles  by  others.  Nor,  for  the  same  reasons,  is 
France.  Such  questions  are,  however,  pregnant  with 
interstate  friction.  The  element  of  national  monopoly 
with  respect  to  the  trade  of  dependent  communities  should 
so  far  as  it  is  possible  be  removed  and  the  principle  of 
the  wide-open  door  should  be  genuinely  applied  to  them, 
as  well  as  to  the  still  independent,  but  undeveloped  and 
backward,  countries  of  the  world.  A  general  inter- 
national agreement  to  this  effect  backed  by  an  English- 
speaking  alliance  pledged  to  this  self-denying  principle 
would  do  much  to  further  the  peace  of  the  world. 

In  normal  times,  the  great  bulk  of  the  foreign  trade 
of  the  United  States  is  with  the  countries  now  at  war. 
In  19 1 3,  more  than  three  quarters  of  its  exports  went  to 
the  belligerent  countries,  while  only  somewhat  less  than 
this  proportion  of  its  imports  came  from  them.  By  far 
the  greater  part  of  this  trade  was  with  the  present  Allies 
of  the  United  States.  To  them  went  63  per  cent,  of  the 
total  exports  and  from  them  came  54  per  cent,  of  the 


244       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

imports.  On  the  other  hand,  the  exports  to  the  Central 
Powers  constituted  only  14.5  per  cent,  and  the  imports 
thence  only  17.7  per  cent,  of  the  respective  totals.''  The 
aggregate  trade  with  America's  Allies  was  almost  four 
times  as  large  as  that  with  the  Teutonic  group.  Military 
events  have  probably  doomed  the  formation  of  a  Mittel- 
europa  extending  from  Antwerp  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  but 
even  the  more  limited  project  of  a  close  economic  union  of 
the  Central  Empires  is  beset  by  grave  difficulties,  since 
the  various  nationalities  of  Austria-Hungary  are  looking 
forward  to  their  own  industrial  development  and  do  not 
relish  their  assigned  part  of  being  mere  purveyors  of  raw 
materials  and  foodstuffs  to  the  German  work-shop.  The 
aim  of  this  plan  was  to  increase  the  economic  self-suffi- 
ciency of  these  countries  and  to  free  them  from  depen- 
dence on  America  and  the  whole  outside  world  for  un- 
manufactured supplies  and  grain.  Whether  or  no  even 
this  limited  project  be  perforce  abandoned,  in  either  case 
the  United  States  cannot  look  forward  to  an  expansion 
of  its  trade  relations  with  this  group.  It  is  true  that  the 
former  commerce  with  Germany  was  large.  In  19 13— 
14,  the  exports  to  Germany  amounted  to  342  million 
dollars  and  the  imports  thence  to  190  millions.'^ ^  But 
these  exports  were  composed  largely  of  such  supplies  as 
copper  and  cotton,  that  are  indispensable  to  Germany. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  imports  consisted  of  fertilizers, 
chemicals,  and  dye-stuffs,  as  well  as  a  varied  assortment 
of  manufactured  goods."  There  is  no  visible  indication 
that  either  Germany  or  the  United  States  is  prepared  to 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  245 

lower  the  barriers  against  foreign  manufactures  in  order 
to  facilitate  an  interchange  of  such  goods.  In  fact,  their 
respective  industries  are  not  in  the  main  complementary, 
but  are  markedly  competitive,  as  both  have  specialized  in 
large  scale  production  of  cheap  goods  by  machinery 
rather  than  in  the  highly  finished  goods  of  skilled  work- 
manship. 

This  trade  of  the  United  States  with  Germany  was 
all  but  completely  cut  off  by  the  war  while,  at  the  same 
time,  the  normally  far  more  extensive  commercial  rela- 
tions with  the  Entente  Allies  expanded  at  an  unprece- 
dented pace.  By  far  the  largest  part  of  this  original  and 
increased  trade  was  with  the  British  Commonwealth. 
Ever  since  the  establishment  of  the  English  Colonies  that 
in  time  developed  into  the  United  States,  the  trade  routes 
between  England  and  America  were  crowded  with  ships 
carrying  merchandise  to  and  fro.  In  191 3,  nearly  one 
half  of  the  exports  of  the  United  States  went  to  coun- 
tries under  the  British  flag  and  somewhat  less  than  one 
third  of  the  imports  came  from  them."'*  The  war  has 
even  further  increased  this  commercial  interdependence 
and  it  has  also  drawn  closer  the  pre-existing  strong  finan- 
cial ties.  As  a  result  of  abnormally  large  exports  at  in- 
ordinately high  prices,  the  United  States  had  during  the 
first  two  and  a  half  years  of  the  war  accumulated  an  un- 
precedentedly  vast  credit  balance  in  foreign  trade  and  was 
able  both  to  buy  back  the  greater  part  of  its  securities 
owned  abroad  and  also  to  loan  very  considerable  amounts 
to  the  Entente  Allies.     Before  the  United  States  had  en- 


246       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

tered  the  war,  these  loans  amounted  to  over  two  billion 
dollars,  of  which  about  one  half  was  Great  Britain's  share. 
Since  that  event,  these  financial  relations  have  become 
even  closer  and  are  binding  the  English-speaking  peoples 
together  by  the  closest  economic  ties.  Not  only  has  the 
war  taken  the  United  States  out  of  the  class  of  debtor 
nations,  but  in  doing  so  it  has  completely  removed  the 
inevitable  element  of  discord  between  creditor  and  debtor 
that  from  the  earliest  colonial  times  was  a  disturbing 
factor  in  Anglo-American  relations.  The  war  has  defi- 
nitely established  a  parity  of  status,  which  will,  among 
other  things,  enable  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  and 
those  of  the  British  Commonwealth  to  co-operate  on 
terms  of  equality  in  developing  the  backward  countries  of 
the  world  and  in  rehabilitating  the  economic  structure  of 
the  war-harassed  nations. 

Everything  is  tending  to  draw  the  English-speaking 
peoples  into  more  intimate  economic  relations.  If  their 
present  co-operation  during  the  war  should  lead  to  future 
close  association  for  their  mutual  security  and  for  main- 
taining freedom,  justice,  and  right  throughout  the  world, 
these  relations  should  be  predominantly  harmonious. 
For  in  that  event,  the  arguments  in  favour  of  a  policy  of 
complete  economic  self-sufficiency  for  the  British  Com- 
monwealth will  be  discredited.  Presumably,  a  tariff  for 
revenue,  with  duties  on  a  much  lower  scale  than  those  of 
the  United  States,  will  at  all  events  have  to  be  imposed  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  To  a  limited  extent,  this  may 
hamper  the  increasing  sale  of  American  manufactures  in 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  247 

England,  but  before  such  a  tariff  could  legitimately  be 
deemed  a  grievance,  the  United  States  would  have  radi- 
cally to  lower  its  own  tariff  walls.  Similarly,  it  is  prob- 
able that  steps  will  be  taken  to  revive  British  agriculture 
and  also  to  give  preferential  treatment  in  England  to  the 
raw  products  of  the  Dominions.  As  a  result,  there  may 
be  less  demand  in  England  for  American  foodstuffs,  but 
this  is  quite  unimportant,  as  it  is  very  probable  that  the 
United  States  will  soon  have  no  agricultural  surplus  to 
export.  Finally,  it  is  quite  assured  that  all  of  Germany's 
enemies  will  take  means  to  prevent  the  unfair  competition 
by  which  their  markets  have  been  penetrated.  To  the 
extent  that  this  is  successful,  there  will  be  a  vacuum  in 
these  countries  which  will  be  supplied  by  their  manufac- 
turers and  by  those  of  the  United  States.  The  same 
effect  will  be  produced  by  the  sentiments  and  passions 
aroused  in  the  war.  Germany's  extremely  unscrupulous 
and  ruthless  conduct  has  attached  a  stigma  to  her  citizens 
which  for  a  considerable  time  will  handicap  them  in  dis- 
posing of  their  wares  in  foreign  countries.  The  personal 
factor  is  important  in  most  business  transactions.  As 
long  as  this  inevitable  semi-boycott  obtains,  it  will  act 
as  a  protective  measure  in  favour  of  all  the  Allied  nations, 
both  in  their  own  markets  and  also  in  those  of  sympa- 
thetic neutrals. 


VIII 
COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY 


"Fourscore  and  seven  years  ago  our  fathers  brought  forth 
on  this  continent  a  new  nation,  conceived  in  liberty,  and  dedi- 
cated to  the  proposition  that  all  men  are  created  equal.  Now 
we  are  engaged  in  a  great  civil  war,  testing  whether  that  nation, 
or  any  nation  so  conceived  and  so  dedicated,  can  long  endure." 
—  Abraham  Lincoln,  November  19,  1863. 

"  The  British  Empire  is  not  founded  on  might  or  force,  but  on 
moral  principles  —  on  principles  of  freedom,  equality  and  equity. 
It  is  these  principles  which  we  stand  for  to-day  as  an  Empire  in 
this  mighty  struggle." 

—  Jan  Smuts,  April  2,  1917. 

"  We  are  glad,  now  that  we  see  the  facts  with  no  veil  of  false 
pretence  about  them,  to  fight  thus  for  the  ultimate  peace  of  the 
world  and  for  the  liberation  of  its  peoples,  the  German  peoples 
included:  for  the  rights  of  nations  great  and  small  and  the 
privilege  of  men  everywhere  to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of 
obedience.    The  world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy." 

—  WooDROW  Wilson,  April  2,  1917. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
Community  of  Policy 

The  Need  of  Co-operation  —  Sea  Power  and  Its  Control  — 
The  Future  of  China  —  Latin  America  —  German  Ambitions  — 
Militarism  —  The  Necessity  of  Security  —  A  Positive  Policy 
—  Conclusion. 

The  war  has  given  the  death-blow  to  America's  cher- 
ished policy  of  isolation  and  has  conclusively  demon- 
strated that  the  traditional  course  of  non-intervention  is 
impossible  in  a  markedly  interdependent  world.  Like 
Cobden,  the  typical  American  was  opposed  to  armed 
intervention  and  believed  in  the  efficacy  of  a  pacific  exam- 
ple to  quell  the  warlike  ambitions  of  other  states.  In 
Mazzini's  eyes,  such  an  aloof  course  was  but  "  cowardly 
desertion  of  duty,"  for  to  him  the  final  justification  of 
national  existence  was  the  active  part  taken  in  inter- 
national politics.  Hence  his  exhortations  to  the  United 
States  to  enter  into  the  stream  of  world  affairs  some 
sixty  years  before  the  logic  of  events  had  finally  brought 
about  this  consummation.* 

The  force  of  this  logic  in  the  future  will  be  largely 
dependent  upon  the  extent  to  which  the  German  menace 
has  been  eliminated,  but  under  all  circumstances  it  pre- 
sumably will  be  sufficiently  cogent  to  render  most  in- 

251 


252       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

judicious  a  return  to  the  obsolete  creed.  Intimate  co- 
operation with  the  other  EngHsh-speaking  peoples  will 
undoubtedly  be  found  to  be  more  and  more  essential. 
The  closeness  of  the  resulting  relation  must  ultimately 
rest  upon  the  immutable  fact  that  these  peoples  are  cul- 
turally closely  akin  and  have  essentially  the  same  political 
ideals  and  institutions.  In  both  branches  of  this  politi- 
cally separated,  but  clearly  defined,  entity,  an  unfettered 
public  opinion,  basing  its  judgments  upon  the  dictates  of 
personal  morality,  as  a  rule  obliges  the  government  in 
its  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  to  conform  to  standards 
that  are  far  from  being  so  generally  recognized  elsewhere. 
This  cultural  solidarity  is  strongly  reinforced  by  an 
ever  increasing  economic  interdependence,  which  not  only 
necessitates  the  closest  association  during  the  war,  but 
also  promises  to  make  imperative  such  collaboration  after 
the  re-establishment  of  peace.  The  absolute  diminution 
of  the  world's  shipping  as  a  result  of  submarine  and  mine, 
the  shortage  in  foodstuffs  throughout  the  world,  the  de- 
pletion of  Europe's  accumulated  supplies  of  raw  mate- 
rials, the  huge  national  debts,  have  produced  a  most 
serious  dislocation  and  will  result  in  disaster  unless  the 
process  of  economic  rehabilitation  is  carefully  supervised 
by  international  agencies.  The  chief  burden  of  directing 
and  controlling  this  reconstruction  will  fall  upon  the 
United  States  and  upon  the  British  Commonwealth  be- 
cause of  their  predominant  financial  power,  their  owner- 
ship of  the  major  portion  of  the  world's  mercantile 
marine,  their  vast  output  of  manufactured  goods  and 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  253 

their  exceptional  resources  in  basic  raw  materials.  Con- 
trolling, as  they  largely  do,  the  world's  sources  of  supply 
of  gold,  copper,  tin,  cotton,  rubber,  and  wool,  the  Eng- 
lish-speaking peoples  must  in  concert  devise  measures  for 
their  distribution  in  the  most  advantageous,  efficacious, 
and  equitable  manner. 

The  complex  problems  of  economic  reconstruction  will 
demand  the  closest  co-operation  between  the  English- 
speaking  peoples.  But  apart  from  all  cultural  and  eco- 
nomic ties,  these  peoples  are  joined  by  physical  con- 
tiguity and  propinquity.  Like  the  United  States,  the 
British  Commonwealth  is  an  American  Power  with  vast 
interests  in  both  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific.  Hence 
intimate  relations  are  inevitable  and  these  relations  are 
more  likely  to  be  of  a  co-operative  than  of  an  antagonistic 
nature,  not  only  because  there  is  no  inherent  conflict  of 
interests,  but  also  because  their  common  civilization  has 
permeated  their  foreign  policies  with  the  same  general 
ideals  and  purposes.  It  may  be  confidently  asserted  that, 
of  all  the  Great  Powers,  these  two  are  the  ones  least 
infected  with  dreams  of  military  glory  or  with  ambitions 
of  territorial  aggrandizement  at  the  expense  of  others. 
In  the  exceptionally  advantageous  position  that  they 
occupy  on  all  the  continents,  it  would  indeed  be  very  sur- 
prising were  it  otherwise.  But  it  is  an  undeniable  fact 
that  with  them  peace  has  been  the  genuine  goal  of  policy. 
As  a  result,  the  general  foreign  policy  of  the  British  Em- 
pire and  that  of  the  United  States  follow  parallel  lines. 
The  fundamental  aim  of  both  states  was,  and  perforce 


254       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

must  always  be,  security;  for,  unless  safety  is  practically 
assured,  the  more  positive  purpose  of  maintaining  the 
liberty  of  others  will  yield  to  the  imperative  immediate 
need.  But  security,  in  these  days  of  rapid  communica- 
tions and  of  ever  growing  economic  interdependence, 
means  far  more  than  mere  immunity  from  invasion.  It 
implies,  in  addition,  the  protection  of  a  state's  interests 
within  the  confines  of  other  countries. 

For  the  United  States,  security  both  in  the  narrower 
and  in  the  broader  sense,  is  obviously  contingent,  in  the 
main,  upon  sea  power.^  The  dependence  is  not  so  great 
as  in  the  case  of  the  British  Commonwealth,  but  it  is  in- 
creasing year  by  year  as  foreign  commerce  is  playing 
a  larger  part  in  the  national  economy.  Sea  power  is, 
however,  an  economic  fact  that  cannot  be  improvised. 
The  British  Empire's  command  of  the  seas  rests,  in  ulti- 
mate analysis,  not  upon  a  navy  that  any  state  sufficiently 
rich  might  duplicate,  but  upon  the  fact  that  its  merchant 
marine  before  the  war  amounted  to  approximately  one 
half  of  the  world's  total  tonnage.^  The  efficiency  of  a 
navy  is  dependent  upon  a  commensurate  auxiliary  mer- 
cantile fleet  and  its  trained  seamen.  Were  all  warships 
to  be  discarded  and  complete  naval  disarmament  to  be  the 
future  dispensation,  British  sea  power  would  be  even 
more  predominant  than  it  now  is.  It  is  certain  that  the 
German  submarine  campaign  will  oblige  the  United  States 
greatly  to  increase  its  mercantile  marine,  but  it  is  highly 
improbable  that  this  expansion  will  be  sufficient  either  for 
the  needs  of  American  commerce  or  for  a  navy  that  will 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  255 

provide  the  requisite  security  if  the  United  States  does 
not  continue  in  close  association  with  the  British  Com- 
monwealth. Before  America's  participation  in  the  war, 
Admiral  Fiske  contended: 

"  In  order  to  have  an  effective  naval  defence  (since  we  are 
precluded  by  our  policy  from  having  European  allies  and  no 
South  American  country  could  give  us  any  effective  naval  help) 
we  must  have  on  each  ocean  a  fleet  as  strong  as  that  of  any 
nation  on  that  ocean  against  whose  wishes  we  may  have  to 
enforce  a  policy  —  or  against  whose  policy  we  may  have  to  op- 
pose resistance."* 

Such  a  naval  programme  is  feasible,  but  it  would  be 
burdensome  in  the  extreme.  It  would  be  highly  inad- 
visable, for  the  same  security  and  the  same  ends  can  be 
attained  by  joining  forces  with  the  British  Common- 
wealth. When,  nearly  one  hundred  years  ago.  Canning 
suggested  to  Richard  Rush,  the  American  Minister  at 
London,  the  policy  that  led  to  the  formulation  and  enun- 
ciation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  he  said  that  he  did  not 
believe  that  concert  of  action  would  be  necessary,  because 
the  knowledge  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
were  of  the  same  opinion  would  by  its  moral  effect  pre- 
vent European  interference  in  South  America.  This 
belief  was  founded.  Canning  said,  "  upon  the  large  share 
of  the  maritime  power  of  the  world  which  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  shared  between  them,  and  the  con- 
sequent influence  which  the  knowledge  that  they  held  a 
common  opinion  upon  a  question  on  which  such  large 
maritime  interests,  present  and  future,  hung,  could  not 
fail  to  produce  upon  the  rest  of  the  world."  '^ 


256       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

Before  reaching  a  definite  decision  on  this  far-reaching 
suggestion,  President  Monroe  turned  for  advice  to  his 
experienced  predecessors  in  office.  In  reply,  Thomas 
Jefferson  stated: 

"  Great  Britain  is  the  nation  which  can  do  us  the  most  harm 
of  any  one,  or  all,  on  earth ;  and  with  her  on  our  side,  we  need 
not  fear  the  whole  world.  .  .  .  But  I  am  clearly  of  Mr.  Can- 
ning's opinion  that  it  will  prevent,  instead  of  provoking  war. 
With  Great  Britain  withdrawn  from  their  scale  and  shifted 
into  that  of  our  two  continents,  all  Europe  combined  would  not 
undertake  such  a  war."  • 

James  Madison  fully  concurred  with  Jefferson,  writing 
to  Monroe  that,  while  such  co-operation  "  must  ensure 
success  in  the  event  of  an  appeal  to  force,  it  doubles  the 
chance  of  success  without  that  appeal."  At  the  same 
time,  he  wrote  to  Jefferson  that  "  with  the  British  power 
&  navy  combined  with  our  own,  we  have  nothing  to 
fear  from  the  rest  of  the  nations."  "^ 

The  situation  is  essentially  the  same  in  19 17  as  it  was 
in  1823.  The  submarine  has  not  fundamentally  changed 
the  nature  of  sea  power.  It  has  merely  re-introduced, 
in  an  aggravated  form,  a  factor  that  was  removed  only 
in  1856  when  privateering  was  abolished.*  Thanks 
largely  to  steam  and  electricity,  the  command  of  the 
surface  of  the  sea  is  more  complete  than  ever  before.* 
While  the  submarine  has  been  extremely  destructive  of 
shipping  and  its  cumulative  effect  may  even  result  in  a 
serious  disarrangement  in  the  carriage  of  necessary  sup- 
plies, this  demolition  of  merchant  vessels  cannot  directly 
accomplish  a  positive  military  purpose.     The  submarine 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  257 

and  mine  are  essentially  defensive  weapons.  They  may 
weaken  the  enemy  commanding  the  sea  and  they  may 
even  disrupt  his  offensive,  but  they  still  leave  his  shores 
immune  from  invasion.  So  long  as  the  British  Common- 
wealth and  the  United  States  can,  with  their  joint  re- 
sources, control  the  surface  of  the  sea,  they  will  be 
secure  from  the  havoc  inflicted  upon  Belgium,  Northern 
France  and  Serbia.  Neither  one  can  unquestionably 
attain  this  full  security  alone.  Nor  is  there  any  definite 
assurance  that  the  control  of  the  sea  by  the  English- 
speaking  peoples  will  in  the  future  be  uncontested.  This 
depends  largely  upon  the  military  outcome  of  the  war 
and  the  future  relations  of  the  British  Commonwealth 
and  the  United  States. 

If  Germany  were  perchance  to  emerge  from  the  war 
as  mistress  of  the  European  Continent,  she  could  readily 
use  the  added  economic  resources  to  build  a  navy  of  por- 
tentous size  for  a  renewal  of  the  bid  for  world  dominion ; 
and  such  a  policy  would  be  all  the  more  probable,  if  it 
were  not  plainly  manifest  that  the  maritime  resources  of 
all  the  English-speaking  peoples  would  be  jointly  used  to 
thwart  her.  But  while  joint  action  during  the  war  and 
close  co-operation  after  its  close  will  probably  be  able  to 
protect  these  culturally  kindred  peoples,  sea  power  in 
itself  cannot  prevent  Germany  from  dominating  Europe, 
though  the  economic  pressure  it  can  exert  may  mitigate 
the  rigours  of  such  hegemony.  The  freedom  of  France 
and  Italy  from  enforced  subservience  to  German  policy 
—  in  fact  the  liberties  of  Europe,  not  to  mention  those  of 


258       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

the  world  —  are  dependent  upon  such  future  intimate 
relations  between  the  British  and  American  peoples. 

In  this  general  connection  also,  it  would  be  the  height 
of  folly  to  overlook  the  fact  that  the  United  States  has 
gained  the  deep  hostility  of  Germany  by  entering  the 
war.  Even  prior  to  that  event,  the  Central  Powers  were 
incensed  at  the  purchase  by  the  Allies  of  vast  supplies  in 
America.  There  is  this  to  be  said  for  their  attitude  that, 
already  before  19 14,  they  had  held  that  a  non-combatant 
state  could  not  become  an  extensive  source  of  warlike 
stores  without  violating  its  neutrality. -^^  Furthermore, 
these  Powers  had  constantly  protested  against  the  failure 
of  the  United  States  to  compel  the  Allies  to  permit 
American  raw  materials  and  foodstuffs  to  reach  Germany. 
Their  case,  it  should  be  noted,  was  strengthened  by  the 
fact  that  the  United  States  had,  to  some  extent  at  least, 
accepted  their  view  of  the  international  law  applicable  in 
these  instances.  In  their  opinion,  America  had  been 
grossly  unneutral  and  her  final  participation  in  the  War 
was  but  the  culmination  of  a  gratuitously  partisan  atti- 
tude. This  has  led  to  a  wide-spread  feeling  of  implacable 
resentment. 

When  we  leave  behind  us  the  question  of  safety  from 
invasion  and  direct  our  attention  to  interests  beyond  the 
state's  frontier,  it  will  inevitably  be  found  that  the  suc- 
cessful and  peaceful  maintenance  of  American  policies 
towards  Latin  America  and  towards  China  is  largely 
dependent  upon  British  support  and  the  sea  power  that 
goes  with  it.     Since  the  aims  of  both  states  are  in  funda- 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  259 

mental  accord,  there  is  no  reason  why  this  support  should 
not  be  forthcoming.  The  policy  of  the  open  door  in 
China  is  essentially  Anglo-American  in  origin.  This 
policy  has  both  idealistic  and  utilitarian  phases.  The  aim 
is  not  merely  to  preserve  and  widen  a  market  for  British 
and  American  wares,  but  to  keep  intact  the  territorial 
integrity  and  political  independence  of  that  backward 
country  with  its  swarming  millions  feebly  groping  toward 
the  progress  of  western  civilization.  Manchuria  and 
Mongolia,  in  large  part,  have  in  all  probability  been 
already  irrevocably  detached  from  China,  but  the  fate  of 
the  rest  of  this  huge  country  hangs  in  the  balance  and 
apparently  the  only  peaceful  means  of  tipping  the  beam 
in  accordance  with  America's  ideals  and  interests  is  a 
clearly-defined  alliance  of  the  English-speaking  peoples. 
Such  an  explicit  engagement  would  probably  give  pause 
to  those  under  the  spell  of  imperialistic  ambitions.^^ 

Similarly,  there  is  no  opposition  in  policy  toward 
Latin  America.  In  so  far  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
concerned,  the  general  interests  and  political  ideals  of 
both  countries  coincide.  The  strength  of  the  doctrine 
was  from  the  very  outset  largely  derived  from  British 
sea  power. ^2  Xhe  chief  aim  of  this  policy  is  to  safe- 
guard Latin  America  from  foreign  domination  so  that 
the  twenty  republics  included  therein  may  develop  their 
characteristic  institutions  unhampered  by  European  dic- 
tation. Great  Britain  has  no  political  aims  or  territorial 
ambitions  here,  but  she  has  a  direct  interest  in  stable 
conditions  because  of  her  extensive  economic  and  com- 


a6o       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

mercial  relations  with  these  countries.  Before  the  war, 
imports  from  the  United  Kingdom  into  Latin  America 
about  equalled  those  from  the  United  States,  in  spite  of 
the  preferential  treatment  accorded  to  American  goods  by 
both  Cuba  and  Brazil. ^^  These  imports  were  at  that  time 
about  fifty  per  cent,  larger  than  those  of  Germany.^* 

Great  Britain  naturally  places  great  stress  upon  this 
extensive  trade  which  has  been  developed  by  centuries  of 
effort  on  the  part  of  individuals,  who  demand  as  of  right 
only  the  privilege  of  equal  opportunity.  There  is  no 
likelihood  of  friction  here  provided  the  United  States 
does  not  adopt  the  reactionary  policy  of  using  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  Pan- Americanism  to  secure  by  treaty  or 
otherwise  special  and  exclusive  privileges  that  would 
partially  shut  the  door  to  British  commerce.^'^  If  the 
United  States  were  to  agree  to  a  self-denying  ordinance 
to  this  effect  and  at  the  same  time  assumed  responsibility 
for  an  adequate  measure  of  order  and  justice  in  the  dis- 
turbed parts  of  Central  and  South  America,  British  in- 
terests would  be  amply  safeguarded.  Under  such  con- 
ditions, the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  unquestionably  secure 
the  formal  and  full  support  of  the  British  Common- 
wealth. 

Nor  is  there  any  conflict  between  an  English-speaking 
alliance  and  Pan- Americanism,  which  is  not  a  national 
policy  of  the  United  States,  but  an  American  inter- 
national movement  to  foster  closer  cultural,  political  and 
economic  relations  between  all  the  Americas.  Some 
ninety  years  ago,  when  this  vision  first  took  hold  of  men, 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  261 

one  of  its  ardent  advocates,  the  great  Liberator  Bolivar,^* 
believed  that  England  should  take  a  prominent  part  in 
any  union  of  all  the  American  states.  In  fact,  at  the  first 
Pan-American  Congress  held  at  Panama  in  1826,  the 
United  States  was  not  represented  owing  to  delay  in 
making  the  appointments,  while  an  accredited  British  offi- 
cial attended  the  meeting,  though  not  as  a  member  in  full 
standing."  A  Pan- Americanism  of  191 7  that  excludes 
Canada,  Newfoundland,  Jamaica,  Barbados,  and  British 
Guiana,  not  to  mention  the  other  American  parts  of  the 
British  Commonwealth,  is  a  strange  contradiction  in 
terms,  and  is  presumably  unwisely  and  unnecessarily  nar- 
row. 

In  connection  with  South  America  it  should  be  remem- 
bered that  the  possibilities  of  German  expansion  there 
cannot  be  ignored.  The  most  disturbing  feature  about 
Germany's  much  advertised  "  place  in  the  sun  "  was  its 
apparently  deliberate  vagueness.  It  was  nowhere  and 
everywhere.  Whenever  in  any  quarter  of  the  globe  the 
political  waters  became  troubled,  Germany  extemporized 
important  interests  in  whose  protection  she  was  ready  to 
shake  the  mailed  fist.  The  policy  of  Napoleon  III  in 
demanding  compensation  for  France  whenever  Prussia 
added  to  her  power,  has  been  justly  denounced  by  Ger- 
man historians,  but  the  same  policy  was  in  turn  adopted 
by  United  Germany  and  kept  the  world  in  a  continuous 
ferment.  Despite  the  indefinite  inclusiveness  of  Ger- 
many's policy,  it  is,  however,  obvious  that  if  ever  a  "  New 
Germany  "  over  the  seas  is  to  arise,  the  most  likely,  if 


262        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

not  the  only  possible,  place  is  Brazil,  in  whose  southern 
states  there  is  already  a  considerable  German  nucleus 
around  which  to  build  such  a  daughter  nation.^^  Ger- 
man economists  and  publicists  have  persistently  painted 
this  dream.  Against  its  realization,  however,  stood  as 
insuperable  barrier,  not  alone  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but, 
in  first  line,  the  British  fleet.  The  grave  danger  is  that 
after  the  war,  an  undisciplined  and  unbeaten,  though  not 
victorious,  Germany  may  seek  to  retrieve  her  fortunes  by 
political  expansion  in  South  America,  There  was  con- 
siderable truth  in  Professor  Usher's  realistic  words  writ- 
ten in  191 6,  that  "  the  easiest  concession  for  the  Allies 
to  make  will  be  the  control  of  Asia  Minor  by  Germany 
and  Austria  and  a  free  hand  for  both  in  South  America, 
leaving  Great  Britain  and  France  still  supreme  in  Africa 
and  Asia,"  ^^  At  all  times,  it  was  highly  improbable 
that  the  British  barrier  would  be  voluntarily  raised  and, 
since  America's  entrance  into  the  war,  this  has  become 
almost  inconceivable.  But  the  direst  of  necessities  may 
permit  of  no  other  choice.  Such  a  state  of  necessity 
would,  however,  be  extremely  unlikely,  and  such  an  out- 
come would  be  well-nigh  impossible  were  the  United 
States  to  contract  binding  engagements  with  the  other 
English-speaking  peoples.  But,  if  the  United  States 
should  after  this  war  retire  to  its  former  isolation,  or  even 
if  it  should  merely  join  the  proposed  league  of  nations 
as  the  only  Great  Power  bound  by  no  ties  of  alliance  to 
any  of  its  fellow  members,  such  difficulties  and  others 
of  a  similar  nature  in  the  Far  East  will  in  all  probability 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  263 

have  to  be  confronted.  In  the  new  and  in  some  respects 
intensified  nationalism  of  the  near  future,  it  will  be 
imperative  to  form  durable  bonds  with  others  if  American 
interests  are  to  be  adequately  considered.  Rights  and 
interests  will  be  fully  regarded  only  if  their  correspond- 
ing responsibilities  are  not  shirked. 

In  addition  to  the  economic  and  political  facts  from 
which  the  imperative  urgency  of  close  co-operation 
between  the  English-speaking  peoples  springs,  there  is  a 
further  most  potent  argument  for  such  an  alliance. 
Hitherto,  not  as  a  result  of  any  virtues  innate  in  them, 
but  rather  by  the  accident  of  favoured  position,  these  peo- 
ples have  been  able  to  escape  the  burdens  and  dangers  of 
large  military  establishments.  If  in  the  future  they  do 
not  fully  co-operate  in  protective  measures,  it  is  extremely 
improbable  that  they  will  continue  to  be  thus  fortunate. 
The  tendency  of  every  human  instrument  is  to  seek  occa- 
sion to  demonstrate  its  effectiveness,^^  and  the  existence 
of  a  powerful  army  leads  insensibly  to  an  aggressive  atti- 
tude towards  weaker  or  more  pacific  states.  It  tends  to 
breed  a  spirit  that  makes  might  the  measure  of  right. 
Furthermore,  it  favours  the  establishment  of  a  military 
caste  that  is  not  subject  to  the  civil  law.  It  not  infre- 
quently results  in  the  subordination  of  policy  to  purely 
strategic  considerations,  as  well  as  in  the  eventual  control 
of  the  body  politic  by  the  military  authorities.  These 
evils  of  militarism  are  most  clearly  exemplified  in  modern 
Germany. 

The    notorious    Zabem    affair  ^^    was    an    inevitable 


264        THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

manifestation  of  a  system  that  gives  the  legislature 
virtually  no  authority  over  the  army.  Such  control 
of  the  German  army  by  the  Reichstag  would,  according 
to  Professor  Delbrueck,  be  inconceivable.  "Whoever 
has  only  the  slightest  feeling  with  our  corps  of  officers 
and  our  staff  of  generals,"  he  writes,  "  knows  that  this  is 
an  impossibility,  that  our  army  would  first  have  to  ex- 
perience a  Sedan  in  an  inverse  sense  in  order  to  permit 
that  to  befall  it."  ^^  Thus,  in  1906,  Colonel  von  Deim- 
ling  bluntly  told  the  Reichstag  that  its  decision  counted 
for  naught  and  that  he  would  never  withdraw  a  single 
soldier  from  South  Africa,  "  unless  my  Emperor  issues 
a  command  to  that  effect."  ^^  But,  in  addition,  the  army 
was  regarded  as  a  means  of  quelling  political  opposition. 
Prince  von  Buelow  calmly  discussed  the  use  of  force  "  as 
the  very  last  resource  "  against  the  rising  tide  of  Social 
Democracy.  "If  the  means  which  law  and  justice 
place  at  our  disposal  fail,"  he  wrote,  "  the  last  resource 
still  remains."  ^  Equally  significant  is  the  fact  that,  had 
the  German  Foreign  Office  been  so  inclined,  it  would  have 
been  powerless  to  prevent  the  invasion  of  Belgium  after 
it  had  become  apparent  that  such  action  would  bring 
England  into  the  war.  On  August  5,  191 4,  the  German 
Under-Secretary  of  State  informed  the  departing  Bel- 
gian Minister  at  Berlin  that  the  Foreign  Office  was  im- 
potent. Since  the  order  of  mobilization  had  been  issued 
by  the  Emperor,  he  said,  all  power  was  vested  in  the 
military  authorities;  they  had  determined  that  the  in- 
vasion of  Belgium  was  an  indispensable  military  oper- 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  265 

ation.^^     The  following  words  of  Prince  von  Buelow 
embody  a  grim  and  sober  historical  fact : 

"  The  history  of  Brandenburg-Prussia,  which  achieved  its 
first,  but  not  its  last,  German  triumph  in  founding  the  German 
Empire  under  Prussian  leadership,  is  the  history  of  the  Prussian 
army ;  with  its  ups  and  downs  it  is  the  history  of  Prussia's  vary- 
ing fortunes  in  war."  ^^ 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  point  out  that  militarism  is 
not  synonymous  with  preparedness.  But  the  menace  of 
the  former  is  inherent  in  the  latter.  One  of  the  greatest 
advantages  of  an  English-speaking  alliance  is  that  its 
main  protective  bulwark  would  be  a  most  formidable,  and 
presumably  an  invincible,  sea  power.  Except  to  a  very 
minor  and  almost  negligible  degree,  no  one  of  the  in- 
sidious dangers  of  militarism  is  to  be  feared  from  naval 
armaments.  Even  in  the  most  powerful  navies,  com- 
paratively few  men  are  required  and  its  spirit  cannot  per- 
vade a  whole  people.  The  British  navy,  abnormally  en- 
larged as  it  was  already  before  the  war  by  the  German 
peril,  included  then  only  i50,(XX)  men.  Hence,  its  politi- 
cal influence  must  be  relatively  slight.  Moreover,  a  fleet 
is  essentially  a  defensive  weapon.  Sea  power  can  pre- 
vent an  opponent  from  being  victorious  and  is  thus  fre- 
quently the  decisive  factor  in  hostilities,  but  in  an  offen- 
sive war  it  is  merely  the  adjunct  of  the  army. 

It  is  almost  axiomatic  that  the  military  and  naval 
forces  of  any  state  should  be  commensurate  not  only  with 
its  location  and  policies,  but  also  with  its  alliances,  under- 
standings and  friendships  with  the  other  members  of  the 


266       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

family  of  nations.  It  is  evident  that  if  the  United  States 
should  revert  to  its  isolation  or  even  if  it  should  entirely 
trust  its  future  to  an  untried  league  of  nations,  the  extent 
of  its  military  and  naval  armaments  must  be  far  greater 
than  if  it  were  intimately  allied  with  the  British  Common- 
wealth. England,  Canada,  Australasia  and  South 
Africa  are  in  a  similar  position.  In  any  eventuality,  the 
old  days  of  light  military  burdens  will  in  all  probability 
not  return  for  some  considerable  time.  But  the  weight 
of  the  future  load,  and  its  exact  nature  also,  will  largely 
depend  upon  the  establishment  of  such  close  and  binding 
ties.  Apparently  only  in  this  way  can  security  be  safe- 
guarded with  armaments  of  such  extent  as  not  to  endan- 
ger the  political  institutions  typical  of  English-speaking 
peoples.  With  the  aid  of  comparatively  small  standing 
armies  recruited  from  a  manhood  extensively  trained  to 
arms,  their  joint  navies  should  be  able  not  only  to  protect 
them  but  to  ensure,  as  far  as  this  is  possible,  the  general 
peace  of  the  world.  Local  wars  in  Europe,  as  well  as 
elsewhere,  may  still  occur,  but  as  in  the  case  of  the  exist- 
ing conflict,  so  also  in  all  probability  in  future  inter- 
national difficulties  tending  toward  world  wars,  the  fun- 
damental causes  will  lie  in  extra-European  conditions. 
When  there  is  no  hope  of  gaining  command  of  the  sea, 
ambitious  designs  of  aggression  in  transmarine  areas 
must  remain  innocuous  in  their  chrysalid  state. 

For  the  United  States  and  for  the  British  Common- 
wealth future  peace  and  security  are  pre-eminently  essen- 
tial.    The  democracy  of  the  English-speaking  peoples 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  267 

may  emerge  safely  from  the  present  ordeal  by  battle,  but 
much  yet  remains  to  be  done  to  make  it  an  adequate  sys- 
tem of  political  and  social  organization.  The  less  secure 
from  outside  attack  the  body  politic  is,  the  more  atten- 
tion will  be  diverted  from  social  reconstruction  and  the 
less  smoothly,  quickly,  and  fully  will  be  realized  the  ideals 
of  liberty  and  social  justice  towards  which  these  democra- 
cies are  insistently  advancing.  In  addition,  each  branch 
of  the  English-speaking  community  has  its  distinctive 
problems  whose  solution  demands  concentrated  effort. 
The  United  States  must  seriously  undertake  the  laborious 
work  of  Americanizing  a  vast  multitude  of  foreign-born 
and  of  overcoming  a  distinct  sectionalism.  The  process 
of  spiritual,  intellectual  and  economic  integration  needs 
the  quickening  of  positive  ideals  so  that  the  American 
state  may  acquire  a  distinctively  national  character  and  a 
unified  purpose. 

Similarly,  the  other  English-speaking  democracies  have 
their  urgent  problems.  First  and  foremost,  is  the  crea- 
tion of  an  organization  that  will  provide  for  the  con- 
tinuous expression  of  their  distinct  solidarity  and  that 
will  give  to  the  self-governing  citizens  of  the  British  Com- 
monwealth outside  the  British  Isles  a  direct  control  over 
the  vital  issue  of  peace  or  war.  This  means  a  voice  in 
foreign  policy  and  in  imperial  defence,  together  with  an 
equitable  distribution  of  their  burdens.  But  far  more 
important  and  far  more  complex  even  than  this  refrac- 
tory problem  is  the  recognized  obligation  to  develop  the 
character  and  mind  of  the  politically  backward  millions  in 


268       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

the  Dependent  Empire  so  that  ultimately  they  too  may 
become  fit  for  self-government.  As  this  fitness  is  never 
acquired  except  empirically  and  is  always  accompanied 
by  a  measure  of  disorder  and  a  large  share  of  blunders, 
the  rate  of  progress  will  be  intimately  connected  with  the 
degree  of  pressure  from  without  the  body  politic.  The 
less  this  pressure,  the  more  the  reins  of  British  authority 
will  be  relaxed.  But  disorder  within  the  house  will  not 
be  tolerated,  if  the  entire  structure  is  endangered.  An 
English-speaking  alliance  would  not  be  directly  concerned 
with  the  internal  affairs  of  India.  If  British  statesman- 
ship could  not  conciliate  the  growing  spirit  of  Indian 
nationalism,  America  would  not  be  concerned,  however 
much  the  outcome  might  be  deplored.  But  such  an 
alliance  would  presumably  give  the  British  Common- 
wealth sufficient  security  to  render  comparatively  harm- 
less the  inefficiency  and  disorder  that  must  inevitably  ac- 
company the  progressive  transfer  of  authority  in  India 
into  the  hands  of  natives.  This  process  has  been  pro- 
ceeding slowly;  the  rate  was  dependent  upon  consider- 
ations of  safety,  and  its  future  progress  will  be  deter- 
mined by  post-bellum  conditions.  It  is  literally  true  that 
the  future  of  self-government  in  India  will  be  largely  con- 
ditioned by  America's  future  foreign  policy. 

While  security  and  the  peace  that  accompanies  it  are 
essential  to  the  English-speaking  peoples,  these  are  but 
negative  aims,  and  a  foreign  policy  based  merely  upon 
them  has  no  moral  value.  It  is,  however,  incontestable 
that  upon  the  closest  co-operation  between  the  English- 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  269 

speaking  peoples  largely  depend  the  future  freedom  of 
Latin  America  from  European  domination,  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  China,  and  the  rapidity  with 
which  self-government  will  be  established  in  India. 
Thus,  indirectly,  the  negative  policy  of  security  will  make 
for  liberty.  This  ideal  has  been  the  historic  goal  of  all 
English-speaking  peoples  and,  with  many  aberrations,  it 
has  been  constantly,  though  somewhat  gropingly  and  er- 
ratically, pursued."  It  must  be  the  key-note  of  the  pro- 
posed association,  if  the  alliance  is  to  work  its  fullest  good 
in  the  world.  Such  an  alliance  can  and  should  be  the 
bulwark  of  free  government  not  only  within  their  own 
frontiers  and  in  Latin  America  and  China,  where  the 
material  interests  of  the  English-speaking  peoples  are 
directly  involved,  but  also  wherever  the  doctrines  of 
ascendancy  threaten  the  liberties  of  the  world.  Its 
available  military  strength  may  not  always  be  able  to 
cope  expeditiously  with  the  situation,  but  its  combined 
naval  and  economic  resources  will  be  able  to  give  pause 
to  the  stoutest  of  militaristic  hearts  bent  upon  subjugat- 
ing and  exploiting  its  European  neighbours.  No  matter 
what  the  military  outcome  of  the  war  may  be,  even  if 
Germany  should  in  the  end  succeed  in  adding  to  her 
European  area,  the  future  freedom  of  France  and  Italy, 
as  well  as  that  of  Belgium,  Holland  and  the  Scandina- 
vian countries,  is  dependent  upon  a  close  association  of 
the  English-speaking  peoples  and  upon  their  readiness 
to  continue  to  use  their  combined  strength  against  the 
projected  hegemony  of  Europe  by  the  Central  Empires. 


270       THE  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

Even  in  the  East  of  Europe,  where  their  sea  power  can- 
not directly  intervene,  it  can  be  effective,  at  least  in  miti- 
gating the  hard  lot  of  suppressed  and  exploited  nationali- 
ties, if  not  in  securing  their  complete  emancipation.  The 
English-speaking  peoples  have  in  their  joint  grasp  naval 
and  economic  weapons  which  those  who  depend  upon  sea- 
borne commerce  must  in  the  long  run  respect,  even  if 
military  exigencies  have  led  to  their  temporary  defiance. 
These  combined  maritime  and  economic  resources  can- 
not but  provide  the  essential  basis  of  any  league  of 
nations  that  may  be  formed  after  the  war.  The  effec- 
tiveness of  the  proposed  league  will  be  directly  commen- 
surate with  the  vitality  of  the  English-speaking  alliance 
which  should  form  its  comer-stone.  There  are,  however, 
various  kinds  of  alliances.  A  dynastic  one,  of  course,  is 
out  of  the  question.  One  merely  of  governments  would 
be  ineffective.  It  must  be  a  popular  association,  based 
upon  mutual  sympathy  and  good-will,  together  with  a 
genuine  desire  for  co-operation.  Only  such  an  associa- 
tion offers  the  hope  for  a  better  future,  because  it  con- 
tains ultimate  potentialities  unknown  to  a  political  science 
based  directly  upon  the  sovereign  state  of  the  modem  era. 
When  one  surveys  the  entire  course  of  historical  evolu- 
tion, it  becomes  clear  that  the  only  way  in  which  law  and 
justice  have  been  established  in  the  relations  of  man  to 
man  and  of  group  to  group  has  been  by  the  integration 
of  ever  larger  and  larger  political  aggregates.  When 
this  process  is  voluntary,  it  distinctly  spells  progress. 
The  world  is  just  beginning  to  realize  that  the  state  is  not 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  271 

unicellular  and  that  there  can  co-exist  within  it  many  and 
varied  concurrent  loyalties.  The  nineteenth  century 
ideal  of  the  national  state  —  the  co-terminous  state  and 
nation  —  is  still  quite  vigorous,  but  the  British  Common- 
wealth of  Nations  is  concretely  demonstrating  that  a 
higher  type  of  political  association  can  exist  in  which  law 
and  justice  rule  over  a  congeries  of  widely  scattered 
peoples  to  each  one  of  which  is  assured  the  free  and  full 
development  of  its  own  ideals.^®  The  outlook  for  the 
eventual  reign  of  law  and  the  rule  of  reason  throughout 
the  world  would  indeed  be  black  if  the  future  did  not 
hold  in  store  even  more  comprehensive  political  organi- 
zations permitting  the  fullest  freedom  to  the  nations  and 
states  within  them,  but  uniting  them  in  a  common  pur- 
pose for  mankind  as  a  whole.  A  mere  alliance  of  the 
English-speaking  peoples,  were  it  to  imply  no  more  than 
did  such  arrangements  in  the  past,  would  not  in  itself  be 
so  alluring.  But  one  can  dimly  perceive  in  it  the  vague 
outlines  of  some  new,  unprecedented  form  of  political 
association  which,  though  preserving  to  each  part  its  full 
freedom,  will  permanently  unite  them,  not  only  for  the 
defence  of  their  own  common  civilization  and  its  ideals, 
but  also  in  support  of  the  liberty  of  all  threatened  by  the 
sword  of  those  who  worship  at  the  shrine  of  organized 
power. 


NOTES 


NOTES 

NOTES  TO  INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY 

1.  "  Liberty  and  Law  are  interdependent ;  the  weak  state  can  only 
be  secure  of  its  liberty  under  the  guardianship  of  law.  In  this 
aspect,  again,  the  Great  War  appears  as  the  last  struggle  of  the  forces 
hostile  to  the  spirit  of  western  civilization :  the  forces  that  repudiate 
the  possibility  of  international  law,  deny  the  claims  of  weak  states 
to  the  liberty  that  law  alone  can  give  them,  decline  to  admit  the  moral 
basis  of  Law,  and  claim  the  right  to  return  to  the  practices  of  the 
jungle  in  inter-state  relations."  Ramsay  Muir,  Nationalism  and  In- 
ternationalism, p.  34. 

2.  "  In  all  centuries  of  the  Middle  Age  Christendom,  which  in  des- 
tiny is  identical  with  Mankind,  is  set  before  us  as  a  single,  universal 
Community,  founded  and  governed  by  God  Himself.  Mankind  is  one 
'  mystical  body ' ;  it  is  one  single  and  internally  connected  '  people '  or 
'folk';  it  is  an  all  embracing  corporation  (universitas) ,  which  con- 
stitutes that  Universal  Realm,  spiritual  and  temporal,  which  may  be 
called  the  Universal  Church  (ecclesia  universalis),  or,  with  equal 
propriety,  the  Commonwealth  of  the  Human  Race  (respublica  generis 
hutnani).  Therefore  that  it  may  attain  its  one  purpose,  it  needs  One 
Law  (/^jr)  and  One  Government  (unicus  principatus) ."  Gierke, 
Political  Theories  of  the  Middle  Age,  p.  10. 

3.  C.  Delisle  Bums,  Political  Ideals,  p.  103. 

4.  W.  A.  Dunning,  A  History  of  Political  Theories,  Ancient  and 
Mediaeval,  pp.  230,  231.  Dante's  De  Monarchia  "  rests  on  the  funda- 
mental conception  that  the  world,  being  a  thought  of  God,  is  designed 
for  unity,  the  attainment  of  which  is  the  chief  aim  of  man."  J.  Hol- 
land Rose,  Nationality  in  Modern  History,  p.  7.  See  also  Ramsay 
Muir,  Nationalism  and  Internationalism,  pp.  124S. 

5.  John  Neville  Figgis,  From  Gerson  to  Grotius,  1414-1625,  p.  63. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  13.  "  With  all  reservations,  there  remains  a  broad  dif- 
ference between  the  self-sufficing  unit  of  International  Law,  and  the 
spoke  in  the  wheel  of  Mediaeval  Christendom,"    Ibid.,  p.  20. 

7.  A.  L.  Smith,  Church  and  State  in  the  Middle  Ages,  pp.  134,  135. 

8.  Figgis,  op.  cit.,  p.  88.  According  to  Grotius,  "  all  mankind,  or 
at  least  the  great  part  of  it,  constitutes  a  society  of  peoples  for  which 
the  rule  of  a  general  law  is  indispensable."    W.  A.  Dunning,  A  His- 

27s 


276  NOTES 

tory  of  Political  Theories,  from  Luther  to  Montesquieu,  pp.  174,  175. 

9.  "  Grotius  and  his  successors  recurred  to  the  Law  of  Nature  as 
being,  according  to  the  theory  of  the  ancient  Roman  jurists,  a  law 
grounded  in  reason  and  valid  for  all  mankind."  Bryce,  Studies  in 
History  and  Jurisprudence,  p.  602. 

10.  Pollock,  Oxford  Lectures,  pp.  18,  19;  Cambridge  Modern  His- 
tory Xn,  pp.  712,  713.  Recently,  this  distinguished  authority  has 
stated  that  "  the  law  of  nations  has  never  professed  to  restrain  sover- 
eign states  from  being  judges  in  their  own  cause  in  the  last  resort"; 
and  he  concludes  his  re-examination  of  the  subject  with  the  significant 
words  that  the  near  future  "  may  see  the  foundations  of  an  authentic 
international  law,  protected  by  organized  international  justice." 
"  What  of  the  Law  of  Nations?  "  in  The  Living  Age  for  January  27, 
1917. 

11.  In  interstate  relations,  "there  is  no  Law,  in  the  strict  modem 
sense  because  (there  is)  no  superior  authority  capable  of  adjudicating 
on  disputes  and  enforcing  rules."  Bryce,  op.  cit.,  pp.  546,  547.  Cf. 
p.  554.  "  The  term  '  law '  when  applied  to  the  rules  and  principles 
that  prevail  between  independent  nations,  is  misleading  because  such 
rules  depend  for  their  entire  validity  upon  the  forbearance  and  con- 
sent of  the  parties  to  whom  they  apply,  and  are  not  and  cannot  be 
legally  enforced  by  any  common  superior."  W.  W.  Willoughby,  The 
Nature  of  the  State,  p.  200.  On  the  English,  and  also  the  American, 
conception  of  law,  see  A.  Lawrence  Lowell,  The  Government  of 
England,  H,  pp.  471-488. 

12.  Oppenheim,  International  Law,  I,  p.  4. 

13.  Figgis,  op.  cit.,  p.  215. 

14.  "  Before  The  Hague  Conference,  international  legislation  in 
Conferences  had  taken  as  its  most  important  subject  the  Laws  of 
War,  and  again,  at  The  Hague  Conferences,  if  one  expects  arbitra- 
tion, the  only  question  really  discussed  and  the  only  results  arrived  at 
concerned  the  conduct  of  nations  during  war.  .  .  .  What  should  we 
think  of  a  State  in  which  there  were  no  laws  to  prevent  riot  and  mur- 
der and  violence,  and  no  police  to  enforce  the  law,  but  yet  there  were 
very  detailed  and  complicated  laws  governing  the  conduct  of  persons 
engaged  in  riots,  murder,  and  violence?  .  .  .  The  Laws  of  War 
should  not  be  the  first,  but  the  last,  to  be  made  in  the  Society  of 
Nations."    L.  S.  Woolf,  International  Government,  pp.  28,  29. 

15.  Edmond  Kelly,  Government  or  Human  Evolution,  I,  p.  360. 

16.  As  any  and  every  dispute  may  be  deemed  to  involve  these  fac- 
tors, the  effect  of  these  treaties  is  greatly  weakened. 

17.  Russia,  largely  at  Bismarck's  instigation,  denounced  during  the 
Franco-Prussian  War  the  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1856  neu- 
tralizing the  Black  Sea.  Bismarck's  Reflections  and  Reminiscences, 
II,  p.  115.    This  high-handed  act  led  to  the  declaration  of  the  Con- 


INTERNATIONAL  ANARCHY  ^r? 

ference  of  London  of  1871  that  it  was  "  an  essential  principle  of  the 
law  of  nations  that  no  Power  can  repudiate  treaty  engagements  or 
modify  treaty  provisions,  except  with  the  consent  of  the  contracting 
parties  by  mutual  agreement." 

18.  To  reduce  this  to  its  inherent  absurdity,  if  Monaco  or  Lichten- 
stein  were  parties  to  a  war  and  had  not  ratified  a  Hague  Convention, 
it  would  not  be  binding  on  the  other  belligerents. 

19.  Sybel,  The  Founding  of  the  German  Empire,  VI,  pp.  20iff. ;  Die 
Begriindung  des  Deutschen  Reiches,  VI,  pp.  i68flF. 

20.  Sanger  and  Norton,  England's  Guarantee  to  Belgium  and  Lux- 
emburg, pp.  15-21,  77ff. 

21.  Gladstone's  Speeches  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  August  5 
and  10,  1870;  Morley's  Gladstone,  II,  p.  342. 

22.  Sanger  and  Norton,  op.  cit.,  pp.  93ff. 

23.  Hans  Wehberg,  Capture  in  War  on  Land  and  Sea,  pp.  4,  5 ;  T. 
Baty  and  J.  H.  Morgan,  War:  Its  Conduct  and  Legal  Results,  pp. 
i66ff. 

24.  P,  S.  Reinsch,  Public  International  Unions;  L.  S.  Woolf,  In- 
ternational Government,  pp.  I53ff;  Oppenheim,  op.  cit.  I,  pp.  si2flf, 

6l2ff. 

25.  W.  A.  Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  contains  an  ex- 
haustive account  of  this  attempt.  An  excellent  short  account  is  avail- 
able in  An  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  International  Relations  by 
Grant,  Greenwood,  Kerr,  and  others,  pp.  iff. 

26.  L.  S.  Woolf,  International  Government,  p.  24,  On  the  inter- 
vention in  Greece  during  the  present  war,  see  Leon  Maccas,  Ainsi 
Parla  Venizelos,  pp.  295flf. 

27.  For  a  full  account  of  this  development,  see  T.  E.  Holland,  The 
European  Concert  in  the  Eastern  Question. 

28.  British  White  Book,  Nos.  2,  6,  9,  90,  97,  99,  120. 

29.  B.  E.  Schmitt,  England  and  Germany,  pp.  306-314. 

30.  "  And  again  in  '  foreign  politics,'  as  we  provincially  call  it,  we 
suppose  always  that  something  corresponding  to  a  '  Balance  of 
Power '  should  be  maintained.  For  if  any  one  State  were  to  become 
too  powerful,  even  though  it  were  still  theoretically  equal  with  the 
others,  it  could  so  influence  the  development  of  the  others  as  not  to 
leave  them  free.  Theoretical  independence  is  valueless  unless  it  in- 
volves a  real  power  to  carry  out  one's  own  will ;  and  were  any  one 
State  to  become  supreme  in  military  or  economic  power,  no  other 
State  would  be  really  able  to  govern  itself  in  its  own  way.  Quite 
apart  from  actual  invasion  or  conquest,  a  preponderant  influence  in 
Europe  would  check  local  differentiation."  C.  Delisle  Burns,  Political 
Ideals,  pp.  124,  125. 

31.  British  White  Book,  No.  loi. 

32.  In  1907,  at  the  Congress  at  Stuttgart,  Jaures  stated  the  incon- 


278  NOTES 

trovertible  truth :  "  Si  une  nation,  en  quelque  circonstance  que  ce  fut, 
renongait  d'avance  a  se  defendre,  elle  ferait  le  jeu  des  gouvernements 
de  violence,  de  barbaric,  et  de  reaction.  .  .  ,  L'unite  humaine  se  real- 
iserait  dans  la  servitude,  si  elle  resultait  de  I'absorption  des  nations 
vaincues  par  une  nation  dominatrice."  Romain  Rolland,  Au-Dessus 
de  la  Melee,  p.  158. 
3S.  Hans  Delbrueck,  Regierung  und  Volkswille,  p.  123. 

34.  Pitt  and  his  colleagues  in  England  "  verteidigten  die  Zukunft 
Englands,  und  sie  hatten  ausserdem  recht,  wenn  sie  zugleich  verkuen- 
deten,  im  englischen  Lager  sei  die  Freiheit  Europas.  England  hat 
damals  in  einem  zwanzigjaehrigen  Kriege  das  Seinige  getan,  um  die 
Zukunft  der  Welt  vor  der  Gewaltherrschaft  der  Napoleonischen  Mili- 
taerdespotie  zu  bewahren."  Paul  Rohrbach,  Zum  Weltvolk  hin- 
durch!,  p.  71, 

35.  In  1894,  France  and  Russia  formed  an  alliance  to  counteract  the 
military  predominance  of  Germany  which  had  been  further  assured  by 
alliances  with  Austria-Hungary,  Italy  and  Rumania.  A  distinguished 
French  historian  regarded  this  arrangement  as  equivalent  to  a  league 
to  safeguard  peace.  Both  groups,  Seignebos  said,  "  ayant  le  meme  but 
declare,  le  maintien  de  la  paix,  leur  opposition  a  produit  en  Europe 
le  meme  effet  pratique  qu'une  entente  generale."  Seignebos,  Histoire 
Politique  de  I'Europe  Contemporaine,  p.  789. 

36.  Imperial  Germany,  by  Prince  von  Buelow  (new  edition  by 
J.  W.  Headlam),  p.  325. 

37.  An  article  in  The  Round  Table  for  December  of  1915  called 
"  The  Harvest  of  the  War,"  ably  outlines  this  plan.  Lord  Salisbury 
held  that  the  concert  is  "  the  embryo  of  the  only  possible  structure 
of  Europe  which  can  save  civilization  from  the  desolating  effects 
of  a  disastrous  war." 


NOTES  TO  NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY 

1.  F.  H.  Giddings,  "  Sovereignty  and  Government "  in  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  XXI,  pp.  iff.;  J.  M.  Mathews,  "  Duguit's  Political 
Theory,"  ibid.,  XXIV,  pp.  284ff.;  J.  N.  Figgis,  From  Gerson  to 
Grotius,  pp.  52  et  passim;  Maitland  and  Gierke,  Political  Theories 
of  the  Middle  Age,  passim;  J.  A.  Murray  Macdonald,  European  In- 
ternational Relations,  pp.  94!?. ;  Harold  J.  Laski,  Studies  in  the  Prob- 
lem of  Sovereignty,  pp.  1-25. 

2.  C.  Delisle  Bums,  The  Morality  of  Nations,  passim;  L.  S.  Woolf, 
International  Government,  passim. 


NATIONALISM  AND  SOVEREIGNTY       279 

3.  See  J.  W.  Gamer,  Introduction  to  Political  Science,  pp.  237S.; 
Bryce,  Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence,  pp.  503fif. 

4.  Romain  Holland,  Au-Dessus  de  la  Melee,  pp.  gjfi. 

5.  See  especially  F.  S.  Marvin,  The  Unity  of  Western  Civilization 
and  the  same  writer's  The  Living  Past,  "  The  nations  of  the  West 
are  far  more  alike  than  they  are  unlike,  and  their  points  of  likeness 
are  much  more  important  than  their  points  of  unlikeness.  Not  only 
materially  but  spiritually  every  nation  is  poorer  by  breach  of  contact 
with  any  other.  The  sole  point  in  which  the  nations  are  inde- 
pendent is  that  of  government."  G.  Lowes  Dickinson  and  others. 
Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement,  p.  26.  "  Religion,  law,  manners,  cus- 
toms, education  —  are  at  bottom  the  same  in  all ;  and  in  respect  of 
them,  the  essential  things  of  our  life,  Europe  is  virtually  one  great 
commonwealth  of  nations."  J.  A.  Murray  Macdonald,  European  In- 
ternational Relations,  p.  77.  In  his  cosmopolitan  period,  before  the 
disaster  of  Jena  had  aroused  his  German  national  consciousness, 
Fichte  said:  "The  Christian  Europeans  are  essentially  but  one 
people ;  they  recognize  this  common  Europe  as  their  own  true  Father- 
land ;  and,  from  one  end  of  it  to  the  other,  pursue  nearly  the  same 
purposes  and  are  ever  actuated  by  similar  motives."  J.  Holland 
Rose,  Nationality  in  Modern  History,  p.  41. 

6.  Similar  influences  were  quite  active  even  before  the  modem  era. 
Witness  the  effect  of  the  Huguenot  immigration  upon  England,  that 
of  the  Palatines  into  the  American  Colonies  and  the  wide-spread  in- 
fluence of  the  dispersion  of  the  Spanish  Jews  under  the  goad 
of  religious  persecution. 

7.  For  American  democratic  influence  in  the  Balkans,  see  National- 
ism and  War  in  the  Near  East,  pp.  xviff. ;  379. 

8.  Laveleye,  Le  Socialisme  Contemporain,  pp.  xxxiiflF.  (7  ed.  1892). 

9.  L.  S.  Woolf,  op.  cit.,  p.  165. 

ID.  In  so  far  as  the  Universal  Postal  Union  is  concerned,  "  the 
theoretical  right  of  the  State  to  refuse  ratification  to  the  Convention 
and  Reglement  as  voted  at  a  Congress  in  practice  hardly  exists.  The 
Administrations,  adhering  to  the  Union,  never  wait  for  formal  rati- 
fication before  putting  the  new  regulations  into  operation,  and  the 
decisions  of  a  Postal  Congress  are  acted  upon  whether  they  are  rati- 
fied or  not."  L.  S.  Woolf,  op.  cit.,  p.  195.  "  The  adherence  of  a  State 
to  the  Postal  Convention  results  in  a  surrender  of  its  independence 
and  sovereignty  in  the  realm  of  postal  communications,  in  its  volun- 
tary submission  to  International  Government."    Ibid.,  p.  197. 

II.  "When  the  interdependence  of  States  is  recognized,  it  will  fol- 
low that  the  philosophical  idea  of  the  State  will  no  longer  be  that  of  a 
single,  self-sufficient  organism,  but  rather  that  of  a  functioning  organ 
in  a  grouping  more  or  less  organized."    C.  Delisle  Bums,  The  Mor- 


28o  NOTES 

ality  of  Nations,  p.  53.    See  also  A.  H.  Fried,  The  Restoration  of 
Europe,  pp.  11-14. 

12.  "  Now  the  process  of  change  which  we  call  civilization  means 
quite  a  number  of  things.  But  there  is  no  doubt  that  on  its  political 
side  it  means  primarily  the  gradual  substitution  of  a  state  of  peace 
for  a  state  of  war.  This  change  is  the  condition  precedent  for  all 
the  other  kinds  of  improvement  that  are  connoted  by  such  a  term 
as  '  civilization.' "    John  Fiske,  American  Political  Ideas,  p.  106. 

13.  P.  H.  Kerr's  lecture,  "  Commonwealth  and  Empire,"  in  The 
Empire  and  the  Future,  p.  86.  See  also  his  essay,  "  Political  Rela- 
tions Between  Advanced  and  Backward  Peoples,"  in  International 
Relations,  by  Grant,  Greenwood,  and  others,  pp.  141-179. 

14.  For  an  excellent  and  full  account  of  these  problems,  see  Arnold 
J.  Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War. 

15.  Henry  Sidgwick,  The  Development  of  European  Polity,  p.  26. 

16.  C.  Delisle  Burns,  Political  Ideals,  p.  174. 

17.  W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  Democracy  and  Liberty,  I,  p.  488.  See  also 
Letters  of  John  Stuart  Mill,  I,  pp.  276-281. 

18.  J.  F.  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  III,  p.  342. 

19.  John  W.  Burgess,  Political  Science  and  Comparative  Constitu- 
tional Law,  I,  p.  4. 

20.  Cf.  Ramsay  Muir,  Nationalism  and  Internationalism,  pp.  47,  48. 

21.  For  an  admirable  account  of  this  development,  see  C.  D.  Buck, 
"Language  and  the  Sentiment  of  Nationality,"  in  the  American  Po- 
litical Science  Review,  X,  pp.  44ff. 

22.  Pierre  Mocaer,  La  Question  Bretonne.  See  also  "  The  Small 
Celtic  Nations  "  in  The  New  Statesman  for  April  14,  1917. 

23.  W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  Democracy  and  Liberty,  I,  p.  502. 

24.  This  is  especially  true  when  nationalism,  as  in  Germany,  is 
based  upon  the  firm  conviction  of  blood  superiority  and  degenerates 
into  what  has  been  well  termed,  "  racialism."  Ramsay  Muir,  Nation- 
alism and  Internationalism,  pp.  84-86. 

25.  Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement,  ed.  by  C.  R.  Buxton,  p.  26. 

26.  Arnold  J.  Toynbee,  The  Destruction  of  Poland. 

27.  R.  A.  Reiss,  How  Austria-Hungar>'  Waged  War  in  Serbia. 

28.  "  In  point  of  material  force  I  held  a  union  with  Russia  to  have 
the  advantage.  I  had  also  been  used  to  regard  it  as  safer,  because  I 
placed  more  reliance  on  traditional  dynastic  friendship,  on  community 
of  conservative  monarchical  instincts,  on  the  absence  of  indigenous 
political  divisions,  than  on  the  fits  and  starts  of  public  opinion  among 
the  Hungarian,  Slav,  and  Catholic  population  of  the  monarchy  of  the 
Habsburgs.  Complete  reliance  could  be  placed  upon  the  durability 
of  neither  union,  whether  one  estimated  the  strength  of  the  dynastic 
bond  with  Russia,  or  of  the  German  sympathies  of  the  Hungarian 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  281 

populace."    Bismarck's  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  II,  p.  256!!. 

29.  J.  Holland  Rose,  The  Development  of  the  European  Nations, 
II,  pp.  15-18;  A.  Debidour,  Histoire  Diplomatique  de  I'Europe,  1878- 
1914,  I,  pp.  4iff. 

30.  This  treaty  of  1883  was  only  a  personal  undertaking  of  King 
Carol ;  it  was  not  binding  on  Rumania,  since  it  had  not  been  ratified 
by  Parliament  as  is  required  by  the  Constitution.  Mitrany,  in  The 
Balkans,  by  Forbes,  Toynbee,  Mitrany,  and  Hogarth,  p.  301. 

31.  "  The  conclusion  of  this  Alliance  came,  not  so  much  from  our 
fear  of  Russia,  as  from  the  fact  that  our  other  neighbour  made  our 
life  intolerable,  and  that  we  found  no  other  means  except  the  Alliance 
to  make  our  existence  tolerable."  "  The  Policy  of  National  Instinct." 
Speech  delivered  by  M.  Take  Jonesco  in  the  Rumanian  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  December  16  and  17,  1915,  p.  83. 

32.  Ibid.,  pp.  84,  85. 

33.  Pierre  Albin,  L'Allemagne  et  la  France,  1885-1894,  p.  384.  As 
a  result  of  this  alliance,  "  I'ere  de  Bismarck  est  cette  fois  definitive- 
ment  close.    L'equilibre  rompu  est  retabli."    Ibid.,  p.  378. 

34.  For  a  clear  account  of  England's  relations  with  the  Triple  Al- 
liance, see  Ernst  zu  Reventlow,  Deutschlands  Auswaertige  Politik, 
pp.  8-17,  25-38. 


NOTES  TO  AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  BEFORE  1914 

1.  "Your  first  Duties  —  first,  at  least,  in  importance  —  are,  as  I 
have  told  you,  to  Humanity.  You  are  men  before  you  are  citizens  or 
fathers.  If  you  do  not  embrace  the  whole  human  family  in  your 
love,  if  you  do  not  confess  your  faith  in  its  unity  —  consequent  on 
the  unity  of  God  —  and  in  the  brotherhood  of  the  Peoples  who  are 
appointed  to  reduce  that  unity  to  fact  .  .  .  you  disobey  your  law  of 
life,  or  do  not  comprehend  the  religion  which  will  bless  the  future." 
Mazzini,  The  Duties  of  Man  (Everyman's  Library),  p.  51. 

2.  Figgis,  op.  cit.,  p.  217.  As  early  as  1713,  in  his  Projet  de  traite 
pour  rendre  la  paix  perpetuelle,  the  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre  argued  that 
"  Christianity  has  given  to  the  nations  of  Europe,  in  religion,  morals, 
and  customs,  and  even  in  laws,  the  impress  of  a  single  society  —  to 
such  a  point  that  those  peoples  which,  like  the  Turks,  have  become 
European  in  a  geographical  sense  without  becoming  Christians,  have 
been  regarded  as  strangers ;  and  between  the  members  of  this  Chris- 
tian commonwealth  the  'ancient  ima?e  of  the  Roman  Empire  has 
continued  to  form  a  sort  of  bond.' "    W.  A.  Phillips,  The  Confedera- 


282  NOTES 

tion  of  Europe,  pp.  20,  21.    For  a  succinct  synopsis  of  this  project, 
see  Ramsay  Muir,  op.  cit.,  pp.  139-143. 

3.  If  the  prevalent  view  of  the  meaning  of  freedom  and  inde- 
pendence entertained  by  the  states  of  Europe  be  a  true  theory,  "  then 
the  binding  force  of  the  engagements  which  nations  enter  into  with 
each  other  must  always  be  weaker  than  the  alleged  necessities  of  the 
life  of  any  one  of  them;  and  wars  between  them  must  always  be 
inevitable."    J.  A.  Murray  Macdonald,  op.  cit.,  pp.  41,  42. 

4.  The  ill-repute  of  diplomacy  is  not  due  to  the  character  of  diplo- 
mats but  to  the  fact  that  the  international  anarchy  places  them  at 
times  in  a  false  situation.  The  diplomatic  code  of  honour,  however, 
varies  greatly  in  the  different  states.  An  especially  crude  and  cynical 
disregard  of  truth  was  evinced,  on  one  occasion  at  least,  by  Baron 
von  Aehrenthal,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Minister,  who  in 
private  life  was  presumably  a  man  of  honour.  Just  before  the  an- 
nexation of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  1908,  he  categorically  lied  in 
his  official  capacity  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Vienna  about  the  im- 
pending proclamation  of  Bulgarian  independence,  although  the  full 
truth  was  bound  to  be  revealed  in  two  days.  H.  W.  Steed,  The 
Hapsburg  Monarchy,  pp.  250-253. 

5.  Baron  von  Hiigel  describes  the  contents  of  a  letter  received  by 
him  a  few  days  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  from  a  highly  culti- 
vated and  deeply  religious  German  scholar  who  knew  England  well. 
"It  was  a  long,  touchingly  earnest,  plea  in  favour  of  the  justice  of 
the  German  claims,  especially  of  a  cultural  kind,  and  centred  in  the 
strange  assertion  and  argument  that  German  culture  had  by  now,  as 
a  sheer  matter  of  fact,  fully  assimilated  all  that  deserved  to  live  in 
the  several  civilizations  of  Greece  and  Rome,  Italy,  France,  and  Eng- 
land ;  and  hence  that  the  spreading  and  the  substitution,  by  means 
even  of  the  force  of  arms,  of  this  German  culture,  now  thus  become 
the  legitimate  heir  (because  the  actual  quintessence)  of  all  those 
other  cultures,  was  both  no  more  than  justice  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many towards  herself,  and  no  kind  of  loss,  but  rather  a  great  gain 
in  fruitful  concentration,  for  Europe  and  humanity  at  large."  Baron 
Friedrich  von  Hiigel,  The  German  Soul,  pp.  7,  8.  This  quotation  is 
made,  not  because  it  is  unique,  but  because  it  expresses  exceedingly 
well  the  thoughts  dominating  many  influential  Germans. 

6.  Luther  "  paves  the  way  for  the  exalted  theory  of  the  State  enter- 
tained by  Hegel  and  his  followers.  He  is  as  much  the  spiritual  an- 
cestor of  the  high  theory  of  the  State,  as  the  Jesuits  and  their  allies 
are  of  the  narrower,  utilitarian  theory."  Figgis,  op.  cit.,  p.  67.  "  In 
bringing  to  an  imaginative  synthesis  what  might  have  remained  an 
immense  diversity  of  enterprises,  Kantianism  has  helped  formulate  a 
sense  of  a  national  mission  and  destiny."  John  Dewey,  German 
Philosophy  and  Politics,  p.  29. 


AMERICAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  283 

7.  For  a  useful  summary  of  the  various  theories  of  the  organic 
nature  of  the  state,  see  J.  W.  Garner,  Introduction  to  Political 
Science,  p.  56ff. 

8.  There  are,  Maitland  says,  permanently  organized  groups  of  men, 
of  which  the  state  is  a  "  highly  peculiar  group-unit."  According  to 
Gierke,  such  a  German  Genossenschaft  or  Fellowship  "  is  no  fiction, 
no  symbol,  no  piece  of  the  State's  machinery,  no  collective  name  for 
individuals,  but  a  living  organism  and  a  real  person,  with  body  and 
members  and  a  will  of  its  own.  Itself  can  will,  itself  can  act ;  it  wills 
and  acts  by  the  men  who  are  its  organs  as  a  man  wills  and  acts  by 
brain,  mouth  and  hand.  It  is  not  a  fictitious  person."  Gierke-Mait- 
land.  Political  Theories  of  the  Middle  Age,  pp.  ix,  x. 

9.  Hans  Delbrueck,  Regierung  und  Volkswille,  pp.  131-133.  Ac- 
cording to  Friedrich  Naumann,  another  German  publicist  of  wide- 
spread influence,  "  the  State  grows  up  upon  the  will  to  make  others 
subservient  to  oneself.  AH  constructions  which  attempt  to  explain 
the  State  from  brotherly  love  to  our  neighbour  are,  considered  his- 
torically, so  much  empty  talk.  The  State  can,  when  it  perfects  itself, 
be  impregnated  with  the  motives  of  brotherly  love,  at  least  one  can 
attempt  it ;  but  according  to  its  nature,  the  State  is  not  love,  but  con- 
straint."   Baron  Friedrich  von  Hugel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  54,  55. 

ID.  According  to  a  somewhat  idealized  view,  the  state  of  English- 
speaking  peoples  "  is  a  community  claiming  an  unlimited  devotion  on 
the  part  of  each  and  all  of  its  members  to  the  interest  of  all  its  other 
members,  living  and  yet  to  live."  Lionel  Curtis,  The  Problem  of  the 
Commonwealth,  p.  91.  For  further  elaboration  of  this  concept  of 
the  state,  see  The  Round  Table,  Nos.  23  and  24,  pp.  39iflf.,  688ff. 

11.  The  same  is  true  of  Austria.  The  English  and  American  ex- 
pression "  civil  service  "  is  not  a  synonym  for  "  bureaucracy."  The 
English  and  American  service  has  not  acquired  a  consciousness  that  it 
is  not  a  service,  but  a  government.  In  Austria  and  in  Germany  this 
consciousness  exists  and  is  assiduously  cultivated.  The  Austrian 
bureaucracy  "  conceives  itself  theoretically  as  the  executive  instru- 
ment of  the  will  of  the  Crown,  and  practically  as  invested  with  a 
mission  to  govern  the  public."  The  same  is  true  of  the  German 
officials.  "  That  the  State  exists  for  the  service  of  the  public  is  a 
conception  foreign  to  the  bureaucratic  mind  which  is  moulded  on  the 
principle  that  the  community  exists  for  the  State  and  derives  its  well- 
being  from  and  through  the  State."  H.  W.  Steed,  op.  cit.,  p.  xxxi. 
Cf.  Delbrueck,  op.  cit.,  p.  141.  See  also  some  very  pertinent  remarks 
in  Norman  Angell,  The  World's  Highway,  p.  78. 

12.  Cf.  Conrad  Gill,  National  Power  and  Prosperity,  p.  85. 

13.  It  is  significant  that  Professor  Paulsen  selected  this  dictum  of 
Treitschke  in  order  to  contrast  the  modern  German  spirit  with  that 
of  Kant.    Friedrich  Paulsen,  Immanuel  Kant,  p.  359-    It  is  not  con- 


284  NOTES 

tended  that  every  German  holds  such  views,  but  they  are  unquestion- 
ably predominant  among  those  determining  policy  and  deed.  Oppos- 
ing views  might  be  cited,  but  they  have  as  little  political  significance 
as  have  the  sporadic  utterances  of  English-speaking  neo-Odinists. 
For  instance,  in  his  Elements  of  Folk  Psychology,  published  in 
igi2,  Wilhelm  Wundt  writes :  "  The  ideal  which  is  at  present  pro- 
posed for  the  distant  future  involves  not  the  extension  of  any  single 
State  into  a  world  State,  but  rather  the  dissolution  of  existing  States 
and  the  establishment  of  a  society  of  universal  peace  among  nations, 
such  as  would  render  entirely  superfluous  any  instruments  of  power 
on  the  part  of  the  State  itself." 

14.  W.  F.  Johnson,  America's  Foreign  Relations,  I,  pp.  20off. 

15.  Henry  Adams,  History  of  the  United  States,  I,  p.  203. 

16.  Ibid.,  I,  p.  214- 

17.  Ibid.,  IV,  p.  342. 

18.  John  W.  Foster,  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  440, 
441.  As  early  as  1814,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Pozzo  di 
Borgo,  recognized  that  the  United  States  was  "  aiming  at  a  complete 
revolution  in  the  relations  of  the  New  World  with  the  Old,  by  the  de- 
struction of  all  European  interests  in  the  American  continent." 
W.  A.  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  90. 

19.  F.  J.  Turner,  Rise  of  the  New  West,  p.  203.  For  details  of  the 
naval  and  military  aid  given  by  British  subjects  to  the  revolting  col- 
onies, see  Justin  Winsor,  Narrative  and  Critical  History,  VHI,  pp. 

332-335- 

20.  The  most  complete  accounts  of  the  genesis  of  Monroe's  famous 
message  are :  Worthington  C.  Ford,  "  John  Quincy  Adams  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,"  in  the  American  Historical  Review,  Vols.  VH  and 
Vin ;  The  Writings  of  James  Monroe,  edited  by  S.  M.  Hamilton,  VI, 
pp.  346flf.  The  best  account  of  the  European  situation  that  led  to  its 
formulation  is  in  W.  A.  Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  pp. 
256-291. 

21.  Thomas  JeflFerson  to  James  Monroe,  October  24, 1823. 

22.  James  Madison  to  James  Monroe,  October  30,  1823. 

23.  James  Monroe  to  Thomas  Jefferson,  October  17,  1823.  Like 
JeflFerson,  he  thought  that  the  time  had  arrived  "when  G.  Britain 
must  take  her  stand,  either  on  the  side  of  the  monarchs  of  Europe, 
or  of  the  U  States,  and  in  consequence,  either  in  favour  of  Despotism 
or  of  liberty." 

24.  Henry  Clay's  plan  was  to  draw  the  nascent  South  American 
republics,  both  commercially  and  politically,  into  the  orbit  of  the 
United  States.  W.  F.  Johnson  op.  cit.,  I,  pp.  326ff;  Carl  Schurz, 
Henry  Clay,  I,  pp.  165-171. 

25.  Cf.  C.  R.  Fish,  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  208-211. 

26.  The  confidence  with  which  the  bold  declarations  were  made  in 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  WAR  285 

Monroe's  Message  "  rested  more  on  the  efficiency  of  the  British  navy 
than  on  our  own  strength.  .  .  .  Thus  to  use  for  one's  own  purposes 
the  resources  of  a  rival  power,  while  yielding  nothing  to  her  rivalry, 
is  daring;  but,  if  justified,  it  is  the  highest  manifestation  of  the  diplo- 
matic art."    Ibid.,  pp.  212,  213. 

27.  James  Monroe  to  John  Quincy  Adams,  November  21,  1823. 

28.  For  the  subsequent  interpretations  and  extensions  of  this  pro- 
tean policy  by  Polk,  Olney,  Roosevelt,  Lodge,  and  others,  see  H. 
Kraus,  Die  Monroedoctrin,  and  A.  B.  Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctrine: 
An  Interpretation. 

29.  The  Letters  of  Daniel  Webster  (ed.  Van  Tyne),  p.  104;  H.  C. 
Lodge,  Daniel  Webster,  pp.  132-135. 

30.  J.  B.  McMaster,  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States, 
VIII,  pp.  I44ff ;  J.  B.  Moore,  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  136-139. 

31.  J.  B.  Moore,  op.  cit.,  pp.  131,  132.  This  of  course  did  not  debar 
the  United  States  from  acquiring  large  portions  of  Mexico  and  the 
principle  was  never  held  to  apply  strictly  to  Cuba.  Cf.  W.  F.  John- 
son, op.  cit.,  II,  p.  237. 

32.  D.  R.  Dewey,  National  Problems,  p.  305, 

33.  J.  H.  Latane,  America  as  a  World  Power,  pp.  278ff. 

34.  Charles  G.  Washburn,  Theodore  Roosevelt,  p.  91. 

35.  Mahan,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  the  French  Revolution, 
II,  p.  285.  Twenty  years  ago.  Prof.  John  W.  Burgess  took  American 
historians  to  task  for  passing  over  "  our  partiality  for  the  French 
in  the  struggle  to  place  a  Napoleonic  despotism  over  all  continental 
Europe,  which  Great  Britain  was  using  all  her  powers  to  prevent." 
Political  Science  Quarterly,  XI,  p.  64.  See  also  Richard  Olney's  re- 
marks in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  for  March  of  igoo. 

36.  Woodrow  Wilson,  A  History  of  the  American  People,  III,  pp. 
216,  217.  See  also  Edward  Channing,  A  History  of  the  United 
States,  IV,  pp.  453,  454. 

Z7.  W.  R.  Thayer,  Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,  II,  p.  369. 


NOTES  TO  THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE  WAR 

1.  On  this  phase  of  German  policy,  see  especially  G.  W.  Prothero, 
German  Policy  before  the  War,  and  Lewis  B,  Namier,  Germany  and 
Eastern  Europe.  On  the  Balkan  corridor,  see  Syud  Hossain,  "  Tur- 
key and  German  Capitalists  "  in  Contemporary  Review  for  April  of 
1915,  and  Evans  Lewin,  The  German  Road  to  the  East. 

2.  John  Fiske,  American  Political  Ideas,  pp.  143-145. 

3.  Britannic  foreign  trade  was  27.4% ;  that  of  the  United  States 


286  NOTES 

9.6%.  Statistisches  Jahruch,  1915,  p.  65.*  The  Britannic  percentage 
would  be  reduced  were  the  duplications  resulting  from  inter-imperial 
trade  eliminated;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  a  large  proportion  of  Ger- 
many's over-sea  trade  is  with  Britannic  countries  and  the  United 
States. 

4.  Two  other  large  aggregates,  a  Chino-Japanese  and  a  Latin 
American,  were  at  times  also  foreseen  by  those  predicting  the  future. 

5.  Statistisches  Jahrbuch,  1915,  pp.  11,  42,  416;  I.  A.  Hourwich, 
Immigration  and  Labor,  pp.  iSofif. 

6.  See  especially  J.  Ellis  Barker,  Modern  Germany  (4th  ed.)  Chap- 
ters III  and  V. 

7.  Buelow,  Imperial  Germany  (ed.  Headlam),  p.  159. 

8.  Naumann,  Central  Europe,  p.  91.  See  for  details  Chapter  III. 
As  has  been  tersely  said,  "  German  Kultur  cannot  absorb ;  it  can  only 
supplant."    A.  D.  McLaren,  Germanism  from  Within,  p.  12. 

9.  Sir  Harry  Johnston,  "  The  German  Colonies,"  in  the  Edinburgh 
Reviezv  of  October,  1914.  See  also  Dr.  Dernburg's  sanguine  esti- 
mates quoted  in  W.  H.  Dawson,  The  Evolution  of  Modern  Ger- 
many, pp.  367fF. 

10.  Rohrbach,  German  World  Policies,  p.  5. 

11.  Zukunft,  July  i,  191 1,  quoted  in  Charles  Andler,  Pan-German- 
ism, p.  53.  See  also  other  excerpts  from  the  Zukunft  in  the  same 
writer's  Le  Pangermanisme  Continental,  pp.  395,  396,  and  Le  Panger- 
manisme  Colonial,  p.  281. 

12.  Charles  Andler,  Le  Pangermanisme  Colonial,  p.  186. 

13.  Cf.  Otfried  Nippold,  Der  Deutsche  Chauvinismus,  p.  21  et 
passim.  Considerable  extracts  from  this  work  are  available  in  Eng- 
lish in  Alexander  Gray's  The  True  Pastime. 

14.  See  likewise  "  Vigilans  sed  .^quus  "  (Thomas  Arnold),  Ger- 
man Ambitions  as  They  Affect  Britain  and  the  United  States  (1903), 
and  G.  Ellis  Barker,  Modern  Germany  (4th  ed.)  Chapter  VI. 

15.  W.  H.  Skaggs,  German  Conspiracies  in  America,  p.  105. 

16.  Gustavus  Ohlinger,  Their  True  Faith  and  Allegiance,  p.  29. 
Since  the  war,  the  National  German-American  Alliance  has  been  very 
active  and  has  officially  stated  that  it  "  is  waging  war  against  Anglo- 
Saxonism."  Ibid.,  p.  43.  See  also  passim.  The  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war  has  not  stopped  these  efforts. 

17.  G.  Lowes  Dickinson  in  Towards  a  Lasting  Settlement,  ed. 
by  C.  R.  Buxton,  p.  21. 

18.  See  Goethe's  remark  in  1828  on  the  young  Englishmen  at 
Weimar.    Eckermann,  Gespraeche  mit  Goethe  (ed.  Kroeber),  p.  663. 

19.  On  this  Anglo-American  policy,  see  W.  F.  Johnson,  America's 
Foreign  Relations,  II,  pp.  285ff. 

20.  When,  some  thirty  years  ago,  the  federation  of  the  British 
Empire  became  a  live  question,  the  English  historian,  Edward  A. 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  WAR  387 

Freeman,  rejected  the  scheme  largely  Jbecause,  in  his  opinion,  it  would 
alienate  the  United  States.  Would  imperial  disintegration  be  too 
dearly  bought,  he  asked,  if  it  carried  with  it  "  a  greater  chance  than 
we  now  have  of  keeping  the  lasting  good  will  of  the  United  States  of 
America?"  Freeman,  Greater  Greece  and  Greater  Britain,  p.  143. 
Such  sincere  feelings  pervaded  broad  circles  in  England. 

21.  On  April  5,  1898,  Hay  wrote  to  Senator  Lodge :  "  If  we  wanted 
it  —  which,  of  course,  we  do  not  —  we  could  have  the  practical  as- 
sistance of  the  British  Navy  —  on  the  do  ut  des  principle,  naturally." 
W.  R.  Thayer,  John  Hay,  II,  p.  164. 

22.  Hay  to  McKinley,  April  4,  1898.  C.  S.  Olcott,  William  McKin- 
ley,  II.  p.  130. 

23.  W.  R.  Thayer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  169. 

24.  See  e.  g.,  John  R.  Dos  Passes,  The  Anglo-Saxon  Century  and 
the  Unification  of  the  English-speaking  People  (New  York,  1903)  ; 
Franklin  H.  Giddings,  Democracy  and  Empire,  pp.  285,  289.  For  a 
discussion  of  this  question  in  1894,  see  Mahan,  The  Interest  of  Amer- 
ica in  Sea  Power,  pp.  107H. 

25.  W.  R.  Thayer,  op.  cit.,  II,  234. 

26.  See  especially  Lionel  Curtis,  The  Commonwealth  of  Nations, 
Part  I ;  Philip  H.  Kerr's  "  Commonwealth  and  Empire  "  in  The  Em- 
pire and  the  Future,  pp.  6gff;  "The  British  Imperial  Problem"  in 
The  New  Republic  for  February  12  and  19,  1916. 

27. 

Germany's  foreign  trade  Germany's  exports 

(In  Millions  of  Marks) 

1914 22,545  10,891 

1903 12,276  5,565 

Gain 10,269  5,326 

Great  Britain's  foreign  trade    Great  Britain's  exports 
(In  Millions  of  Marks) 

1914 28,632  12,950 

1903 18,809  7,568 

Gain 9,823  5.382 

Statistisches  Jahrbuch,  1915,  p.  61.*  These  figures  were  to  no  degree 
alarming,  in  fact  they  were  decidedly  encouraging  when  the  disparity 
in  population  was  considered  and  also  the  rapid  development  of 
British  shipping  and  banking.  For  a  study  of  this  question,  see  B.  E. 
Schmitt,  England  and  Germany,  Chapter  V. 

28.  W.  H.  Dawson,  What  is  Wrong  with  Germany?,  p.  159. 

29.  Cf.  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East,  pp.  104,  no,  214, 
215. 


288  NOTES 

30.  For  an  illuminating  analysis  of  this  fundamental  problem,  see 
Philip  H.  Kerr's  "  Political  Relations  between  Advanced  and  Back- 
ward Peoples "  in  An  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  International 
Relations  by  Grant,  Greenwood,  Hughes,  Kerr  and  Urquhart,  pp.  141- 
182.  Compare  also  A,  J.  Macdonald,  Trade  Politics  and  Christianity 
in  Africa  and  the  East. 

31.  Evans  Lewin,  The  Germans  and  Africa,  pp.  232flF.  See  also 
Louis  Maurice,  La  Politique  Marocaine  de  rAUemagne,  pp.  4-15. 

32.  On  May  16,  1891,  Lord  SaHsbury  instructed  Sir  Charles  Euan- 
Smith,  the  Envoy-Extraordinary  to  Morocco,  as  follows :  "  You  will 
observe  that  it  has  been  the  constant  aim  of  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment and  of  your  predecessors  at  Tangier,  to  preserve  the  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Empire  of  Morocco,  while 
neglecting  no  favourable  opportunity  of  impressing  upon  the  Sultan 
and  his  Ministers  the  importance  and  advantage  of  improving  the 
government  and  administration  of  the  country."  R.  D.  Morel,  Ten 
Years  of  Secret  Diplomacy,  p.  7. 

33.  "  Frankreich  befand  sich  zu  Marokko  in  einer  ganz  anderen 
Stellung  wie  Grossbritannien  zu  Aegypten.  Die  Englaender  herrsch- 
ten  dort  schon  laengst,  in  jedem  Sinne  des  Wortes  und  waren  de 
facto  auch  international  als  Herren  anerkannt.  Mit  den  Franzosen 
stand  es  umgekehrt :  sie  woUten  alles,  aber  sie  besassen  nichts  —  als 
die  Grenznachbarschaft  durch  Algerien."  Ernst  zu  Reventlow, 
Deutschlands  Auswaertige  Politik  (2d  ed.),  p.  222.  Cf.  C.  Seymour, 
The  Diplomatic  Background  of  the  War,  p.  157, 

34.  Curzon,  Persia  and  the  Persian  Question,  II,  pp.  593,  594, 

35.  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  The  Middle  Eastern  Question  (1903),  p. 

397- 

36.  According  to  a  far  from  lenient  critic,  "Russia's  work  in  the 
Caucasus  has  been  the  most  brilliant  triumph  of  pacification  in  the 
nineteenth  century."  Arnold  J.  Toynbee,  Nationality  and  the  War,  p. 
389.  See  also  pp.  394,  395,  and  Chapter  XI.  An  equally  favourable 
judgment  of  the  Pax  Rossica  is  given  by  Sir  Harry  Johnston  in 
Common  Sense  in  Foreign  Policy,  pp.  71,  72.     See  likewise  pp.  62-67. 

37.  K  G.  Browne,  The  Persian  Revolution  of  1905-1909,  p.  193, 


38. 


Area  in  square  miles     Population 

British  sphere 137,000  690,000 

Russian  sphere 305,000  6,900,000 

Neutral  sphere 188,000  1,910,000 


630,000  9,500,000 

These  figures  are  more  or  less  approximate.    Statesman's  Year-Book 
1915,  p.  1210. 


THE  BACKGROUND  OF  WAR  289 

39.  Gilbert  Murray,  The  Foreign  Policy  of  Sir  Edward  Grey,  pp. 
83-102. 

40.  It  was  the  official  understanding  of  both  Russia  and  England 
that  neither  Power  would  "  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  Persia  unless 
injury  is  inflicted  on  the  persons  or  property  of  their  subjects." 

41.  The  best  criticism  of  Mr.  Shuster's  activities  is  contained  in  the 
following  sentences  of  an  American  publicist.  Mr.  Gibbons  writes: 
"One  day  in  the  summer  of  191 1,  I  was  walking  along  the  Galata 
Quay  in  Constantinople.  I  heard  my  name  called  from  the  deck  of 
a  vessel  just  about  to  leave  for  Batum.  Perched  on  top  of  two  boxes 
containing  typewriters,  was  a  young  American  from  Boston,  who  was 
going  out  to  help  reform  the  finances  of  Persia.  I  had  talked  to  him 
the  day  before  concerning  the  extreme  delicacy  and  difficulty  of  the 
task  of  the  mission  whose  secretary  he  was.  But  his  refusal  to  admit 
the  political  limitations  of  Oriental  peoples  made  it  impossible  for 
him  to  see  that  constitutional  Persia  was  any  different,  or  should  be 
treated  any  differently,  from  constitutional  Massachusetts.  From  the 
sequel  of  the  story,  it  would  seem  that  the  chief  of  the  mission  had 
the  same  attitude  of  mind  as  his  secretary."  H.  A.  Gibbons,  The 
New  Map  of  Europe,  p.  91. 

42.  W.  Morgan  Shuster,  The  Strangling  of  Persia,  pp.  53,  54,  253- 
261. 

43.  Reventlow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  163-169;  B.  E.  Schmitt,  England  and 
Germany,  p.  151 ;  B.  L.  Putnam  Weale,  The  Re-Shaping  of  the  Far 
East,  I,  pp.  352,  373,  465. 

44.  The  Secret  Memoirs  of  Count  Hayashi,  ed.  by  A.  M.  Pooley. 

45.  S.  K.  Hornbeck,  Contemporary  Politics  in  the  Far  East, 
passim;  W.  W.  McLaren,  A  Political  History  of  Japan  during  the 
Meiji  Era,  pp.  290-298,  311-323;  T.  J.  Abbott,  Japanese  Expansion  and 
American  Policies,  pp.  66-71 ;  J.  O.  P.  Bland,  "  The  Future  of  China  " 
in  the  Edinburgh  Review  for  October,  1914;  Price  Collier,  The  West 
in  the  East,  pp.  3-22,  437-440.  Mr.  Pooley,  a  critic  so  decidedly  un- 
favourable to  British  policy  as  only  a  Briton  can  be,  summed  up  his 
country's  policy  as  follows:  "The  only  justification  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  is  that  existence  in  Europe  outweighs  interests  in 
Asia."    Secret  Memoirs  of  Count  Hayashi,  (ed.  Pooley),  p.  71. 

46.  Belgische  Aktenstuecke,  1905-14,  p.  105. 

47.  For  an  authoritative  account  of  these  negotiations,  see  Sir 
Edward  Cook,  How  Britain  Strove  for  Peace,  1898-1914. 

48.  Delbrueck  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  April,  1915,  p.  531.  At  the 
outset  of  these  negotiations,  before  the  Balkan  Wars,  there  was  un- 
officially suggested  on  the  part  of  England  a  re-arrangement  of  the 
map  that  would  have  made  Germany  supreme  from  the  North  Sea 
to  the  Persian  Gulf.  The  most  significant  thing  about  this  episode  is 
that  the  leading  German  newspapers  were  forbidden  to  review  the 


290  NOTES 

book  in  which  these  suggestions  were  embodied,  "  on  account  of  the 
proposed  retrocession  of  Metz."  Sir  Harry  Johnston,  "  The  German 
Colonies  "  in  the  Edinburgh  Review  for  October,  1914,  p,  303n.  The 
book  referred  to  is  his  more  than  generous  "  Gimmonsense  in  For- 
eign Policy." 

49.  See  "  The  Anglo-German  Negotiations  in  1914,"  in  The  New 
Republic  of  December  18,  1915;  The  New  Europe  of  December  14, 
1916,  pp.  257-259;  Fullerton,  Problems  of  Power,  (ed.  1915),  pp.  306, 
307 ;  B.  E.  Schmitt,  England  and  Germany,  pp.  36S-373 ;  Evans  Lewin, 
The  German  Road  to  the  East,  pp.  69-74 ;  S.  S.  McClure,  Obstacles  to 
Peace,  pp.  3^45- 

50.  For  a  valuable  account  of  England's  time-honoured  connection 
with  the  Persian  Gulf  —  it  dates  from  the  victory  over  the  Portu- 
guese at  Ormuz  in  1622  —  and  of  the  little  known  incidents  of  recent 
Anglo-German  rivalry  there,  see  "  The  Invasion  of  Chaldea "  in 
London  Times  History  of  the  War,  IH,  pp.  81-120. 

51.  Hansard  64,  pp.  lisff. 

52.  This  settlement  had  been  preceded  by  similar  ones  between 
France  and  Turkey  and  between  France  and  Germany.  Nationalism 
and  War  in  the  Near  East,  pp.  329,  330,  223,  334;  Belg^sche  Akten- 
stuecke  1905-1914,  pp.  128-130. 

53.  The  agreement  covered  many  additional  points.  Thus  England 
agreed  to  an  increase  in  the  Turkish  customs  without  which  the 
revenue  could  not  have  been  raised  to  make  valid  the  exorbitant 
guarantees  demanded  by  the  German  company  before  building  the 
railroad.  "  We  could  not  agree  to  a  15  per  cent.  Turkish  Customs 
Duty,"  Grey  said,  "  if  the  increase  of  revenue  was  going,  directly  or 
indirectly,  to  facilitate  the  making  of  the  Bagdad  Railway,  and  if 
that  were  to  be  continued  to  a  port  on  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  upset 
the  status  quo  there,  without  any  agreement  with  us.  On  that  ac- 
count, therefore,  we  had  to  oppose  it,  and  that  brought  us  into 
diplomatic  opposition  with  Germany.  It  was  a  very  disagreeable 
position." 

54.  Paul  Rohrbach,  Germany's  Isolation,  pp.  130,  131. 

55.  In  the  spring  of  1914,  the  German  Foreign  Secretary  suggested 
to  the  French  Ambassador  at  Berlin  the  advisability  of  an  agreement 
between  France,  England,  and  Germany  about  future  railroads  in 
Africa.  When  Cambon  replied  that  Belgium  was  also  planning  such 
construction  and  that  the  conference  should  be  held  in  Brussels,  von 
Jagow  dissented,  "  car  c'est  aux  depens  de  la  Belgique  que  notre 
accord  devrait  se  conclure."  He  further  developed  the  thesis  that 
the  Congo  was  too  heavy  a  burden  for  so  small  a  country  as  Belgium. 
According  to  his  views,  only  the  Great  Powers  were  in  a  position  to 
colonize  and,  furthermore,  he  claimed  that  in  the  future  the  small 
states   of   Europe   could   not   enjoy  their   former   complete  inde- 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  WAR  291 

pendence.  "  lis  etaient  destines  a  disparaitre  ou  a  graviter  dans 
I'orbite  des  grandes  Puissances."  Cambon  rejoined  that  these  were 
not  the  opinions  of  France  nor,  so  far  as  he  knew,  of  England  either. 
Royaume  de  Belgique,  Correspondance  Diplomatique  1914-1915,  II, 
no.  2,  pp.  2,  3. 

56.  Rohrbach,  Zum  Weltvolk  hindurch  I,  pp.  47,  48 ;  Germany's  Iso- 
lation, pp.  130,  131. 


NOTES  TO  AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  THE  WAR 

1.  Hans  Delbrueck,  Regierung  und  Volkswille,  pp.  133-139.  See 
also  "  The  German  Polity "  in  The  New  Republic  for  September  18, 
1915. 

2.  Arthur  J.  Balfour  to  Sir  Cecil  Spring-Rice,  January  13,  1917. 

3.  J.  W.  Headlam,  The  Issue,  pp.  38,  39.  Cf.  also  T.  Veblen,  The 
Nature  of  Peace. 

4.  For  attempts  to  do  this,  see  "American  Public  Opinion  and 
the  War"  and  "America's  Reaction  to  the  War"  in  The  Round 
Table,  respectively  for  September,  1915  and  March,  1916. 

5.  Cf.  Reinhold  Niebuhr,  "  The  Failure  of  German- Americanism," 
in  Atlantic  Monthly  for  July,  1916;  H.  P.  Fairchild,  "Americanizing 
the  Immigrant,"  in  Yale  Review  for  July,  1916. 

6.  See  Charles  G.  Washburn,  Theodore  Roosevelt,  pp.  43-56. 

7.  Enforced  Peace,  p.  125. 

8.  When  so  ardent  an  advocate  of  peaceful  international  co-opera- 
tion and  so  ssnnpathetic  a  friend  of  the  United  States  as  Baron 
d'Estournelles  de  Constant  was  asked  about  the  future  part  of  Amer- 
ica in  international  politics  and  conferences,  he  replied :  "  It  will  be 
long  before  any  American  again  will  be  in  a  position  to  lead  any 
really  great  movement  —  there  are  those  who  would  not  even  like  to 
have  him  follow,  unless  at  the  eleventh  hour — ."  Interview  by  Ed- 
ward Marshall  in  the  New  York  Sun  of  August  20,  1916. 

9.  Bolton  King,  Mazzini,  p.  305. 

10.  This  did  not  escape  foreign  observers.  In  his  speech  of  De- 
cember 16  and  17,  1915,  the  Rumanian  statesman.  Take  Jonesco  said : 
"  How  is  it  the  conscience  of  the  United  States  of  America  has 
become  uneasy?  Out  of  love  for  England?  Nothing  of  the  sort, 
gentlemen.  To  attack  Great  Britain  has  always  been  recognized  as 
a  safe  and  popular  note  by  orators  in  the  United  States.  ...  If  the 
German  soldier  were  to  win  to-day,  the  first  result  would  be  that  the 
same  military  force,  which  is  the  greatest  in  the  world,  would  also  be 
the  greatest  naval  force,  and  there  would  be  no  more  independence. 


292  NOTES 

no  more  liberty  for  any  one  in  the  world,  not  even  for  the  great 
American  democracy." 

11.  Charles  H.  Sherrill,  Modernizing  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  139. 
Since  America's  entrance  into  the  war  the  ignoble  suggestion  has 
been  made  that  advantage  be  taken  of  the  needs  of  her  Allies  and 
that  the  cession  of  the  American  lands  tmder  the  French  and  British 
flags  [Canada  excepted]   be  the  price  of  full  co-operation. 

12.  Cf.  Ernesto  Nelson,  "  Efficient  Pan- Americanism  "  in  Report  of 
Lake  Mohonk  Conference  1916,  pp.  iSjff;  Bryce,  South  America, 
chapter  XIV;  F.  Garcia  Calderon,  Les  Democraties  Latines  de 
I'Amerique,  passim. 

13.  Munroe  Smith,  "  American  Diplomacy  in  the  European  War  " 
in  Political  Science  Quarterly  for  December,  1916 ;  "  The  German- 
American  Submarine  Controversy"  in  The  Round  Table  for  June, 
1916. 

14-  For  details  of  this  organization,  see  Robert  Goldsmith,  A 
League  to  Enforce  Peace ;  Enforced  Peace ;  "  The  United  States  and 
the  Future  Peace "  in  The  Round  Table  for  March,  1917.  For  a 
parallel  English  scheme,  consult  L.  S.  Woolf,  International  Govern- 
ment   See  also  H.  N.  Brailsford,  A  League  of  Nations. 

15.  Address  of  Mr.  Theodore  Marburg  before  the  American 
Society  for  Judicial  Settlement  of  International  Disputes,  December 
8^  1916. 

16.  This  power  of  injunction  to  stop  continuing  injuries  under 
adjudication  or  hearing,  backed  by  the  full  force  of  the  league,  is  an 
essential  part  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  programme.  "  It  would 
doubtless  be  necessary  when  some  issues  arise,"  Mr.  Taft  said,  "to 
require  a  maintenance  of  the  status  quo  until  the  issues  were  sub- 
mitted or  decided  in  one  tribunal  or  the  other." 

17.  Mr.  H.  N.  Brailsford  has  suggested  that  "  no  treaty  of  alliance, 
past  or  future,  shall  bind  any  state  adhering  to  the  League  to  support 
an  ally  who  had  engaged  in  war  without  submitting  his  case  to  a 
court  or  council  of  the  League."  This,  however,  does  not  solve  the 
inevitable  conflict  of  obligations. 

18.  E.g.,  on  May  8,  1916,  before  the  Union  against  Militarism. 

19.  At  Arlington  on  May  30  and  at  West  Point  on  June  13. 

20.  Speech  of  Acceptance,  July  31,  1916. 

21.  At  Omaha,  on  October  5;  at  Indianapolis,  on  October  12;  at 
Cincinnati,  on  October  26. 

22.  Speech  to  the  Foreign  Press  Representatives,  October  23,  191 6. 

23.  This  difficulty  has  been  emphasized  by  an  English  critic,  who 
writes :  "  Until  the  doubt  as  to  whether  the  American  Government 
could  legally  commit  itself  beforehand  to  go  to  war,  if  necessary, 
under  the  conditions  of  a  League  of  Peace,  it  would  appear  that 
American  participation  in  such  a  league  might  be  an  actual  danger  to 


AMERICA'S  REACTION  TO  WAR  293 

its  other  members  by  seeming  to  promise  a  help  in  case  of  need  that 
might  not  be  forthcoming."  Ramsay  Muir,  in  The  New  Europe, 
for  February  i,  1917,  p.  73.  Although  a  constitutional  amendment 
has  been  proposed  to  overcome  this  objection,  the  difficulty  is  not 
primarily  legal  in  nature.  It  is  quite  easy  to  traverse  the  argument 
of  unconstitutionality,  but  the  political  fact  stated  in  the  text  remains. 
Without  such  unquestioning  popular  support  as  is  accorded  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the  proposed 
league  would  be  futile. 

24.  A  generation  ago,  Gladstone  proclaimed  that  "the  greatest 
triumph  of  our  time  has  been  the  enthronement  of  the  idea  of  public 
right  as  the  governing  idea  of  European  politics."  The  content  of 
this  concept  has  been  admirably  summarized  by  Mr.  Asquith  who,  in 
memorable  words  declared  that  public  right  means  :  "  An  equal  level 
of  opportunity  and  of  independence  as  between  small  States  and  great 
States,  as  between  the  weak  and  the  strong ;  safeguards  resting  upon 
the  common  will  of  Europe,  and  I  hope,  not  of  Europe  alone,  against 
aggression,  against  international  covetousness  and  bad  faith,  against 
the  wanton  recourse  in  case  of  dispute  to  the  use  of  force  and  the 
disturbance  of  peace ;  finally,  as  the  result  of  it  all,  a  great  partnership 
of  nations  federated  together  in  the  joint  pursuit  of  a  freer  and  fuller 
life  for  countless  millions  who  by  their  efforts  and  their  sacrifices, 
generation  after  generation,  maintain  the  progress  and  enrich  the 
inheritance  of  humanity."     Speech  at  Queen's  Hall,  Augfust  4,  1916. 

25.  There  is  very  little  reason  to  assume  that  even  a  democratic 
Germany  would  soon  be  purged  of  aggressive  ambitions.  The  cult  of 
power  numbers  too  many  devotees.  Cf.  the  following  work  by  a 
Danish  theologian.  Dr.  J.  P.  Bang,  Hurrah  and  Hallelujah,  passim. 

26.  For  a  clear-cut  and  sound  distinction  between  the  functions 
of  the  army  and  the  police  of  any  state,  see  Norman  Angell,  The 
World's  Highway,  pp.  309,  310. 

27.  Failure  to  arbitrate  or  even  to  accept  the  judgment  would  be 
such  criteria  of  aggression.  In  these  cases,  non-belligerent  states 
might  be  permitted  to  assume  an  attitude  of  benevolent  neutrality  and 
waive  their  rights  in  favour  of  the  attacked  party.  Under  existing 
conditions  a  grave  difficulty  arises  from  the  fact  that  rigid  insistence 
upon  neutral  rights  and  all  the  precedents  of  international  law  may 
defeat  international  justice  and  morality.  What  is  needed  is  a  flex- 
ible code  of  neutral  and  belligerent  rights,  for  their  respective  im- 
portance to  mankind  as  a  whole  varies  with  the  extent  and  nature  of 
wars. 

28.  The  Living  Age,  January  27,  1917. 

29.  Speech  of  Senator  Cummins,  January  30,  1917.  Congressional 
Record  54,  no.  43  pp.  2S2oflF. 

30.  "A  beautiful  treaty  for  world-organization  could  be  made  in 


294  NOTES 

twenty-four  hours,  if  only  the  will  were  there  to  give  it  life  and  to 
enforce  it."    A.  H.  Fried,  The  Restoration  of  Europe,  p.  104. 

31.  Lecture  at  the  Sorbonne,  January  20,  1917  in  The  New  Europe 
of  March  8,  1917. 


NOTES  TO  THE  UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES 

1.  E.  g.,  Charles  W.  Eliot,  Darwin  P.  Kingsley,  Sinclair  Kennedy 
in  "The  Pan-Angles,"  Walter  Lippmann,  Herbert  Croly,  Roland  G. 
Usher  in  "The  Challenge  of  the  Future,"  H.  H.  Powers  in  "The 
Things  Men  Fight  For,"  etc. 

2.  A.  B.  Keith,  Imperial  Unity  and  the  Dominions,  pp.  564,  565. 

3.  The  Empire  and  the  Future,  p.  xiii. 

4-  Lord  Milner,  The  Nation  and  the  Empire,  p.  xxxii. 

5.  Ibid.,  pp.  329,  330. 

6.  "  Even  at  the  present  day,  many  Americans  do  not  clearly  see 
that  the  fundamental  issue  in  the  Boer  War  was  essentially  the  same 
for  the  British  as  the  fundamental  issue  in  our  great  Civil  War,  the 
issue  between  the  higher  unity  of  the  whole  and  disruption  by  a 
part  .  .  .  Fortunately,  however,  by  a  kind  of  sure  instinct,  the  ma- 
jority in  the  Empire  did  recognize  that  here  was  a  test  of  unity  and 
of  the  right  and  power  to  survive.  ...  It  needed  only  the  sharp  test 
of  attempted  disruption,  supported  by  a  historical  argument  no  better 
than  but  perhaps  as  good  as  that  of  the  Southern  States,  to  give  it 
clearness  and  convincing  force."  George  Burton  Adams,  "  British 
Imperial  Federation,"  in  the  Yale  Review  for  July,  1916,  pp.  6gi3. 

7.  See  F.  S.  Oliver,  Alexander  Hamilton. 

8.  Lionel  Curtis,  The  Commonwealth  of  Nations,  Part  I,  p.  8. 

9.  "  The  Imperial  Dilemma,"  in  The  Round  Table  for  September, 
1916,  p.  691.  "  For  men  who  are  fit  for  it,  self-government  is  a  ques- 
tion not  of  privilege  but  rather  of  obligation.  It  is  duty,  not  interest, 
which  impels  men  to  freedom,  and  duty,  not  interest,  is  the  factor 
which  turns  the  scale  in  human  affairs."  Lionel  Curtis,  The  Problem 
of  the  Commonwealth,  pp.  123,  124. 

la  See  Colonel  A.  M.  Murray,  Imperial  Outposts. 

11.  Morley,  Miscellanies,  III,  p.  315. 

12.  In  1886,  Chamberlain  said :  "  There  are  very  many  people  who 
believe  that  the  result  would  be,  if  we  ever  got  into  a  war,  that  the 
relations  between  us  and  our  colonies  would  be  so  strained  that  they 
would  break  adrift  altogether,  and  I  think  it  is  not  altogether  impos- 
sible. My  point  is  this,  that  these  colonies  are  connected  with  us  by 
ties  which  are  really  very  loose,  and  if  we  got  into  war  or  anything 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    295 

of  that  kind  practically  they  would  break  adrift  and  become  separate 
countries."    Mr.  Chamberlain's  Speeches,  I,  p.  278. 

13.  Bryce,  Impressions  of  South  Africa,  chapter  XXV. 

14.  Despite  the  assertion  of  the  Kaiser  in  his  famous  Daily  Tele- 
graph interview  of  1908,  that  the  Government's  attitude  was  friendly, 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  Sir  Valentine  Chirol's  categorical 
statement  that  Germany  tried  to  form  a  coalition  consisting  of  her- 
self, France,  and  Russia  for  diplomatic  action  against  England.  The 
Quarterly  Review  for  October,  1914,  pp.  425,  426.  See  also  the  official 
account  of  the  German  Government's  attitude  in  Prince  von  Buelow, 
Imperial  Germany  (ed.  Headlam),  pp.  30-32. 

15.  See  J.  Ellis  Barker,  Modern  Germany,  Chapter  VII. 

16.  For  some  actual  qualifications  to  these  generalizations,  see  A.  B. 
Keith,  Imperial  Unity  and  the  Dominions,  pp.  14,  505,  Si6fF. 

17.  Maitland-Gierke,  Political  Theories  of  the  Middle  Age,  p.  x. 

18.  "  They  did  not  know  in  Berlin  and  in  Vienna  that  when  peace 
still  hung  in  the  balance,  when  the  British  Cabinet  itself  was  divided 
and  hesitating,  the  Governments  of  Canada  and  other  Dominions  had 
cabled  to  the  Home  Government  asking  anxiously  for  immediate 
advice  how  they  could  best  help  if  the  war-cloud  should  break  over 
England.  Four  days  before  England  was  at  war,  Canadian  Ministers 
hurried  back  to  Ottawa  from  holiday  resorts  and  went  into  emer- 
gency council  to  plan  for  Canada's  direct  participation  should  Eng- 
land become  involved.  As  a  result,  the  Canadian  Government  of- 
fered at  once,  even  before  England  was  driven  into  the  conflict,  to 
send  *  a  considerable  force '  as  Imperial  troops,  Canada  making  her- 
self responsible  for  their  pay,  maintenance  and  equipment.  .  .  .  From 
Australia  there  came,  four  days  before  war  broke  out,  the  pledge  of 
the  Prime  Minister  that  the  Commonwealth  would  stand  beside  Eng- 
land '  to  the  last  man  and  last  shilling.'  ...  A  similarly  urgent  desire 
to  help  animated  the  Governments  and  peoples  of  New  Zealand,  New- 
foundland, and  other  parts  of  the  Empire."  Percy  and  Archibald 
Hurd,  The  New  Empire  Partnership,  pp.  239,  240.  On  July  31,  1914, 
the  Prime  Minister  of  New  Zealand  telegraphed  to  London  offering 
an  expeditionary  force.    Quarterly  Review  for  January,  1917,  p.  130. 

19.  The  most  logical  solution  is  that  elaborated  by  Mr.  Lionel  Cur- 
tis in  "  The  Problem  of  the  Commonwealth."  This  is  based  upon  the 
firm  conviction  that  anything  less  than  organic  union  is  a  dangerous 
make-shift  Such  also  is  the  solution  consistently  advocated  for 
years  by  Lord  Milner.  For  an  exposition  of  the  solution  by  alliance, 
see  Richard  Jebb,  The  Britannic  Question.  For  a  programme  of 
most  moderate  change,  see  A.  B.  Keith,  Imperial  Unity  and  the 
Dominions.  For  a  Canadian  proposition,  see  Z.  A.  Lash,  Defence 
and  Foreign  Affairs.    For  authoritative  accounts  of  the  opinion  of 


296  NOTES 

Australia,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa  and  Canada  on  these  projects, 
consult  The  Quarterly  Review  for  January  and  April,  1917. 

20.  Interview  with  Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  the  London  Times  (weekly 
ed.)  of  February  2,  1917.  Five  days  later,  Mr.  Bonar  Law  stated  in 
the  House  of  Commons :  "  The  invitation  which  has  now  been  given 
is  that  in  the  questions  which  specially  concern  them  —  and  most 
questions  do  —  they  should  have  continuous  sittings  as  members  of 
the  Cabinet,  .  .  .  That  is  an  immense  step  forward.  .  .  .  Under  the 
stress  and  strain  of  this  war  the  difficulties,  the  dangers,  and  the  ter- 
rible losses  which  have  been  borne  in  common,  the  whole  British 
Empire  has  been  brought  together  with  a  degree  of  rapidity  and 
strength  which  nothing  but  this  war  could  have  brought  about." 

21.  "The  War  Conference  of  the  Empire"  in  The  Round  Table 
for  March,  1917. 

22.  On  account  of  the  political  crisis  at  home,  Australia  was  not 
represented. 

23.  Speech  before  the  Empire  Parliamentary  Association,  April 
2,  1917.  After  his  return  to  Canada,  Sir  Robert  Borden  described  the 
development  as  follows : 

"  We  sat  on  alternate  days  in  the  Imperial  War  Cabinet  and  in 
the  Imperial  War  Conference.  On  days  when  the  Imperial  War 
Cabinet  did  not  sit  the  war  did  not  wait ;  therefore  it  was  necessary 
that  the  British  Cabinet  itself  should  sit  on  those  days  to  deal  with 
questions  arising  out  of  the  war.  This  result,  therefore,  very  early 
obtained :  that  the  Imperial  War  Cabinet  was  differentiated  from  the 
British  War  Cabinet;  that  the  Imperial  War  Cabinet  sat  for  the 
purpose  of  dealing  with  matters  of  common  concern  to  the  whole 
Empire,  and  the  British  War  Cabinet  sat  for  the  purpose  of  dealing 
with  those  matters  which  chiefly  concerned  the  United  Kingdom." 
Canadian  Hansard,  May  18,  1917. 

24.  Simultaneously,  under  the  presidency  of  the  Colonial  Secretary, 
the  representatives  of  the  Dominions  and  of  India  assembled  in  an 
Imperial  Conference.  Although  its  membership  was  very  largely  the 
same,  this  body  was  quite  distinct  from  the  Imperial  War  Cabinet. 
It  devoted  itself  to  the  same  matters  that  had  been  discussed  in 
former  Imperial  Conferences.  This  Conference  reported  early  in 
May  that:  "The  readjustment  of  the  constitutional  relations  of  the 
component  parts  of  the  Empire  is  too  important  and  intricate  a  sub- 
ject to  be  dealt  with  during  the  war,  and  that  it  should  form  the  sub- 
ject of  a  special  Imperial  Conference  to  be  summoned  as  soon  as 
possible  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities. 

"  It  deems  it  its  duty,  however,  to  place  on  record  its  view  that  any 
such  readjustment,  while  thoroughly  preserving  all  existing  powers 
of  self-government  and  complete  control  of  domestic  affairs,  should 
be  based  upon  a  full  recognition  of  the  Dominions  as  autonomous 
nations  of  an  Imperial  Commonwealth,  and  of  India  as  an  important 


UNITY  OF  ENGLISH-SPEAKING  PEOPLES    297 

portion  of  the  same,  should  recognize  the  right  of  the  Dominions 
and  India  to  an  adequate  voice  in  foreign  policy  and  in  foreign  rela- 
tions, and  should  provide  effective  arrangements  for  continuous  con- 
sultation in  all  important  matters  of  common  Imperial  concern,  and 
for  such  necessary  concerted  action,  founded  on  consultation,  as  the 
several  Governments  may  determine." 

25.  Speech  before  the  Empire  Parliamentary  Association,  April  2, 
1917.  Shortly  thereafter,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  said:  "When  the  re- 
construction time  comes  I  hope  and  pray  that  we  will  not  dive  into 
dusty  pigeon-holes  in  searching  for  precedents  for  our  programmes. 
There  is  a  great  need  for  revision  of  our  ideas  and  our  attitude  to- 
ward that  great  Commonwealth  of  Nations  called  the  British  Em- 
pire."   Speech  at  the  Guildhall,  April  27,  1917. 

26.  Sinclair  Kennedy,  The  Pan- Angles,  p.  190. 

27.  William  H.  Skaggs,  German  Conspiracies  in  America,  pp.  68, 69. 

28.  J.  A.  Cramb,  Germany  and  England,  p.  127. 

29.  Lord  Milner,  The  Nation  and  the  Empire,  p.  xxxviiL 

30.  Cf.  Franz  Boas,  The  Mind  of  Primitive  Man,  p.  116. 

31.  A  well-known  French  psychologist  holds  to  a  contrary  view, 
saying  "  si  les  vivants  peuvent  f ondre  leurs  langues  et  leurs  moeurs, 
I'ame  des  morts  qu'ils  portent  en  eux  reste  rebelle  a  de  semblables 
fusions."  Gustave  Le  Bon,  Premieres  Consequences  de  la  Guerre,  p. 
259.  The  established  fact  that  musical  and  artistic  gifts,  as  well  as 
other  aptitudes,  may  be  inherited  to  no  extent  derogates  from  what 
has  been  said  in  the  text. 

:i2.  D.  J.  Brinton,  The  Basis  of  Social  Relations,  p.  167. 

33.  A.  B.  Hart,  National  Ideals  Historically  Traced,  p.  46. 

34.  New  Jersey  Historical  Society  Address,  quoted  by  H.  J.  Ford, 
Woodrow  Wilson,  pp.  62,  63. 

35.  H.  C.  Lodge,  Historical  and  Political  Essays,  pp.  138  et  seq. 
36. 

English 10,376 

Scotch-Irish 1439 

Scotch   436 

Welsh    159 

Irish 109 


12,519 

37.  John  R.  Dos  Passos,  The  Anglo-Saxon  Century  (New  York, 
1903),  pp.  105-108;  Sinclair  Kennedy,  The  Pan- Angles  (New  York, 

1914),  P-  37- 

38.  J.    McKeen    Cattell,    "The    Families    of    American    Men    of 
Science,"  in  The  Popular  Science  Monthly,  vol.  86,  p.  505. 

39.  On  this  subject,  see  especially  L.  March  Phillipps,  Europe  Un- 
bound. 


298  NOTES 

40.  W.  A.  Dunning,  The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States, 
p.  352.  This  is  by  far  the  best  and  most  judicial  account  of  Anglo- 
American  relations. 

41.  W.  F.  Johnson,  America's  Foreign  Relations,  I,  p.  280. 

42.  J.  F.  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  IV,  pp.  337-394; 
W.  A.  Dunning,  The  British  Empire  and  the  United  States,  pp.  199- 
264;  W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  Democracy  and  Liberty,  I,  pp.  485-490;  C.  F. 
Adams,  Trans-Atlantic  Historical  Solidarity,  pp.  87-129. 

43.  H.  H.  Powers,  The  Things  Men  Fight  For,  pp.  374,  375. 

44.  This,  of  course,  has  for  some  time  been  plainly  apparent  to  for- 
eign observers.  Thus,  Count  Reventlow  said :  "  To  base  plans  for 
future  empire  for  Germany  on  the  possibility  of  future  conflict  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  would  be  terribly  dan- 
gerous, an  almost  unparalleled  piece  of  Utopian  folly.  In  future  the 
Anglo-Saxon  nations,  perhaps  marching  independently,  will  stand  op- 
posed to  the  German  Empire  and  people."  New  York  Sun,  August 
13,  1916.  Since  April  6,  1917,  the  German  papers  have  contained  a 
number  of  articles  to  this  effect. 

45.  "  Given  two  democracies,  speaking  the  same  language,  familiar 
with  the  same  literature,  having  frequent  and  easy  commercial  in- 
tercourse with  one  another,  and  above  all,  able  when  they  choose  to 
make  their  will  avail  with  the  governing  classes  to  whom  they  dele- 
gate their  authority,  it  would  be  strange  if  they  could  not  rise  above 
selfish  futilities  of  bureaucratic  foreign  policy,  and  strike  up  a  for- 
mula of  concord  which  they  knew  to  be  in  the  common  interest  of 
all."  H.  S.  Ferris,  Pax  Britannica  (London,  1913),  p.  296.  In  1917, 
Professor  F.  H.  Giddings  said  in  a  similar  vein: 

"The  English-speaking  people  of  the  world  are  together  the 
largest  body  of  human  beings  among  whom  a  nearly  complete  in- 
tellectual and  moral  understanding  is  already  achieved.  They  have 
reached  high  attainments  in  science  and  the  arts,  in  education,  in 
social  order,  in  justice.  They  are  highly  organized,  they  cherish 
the  traditions  of  their  common  history.  To  permit  anything  to  en- 
danger the  moral  solidarity  of  this  nucleus  of  a  perfected  internation- 
alism would  be  a  crime  unspeakable."  International  Conciliation, 
April,  1917,  p.  9. 

46.  "  A  second  plausible  union  —  under  some  form,  no  matter  how 
loose  —  is  that  of  the  United  States  and  the  British  Empire.  Their 
separation  was  the  tragedy  of  English  history,  though  inevitable  and 
wholesome  in  its  reaction  upon  both.  There  is  no  possible  union 
of  major  powers  for  which  sentiment  speaks  so  strongly,  but  senti- 
ment does  not  form  such  unions,  nor  can  it  alone  preserve  them 
when  formed.  If  the  Anglo-Saxon  world  is  ever  united  —  a  condi- 
tion essential  to  its  ultimate  success  —  it  will  be  through  the  pres- 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  299 

sure  of  a  common  danger.    That  pressure  is  likely  to  be  forthcom- 
ing."   H.  H.  Powers,  op.  cit.,  p.  304. 


NOTES  TO  ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE 

1.  L.  March  PhilHpps,  Europe  Unbound,  p.  ix. 

2.  Cf.  J.  A.  Hobson,  The  Open  Door,  in  Towards  a  Lasting  Set- 
tlement (ed.  by  C.  R.  Buxton),  pp.  85 ff. 

3.  See  E.  V.  Robinson,  "  War  and  Economics  "  in  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  XV,  pp.  581  ff.;  Walter  E.  Weyl,  American  World  Policies, 
Chapter  II;  Gilbert  Slater,  Peace  and  War  in  Europe,  pp.  1-22. 

4.  "  Cromwell's  Policy  in  its  Economic  Aspects,"  in  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  XVI,  pp.  19,  20. 

5.  In  Germany,  where  the  neo-mercantilist  doctrines  have  taken 
firmest  hold,  this  goal  dominated  the  colonial  policy  of  Dr.  Dern- 
burg  whose  "  ultimate  ideal  is,  in  fact,  the  economic  terra  clausa,  the 
self-contained  Empire."  W.  H.  Dawson,  The  Evolution  of  Modem 
Germany,  p.  380  and  chap.  XIX.  This  idea  is  also  present  in  modern 
British  thought.  Cf.  Milner,  The  Nation  and  the  Empire,  pp.  xvi, 
xxi,  463 ;  Chamberlain's  Speeches,  II,  p.  333. 

6.  Conrad  Gill,  National  Power  and  Prosperity,  pp.  Ii6ff ;  Norman 
Angell,  The  World's  Highway,  pp.  248,  249n. 

7.  A.  S.  Johnson,  "Commerce  and  War,"  Political  Science  Quar- 
terly, XXIX,  pp.  47ff. 

8.  Lord  Rosebery,  Napoleon :    The  Last  Phase,  pp.  195,  196. 

9.  Those  who  figure  always  in  terms  of  force  and  neglect  the 
moral  factors  forget  that  force  begets  force  in  opposition  and  that 
pride  of  power  has  its  nemesis.  In  this  connection,  another  militar- 
ist's criticism  of  British  policy  is  instructive.  According  to  Bern- 
hardi,  "since  England  committed  the  unpardonable  blunder,  from 
her  point  of  view,  of  not  supporting  the  Southern  States  in  the 
American  War  of  Secession,  a  rival  to  England's  world-wide  Em- 
pire has  appeared  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  in  the  form  of  the 
United  States  of  North  America,  which  are  a  grave  menace  to  Eng- 
land's fortunes."    F.  v.  Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  p.  94. 

10.  H.  R.  Mussey,  "  The  New  Commercial  Freedom  "  in  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  XXIX,  p.  616. 

11.  For  instance,  the  London  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  1916  sug- 
gested a  future  rate  of  30%  on  wholly  manufactured  goods  and 
one  of  15%  on  semi-manufactured  goods,  imported  from  present 
enemy  countries.  The  proposed  duties  on  importations  from  allied 
and  neutral  countries  were  to  be  respectively  one  third  and  two 


300  NOTES 

thirds  of  these  rates.    J.  A.  Hobson,  The  New  Protectionism,  p.  153. 

12.  Robert  H.  Patchin,  The  Need  of  a  National  Foreign  Trade 
Policy,  p.  3. 

13.  F.  W.  Taussig,  Some  Aspects  of  the  Tariff  Question,  p.  4. 

14.  Prince  von  Buelow,  Imperial  Germany  (ed,  Headlam),  pp. 
274-298. 

15.  On  this  entire  subject,  see  Henri  Hauser,  Les  Methodes  Al- 
lemandes  d'Expansion  Economique;  Maurice  Millioud,  The  Ruling 
Caste  and  Frenzied  Trade  in  Germany;  Ezio  M.  Gray,  ITnvasione 
Tedesca  in  Italia ;  J.  Ellis  Barker,  Modern  Germany ;  Daniel  Bel- 
let,  Le  Commerce  Allemand;  Josef  Grunzel,  Economic  Protection- 
ism, pp.  220-231 ;  Luciano  de  Feo,  La  Lotta  Economica  del  Dope 
Guerra,  pp.  8-22. 

16.  The  easiest  method  is  by  the  specialization  of  duties,  which  was 
employed  in  the  German  tariff  of  1902  and  in  subsequent  commer- 
cial treaties.  H.  Hauser,  op.  cit.,  pp.  188,  189.  "  In  order  to  favour 
Swiss  cattle  rather  than  French,  the  former  were  included  in  a  spe- 
cial category  consisting  of  those  reared  at  an  altitude  of  300  metres 
and  having  brown  heads  and  tails."     Millioud,  op.  cit.,  p.  143. 

17.  Leo  Pasvolsky,  "  The  Situation  in  Russia,"  in  The  New  Re- 
public for  November  11,  1916. 

18.  "  What  is  deeply  resented,  however,  is  that  the  German  com- 
petition is  a  disciplined  state-aided  competition,  that  it  is  collective 
rather  than  individual.  The  Belgian,  Italian  or  Dutch  manufacturer 
feels  that  behind  his  German  competitor  stand  the  gigantic  power 
and  resources  of  the  whole  German  nation.  It  is  not  individual  Ger- 
mans who  compete,  but  Germany."  Walter  E.  Weyl,  American 
World  Policies,  pp.  117,  118.  For  some  instances  of  this  in  the 
trade  of  the  Far  Pacific,  see  C.  B.  Fletcher,  The  New  Pacific,  chapter 
XVL 

19.  Henri  Hauser,  op.  cit.,  pp.  168-171. 

20.  Bertrand  Russell,  Justice  in  War-Time,  p.  27.  "It  is  said  on 
the  Continent  —  not  only  by  Germans  —  that  jealousy  of  Germany's 
economic  development  was  an  equal  cause  of  hostility;  but  I  be- 
lieve this  to  be  an  entire  mistake.  America's  economic  development 
has  been  quite  as  remarkable  as  that  of  Germany,  but  it  has  not 
produced  the  slightest  ripple  of  political  hostility.  The  government 
in  power,  as  free  traders,  do  not  believe  that  the  prosperity  of  one 
country  is  economically  injurious  to  that  of  another,  and  in  this 
opinion  a  majority  of  the  nation  agree  with  them."    Ibid.,  p.  71. 

21.  Josef  Grunzel,  Economic  Protectionism,  pp.  138,  139. 

22.  "  As  matters  stand,  nevertheless,  our  railways,  which  so  far 
dominate  our  whole  internal  distribution,  are  the  greatest  system  of 
protection  in  favour  of  the  foreigner  that  the  world  has  ever  seen." 
H.  M,  Hyndman,  "  The  National  Railways  after  the  War,"  in  The 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  301 

Nineteenth  Century  for  February,  1916,  p.  462.    See  also  J.  Ellis 
Barker,  Modern  Germany  (4th  ed.),  pp.  524ff.,  563flf. 

23.  Price  Collier,  The  West  in  the  East,  pp.  439,  440. 

24.  Year  1913 

(In  hundred  thousands  of  dollars) 

Total              Total  Exports  to  Imports  from 

Exports  Imports  United  States  United  States 

Philippines    ....  47.773               53,3^2  i6434  26,676 

Porto  Rico 49,104               36,900  40,538  33,155 

Cuba   164,309  140,064  131,270  75,316 

Hawaii  (1913-4)  41,594               35,55©  40,679  29,268 


302,780  265,826  228,921  164415 

Report  of  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs,  1915,  pp.  8,  15;  Statesman's 
Year-Book  1915,  pp.  630,  821. 

25.  In  1912-3,  the  total  foreign  trade  of  British  India  with  her 
315  million  people  amounted  only  to  £338,172451.  Statistical  Ab- 
stract relating  to  British  India  (1915),  p.  149. 

26.  F.  W.  Taussig,  op.  cit.,  pp.  59-79. 

27.  Report  of  Bureau  of  Insular. Affairs,  1913,  pp.  7,  54. 

28.  Josef  Grunzel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  48-51. 

29.  General  Commerce  of  France  in  1912 

(In  millions  of  francs) 

Imports  Exports 

Foreign  countries  9,354-8  7,8oi 

Algeria,  Tunis  and  Colonies  938.8  1,022.9 


10,293.6  8,823.9 

The  trade  with  Morocco  is  not  included  in  this  table.    Arthur 

Girault,  The  Colonial  Tarif?  Policy  of  France,  pp.  165,  167. 
30.  Arthur  Girault,  op.  cit.;  Sir  Harry  Johnston,  Common  Sense 

in  Foreign  Policy,  pp.  24,  25. 

31- 

Over-sea  Trade  of  Algeria  in  1912 
(In  millions  of  francs) 

To  or 
Total      From  France       Per  Cent. 

Exports   499  400.5  80.1 

Imports    654  568.4  87 

1,153  968.9  84 

Girault,  op.  cit.,  pp.  255-260. 
32.  Ibid.,  pp.  268,  269. 


302  NOTES 

23.    External  Commerce  of  the  French  Colonies,  Exclusive  of 
Algeria  and  Tunis,  for  191  i 
(In  millions  of  francs) 

Imports  from  France 261.3      Exports  to  France 273.4 

Imports  from  French  col-               Exports    to     French    col- 
onies        16.5         onies   10.4 

Imports       from       foreign               Exports   to   foreign   coun- 
countries    323.4         tries 357.2 

601.2  641. 

Girault,  op.  cit.;  p.  169.    Cf.  Daniel  Bellet,  op.  cit.,  pp.  129,  130. 
There  are  marked  discrepancies  between  the  statistics  of  France  and 
those  of  the  colonies.     See  Girault,  op.  cit.,  pp.  i6iff. 
34.    External  Commerce  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  1913 
(In  millions  of  pounds  sterling) 

To  and  from 
Total  British  Countries 

Exports   634.8  218.8 

Imports 768.7  212.9 


M03.S  4317 

These  statistics  include  Egypt  and  all  the  Protectorates.  States- 
man's Year  Book,  1915,  pp.  73-77. 

35.  J.  Ellis  Barker,  op.  cit.,  pp.  148-173;  Josef  Grunzel,  op.  cit.,  p. 
44 ;  P.  and  A.  Hurd,  op.  cit.,  pp.  228,  229.  In  addition,  these  Domin- 
ions give  preferential  treatment  to  one  another ;  and  Canada  and  the 
British  West  Indies  have  effected  a  similar  arrangement. 

36.  Imports  1913 

(In  millions  of  pounds  sterling) 

From  the  United  Kingdom 240 

From  British  Possessions  79 

From  Foreign  Countries 243.6 

562.6 
Exports 

To  the  United  Kingdom  235.7 

To  British  Possessions 71.9 

To  Foreign  Countries 246.2 

SS3.8 

1,116.4 
These  figures  do  not  include  Egypt,  Gibraltar,  Hong  Kong,  and 
gome  of  the  Protectorates.    Statistical  Abstract  for  the  British  Self- 


I 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  303 

Governing  Dominions,  etc.,  1915,  pp.  55,  61,  404ff.  It  should  be  noted 
that,  as  in  the  case  of  the  French  statistics,  those  furnished  by  the 
Dominions,  etc.,  do  not  agree  with  those  compiled  by  the  customs  au- 
thorities in  England.    The  causes  of  these  discrepancies  are  obvious. 

27-  1913 

(In  millions  of  pounds  sterling) 

The  Self-governing  Dominions   Imports  106.6 

Exports  158.3 


56  per  cent.  264.9 

British  India  Imports  102.5 

Exports    41.2 


30  per  cent.  143.7 

The  Colonics,  Dependencies,  Protectorates,  etc.:  Imports    30.9 

Exports    36.2 


Ibid.,  pp.  59,  65.  14  per  cent 


^  1913 

(In  millions  of  pounds  sterling) 

United  Kingdom 

Australia    Imports    41.3 

Exports    34.8 


New  Zealand Imports    13.3 

Exports     18. 1 


Union  of  South  Africa Imports    23.8 

Exports    59. 


Canada  and  Newfoundland Imports    28. 

Exports    46.3 


Ibid.,  pp.  217,  223,  226,  249,  253, 

39.  Ibid.,  p.   69.    In    1914,   Great   Britain  has   56  million   cotton 
spindles,  as  against  31.5  in  the  United  States,  114  in  Germany,  and 


67.1 

4757 

om 

Total 

79.7 

78.S 

76.1 

158.2 

22.2 

22.9 

314 

45-1 

42.7 

66.6 

82.8 

109.3 

133.4 

101.4 

74.3 

234.8 

264.6 

547-4 

304  NOTES 

6.4  in  India.     Statistisches  Jahrbuch,  1915,  p,  30.*    See  also  F.  W. 
Taussig,  op.  cit.,  pp.  279,  294. 
40.  1913 

British  India 
(In  millions  of  pounds  sterling) 

United  Kingdom  Total 

Exports  to 41.2  23^  per  cent.  176.2 

Imports  from 102.5  62^  per  cent.  163.6 


143.7  42  per  cent.  339.8 

Statistical  Abstract  as  ante,  pp.  199-205. 

41.  For  details,  see  Ibid.,  pp.   198-273.     For  self-evident  reasons 
the  trade  of  Egypt  was  not  included  in  the  foregoing  statistics. 

Egypt  1913 
(In  millions  of  Egyptian  pounds) 

United  Kingdom  Total 

Exports  to  13.6  43  per  cent.  31.6 

Imports  from 8.4  30  per  cent.  27.8 


22.  27  per  cent.  59.4 

Statesman's  Year-Book,  1915,  p.  259. 

42.  Ibid.,  p.  790. 

43.  The  German  colonial  system  is  one  of  free  trade,  but  unques- 
tionably such  forces,  combined  with  the  military  and  bureaucratic 
spirits,  have  kept  foreigners  from  trading  with  the  German  col- 
onies. Excluding  that  of  Kiau-Chau,  their  total  external  commerce 
in  1912  amounted  to  263.5  million  marks,  of  which  approximately 
two  thirds  was  with  Germany.  Statistisches  Jahrbuch,  1915,  pp.  4635. 
Cf.  C.  B.  Fletcher,  The  New  Pacific,  pp.  59,  258ff. 

44.  In  1892,  Lord  Milner  wrote :  "  So  far  from  unduly  favouring 
the  commercial  interests  of  their  own  countrymen,  the  British  ad- 
ministrators in  Egypt  err,  if  anything,  on  the  other  side;  so  intense 
is  their  anxiety,  that  in  the  position  of  trust  which  they  occupy  they 
should  be  above  the  least  suspicion  of  partiality.  Neither  directly  nor 
indirectly  has  Great  Britain  drawn  from  her  predominant  position 
any  profit  at  the  expense  of  other  nations."  Milner,  England  in 
Egypt  (7th  ed.),  p.  215.  England's  share  in  the  trade  of  Egypt  be- 
fore the  occupation  was  57  per  cent. ;  in  1891,  it  was  only  54  per 
cent.  In  1913,  it  had  fallen  to  2/7  per  cent.  Yet  some  charges  are 
current  that  favouritism  is  shown  to  British  contractors.  Josef 
Grunzel,  op.  cit.,  p.  188. 

45.  This  question  is  entirely  distinct  from  the  special  benefits  de- 
rived by  some  industrial  and  financial  groups  from  such  sources. 

46.  London  Times  (weekly  ed.),  November  3,  1916. 

47.  Charles  Andler,  Le  Pangermanisme  Continental,  pp.  xxixff; 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  305 

Gustav  Schmoller,  Umrisse  und  Untersuchungen  (1898),  p.  685; 
Josef  Grunzel,  Economic  Protectionism,  pp.  3oflf;  German  Ambitions 
(1903),  p.  25. 

48.  Imperial  Germany  (ed.  Headlam),  p.  59. 

49.  Naumann,  who  is  of  a  deeply  religious  nature,  cannot  reconcile 
his  Christian  ethics  and  his  Realpolitik,  but  he  retains  both  despite 
their  disharmony.  "  The  State,"  he  says,  "  rests  upon  entirely  differ- 
ent impulses  from  those  which  are  cultivated  by  Jesus.  .  .  .  The  State 
grows  up  upon  the  will  to  make  others  subservient  to  oneself."  He 
accepts  the  world  in  which  he  lives  and  contends  that  it  "  is  organ- 
ized according  to  the  principle  '  Thou  shalt  covet  thy  neighbour's 
house ! '  "  He  cannot  say  that  Bismarck's  preparation  for  the  Schles- 
wig-Holstein  War  was  ethical,  but  he  does  not  lament  it.  "  Bis- 
marck did  his  duty,  for  his  avocation  was  the  cultivation  of  power. 
But  such  a  duty  and  its  fulfilment  are  not  directly  an  imitation  of 
Christ."  "  We  either  dare,"  he  concludes,  "  to  aim  at  being  without 
a  State,  and  thus  throw  ourselves  deliberately  into  the  arms  of  an- 
archy; or  we  decide  to  possess,  alongside  of  our  religious  creed,  a 
political  creed  as  well."  The  latter  creed  in  interstate  relations  di- 
vorces ethics  from  politics  and  is  completely  non-moral.  Baron 
Friedrich  von  Hiigel,  The  German  Soul,  pp.  52-58. 

50.  Friedrich  Naumann,  Central  Europe,  pp.  182,  194  and  Chapter 
VI.  On  this  project  see  also  "The  New  German  Empire"  in  The 
Round  Table  for  March,  1917 ;  T.  F.  A.  Smith,  "  German  War  Liter- 
ature" in  the  Quarterly  Review  for  January,  1917;  "German  Eco- 
nomic Policy  after  the  War  "  in  The  New  Europe  for  February,  1917. 

51.  On  the  possibility  of  securing  copper  and  cotton  in  Asiatic 
Turkey,  see  "  Germany  in  Asia  Minor  "  in  Blackwood's  Magazine  for 
February,  1916. 

52.  See  "  German  Tariff  Plans  "  in  The  New  Republic  for  March 

31,  1917- 

53.  Recommendations  of  the  Economic  Conference  held  on  June 
14-17,  1916.     (Cd.  8271.) 

54.  In  November  of  1916,  Signor  Giuseppe  Canepa  wrote  that  if  the 
victory  were  an  incomplete  one,  the  conclusion  of  peace  would  lead  to 
a  most  severe  economic  conflict.  Luciano  de  Feo,  La  Lotta  Eco- 
nomica  del  Dopo  Guerra,  p.  xi. 

55.  J.  A.  Hobson,  The  New  Protectionism,  pp.  42ff ;  L.  de  Feo,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  31  ff. 

56.  Thus  M.  Clementel,  the  French  Minister  of  Commerce  said: 
"  There  never  was  any  question  at  the  Conference  of  adopting  a 
customs  policy  for  all ;  each  ally  will  remain  wholly  independent. 
Each  product  will  be  the  subject  of  separate  negotiations  between 
the  countries  interested  in  the  matter,  and  an  infinite  variety  of  com- 
binations may  be  made." 


3o6  NOTES 

57.  On  July  24,  1916,  Mr.  Asquith  stated  in  the  House  of  Commons 
that  this  Conference  was  "to  consider  the  commercial  policy  to  be 
adopted  after  the  war." 

58.  It  was  suggested  in  The  New  Statesman  of  February  24,  1917, 
that  the  British  Government  should  pay  the  freight  on  shipments 
from  the  Colonies  or  should  give  a  bounty  on  all  colonial  products 
consumed  in  the  British  Isles. 

59.  White  Paper  (Cd.  8482). 

60.  While  endorsing  the  principle  of  Imperial  Preference,  two 
Irish  members  refused  to  subscribe  to  any  report  that  did  not  deal 
with  the  special  case  of  Ireland.  In  their  opinion,  "  the  same  fiscal 
liberty  which  is  at  present  enjoyed  by  the  self-governing  Dominions 
should  be  extended  to  Ireland." 

61.  Simultaneously  at  the  Guildhall,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  stated  that 
"  the  system  of  preference  can  be  established  without  involving  any 
addition  to  the  cost  of  our  food."  Sir  Robert  Borden  threw  some 
light  on  how  this  was  to  be  accomplished.  This  resolution,  he  said, 
"  does  not  necessarily  purpose,  or  even  look  to  any  change  in  the 
fiscal  arrangements  of  the  United  Kingdom.  It  does  not  involve 
taxation  of  food;  it  does  not  involve  taxation  of  anything.  As  far 
as  the  fiscal  system  of  the  United  Kingdom  is  concerned,  I  followed 
when  in  England  precisely  the  same  course  that  I  have  carried  out 
in  this  Parliament  and  in  this  country  —  I  decline  to  interfere  in 
matters  which  are  the  subject  of  domestic  control  and  concern  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  I  declined  to  invite  them  to  change  their  fiscal 
policy.  These  matters  are  within  their  control,  as  our  fiscal  policy 
is  within  ours.  And  I  would  go  further  and  say  that  the  people 
of  Canada  would  not  desire  the  people  of  the  United  Kingdom  to 
change  their  fiscal  policy  for  the  purpose  alone  of  giving  a  preference 
to  the  producers  of  this  country,  especially,  if  the  proposed  fiscal 
changes  should  involve  any  proposed  injustice,  should  be  regarded 
as  oppressive  by  a  considerable  portion  of  the  people  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  But  what  this  proposal  looks  to,  as  I  understand  it,  is 
this  —  that  we  can  within  this  Empire  get  better  and  cheaper  facil- 
ities of  communication  than  we  have  enjoyed  up  to  the  present  time. 
That,  I  believe,  is  the  line  along  which  the  change  indicated  will  pro- 
ceed."   Canadian,  Hansard,  May  18,  1917,  p.  1604. 

62.  London  Times  (weekly  ed.),  January  12,  1917. 

63.  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  Indian  Unrest,  pp.  274ff. ;  Lajpat  Rai, 
Young  India,  pp.  i67ff. ;  R.  Mukerjee,  The  Foundations  of  Indian 
Economics,  pp.  342flF. 

64.  J.  Grunzel,  Economic  Protectiom'sm,  pp.  21,  22. 

65.  E.g.,  The  Spectator  for  March  10,  1917,  and  The  New  States- 
man for  March  17,  1917.  This  was  denied  by  the  London  Times 
(weekly  ed.),  March  9,  1917. 

66.  Blue  Book,  1917.    (Cd  8462.) 


ECONOMIC  INTERDEPENDENCE  307 

67.  The  Spectator  for  February  24,  1917;  The  New  Statesman  for 
February  3.  1917. 

68.  The  pertinent  resolution  runs  as  follows : 

"  The  time  has  arrived  when  all  possible  encouragement  should  be 
given  to  the  development  of  Imperial  resources,  and  especially  to 
making  the  Empire  independent  of  other  countries  in  respect  of  food 
supplies,  raw  materials,  and  essential  industries.  With  these  objects 
in  view,  this  Conference  expresses  itself  in  favour  of :  — 

(i)  The  principle  that  each  part  of  the  Empire,  having  due  re- 
gfard  to  the  interests  of  our  Allies,  shall  give  specially  favourable 
treatment  and  facilities  to  the  produce  and  manufactures  of  other 
parts  of  the  Empire. 

(2)  Arrangements  by  which  intending  emigrants  from  the  United 
Kingdom  may  be  induced  to  settle  in  countries  under  the  British  flag. 

Having  regard  to  the  experience  obtained  in  the  present  war,  this 
Conference  records  its  opinion  that  the  safety  of  the  Empire  and 
the  necessary  development  of  its  component  parts  require  prompt 
and  attentive  consideration,  as  well  as  concerted  action,  with  regard 
to  the  following  matters :  — 

(i)  The  production  of  an  adequate  food  supply  and  arrangements 
for  its  transportation  when  and  where  required,  under  any  condi- 
tions that  may  reasonably  be  anticipated. 

(2)  The  control  of  natural  resources  available  within  the  Empire, 
especially  those  that  are  of  an  essential  character  for  necessary  na- 
tional purposes,  whether  in  peace  or  in  war. 

(3)  The  economical  utilization  of  such  natural  resources  through 
processes  of  manufacture  carried  on  within  the  Empire. 

The  Conference  commends  to  the  consideration  of  the  Govern- 
ments summoned  thereto  the  enactment  of  such  legislation  as  may 
assist  this  purpose. 

That  it  is  desirable  to  establish  in  London  an  Imperial  Mineral 
Resources  Bureau,  upon  which  should  be  represented  Great  Britain, 
the  Dominions,  India,  and  other  parts  of  the  Empire. 

The  Bureau  should  be  charged  with  the  duties  of  collection  of  in- 
formation from  the  appropriate  departments  of  the  Governments  con- 
cerned and  other  sources  regarding  the  mineral  resources  and  the 
metal  requirements  of  the  Empire,  and  of  advising  from  time  to 
time  what  action,  if  any,  may  appear  desirable  to  enable  such  re- 
sources to  be  developed  and  made  available  to  meet  the  metal  re- 
quirements of  the  Empire. 

That  the  Conference  recommends  that  his  Majesty^s  Government 
should,  while  having  due  regard  to  existing  institutions,  take  im- 
mediate action  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  such  a  Bureau,  and 
should  as  soon  as  possible  submit  a  scheme  for  the  consideration  of 
the  other  Governments  summoned  to  the  Conference. 


3o8  NOTES 

That  the  Imperial  War  Conference  welcomes  the  proposed  in- 
crease of  the  Board  of  Trade  service  of  Trade  Commissioners  and 
its  extension  throughout  the  British  Empire  in  accordance  with  the 
recommendations  of  the  Dominions  Royal  Commission,  and  recom- 
mends that  the  Governments  concerned  should  co-operate  so  as  to 
make  that  service  as  useful  as  possible  to  the  Empire  as  a  whole, 
especially  for  the  promotion  of  inter-Imperial  trade." 

The  scope  and  purpose  of  these  proposals  were  lucidly  explained 
by  Sir  Robert  Borden  in  the  Canadian  Parliament  on  May  i8,  1917. 
Canadian  Hansard,  51,  pp.  i6o3ff. 

69.  The  restrictions  on  importations  into  the  United  Kingdom  since 
the  war,  either  by  duties  or  prohibitions,  were  not  protective  in  pur- 
pose, their  object  being  to  restrict  the  consumption  of  luxuries,  to 
lessen  the  demands  on  shipping  and  to  maintain  the  parity  of  ex- 
change. The  only  real  departure  in  policy  was  the  imposition  dur- 
ing the  war  and  for  five  years  thereafter  of  an  export  duty  on  palm- 
kernels  shipped  from  Africa  to  foreign  countries. 

70.  See  the  resolutions  of  the  Association  of  the  Chambers  of 
Commerce  of  the  United  Kingdom  of  March  i,  191 6,  and  the  report 
of  the  London  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  June  25,  1916.  European 
Economic  Alliances  (New  York,  1916),  pp.  65-68.  For  a  significant 
instance  of  conversion  from  free  trade,  see  Lord  George  Hamilton, 
Parliamentary  Reminiscences  and  Reflections. 

71.  European  Economic  Alliances,  p.  84. 

72.  Annual  Report  on  Commerce  and  Navigation  for  1915,  no.  5, 
p.  746 ;  do.  for  1914,  no.  3,  p.  296. 

73.  Statistisches  Jahrbuch,  1915,  pp.  286,  287. 

74.  Exports  were  1,131  million  dollars  and  imports  were  574  mil- 
lions. European  Economic  Alliances,  pp.  8,  84.  According  to  the 
British  statistics,  the  exports  from  the  Empire  to  the  United  States 
amounted  in  1913  to  133  million  pounds,  as  opposed  to  imports  of 
268  millions   thence.    The   Statesman's   Year-Book,   191 5,   p.   xlix. 


NOTES  TO  COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY 

1.  John  MacCunn,  Six  Radical  Thinkers,  pp.  I99ff.,  2o8ff. ;  Morley 
Cobden,  pp.  527!?.;  Bolton  King,  Mazzini,  pp.  105,  151,  170,  198;  J. 
Holland  Rose,  Nationality  in  Modern  History,  pp.  74ff. 

2.  In  1894,  Mahan  wrote :  "  To  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  if  they  rightly  estimate  the  part  they  may  play  in  the  great 
drama  of  human  progress,  is  intrusted  a  maritime  interest,  in  the 
broadest  sense  of  the  word,  which  demands,  as  one  of  the  condi- 
tions of  its  exercise  and  its  safety,  the  organized  force  adequate  to 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  309 

control  the  general  course  of  events  at  sea ;  to  maintain,  if  necessity 
arise,  not  arbitrarily,  but  as  those  in  whom  interest  and  power  alike 
justify  the  claim  to  do  so,  the  laws  that  shall  regulate  maritime 
warfare."  A.  T.  Mahan,  The  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power, 
p.  III. 

3.  It  should  be  noted  in  addition  that,  before  the  war,  the  share 
of  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  world's  ship-building  was  about  60 
per  cent.  American  Whitaker  1916,  pp.  74,  2i5ff. ;  Statesman's 
Year-Book  1915,  pp.  Iv,  8iff. ;  Statistisches  Jahrbuch,  1915,  pp.  SO*ff. ; 
The  New  Europe  II,  pp.  208-216. 

4.  Bradley  A.  Fiske,  The  Navy  as  a  Fighting  Machine. 

5.  Writings  of  James  Monroe  (ed.  Hamilton)  VI,  p.  362. 

6.  Ibid.,  pp.  391,  392. 

7.  Ibid.,  pp.  394,  395- 

8.  The  comparative  loss  inflicted  upon  British  trade  during  the 
Napoleonic  wars  was  apparently  about  the  same  as  that  caused  by 
submarines  and  mines  during  the  spring  months  of  1917.  The  risk 
of  capture  in  the  former  era  was,  however,  greater  than  is  the 
present  risk  of  destruction,  in  so  far  as  each  separate  voyage  is  con- 
cerned. But  as  a  steamer  makes  many  more  voyages  a  year  than 
did  the  wind-driven  ships  of  Nelson's  day,  the  relative  loss  in  ton- 
nage is  now  far  greater.  During  the  Napoleonic  period  that  loss 
was  much  more  than  made  good  by  new  construction  and  captures. 
Whether  this  can  be  done  at  present  is  problematical.  Mahan, 
Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon  the  French  Revolution  II,  pp.  206-227; 
Cambridge  Modern  History  IX,  pp.  241-243;  W.  R.  Scott  in  Scot- 
tish Historical  Review  for  April,  1917. 

9.  During  the  Civil  War,  one  vessel  is  reported  to  have  run  the 
blockade  successfully  44  times  and  others  eluded  capture  during  as 
many  as  16  to  21  voyages.  At  one  time  it  was  estimated  that,  in  this 
contraband  trade  between  Nassau  and  Wilmington,  there  was  on 
the  average  but  one  capture  in  4J/5  voyages.  J.  F.  Rhodes,  History 
of  the  United  States  V,  pp.  399ff. 

10.  The  German  Kriegsbrauch  im  Landkriege  states  this  explicitly. 
See  J.  H.  Morgan,  The  German  War  Book,  p.  148.  This  contention 
was  the  basis  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  protest  of  June  29,  1915. 
Department  of  State,  European  War  No.  2,  p.  193.  See  also  the 
German  Memorandum  of  April  4,  1914.    Ibid.,  No.  i,  pp.  73,  74. 

11.  A  Japanese  educator  contends  that,  if  the  Allies  win,  then 
liberalism  is  assured  of  an  unhindered  growth  in  Japan;  otherwise, 
German  Kultur  and  military  despotism  will  acquire  added  prestige 
there.  In  December  of  1916,  he  asked  a  Senator  in  Washington  who 
inquired  why  Japan  was  in  this  war,  "  how  he  would  like  —  in  view 
of  his  expressed  desire  for  the  premature  ending  of  the  war  and 
for  a  league  of  peace  — the  sight  of  a  powerful  military  empire 


3IO  NOTES 

rising  up  in  the  Far  East,  which  in  all  probability  would  work  hand- 
in-hand  with  the  Central  Empires  of  Europe  in  the  carrying  out  of 
their  imperialistic  ambitions."  Tokiwo  Yokoi,  "  Japan's  Stake  in  the 
War"  in  The  New  Europe  III,  p.  6. 

12.  See  ante  Chapter  III  and  also  W.  S.  Robertson,  "  South  Amer- 
ica and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  "  in  Political  Science  Quarterly,  XXX, 
pp.  82-92.  In  1824,  Bolivar  wrote :  "  England  and  the  United  States 
protect  us.  You  know  that  at  present  these  two  nations  are  the 
only  two  maritime  powers  of  the  world,  and  that  no  aid  can  come  to 
the  Spanish  royalists  but  by  sea." 

13.  Under  the  Brazilian  budget  law  for  1917,  "the  preferential  is 
a  30  per  cent,  reduction  on  wheat  flour  and  a  20  per  cent,  reduction 
on  condensed  milk,  certain  manufactures  of  rubber,  clocks  and 
watches,  paints  and  inks  (not  including  writing  fluids),  varnishes, 
t)T)ewriters,  scales,  refrigerators,  pianos,  windmills,  cement,  dried 
fruits,  furniture  for  schools,  corsets  and  desks." 

14.  Trade  of  Latin  America  in  1913 
(In  millions  of  dollars) 
Total  Imports:  1322  Total  Exports:  1553 

of  which  from:  of  which  to: 

United   States    331  478 

United  Kingdom    323  330 

Germany    219  192 

France   no  124 

It  was  only  in  1913  that  the  imports  from  the  United  States  took 
the  first  place.  Pan  American  Union,  General  Survey  of  Latin- 
American  Trade  in  1915,  p.  591. 

15.  See  Sir  Harry  Johnston,  Common  Sense  in  Foreign  Policy,  pp. 
IS,  16,  88ff. 

16.  Bolivar's  Code  of  Pan-Americanism,  in  New  York  Times 
Magazine  of  March  26,  1916. 

17.  The  British  representative  was  not  to  take  part  in  the  de- 
liberations, but  to  give  his  advice  when  it  was  requested.  Holland 
was  represented  in  the  same  manner.  Vidal  Morales  y  Morales, 
Iniciadores  y  Primeros  Martires  de  la  Revolucion  Cubana,  p.  62. 

18.  L.  E.  Elliott,  Brazil :  To-day  and  To-morrow ;  F.  Garcia 
Calderon,  Les  Democraties  Latines  de  I'Amerique,  pp.  269-273; 
Andre  Cheradame,  Le  Plan  Pangermaniste  Demasque,  pp.  171-173, 
294-301 ;  Evans  Lewin,  The  Germans  and  Africa,  pp.  51-55. 

19.  R.  G.  Usher,  The  Challenge  of  the  Future,  p.  231.  See  also  pp. 
314-315.  For  similar  English  statements,  likewise  made  before 
America's  entrance  into  the  war,  see  J.  H.  Rose,  The  Origins  of  the 
War,  p.   188 ;   Moreton  Frewen,  "  The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the 


COMMUNITY  OF  POLICY  311 

Great  War,"  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  and  After  of  February,  1916, 
and  the  London  Morning  Post  of  November  27,  1916. 

20.  "  To  all  war  preparations  we  can  apply  the  broad  sociological 
principle  that  a  social  need  creates  a  social  organization,  and  that 
the  social  organization,  once  it  is  created,  acquires  an  independent 
life  of  its  own,  which  struggles  for  existence  even  at  the  expense 
of  the  well-being  of  society.  ...  It  is  continually  looking  for  evi- 
dence that  its  services  will  be  required  and  its  existence  justified." 
Gilbert  Slater,  Peace  and  War  in  Europe,  p.  72. 

21.  W.  H.  Dawson,  What  is  Wrong  with  Germany?,  pp.  124-130. 

22.  Hans  Delbrueck,  Regierung  und  Volkswille,  p.  136. 

23.  Evans  Lewin,  The  Germans  and  Africa,  p.  123. 

24.  Bernhard  von  Buelow,  Imperial  Germany,  p.  213.  His  diatribes 
against  the  Social  Democrats  were  excised  from  the  new  edition 
published  during  the  war. 

25.  Royaume  de  Belgique,  Correspondance  Diplomatique  1914- 
1915,  II,  p.  45;  Baron  Beyens,  L'Allemagne  avant  la  Guerre,  p.  112. 
On  this  general  subject,  see  Munroe  Smith,  "  Military  Strategy 
versus  Diplomacy,"  Political  Science  Quarterly,  XXX,  pp.  37flF. 

26.  Prince  von  Buelow,  Imperial  Germany  (ed.  Headlam),  p.  129. 
The  two  chapters  eulogizing  militarism  were  added  since  the  war. 

27.  For  two  valuable  studies  of  this  ideal  in  its  various  vicissitudes 
and  manifestations,  see  Ramsay  Muir,  Nationalism  and  Internation- 
alism; L.  March  Phillipps,  Europe  Unbound. 

28.  "  Whatever  may  be  the  shortcomings  of  our  rule  in  India  and 
Egypt,  it  remains  our  object,  while  securing  for  the  populace  such 
practical  securities  as  may  add  to  their  material  welfare  and  pros- 
perity, to  respect  at  the  same  time  to  the  utmost  their  ways  of 
thought,  customs,  and  faiths;  that  is  to  say,  it  remains  the  object 
of  our  government  to  secure  for  the  governed  the  right  to  live 
freely.  Moreover,  if  or  when  they  develop  a  capacity  for  self- 
government,  self-government  will  be  granted  them."  L.  March 
Phillipps,  op.  cit.t  p.  104. 


INDEX 


Adams,  John  Quincy,  influence 
of,  on  America's  traditional 
foreign  policy,  78-79. 

Africa,  division  of,  by  peaceful 
negotiations,  17 ;  settlement  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Ger- 
many concerning  (1914),  117- 
119. 

Agriculture,  measures  for  stimu- 
lating British,  239-240,  242,  247, 

Algeciras  Treaty,  21,  22;  posi- 
tion taken  by  America  in  sign- 
ing, 84. 

Algeria,  trade  arrangements  be- 
tween France  and,  220-221. 

Algeria,  trade  of,  with  France 
and  with  other  countries,  221, 
298. 

Alliances,  necessary  to  freedom 
and  security  of  states  under 
modern  system,  24-25;  effect- 
iveness of  system  of,  against 
various  military  despots,  25-26 ; 
change  in  character  of,  result- 
ing from  War  of  1914,  58-63; 
the  future  of  existing,  62-63. 

Ambiguity  of  international  law, 
13-14- 

America,  selfish  political  philoso- 
phy of,  70;  contrasted  with 
Germany,  70-72 ;  domination  of 
political  life  of,  by  concepts  of 
independence,  union,  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  72;  origins 
of  fundamental  features  of 
foreign  policy  of,  73-80;  policy 
of  non-intervention  in  Eu- 
ropean affairs  determined  up- 
on, 79;  obligations  forced  upon 


by  Monroe  Doctrine,  80-82; 
extension  of  interests  in  Far 
East  and  assumption  of  posi- 
tion as  a  world-power,  82-83; 
renewed  assertions  by,  of  pol- 
icy of  non-intervention  in  Eu- 
ropean affairs,  83-84;  foreign 
policy  one  of  expedience,  but 
devoid  of  moral  value,  84-85 ; 
ineffectiveness  of  policy  of,  86- 
87;  degree  of  negative  re- 
sponsibility of,  for  present  war, 
87;  proposals  made  at  time  of 
Spanish-American  War  for  an 
alliance  between  England  and, 
102-103;  lukewarm  attitude  in, 
toward  Anglo-American  al- 
liance, 103-104;  neglect  of 
duty  in  international  affairs, 
120-121 ;  relation  of  present  war 
to,  129-13 1 ;  public  opinion  in, 
131-133;  neutrality  in,  I33-I34; 
growth  of  pacifism  in,  136; 
preparedness  and  Pan-Ameri- 
canism in,  136 ;  obstacles*  in  way 
of  Pan-American  ideal,  136- 
137;  promulgation  of  League 
to  Enforce  Peace  in,  138-151 ; 
compelled  by  German  disre- 
gard of  American  rights  to  de- 
part from  course  of  neutrality, 
151-153;  impossibility  of  main- 
taining "  armed  neutrality  " 
policy,  152-153;  object  in  en- 
tering war  as  defined  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  153-154;  post- 
bellum  policy  of,  a  momentous 
question,  162-163 ;  arguments 
against  a  general  defensive  al- 
liance with  a  group  of  nations 


313 


314 


INDEX 


and  in  favour  of  an  alliance 
with  the  British  Common- 
wealth, 163-165 ;  importance  of 
question  of  relations  of,  to  Brit- 
ish Commonwealth,  186;  sys- 
tem in,  intensely  national 
rather  than  supernational,  187- 
188;  predominance  of  British 
stock  in  upbuilding,  and  in  di- 
recting affairs  of  nation,  188- 
193 ;  relations  between  Great 
Britain  and,  in  the  past  and  in 
the  future,  194-198;  defensive 
character  of  tariff  system  of, 
214-215;  efforts  to  secure 
government  support  of  foreign 
trade,  215-216;  policy  of,  re- 
garding trade  of  dependencies, 
219-220;  effect  of  entrance  in- 
to the  war  upon  economic 
plans  and  projects  of  Allies 
and  of  Central  Powers,  240- 
242;  future  of  trade  between 
Central  Powers  and,  244-245; 
economic  interdependence  of 
British  Commonwealth  and, 
245-247;  importance  of  sea 
power  to  security  of,  254;  se- 
curity to  be  attained  by,  by  join- 
ing forces  with  British  Com- 
monwealth, 255;  present  deep 
hostility  of  Germany  toward, 
258;  future  peace  and  security 
pre-eminently  essential  for, 
266-267. 

American  statesmen,  indebted- 
ness of  spirit  of  modern  impe- 
rialism to,  172. 

Anarchy,  international,  war  due 
to  present  state  of,  7 ;  respon- 
sible for  balance  of  power  sys- 
tem, 24. 

Anglo-American  alliance,  early 
proposals  for,  102-103 ;  prob- 
able change  in  course  of  his- 


tory which  would  have  re- 
sulted from,  104-105 ;  proposal 
for,  superseded  by  plan  for  al- 
liance of  English-speaking 
peoples,  169. 

Anglo-German  settlement  of 
1914,  115-119. 

Anglo- Saxondom,  duel  between 
Germanism  and,  99. 

Arbitration,  settlement  of  inter- 
national disputes  by,  17;  ex- 
tent of  part  played  by,  17-20. 

Armaments,  necessity  of,  under 
modern  state  system,  24-25. 
See  Preparedness. 

Armed  neutrality,  impossibility 
of  America's  maintaining  pol- 
icy of,  152-153- 

Asquith,  Herbert,  issues  at  stake 
in  War  of  1914  defined  by,  127. 

Azerbaijan,  province  of  Persia, 
no;  occupation  of,  by  Russia, 
112. 

Bagdad  Railway,  no;  settlement 
between  Great  Britain  and 
Germany  concerning  (1914), 
116-117. 

Baker,  Newton  B.,  remark  by, 
quoted  to  show  supposed  moral 
quality  inherent  in  neutrality, 
134- 

Balance  of  power,  system  of,  the 
outcome  of  system  of  sover- 
eign states,  23-24. 

Balfour  Committee,  work  of, 
233-236. 

Belgium,  views  of  British  states- 
men concerning  treaty  guar- 
anteeing neutrality  of,  14; 
treaty  effecting  neutrality  of, 
21 ;  impression  made  in  Amer- 
ica by  violation  of,  132-133. 

Bodin,  theory  of  state  sovereign- 
ty held  by,  8. 


INDEX 


315 


Borden,  Sir  Robert,  quoted,  181. 

Brazil,  German  colonization  of, 
261-262. 

British  Commonwealth,  factors 
which  worked  for  creation  of, 
40 ;  significance  of,  41 ;  tend- 
ency of,  toward  greater  co- 
hesion due  to  pressure  of  out- 
side forces,  48;  the  nearest  ap- 
proach to  the  ideal  of  a  world- 
state,  54;  world-wide  develop- 
ment of,  91-93;  foreign  policy 
of,  as  dictated  for  fifteen  years 
by  German  menace,  105-120; 
arguments  in  favour  of  alliance 
between  United  States  and, 
164-165 ;  growth  of  the  spirit 
underlying  the  present-day, 
171-178;  representatives  of 
Dominions  of,  at  Imperial  War 
Council  in  London,  182;  meet- 
ing of  Imperial  Cabinet  a  mo- 
mentous step  in  history  of, 
183 ;  effect  of  Imperial  Cabinet 
on  relations  of  Dominions  to 
United  Kingdom,  184-185;  im- 
portance of  question  of  rela- 
tions of  American  people  to, 
l86;  economic  interdependence 
of  America  and,  245-247;  fu- 
ture peace  and  security  pre-em- 
inently essential  for,  266-271. 

Buelow,  Prince  von,  quoted,  26; 
on  the  failure  of  Germany  to 
make  moral  conquests,  95. 

Burgess,  John  W.,  quoted,  49. 

Burns,  C.  D.,  cited  on  doctrine  of 
nationalism,  46. 

Canning,  George,  quoted,  20;  co- 
operation between  England 
and  America  suggested  by,  76. 

Central  European  project,  227- 
230;  difficulties  in  way  of,  244. 

Chamberlain,   Joseph,   proposals 


of,  looking  to  Anglo-Ameri- 
can alliance,  102-103. 

China,  British  policy  toward, 
113-114;  future  of,  as  affected 
by  proposed  League  to  Enforce 
Peace,  147;  post-bellum  prob- 
lems concerning,  162-163;  how 
future  of,  is  dependent  on  al- 
liance of  English-speaking  peo- 
ples, 258-259. 

Civil  War,  doctrine  which  caused 
liberal  Englishmen  to  side  with 
South  in,  47;  effect  of,  upon 
Anglo-American  relations,  195. 

Collective  guarantee,  a  phrase  of 
doubtful  meaning,  14. 

Colonial  trade,  policies  of  United 
States,  France,  and  Great  Brit- 
ain regarding,  219-225. 

Colony,  wrong  implications  of 
the  word,  170;  "Dominion" 
substituted  for,  171. 

Commercial  interdependence  of 
western  world,  35-36, 

Commissions  for  administration 
of  international  interests,  16- 
17. 

Concert  of  Great  Powers,  de- 
velopment of  system  of,  18-19; 
reasons  for  breaking  down  of 
system,  19-20;  question  of  re- 
turn to  system,  after  present 
war,  26-27. 

Conferences,  international,  18-22. 

Congresses,  for  handling  inter- 
national affairs,  18-22;  causes 
of  failure  of  system,  22 ;  meet- 
ing of  international,  36. 

Cuba,  trade  arrangements  of 
United  States  and,  219. 

Curzon,  on  Russia's  position  in 
Persian  question,  no. 

Dante,  on  the  desirability  of  gen- 
eral peace,  7. 


3i6 


INDEX 


Delbrueck,  Hans,  analysis  of 
German  militaristic  system  by, 
127-128. 

Dickinson,  G.  Lowes,  quoted,  53, 

lOI. 

Dominions,  self-governing  Brit- 
ish democracies  called,  instead 
of  Colonies,  171 ;  development 
of  change  of  status  of,  172- 
182;  representatives  of,  attend 
Imperial  War  Council  in  Lon- 
don, 182;  trade  arrangements 
between  Great  Britain  and, 
222-225. 

Dual  Alliance,  reasons  for,  60. 

Economic  Conference  at  Paris 
(1916),  230-232. 

Economic  factors,  school  of 
thinkers  which  explains  all 
historical  phenomena  by,  202; 
importance  to  be  assigned  to, 
203-205 ;  in  the  existing  world- 
war,  205. 

Economic  interdependence,  ef- 
forts under  way  to  decrease, 
227. 

Economic  self-sufficiency,  effect 
of  ideal  of,  on  unity  of  the 
world,  212-213. 

Educational  Alliance  for  Pres- 
ervation of  German  Culture  in 
Foreign  Lands,  organization 
of,  99. 

Empire,  substitution  of  "  Com- 
monwealth "  for,  171. 

England.    See  Great  Britain. 

English-speaking  peoples,  world- 
wide spread  of,  91-93 ;  why 
regarded  by  Germany  as  the 
chief  obstacle  to  progress  of 
German  power  and  prestige, 
97-100;  fate  of,  at  stake  in 
present  war,  129-130;  argu- 
ments for  an  alliance  of,  162- 


165;  unity  of,  169-198;  trend 
toward  more  intimate  eco- 
nomic relations  among,  246- 
247;  future  of  China  depend- 
ent on  alliance  of,  259;  advan- 
tage to  Latin  America  from  al- 
liance of,  259-260;  peace  and 
security  to  be  gained  from  al- 
liance of,  266-267 ;  liberties  of 
other  countries  dependent  upon 
alliance  of,  268-270. 
Entente  group  of  nations,  possi- 
bility of  league  between,  to 
maintain  peace,  160-163. 

Fear,  element  of,  in  alliances  be- 
tween nations,  58-60. 

Fiscal  policies  of  America,  Ger- 
many, and  Great  Britain,  213- 
219. 

Fisher,  Andrew,  quoted,  181. 

Eiske,  Admiral,  quoted  on  Amer- 
ica's need  of  a  navy,  255. 

Fiske,  John,  quoted,  39;  on  the 
growth  of  English-speaking 
peoples,  91-92. 

Foreign  policy,  selfish  character 
of  national,  under  system  of 
state  sovereignty,  68;  of  Ger- 
many and  of  England  con- 
trasted, 68-70 ;  characteristics 
of  American,  7off. ;  of  British 
Commonwealth,  105-120;  of 
America  after  the  war,  162- 
165. 

Foreign  trade,  efforts  to  enlist 
government  aid  for  American, 
215-216. 

France,  policy  of,  concerning 
trade  with  colonies,  220-221 ; 
how  freedom  of,  may  depend 
on  future  intimate  relations  of 
English-speaking  peoples,  257- 
258. 

Free  trade,  productive  of  good- 


INDEX 


317 


will  and  peace,  210-213;  sys- 
tem of,  in  Great  Britain,  218- 
219. 

German  civilization,  inability  of, 
to  compete  with  other  ad- 
vanced types  of  civilization,  95. 

Germany,  unification  of,  due  to 
nationalism,  47 ;  selfish  foreign 
policy  of,  69;  America's  polit- 
ical philosophy  contrasted  with 
that  of,  70-72 ;  general  plans 
and  ambitions  of,  in  period  be- 
fore the  war,  91 ;  feeling  in, 
over  world-wide  development 
of  English-speaking  peoples, 
93-95 ;  reasons  for  failure  of, 
to  spread  German  type  of  civ- 
ilization, 95-96 ;  discouraging 
conditions  in  large  colonial  do- 
main of,  96-97;  reasons  for 
viewing  English-speaking  peo- 
ples as  chief  obstacle  to  prog- 
ress of  German  power  and 
prestige,  97-100;  duel  between 
Anglo-Saxondom  and,  99 ; 
"  blood  and  iron  "  methods  of, 
to  construct  a  Greater  Ger- 
many, loi ;  British  foreign  pol- 
icy dictated  for  past  fifteen 
years  by  menace  of,  105-120; 
diplomatic  settlement  between 
Great  Britain  and,  in  1914,  115- 
119;  domination  over  Europe 
by,  one  of  issues  at  stake  in 
present  war,  125-127;  future 
of  liberalism  throughout  world 
dependent  upon  defeat  of,  130- 
131 ;  prevention  of  menace  of, 
by  alliance  of  English-speaking 
peoples,  165;  incorrect  to  say 
that  economic  conditions  im- 
pelled to  war,  209-210;  char- 
acter of  tariff  system  of,  216- 
217;  project  of,  for  a  Central 


European  economic  and  polit- 
ical unit,  227-230;  future  of 
trade  between  America  and, 
244-245 ;  effect  of  ruthless  con- 
duct of,  on  future  trade,  247; 
hostility  toward  America,  258; 
danger  of  expansion  of,  in 
South  America,  261-263. 

Great  Britain,  position  of,  under 
system  of  international  alli- 
ances, 60-61 ;  international  pol- 
icy of,  as  contrasted  with  Ger- 
many's, 69;  proposals  made  by, 
looking  to  an  Anglo-American 
alliance,  102-103 ;  diplomatic 
settlement  between  Germany 
and,  in  1914,  115-119;  foreign 
policy  of,  one  of  renunciation, 
1 19-120;  free-trade  system  in, 
218-219;  policy  of,  regarding 
colonial  trade,  221-225 ;  pro- 
posed economic  policies  of, 
233-240. 

Greece,  independence  of,  due  to 
doctrine  of  nationalism,  47. 

Grey,  Viscount,  reply  of,  to  Ger- 
many's bid  for  British  neu- 
trality, quoted,  24;  quoted  con- 
cerning British  and  German 
plans  in  Africa,  1 18 ;  quoted  on 
League  to  Enforce  Peace,  149- 
150. 

Grey,  Earl,  proposal  made  by, 
concerning  Anglo-American 
co-operation,  at  time  of  Span- 
ish-American War,   102. 

Grotius,  Hugo,  view  of,  of  hu- 
man life  as  a  society,  9;  sys- 
tem of  interstate  relations 
elaborated  by,  resulting  in 
modern  international  law,  10. 

Hague     Conventions,     lack     of 

binding  force  of,  13. 
Harden,  Maximilian,  quoted  on 


3i8 


INDEX 


the  Anglo-Saxon  hegemony, 
98. 

Hart,  A.  B.,  quoted,  190. 

Hawaii,  trade  arrangements  of 
United  States  and,  219. 

Hay,  John,  quoted  on  American 
policy  in  China,  86-87;  pro- 
posals made  to,  by  English 
statesmen,  concerning  Anglo- 
American  alliance,  102-103. 

Headlam,  J.  W.,  on  Germany  and 
peace,  128-129. 

Hobbes,  theory  of  state  sov- 
ereignty held  by,  8. 

Holy  Alliance,  characteristics  of, 
18. 

Hughes,  Charles  R,  doctrines  of 
League  to  Enforce  Peace  en- 
dorsed by,  149. 

Hsrphenism  in  United  States, 
131-132. 


Imperial  Development  Board, 
proposed  creation  of,  238. 

Imperialism,  significance  of 
word,  in  connection  with  Brit- 
ish Commonwealth,  170;  real 
spirit  of  modern  British,  171- 
173;  steps  in  the  change  in 
spirit  animating  British,  174; 
statement  of  characteristics  of 
British,  187. 

Imperial  Mineral  Resources  Bu- 
reau, establishment  of,  240. 

Imperial  War  Cabinet,  meeting 
and  scope  of,  182;  momentous- 
ness  of  step,  in  British  Em- 
pire's history,  183 ;  function  of, 
to  determine  policy  to  be  fol- 
lowed in  waging  the  war,  184. 

Imperial  War  Conference,  rep- 
resentatives of  Dominions  at, 
182;  proposed  economic  pro- 
gramme discussed  at,  240. 


Independence,  ideal  of,  in  Amer- 
ican political  life,  72. 

India  (British),  trade  between 
United  Kingdom  and,  223,  224; 
proposed  revision  of  trade 
arrangements  with  (1917), 
'2'i^-2y7\  how  an  English- 
speaking  alliance  would  affect, 
268. 

International  law,  origins  of 
modern  structure  of,  10;  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  really  law 
at  all,  10;  in  practice,  merely  a 
code  of  rules  more  or  less  in- 
effective, 11;  lack  of  tribunals 
for  enforcement  of,  il;  lim- 
ited scope  of,  11-13;  ambiguity 
of  content  of,  shown  by  trea- 
ties, 13-14;  indefiniteness  of 
portion  of,  based  upon  cus- 
tom, 14-15;  treaties  concluded 
under,  16;  administration  of, 
by  international  unions  and 
commissions,  16-17. 

Internationalization  of  western 
civihzation,  34-36. 

Internationalism,  development 
of,  together  with  nationalism, 

52-53- 

Isolation  policy,  followed  by 
United  States,  73-80;  partially 
responsible  for  present  war, 
105;  rejection  of,  by  increasing 
number  of  Americans,  137 ;  en- 
trance of  America  into  Euro- 
pean war  marks  abandonment 
of,  154;  increasing  recognition 
by  Americans  of  perils  of,  169. 

Italy,  unification  of,  due  to  na- 
tionalism, 47;  entrance  into 
Triple  Alliance  due  to  fear, 
59;  liberty  of,  may  be  depend- 
ent on  future  intimate  rela- 
tions of  English-speaking  peo- 
ples, 257-258. 


INDEX 


319 


Japan,  England's  alliance  with, 
60-61,  107,  113-114;  Germany's 
attempt  to  embroil  United 
States  with,  152;  plans  of,  as 
to  China,  162-163. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  influence  of, 
on  American  foreign  policy, 
74-77;  quoted  on  co-operation 
between  Great  Britain  and 
America,  256. 

Jonesco,  Rumanian  statesman, 
quoted,  59-60. 

Kerr,  Philip  H.,  quoted  on  fac- 
tors in  creation  of  British 
Commonwealth,  40-41. 

Knowledge,  effect  of  spread  of, 
on  differentiation  between  na- 
tions, 51-53. 

Language,  effect  of  unity  of,  in 
giving  Americans  a  common 
mind,  19a 

Latin  America,  successful  main- 
tenance of  American  policies 
toward,  dependent  on  British 
support  and  sea  power,  258; 
alliance  of  English-speaking 
peoples  will  react  to  benefit  of, 
259-260. 

League  to  Enforce  Peace,  termed 
a  temporary  shelter  only,  27; 
four  fundamental  proposals  of, 
138-139;  possibilities  and  lim- 
itations of,  139-147;  endorse- 
ment of  programme  of,  by 
President  Wilson,  147-148 ;  en- 
dorsed also  by  Mr.  Hughes, 
149;  Viscount  Grey's  comment 
on,  149-150;  Senate  discussion 
of,  150-15 1 ;  alternative  pro- 
posals, 155-159;  conflict  be- 
tween state-sovereignty  ideal 
and,  159-160. 

Lecky,  W.  E.  H.,  cited,  51. 


Lincoln,  Abraham,  debt  of  mod- 
ern spirit  of  imperialism  to, 
172. 

Lloyd  George,  David,  quoted  on 
the  Imperial  War  Council,  182. 

Lodge,  H.  C,  study  of  distribu- 
tion of  ability  in  United  States 
made  by,  191-192. 

London,  Treaty  of  (1867),  am- 
biguous character  of,  13-14. 

Luther,  Martin,  theory  of  state 
sovereignty  held  by,  8. 

Luxemburg,  treaty  guaranteeing 
neutrality  of,  13-14,  21. 


Machiavelli,  conception  of  state 
sovereignty  held  by,  8. 

McKinley,  William,  quoted  to 
show  new  attitude  of  United 
States  as  a  world-power,  82- 
83. 

Madison,  James,  quoted  on  co- 
operation between  Great  Brit- 
ain and  America,  256. 

Mahan,  A.  T.,  on  effect  of  Amer- 
ica's policy  of  non-interven- 
tion, 85. 

Massey,  William,  on  decreasing 
economic  interdependence,  227. 

Mazzini,  principles  of,  quoted, 
67,  134- 

Mediaeval  conception  of  com- 
munity of  mankind,  7;  differ- 
ence between  modern  ideas 
and,  8. 

Mexico,  attitude  of  United 
States  toward  problem  pre- 
sented by,  81-82;  Germany's 
attempt  to  embroil  United 
States  with,  152.  See  Latin 
America. 

Militarism,  dangers  of,  to  be 
prevented  by  co-operation  of 
English-speaking  peoples,  263- 


320 


INDEX 


265 ;  menace  of,  inherent  in 
preparedness,  265. 

Milner,  Lord,  on  spirit  of  mod- 
em British  imperialism,  171, 
172,  187. 

Mitteleuropa  project,  227-230, 
244. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  effect  of  con- 
cept of,  on  American  political 
life,  72,  75 ;  events  leading  up 
to  enunciation  of,  76-79;  obli- 
gations forced  upon  America 
by,  80-82;  as  affected  by  pro- 
visions of  League  to  Enforce 
Peace,  145-147 ;  Germany^s 
challenge  to,  in  offer  to  Mex- 
ico, 152. 

Moral  quality  in  neutrality,  dis- 
cussion of  the  supposed,  134- 

135- 
Morocco,  British  policy  concern- 
ing, in  1904,  108-109;  trade  ar- 
rangements   of     France    and, 
220. 

Napoleonic  wars,  protraction  of, 
resulting  from  America's  pol- 
icy of  isolation,  85. 

Nation,  definition  of,  45.  See 
State  and  nation. 

Nationalism,  discussion  of  use 
and  meaning  of  word,  41-43; 
origins  of  doctrine  of,  44-46; 
the  joint  product  of  ideals  of 
state  sovereignty  and  eight- 
eenth-century revolutionary 
rights,  46-47;  some  results  of 
rise  of  doctrine,  47;  in  some 
cases  disintegrates,  in  some 
consolidates,  47-48 ;  primarily 
a  disintegrating  force,  48;  no 
inherent  antagonism  between 
internationalism  and,  53 ;  a  dis- 
ruptive force  when  thwarted 
in  attempts  at  self-expression, 


53-54;  effect  of  present  war 
upon,  56-58. 

Naumann,  Friedrich,  on  the  Ger- 
mans as  "  bad  Germanizers," 
95 ;  quoted  in  connection  with 
Central  European  project,  229. 

Neutrality,  reasons  for  Ameri- 
can, and  feelings  in  United 
States  concerning,  133-134 ;  un- 
tenability  of  doctrine  recog- 
nized by  President  Wilson, 
138;  America  forced  to  de- 
part from  course  of,  151-153; 
effect  of  policy  of,  on  relations 
between  Entente  Powers  and 
America,  196. 

Olney,  Richard,  statement  made 
by,  during  Venezuela  boundary 
negotiations,  80;  dictum  of,  as 
to  unnaturalness  and  inexpe- 
diency of  political  union  be- 
tween European  and  American 
states,  136. 

Pacifism,  growth  of,  in  America, 
with  progress  of  war,  136. 

Pan-Americanism,  theories  of 
Adams  and  Clay  concerning, 
78-79;  reversion  to  idea  of,  as 
a  result  of  war,  136;  obstacles 
to,  136-137;  no  conflict  be- 
tween alliance  of  English- 
speaking  peoples  and,  260-261. 

Paris,  Economic  Conference  at 
(1916),  230-232. 

Parliamentary  sovereignty,  pass- 
ing of  theory  of,  176-180. 

Persia,  British  policy  toward,  as 
dictated    by    German    menace, 

109-113- 
Philippine  Islands,  trade  arrange- 
ments  of   United    States    and, 
219;   extent  of  trade  between 
United  States  and,  220. 


INDEX 


321 


Pollock,  Sir  Frederick,  affirma- 
tive view  of  international  law 
as  real  law  held  by,  10 ;  quoted, 

159. 

Porto  Rico,  trade  arrangements 
of  United  States  and,  219. 

Portsmouth,  treaty  of,  114. 

Preparedness,  realization  of  ne- 
cessity for,  in  America,  136; 
measures  taken  toward,  138; 
menace  of  militarism  inherent 
in,  265. 

Protective  tariff  systems,  a  cause 
of  international  antagonisms, 
211-212;  American  and  Ger- 
man, 214-217. 

Public  opinion  in  America,  131- 
133- 

Rohrbach,  Paul,  quoted  concern- 
ing Germans  and  Anglo-Sax- 
ons, 98. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  quoted  on 
responsibilities  of  United 
States  under  Monroe  Doctrine, 
81. 

Rosebery,  Lord,  on  reorganiza- 
tion of  British  Empire  after 
the  war,  181. 

Russia,  British  arrangements 
with,  concerning  Persia,  iio- 
III. 

Santo  Domingo,  American  inter- 
ference in,  81. 

Sea  power,  importance  of,  to  se- 
curity of  United  States,  254; 
what  is  implied  by,  254;  se- 
curity to  be  attained  by  Amer- 
ica from  joining  forces  with 
British  Commonwealth,  255 ; 
nature  of,  not  changed  by  the 
submarine,  256 ;  importance  of, 
to  English-speaking  peoples  if 
Germany    should    conquer    in 


war,  257;  freedom  of,  from 
dangers  of  militarism,  265. 

Security,  pre-eminently  essential 
for  United  States  and  British 
Commonwealth,  266-267. 

Shuster,  W.  Morgan,  career  of, 
in  Persia,  112. 

South  America,  possibilities  of 
German  expansion  in,  261-263. 

Sovereignty  of  the  state,  modern 
doctrine  of,  contrasted  with 
mediaeval  ideal  of  unity,  7-10; 
the  fundamental  comer-stone 
of  the  modem  state  system,  31 ; 
theory  of,  not  in  accord  with 
actual  facts,  31-32;  interna- 
tionalization of  western  civil- 
ization at  variance  with  doc- 
trine of,  yj ;  selfishness  of  for- 
eign policy  under,  68;  impos- 
sibility of  league  of  nations  to 
insure  peace  under,  159-160; 
relation  between  economic  in- 
terdependence and,  210-21 1. 

Spanish-American  War,  signifi- 
cance of,  regarding  America's 
foreign  policy,  81. 

State,  mediaeval  and  modern 
theories  of,  contrasted,  7-9. 

State  and  nation,  confusion  from 
interchangeable  use  of  words, 
42;  two  fundamentally  distinct 
concepts,  43. 

Steel- Maitland,  quoted  on  "  Em- 
pire "    and    "  Commonwealth," 

171. 
Submarine,  nature  of  sea  power 
not  fundamentally  changed  by 
the,  256. 

Taft,  W.  H.,  quoted  in  connec- 
tion with  League  to  Enforce 
Peace,  140. 

Tariff  systems,  an  aid  to  state 
sovereignty,  210;  not  produc- 


322 


INDEX 


tive  of  international  good-will, 
211 ;  an  indirect  denial  of  unity 
of  mankind,  212;  of  United 
States,  Germany,  and  Great 
Britain,  213-219;  policy  of 
America,  France,  and  Great 
Britain  regarding  colonies, 
219-225. 

Treaties,  ambiguity  of  content  of 
international  law  as  embodied 
in,  13-14. 

Triple  Alliance,  elements  enter- 
ing into,  59-60. 

Tunis,  trade  arrangements  of 
France  and,  221. 

Turkey,  settlement  between  Great 
Britain  and  Germany  concern- 
ing  (1914).  116-117. 

Union,  dominant  ideal  of,  in 
American  political  life,  72. 

Unions  for  administration  of  in- 
ternational interests,  16-17. 

United  States.    See  America. 

Unity  of  English-speaking  peo- 
ples, 169-198. 

Unity  of  mankind,  mediaeval  con- 
ception of,  7. 

Unity  of  western  civilization,  33- 
34 ;  setback  to,  a  result  of  pres- 
ent war,  56-58. 

Usher,  Roland,  quoted  on  possi- 
bility of  German  expansion  in 
South  America,  262. 

War  of  1812,  effect  of,  upon  An- 


glo-American   relations,    194- 

195- 
War  of  19 14,  effect  of,  upon  na- 
tional feeling,  56-58;  might 
have  been  averted  by  an  An- 
glo-American alliance,  104-105 ; 
issues  at  stake  in,  125-132; 
America's  entrance  into,  153- 

154- 

Wars,  influence  of  economic 
factors  in,  204-207. 

Washington,  George,  influence  of, 
upon  America's  foreign  policy, 
74;  lessons  drawn  from  char- 
acter of,  by  present-day  im- 
perialists, 172. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  course  fol- 
lowed by,  in  treating  Mexican 
problem,  81-82;  quoted  on 
America's  attitude  during  Na- 
poleonic wars,  85 ;  policy  of, 
of  following  course  of  public 
opinion,  137-138 ;  league  of  na- 
tions to  enforce  peace  advo- 
cated by,  i38ff. ;  programme 
proposed  by  League  to  Enforce 
Peace  endorsed  by,  147-149; 
recognizes  impossibility  of 
armed  neutrality  and  advises 
entrance  into  the  war,  153; 
league  of  self-governing  de- 
mocracies proposed  by,  155. 


Zabem  affair,  evils  of  militarism 
illustrated  by,  263-264. 


FBUmCD  IN  THX  WITKD  STATX8  OT  A3CEBI0A 


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*■  by  the  same  author.  To  these  four  volumes  was 
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work  printed  and  published  in  the  English  language  on 
the  History,  Geography,  Archaeology,  Ethnology,  Phi- 
lology, or  numismatics  of  North  America  "  during  the  pre- 
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British  Colonial  Policy— 1  754-1 765 

By  GEORGE  LOUIS  BEER 

Cloth,  8vo,  xii  +  327  pages,  $2.00 

"  Mr.  Beer  has  treated  the  period  in  question  with  a  fulness  of 
knowledge  and  an  absence  of  bias  greater  than  those  of  any  previous 
historian." —  The  English  Historical  Review. 

"Mr.  Beer's  new  book  on  an  old  subject  will  add  to  the  reputa- 
tion he  has  already  won  in  this  field.  ...  It  is  primarily  a  piece  of 
imperial  economic  history,  worked  up  from  unpublished  sources  of 
information  —  the  State  papers,  '  virtually  undisturbed  since  they 
were  filed  away  a  century  and  a  half  ago.'  To  these  Mr.  Beer  has 
added  the  contemporary  pamphlet  literature,  and  a  mass  of  other 
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"  It  is  strange,  in  view  of  the  absorbing  interest  which  Americans 
have  in  the  history  of  the  Revolution,  that  no  adequate  study  has 
ever  been  made  of  the  deeper  causes  of  that  event.  .  .  .  Mr.  Beer 
now  comes  before  us  with  a  new  essay  upon  the  subject.  For  some 
years  he  has  been  known  as  a  student  of  England's  commercial 


policy  and  a  writer  of  marked  ability  in  dealing  with  problems  of 
this  nature.  For  the  writing  of  this  essay,  which  is  but  the  first 
part  of  a  larger  whole,  he  has  made  unusual  preparations.  No  one 
before  him  has  ever  attempted  to  examine  in  detail  or  systematically 
the  evidence  which  the  British  archives  furnish.  .  .  .  He  has  brushed 
aside  all  secondary  considerations  that  obscure  the  main  issue,  and 
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over, master  of  an  admirably  clear,  succinct  and  luminous  mode  of 
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himself  to  the  one  decade,  his  essay  makes  that  so  intelligible  that  it 
does  much  to  illuminate  a  vastly  wider  range  of  historical  move- 
ment, struggle  and  evolution." — Tribune,  Chicago. 

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either  of  its  method  or  of  its  point  of  view.  From  most  of  its 
predecessors  it  differs  in  both  respects.  And  its  differences,  with 
scarcely  an  exception,  are  to  Mr.  Beer's  credit  and  to  his  reader's 
profit.  ...  It  constitutes,  in  the  reviewer's  opinion,  the  most  -sub- 
stantial contribution  to  an  understanding  of  the  causes  of  the 
American  Revolution  that  has  appeared  since  Mellen  Chamberlain 
wrote  his  chapter  for  the  sixth  volume  of  Winsor's  Narrative  and 
Critical  History,  twenty  years  ago;  while  upon  its  own  direct  sub- 
ject it  is  not  only  unrivalled  but  unapproached  by  any  one." — The 
American  Historical  Review. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

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Origins  of  the  British  Colonial  System 
1578-1660 

By  GEORGE  LOUIS  BEER 

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"The  third  contribution  of  Mr.  G.  L.  Beer  to  the  history  of  the 
policy  of  Great  Britain  towards  her  American  colonies  maintains 
the  high  standard  of  scholarship  established  by  the  author  in  his 
previous  works." —  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political 
Science. 

"L'ouvrage  de  M.  Beer  forme  une  excellente  introduction  a 
I'histoire  du  systeme  colonial  qui  fut  applique  dans  I'empire  brittan- 
ique  avant  I'epoque  du  libre-echange.  .  .  .  EUe  a  ete  admirablement 
presentee  par  M.  Beer  dans  une  serie  de  chapitres  substantiels, 
remplis  de  faits  puises  aux  sources  les  plus  varices  et  bien  choisis." 
—  Revue  Historique. 

"  In  this  and  his  preceding  volume  Mr.  Beer  has  rendered  an  im- 
portant service  both  to  the  history  of  the  American  colonies  and  to 
economic  history.  No  student  of  this  or  any  other  period,  whatever 
his  predispositions,  can  fail  to  welcome  a  work  which  is  so  effective 
and  so  satisfying  in  its  conclusions  as  this." — Political  Science 
Quarterly. 

"  In  1907  Mr.  Beer  issued  the  first  volume  of  his  series  upon  the 
old  colonial  policy  of  Great  Britain,  in  which  he  presented  in  a 
new  and  convincing  fashion  the  fundamental  causes  of  the  separa- 
tion of  the  colonies  from  the  mother  country.    He  now  turns  back 


to  the  beginnings  of  his  subject  and  analyzes  with  great  thorough- 
ness and  skill  the  origins  of  British  policy."— T/ie  American  His- 
torical Review. 

"  In  method  Mr.  Beer's  work  leaves  little  to  be  desired.  His  re- 
search has  been  exhaustive,  his  point  of  view  is  that  of  the  scientific 
historian,  his  grasp  of  the  larger  aspects  of  world-history  is  firm 
and  comprehensive." — The  Nation  and  The  Evening  Post,  New 
York. 

"  No  mere  enumeration  of  chapter  subjects  can  convey  an  adequate 
idea  of  the  richness  of  Mr.  Beer's  volumes  for  the  economic  historian 
of  our  colonial  period.  Almost  every  page  abounds  with  information 
or  sugfgestion." —  The  Economic  Bulktin. 

"  One  of  the  most  remarkable  contributions  to  the  historical  litera- 
ture of  this  country  which  it  has  been  my  pleasure  to  read  is  George 
Louis  Beer's  newly  published  volume,  The  Origins  of  the  British 
Colonial  System,  1378-1660.  .  .  .  What  makes  Mr.  Beer's  work  re- 
markable and  distinctive  is  the  fact  that,  unlike  most  of  the  his- 
torians of  that  period,  he  recognizes  from  the  very  first  that  the 
political  systems  and  developments  of  the  time  cannot  be  understood 
apart  from  the  prevailing  economic  conditions.  .  .  .  Such  equipment 
and  temper  as  Mr.  Beer  brings  to  the  undertaking  ought  to  result 
in  a  work  of  monumental  importance." —  The  International  Socialist 
Review. 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers     64-6fl  Fifth  Avenue     New  York 


The  Old  Colonial  System— 1660-1754 

Part  I 
1660-1688 

In  two  volumes 

By  GEORGE  LOUIS  BEER 

Cloth,  8vo,  xviii  —  381  and  viii — 382  pag&s,  $4.00 

"  Mr.  G.  L.  Beer  is  already  known  for  his  books  —  and  his  previ- 
ous works  showed  that  he  was  able  to  handle  enormous  masses  of 
papers  and  to  sift  the  important  facts  from  details  which  had  little 
value.  He  has  treated  his  present  subject  with  great  knowledge  and 
with  the  utmost  fairness." — The  Athenaeum. 

"  Mr.  Beer  is  already  known  as  one  of  the  most  authoritative 
among  those  investigators  of  official  sources  who  during  the  past 
two  decades  have  largely  re-presented  —  and  to  some  degree  effect- 
ively rewritten  —  the  earlier  or  prerevolutionary  history  of  the 
United  States." —  The  Manchester  Guardian. 

"  The  luminous,  informing  and  authoritative  pages  of  Mr.  Beer's 
sumptuous  volumes  are  crowded  with  facts  and  suggestions  of  value 
to  the  student,  and  not  only  to  the  academic  student  of  abstractions 
and  achievements  of  the  past,  but  also  and  at  least  equally  to  the 
practical  student  of  current  affairs." —  The  Tribune,  New  York. 

"The  fulness  of  presentation,  the  vigorous  manner  with  which 
Mr.  Beer  has  handled  the  many  problems  involved,  and  the  under- 
standing which  he  has  shown  of  the  spirit  of  the  times  with  which 
he  is  concerned  give  to  the  work  a  plan  of  preeminence  among  the 
similar  writings  on  the  period." —  The  Nation  and  The  Evening  Post, 
N.  Y. 

"The  final  judgment  upon  the  volumes  must  be  highly  favorable. 
They  are  a  splendid  product  of  painstaking,  scholarly  work  in  a 
field  that  needed  careful  investigation.  Mr.  Beer's  familiarity  with 
his  background  and  his  mastery  of  scientific  method  are  an  earnest 
that  his  future  labors  will  be  as  fruitful  as  those  for  which  we  are 
already  indebted." — Political  Science  Quarterly. 

"  In  conclusion,  we  must  count  sadly  deficient  in  knowledge  the 
teacher,  the  text-book  writer,  and  the  general  historian,  who  seeks  to 
deal  with  our  colonial  history  without  a  careful  reading  of  Mr.  Beer's 
books." —  The  History  Teacher's  Magazine. 


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